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THE 



Ethics of Hobbes 



AS CONTAINED IN 

Selections from his Works 

\ \ 
WITH AN INTRODUCTION 

BY 

E. HERSHEY SNEATH, Ph.D. 

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN YALE UNIVERSITY 




BOSTON, U.S. 
GINN & COMPANY, PUB] 

We atbensettm JJress 

1898 

2nd COPY/"* C ^Sfi^ £0i 
1898. VV^I, 






5620 



Copyright, 1898, by 
E. HERSHEY SNEATH 

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



PREFACE 



The ethical and political philosophy of Hobbes are so 
intimately related that they cannot really be separated. 
In consequence of this, the extracts from his writings, 
which form the major part of this volume, have been 
chosen with reference to a study of both. To this end 
Parts I. and II. of Leviathan, and Chapters VI. and VII. 
of De Corpore Politico, have been selected. The extracts 
from the De Corpore Politico deal with the main subject 
discussed in Part III. of Leviathan, but in a much more 
summary manner ; hence the substitution. The book thus 
constructed is designed for use in classes in the History of 
Ethics and the History of Political Science, where these 
subjects are studied according to the method contemplated 
by the "Series" to which this book belongs. Portions of 
Part I. of Leviathan, which deal with the Psychology and 
Logic of Hobbes, have been retained for the purpose of 
adapting the book also for use in courses in the History of 
Philosophy. Chapters I.-IX. deal chiefly with these sub- 
jects, and may be omitted by the student who is merely 
interested in the ethical and political speculations of 
Hobbes, especially since the psychological basis of these 
speculations is mainly contained in the chapters following. 
The text of this volume is based on Sir Wm. Molesworth's 



VI EDITOR'S PROSPECTUS. 

prevailed in the past. Instruction in the History of Ethics, 
like instruction in the History of Philosophy, has largely 
been based on text-books or lectures giving expositions of, 
and information about, the various systems. Such methods, 
although serviceable, are not as stimulating and helpful as 
those which put the student in direct contact with the 
text of the author, enabling him to study the system itself 
rather than to study about the system. Undoubtedly the 
best plan would be to have the student read the entire 
work of the author, but all teachers will probably concede 
the impracticability of this in undergraduate work, if a num- 
ber of systems is to be studied, which is usually desirable. 
Only inferior, in my judgment, to the best, but impracticable 
plan is the plan of the "Ethical Series," — to study selec- 
tions or extracts from the original works, embodying the 
substance of the system. The " Series " makes provision 
for such work in a convenient and comparatively inexpen- 
sive manner. That the plan of instruction on which the 
" Series" is based is in the interest of better scholarship, 
I am assured by my own experience, and by that of many 
other teachers in the leading colleges of the country, with 
whom I have communicated. It is with the earnest hope 
of facilitating instruction and study in the History of Ethics 
that this Series is issued. 

E. HERSHEY SNEATH. 

Yale University. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



PAGE 

Bibliography . . . . xi 

Introduction i 

I. Biographical Sketch i 

II. Exposition of the Ethics of Hobbes . . .11 

III. Considerations in Studying the Ethics of 

Hobbes -35 

IV. Influence of the Speculations of Hobbes . 39 
Selections . . 45 

FROM "LEVIATHAN." 
PART I. — OF MAN. 

CHAPTER 

I. Of Sense 47 

II. Of Imagination . 49 

III. Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations 55 

IV. Of Speech 61 

V. Of Reason and Science 71 

VI. Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary 
Motions; commonly called the Passions; and 

the Speeches by which they are expressed . 78 

VII. Of the Ends, or Resolutions of Discourse . 90 
VIII. Of the Virtues commonly called Intellectual, 

and their contrary Defects .... 93 

IX. Of the Several Subjects of Knowledge . . 106 
X. Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and 

Worthiness * > 107 






I2 6 



vin TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XI. Of the difference of Manners . . . .118 
XII. Of Religion 

XIII. Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as con- 
cerning their Felicity, and Misery . . 139 

XIV. Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of 
Contracts 145 

XV. Of other Laws of Nature 157 

XVI. Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated . 171 - 



PART II. — OF COMMONWEALTH. 

XVII. Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a 

Commonwealth 177 

XVIII. Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution . 182 
XIX. Of the Several Kinds of Commonwealth by 
Institution, and of Succession to the Sover- 
eign Power 192 

XX. Of Dominion Paternal, and Despotical . . 203 

XXI. Of the Liberty of Subjects 213 

XXII. Of Systems Subject, Political, and Private . 224 

XXIII. Of the Public Ministers of Sovereign Power . 238 

XXIV. Of the Nutrition, and Procreation of a Com- 

monwealth 243 

XXV. Of Counsel 250 

XXVI. Of Civil Laws 259 

XXVII. Of Crimes, Excuses, and Extenuations . . 281 

XXVIII. Of Punishments and Rewards .... 298 
XXIX. Of those things that weaken, or tend to the 

Dissolution of a Commonwealth . . . 307 

XXX. Of the Office of the Sovereign Representative 319 

XXXI. Of the Kingdom of God by Nature . . . 336 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



IX 



FROM "DE CORPORE POLITICO." 



PART II. 

CHAPTER PAGE 

VI. A Difficulty concerning Absolute Subjection to 
Man, arising from our Absolute Subjection to 
God Almighty, Propounded, etc 353 

VII. The Question Propounded, Who are the Magis- 
trates in the Kingdom of Christ, etc. 369 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 



On the Life of Hobbes. 

i. T. Hobbes ; or dictated by Hobbes to T. Rymer, T. Hobbes 
Malmesburiensis Vita (written in Latin). 

2. R. Blackbourne, Vitae Hobbianae Auctarium (written in 

Latin). 

3. T. Hobbes, Thomae Hobbes Malmesburiensis Vita Carmine 

Expressa (written in Latin verse), 1679-80. [The above 
accounts of the life of Hobbes were published together in 
1 68 1, by R. Blackbourne. They are all contained in Wm. 
Molesworth's edition of Hobbes's Latin Works referred 
to below, Vol. I.] 

4. J. Aubrey, Life of Th. Hobbes of Malmesbury, printed in his 

Letters, and Lives of Eminent Men, 1813. 

5. G. C. Robertson, Hobbes, Philadelphia and Edinburgh, 1886. 

6. F. Tonnies, Hobbes, Leben und Lehre, Stuttgart, 1896. 

II. 
Works of Hobbes. 

1. Gul. Molesworth, Thomae Hobbes Malmesburiensis Opera 

Philosophica quae Latine scripsit omnia in unum cor- 
pus nunc primum collecta, Londini, 1839. 

2. Sir Wm. Molesworth, The English Works of Thomas 

Hobbes of Malmesbury ; now first collected and edited 
by Sir William Molesworth, Bart, London, 1841, 



xil BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

3. For information concerning the various early editions of the 

individual works of Hobbes, refer to the Vitae Hobbianae 
Auctarium, by R. Blackbourne, Latin Works, Vol. I., 
pp. lxv ff. 

4. For a list of the various translations of individual works of 

Hobbes, consult the Bibliography appended to G. C. 
Robertson's article on Hobbes in the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 9th ed. 

5. The ethical and political philosophy of Hobbes is contained 

mainly in the following works : 

De Cive, which appeared later under the title of Philosophical 
Rudiments concerning Government and Society. 

Human Nature ; or, The Fundamental Elements of Policy. 

De Corpore Politico ; or, The Elements of Law, Moral and 
Politic. 

Leviathan ; or, the Matter, Form and Power of a Common- 
wealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil. 

Other works bearing on his ethical and political philosophy are : 

De Homine. 

Of Liberty and Necessity. 

Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance. 

Dialogue of the Common Laws. 

Behemoth : The History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of 
England, and of the Counsels and Artifices by which they were 
carried on from the year 1640 to 1660. 

III. 
Expository and Critical Works. 

For a list of such works published shortly after the appearance 
of Hobbes's Political Treatises, consult Molesworth's edition of 
the Latin Works, Vol. I., pp. lxii-lxxx. Other expository and 
critical works are as follows : 

1. Sir R. Filmer, Observations upon Mr. Hobbes's Leviathan, 
etc., 1652. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. xni 

2. T. Tenison, The Creed of Mr. Hobbes, examined in a 

feigned Conference between him and a Student of Divinity, 
London, 1670-71. 

3. J. Eachard, Mr. Hobbes's State of Nature considered in a 

Dialogue between Philautus and Timothy, London, 1672; 
also, Some Opinions of Mr. Hobbes considered in a 
Second Dialogue, London, 1673. 

4. R. Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae Disquisitio Philo- 

sophica, etc., London, 1672. English ed. by J. Maxwell, 
London, 1 714-15. 

5. E. Hide (Lord Clarendon), Brief Survey of the dangerous 

and pernicious Errors to Church and State in Mr. Hobbes's 
book entitled Leviathan, London, 1674. 

6. J. Bramhall, Castigations of Mr. Hobbes, etc. ; also, The 

Catching of Leviathan, Works, Dublin, 1676. Works 
published in the Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology. 

7. R. Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Uni- 

verse, London, 1678; also, Treatise concerning Eternal 
and Immutable Morality, London, 1 731. 

8. A. A. Cooper (Lord Shaftesbury), Characteristics of Men, 

Manners, Opinions, and Times, Vol. II., 171 1. London, 

I7I4-I5- 

9. J. Butler, Sermons, London, 1726. 

10. S. Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of 
God, etc. ; also, A Discourse concerning the unchangeable 
Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Cer- 
tainty of the Christian Revelation, Works, Dublin, 1734. 

n. Wm. Warburton, Divine Legation of Moses, London, 
1738 ; with Hurd's Preface, 10th ed., London, 1846. 

12. James Mackintosh, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical 

Philosophy, chiefly during the 17th and 18th Centuries, 
American ed., Philadelphia, 1832, § IV. 

13. Henry Hallam, Introduction to the Literature of Europe, 

1839, VoL III-j chap. 4. 

14. B. Disraeli, Miscellanies of Literature, New York, 1841, 

Vol. II., pp. 247-294. 



XIV BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

15. Lambert Welthysen, De principiis juris et decori, disser- 

tatio epistolica, continens apologiam pro tractatu clarissimi 
Hobbesii de Cive, Amstelodami. 1851. 

16. Wm. Whewell, History of Moral Philosophy in England, 

London, 1852, Lect. II. 

17. Robert Blakey, The History of Political Literature, 

London, 1855, Vol. II., §3, chap. 2. 

18. Paul Janet, Histoire de la Philosophic Moral et Politique, 

Paris, i860, Tome II., Livre 4, chaps. 1 and 2. 

19. Th. Jouffroy, Introduction to Ethics, trans, by W. H. 

Channing, Boston, 1867, Lect. XI. 

20. A. Bain, Mental and Moral Philosophy, London, 1868, pp. 

543-556. 

21. John Hunt, Religious Thought in England, etc., London, 

1870, Vol. I., chap. VI. 

22. Henry Calderwood, Hand-Book of Moral Philosophy, 

London, 1872, Div. II., chap. 2. 

23. John Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy 

in England in the Seventeenth Century, Edinburgh 
and London, 1872, Vol. II., pp. 25-30 ; also pp. 293- 
299. 

24. Francis Lieber, Manual of Political Ethics, Philadelphia 

and London, 1875, Vol. I., Bk. II., chap. 8. 

25. Sir H. S. Maine, Lectures on the Early History of Institu- 

tions, London, 1875, Lects. XII. and XIII. 

26. T. D. Woolsey, Political Science; or, The State, etc., New 

York, 1878, Vol. I., Pt. II., chap. 1, § 62. 

27. Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1880. 

28. Sir F. Pollock, Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy, London, 

1880, chap. X.; also, An Introduction to the History of 
the Science of Politics, London and New York, 1890, 
Pts. II. and III. 

29. G. S. Morris, British Thought and Thinkers, Chicago, 1880, 

chap. VI. 

30. L. Carran, La Morale Utilitaire, Paris, Pt. I., Lvr. I., § 3, 

chap. I. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. XV 

31. F. Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik in der Neueren Philosophic, 

Stuttgart, 1882, I. Band, IV. Cap. 

32. J. K. Bluntschli, The Theory of the State, trans, by D. G. 

Ritchie and others, Oxford, 1885, Bk. IV., chaps. 6 and 9. 

33. J. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, 2d ed., Oxford 

and New York, 1886, Vol. II., Bk. II., chap. 1. 

34. W. L. Courtney, Constructive Ethics, London, 1886, Pt. II., 

Bk. I., chap. 2. 

35. G. C. Robertson, Hobbes (Blackwood's Phil. Classics), 

Edinburgh, 1886 ; also, Article on Hobbes in Encyclo- 
paedia Britannica, Vol. XII. 

36. H. Sidgwickj/, Outlines of the History of Ethics, 2d ed., 

London arid New York, 1888, pp. 162-169. 

37. F. Tonnies, Preface and Critical Notes to Hobbes's The 

Elements of Law, Natural and Political, etc., with extracts 
from unpublished MSS. of Hobbes, London, 1888; also 
Hobbes, Leben und Lehre, Stuttgart, 1896. 

38. J. Bonar, Philosophy and Political Economy in some of 

their Historical Relations, London and New York, 1893, 
Bk. II., chap. 3, and other references. 

39. D. G. Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel, London and New York, 

1893, chaps. VII. and VIII. ; also, various references in 
Natural Rights, London and New York, 1895. 

40. G. Lyon, La Philosophic de Hobbes, Paris, 1893. 

41. Willoughby, The State, New York, 1896, chaps. IV. and V. 

42. J. Watson, Hedonistic Theories, Glasgow, London, and 

New York, 1895, chap. IV. 

IV. 

The following works on the History of Philosophy may be 
consulted with advantage : 

1. Buhle, Geschichte der Neueren Philosophic, Gottingen, 1802, 

Vol. III., pp. 223-325. 

2. J. D. Morrel, History of Modern Philosophy, 2d ed., 

London, 1847. 



xvi BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

3. M. Ad. Franck, Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, 

1875, "Hobbes," p. 718. 

4. K. Fischer, Francis Bacon und seine Nachfolger, Leipzig, 

1875, III. Band, II. Cap. 

5. L. Noack, Historisch-biographisches Handworterbuch zur 

Geschichte der Philosophic, Leipzig, 1879, "Hobbes," 
p. 388. 

6. G. H. Lewes, The Biographical History of Philosophy, 

New York, 1883, Vol. II., pp. 495-505. 

7. J. E. Erdmann, A History of Philosophy, edited by W. S. 

Hough, London and New York, 1890, Vol. I., pp. 706-721. 

8. B. C. Burt, A History of Modern Philosophy, Chicago, 

1892, Vol. I., pp. 77-87. 

9. R. Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, trans, by 

A. C. Armstrong, jr., New York, 1893, pp. 71-79. 

10. W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans, by J. H. 

Tufts, New York and London, 1893, Pt. IV., chap. 2. 

11. A. Weber, History of Philosophy, trans, by F. Thilly, New 

York, 1896, pp. 300-5. 

V. 

The following works may be consulted with reference to the 
subject of the relation of Hobbes's Ethical and Political Philosophy 
to the political conditions of his time : 

1. L. v. Ranke, History of England, Oxford, 1875, Vol. III., 

Bk. XL, chap. 1, also Bk. XV., chap. 12. 

2. D. Masson, The Life of John Milton : Narrated in connection 

with the Political, Ecclesiastical and Literary History of 
his Time, London, 1881-94. Consult the "Index Vol- 
ume." 

3. S. R. Gardiner, History of the Commonwealth and Protec- 

torate, London and New York, 1894-97, Vol. I., chaps. 
2 and 7, also Vol. II., chaps. 18 and 24. 



INTRODUCTION. 



i. 

Biographical Sketch. 

Thomas Hobbes was born in Westport, England, April 
5, 1588. In his metrical autobiography he refers to his 
birth as follows : 

Natus erat noster servator Homo-Deus annos 
Mille et quingentos, octo quoque undecies. 
Stabat et Hispanis in portubus inclyta classis 
Hostilis, nostro mox peritura mari: 
Primo vere; dies et quintus inibat Aprilis: 
I Ho vermiculus tempore nascor ego, 
In Malmesburia. 

He was the son of Rev. Thomas Hobbes, vicar of Charl- 
ton and Westport. When four years of age he was sent to 
school at Westport. Four years later he went to Malmes- 
bury School, and shortly afterward attended a private 
school in Westport. In 1602-3 ne entered Magdalen Hall, 
Oxford, receiving his bachelor's degree Feb. 5, 1607-8. 
These five years spent at Oxford were years of great politi- 
cal and ecclesiastical strife, and undoubtedly had much 
to do in determining the future conduct of Thomas 
Hobbes. The curriculum was still dominated by scholas- 
tic influences and had very little attraction for him. In 
the year of his graduation he was engaged by William 
Cavendish, afterward Earl of Devonshire, as companion for 



2 INTRODUCTION. 

his eldest son. In 1610 Hobbes went to the Continent 
with his young master. He was especially impressed dur- 
ing his travels by the great interest manifested in the study 
of physical science. Returning to England, the next eight- 
een years find him devoting himself to classical study. 
Availing himself of the advantages afforded by the library 
of the Earl of Devonshire, he made a careful study of the 
Greek poets and historians. The outcome of these studies 
was a translation of Thucydides, published in 1628; also 
a translation of Homer. His relation to distinguished men 
of letters constitutes another interesting feature of this 
period of his life. Through his master he became acquainted 
with Lord Bacon, who found in him a very congenial 
acquaintance. He also associated with Edward Herbert, 
later Baron of Cherbury, founder of the deistic movement 
in England ; also with Ben Jonson and Sir Robert Ayton. 
In 1628 his companion and master, the young earl, died. 
This caused a decided change in the affairs of Hobbes. 
After remaining several months with the family of his late 
master, in 1629 he accepted an invitation to go to the Con- 
tinent as traveling tutor to Sir Gervase Clifford's son. 
During this visit abroad Hobbes was for the first time 
brought into contact with Euclid's Elements. This fact 
is of great interest when we remember the prevalence of the 
mathematical method involved in the philosophy of nature 
of the time and the influence of this method on Hobbes's 
later philosophical thinking. He also at this time became 
more or less interested in the subject of motion, which was 
receiving much attention in scientific circles. In 1631, 
while studying in Paris, he accepted an invitation to become 
tutor to the young son of his late master, the Earl of Dev- 
onshire. In 1634, in company with the young earl, he 
made his third visit to the Continent. They traveled 
through France and Italy, finally returning to France. 
Hobbes took up his abode in Paris, where he remained 



INTR OD UC TION. 3 

eight months. This third visit was one of exceptional 
interest to him. In Italy he became intimately acquainted 
with the renowned Galileo. There also he met Beregardus. 
In such company his interest in physical science was greatly 
quickened and his knowledge of recent scientific discoveries 
and investigations greatly enlarged. After returning to 
Paris, through the kind offices of Pere Marsenne, he was 
admitted to a circle of scientific men. To fully appreciate 
the effect of association with these men of science on 
Hobbes's future thinking, we must take into consideration 
the nature of the new philosophy which was being promul- 
gated at that time. Galileo had discovered the laws of 
motion and had announced all physical phenomena to be 
explainable on the basis of moving matter and its laws. 
This explanation had been quite generally accepted by scien- 
tific men. It resulted in the mechanical conception of na- 
ture which not only dominated the physical science of the 
time but also greatly influenced the philosophy of nature of 
the leading continental philosophers of the seventeenth cen- 
tury. This view of nature greatly interested Hobbes, and 
it was not long before, in his own mind, he was applying the 
principles of the mechanical philosophy to other phenom- 
ena than those of nature. He soon beheld all phenomena, 
physical, mental, and social, comprehended in one general 
system and explainable on the basis of motion and its laws. 
As Falckenberg says with reference to Hobbes's philoso- 
phy : " Mechanism applied to the world gives materialism ; 
applied to knowledge, sensationalism of a mathematical 
type ; applied to the will, determinism ; to morality and 
the state, ethical and political naturalism." 1 

In 1637 he returned to England. He found his native 
country becoming more and more involved in political and 
ecclesiastical strife. The estrangement between the king 
and Parliament was becoming more decided ; the controver- 

1 History of Modern Philosophy, trans., p. 72. 



4 INTR OD UC TION. 

sies concerning the relations between civil and spiritual 
power w r ere becoming more intense. In 1640 he wrote a 
"little treatise," expressing his political views. In it he 
attempted to vindicate the supremacy of the royal preroga- 
tive. The " little treatise " was circulated rather freely in 
manuscript form, and, according to Hobbes's own opinion, 
he incurred the hostility of the leaders of Parliament by it. 
He continued to ventilate his political views, and, feeling 
himself in danger, he fled to Paris, where, rejoining the 
scientific circle, he remained eleven years. In 1641 he 
wrote the De Cive in Latin, a work treating of the 
origin, nature, and power of civil government. In this 
work the absoluteness of sovereignty is advocated. Only a 
small number of copies was printed in 1642. The next 
three years were spent largely in scientific study. In 1647 
a new edition of the De Cive was published in Amster- 
dam, bearing the title Ehmenta Philosophica de Cive, the 
date of dedication being 1641-46. The Preface to this 
edition indicates the circumstances which impelled not only 
its publication but doubtless also the publication of the 
previous edition. 

He says, in the " Preface to the Reader " of the Philo- 
sophical Rudiments conce?-ni?ig Government and Society, which 
is an English translation of the De Cive : "I was study- 
ing Philosophy for my mind sake, and I had gathered 
together its first elements in all kinds ; and having digested 
them into three sections by degrees, I thought to have 
written them, so as in the first I would have treated of 
Body and its general properties ; in the second, of Man and 
his special faculties and affections ; in the third, of Civil 
Government and the duties of subjects. Wherefore the first 
section would have contained the First Philosophy, and 
certain elements of Physic ; in it we would have considered 
the reasons of Time, Place, Cause, Power, Relation, Propor- 
tion, Quantity, Figure, and Motion. In the second we 






INTR OD UC TION. 5 

would have been conversant about Imagination, Memory, 
Intellect, Ratiocination, Appetite, Will, Good and Evil, Hon- 
est and Dishonest. . . . Whilst I contrive, order, pen- 
sively and slowly compose these matters (for I do only 
reason, I dispute not) ; it so happens in the interim, that 
my country, some few years before the Civil Wars did rage, 
was boiling hot with questions concerning the rights of 
dominion, and the obedience due from subjects, the true 
forerunners of an approaching war ; and was the cause 
which, all those other matters deferred, ripened and plucked 
from me this third part. Therefore it happens that what 
was last in order, is yet come forth first in time. And the 
rather because I saw that, grounded on its own principles 
sufficiently known by experience, it would not stand in need 
of the former sections. 1 

In 1646 he was appointed instructor in mathematics to 
the Prince of Wales, who was then in Paris. In 1650, after 
the Revolution, his "little treatise," previously referred to, 
was published in two parts. The first part was entitled 
Human Nature, or The Fundamental Elements of Policy. 
The second part, published later, was entitled De Corpore 
Politico, or The Elements of Law, Moral and Politic. A 
translation of the De Cive, under the title Philosophical 
Rudiments concerning Government and Society, followed in 
1 65 1. According to Aubrey's papers, this translation was 
made by Hobbes himself. This same year witnessed the 
publication of his Leviathan, which was really projected 
as early as 1642 and written in the interim. The full 
title of the work is Leviathan ; or, The Matter, Form, and 
Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil. In 
it Hobbes represents the commonwealth to be an artifi- 
cial man ; " though of greater stature and strength than the 
natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended." 
In it, he says, " the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as 

1 See also De Cive, Praefatio ad Lectores. 



6 INTR OD UC TION. 

giving life and motion to the whole body ; the magis- 
trates, and other officers of judicature and execution, arti- 
ficial joints; reward and punishment, by which fastened 
to the seat of the sovereignty every joint and member 
is moved to perform his duty, are the nerves, that do the 
same in the body natural ; the wealth and riches of all 
the particular members, are the strength ; salus popnli, 
the people's safety, its business ; counsellors, by whom all 
things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are 
the memory ; equity, and laws, an artificial reason and 
will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, 
death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the 
parts of this body politic were at first made, set together 
and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us make man, 
pronounced by God in the creation." 1 The description of 
this commonwealth or artificial man involves the considera- 
tion of the following : " First, the matter thereof, and the 
artificer ; both which is man. Secondly, how, and by what 
covenants it is made ; what are the rights and just power 
or authority of a sovereign ; and what it is that preserveth 
or dissolveth it. Thirdly, what is a Christian common- 
wealth. Lastly, what is the kingdom of darkness." 2 A 
copy of the Leviathan, beautifully written on vellum, 
was presented to the young prince, later Charles II. 3 
Robertson interestingly and accurately describes the 
effect produced by this famous work of Hobbes. He says : 
"The effect of the book at home will appear through all 
Hobbes's later years. Abroad, it soon brought about a 
great change in his own position. That he himself con- 
sidered his personal loyalty impeached by anything he had 
penned could not be more completely disproved than it is. 
As he had made no secret beforehand of his wish to return 

1 Leviathan, Int. 2 Ibid. 

3 A description of this manuscript copy is given in the January num- 
ber of the Gentleman's Magazine for 1813. 



INTRODUCTION. 7 

home, so he now showed no unseemly haste to be gone, but 
for months still continued to share the fortunes and mix in 
the society of the royalist exiles. Nay, when the young 
king of the Scots escaped to Paris (about the end of Octo- 
ber) after the defeat at Worcester, Hobbes felt himself at 
perfect liberty to present to the royal fugitive, fresh from 
the crushing disaster, a specially prepared manuscript copy 
of his book, 'engrossed' (says Clarendon) 'in vellum in 
a marvellous fair hand' — an odd proceeding in a conscious 
traitor. But if he thought that he still stood where he had 
stood before, there were others that thought differently. It 
is, indeed, sufficiently absurd to find Clarendon declaring, 
in almost the same breath with his mention of the gift to 
the king, that the book was written to support Cromwell's 
usurpation. This particular charge, afterward commonly 
current, though refuted by Clarendon's own admission, 
could not have occurred to any one as early as 1651, when 
Cromwell was still the servant of the Rump. Nothing, how- 
ever, could be more natural than that a book like Levia- 
than should awake suspicion and dislike in the minds of 
royalists, then at the lowest depths of despair. The^exiled 
clergy in particular, rendered critical by misfortune, and 
meeting in the book much that jarred upon their honest 
religious convictions, much, also, that was incomprehensible 
to their unreasonable loyalty, and, above all, a vein of deep 
distrust of clerical ambition with an imposing scheme for 
the utter subjection of spiritual to civil authority, could 
not but be affected to indignation in every fiber of their 
being. Accordingly, as different accounts agree in stating, 
some of them lost no time in working upon the mind of the 
prince on his return, and for the moment they were able to 
prevail upon his easy nature. When Hobbes, soon after 
making his present, sought to pay his respects in person to 
his former pupil, he was denied the royal presence, and was 
told by the Marquis of Ormond that he lay under grave 



8 INTR OD UC TWA'. 

charges of disloyalty and atheism. Thus deprived of the 
prince's protection, Hobbes, ever full of fears, at once saw 
himself exposed to a twofold peril. The royalist party, he 
well knew, counted in its ranks desperadoes who could slay 
— who had newly slain two defenceless envoys of the com- 
monwealth, Doreslaus at The Hague, and Ascham at Madrid. 
And there was another danger not to be slighted even by a 
man less prone to terror. The French clerical authorities, 
made aware of the contents of Leviathan, and exasperated 
by such an open and unsparing assault (no longer a masked 
attack, as in the De Cive) on the Papal system, were mov- 
ing (as Clarendon again bears confirmatory witness) to 
arraign the foreign offender. No course seemed left to 
Hobbes but sudden and secret flight. After a self-imposed 
exile of eleven years, cast out in the end by his own party, 
and a fugitive from religious hate, he could turn only to his 
native country, which he had been so ready to desert, and 
seek protection from the revolutionary government which 
he had sacrificed everything to oppose." 1 

In 1 65 1 Hobbes returned to England. He took up his 
abode in London and devoted himself mainly to literary 
work. In 1655 he published De Corpore, containing, for 
the most part, his views on First Philosophy and Physics. 
In 1656 an English translation of De Corpore appeared 
with an appendix of "Six Lessons" written in connection 
with a mathematical controversy with Professor John 
Wallis. In 1658 he published De Ho7iiine, a psychological 
treatise, the major portion of which is devoted to optics. 
He had already, as we have seen, published his works De 
Cive and Leviathan, so that his philosophical system was 
now essentially developed. It represented in this prac- 
tically complete form essentially what he had in mind as 
indicated in the preface to the De Cive, part of which 
has already been quoted, viz. : the division of Philosophy 

1 Hobbes, pp. 71-73. 



INTR OD UC TION. 9 

into three parts; Part I, treating of "Body and its general 
properties "; Part II, treating of " Man and his special fac- 
ulties and affections''; and Part III, treating of "Civil 
Government and the duties of subjects." 

Hobbes remained in England from 165 1, the time of his 
return from France, until 1679, the date of his death. 
Daring C r om well's- - rule he lived peacefully, having sub- 
mitted to the government. After the Restoration in 1660, 
the king, Charles II., his former pupil, who had been 
alienated from Hobbes by charges of disloyalty and athe- 
ism made by others against him, again granted his favor 
to Hobbes. He was made welcome at the court and was 
granted a pension by the king. His path, however, was 
not altogether smooth. He experienced much annoyance 
at the hands of the clergy, who took exceptions to his 
religious and ecclesiastical views — especially as contained 
in the Leviathan. Furthermore, this closing period of 
his life brought him into a number of controversies involv- 
ing much unpleasantness. One of these was with Dr. 
Bramhall, Bishop of Londonderry. In 1654, in answer to 
a discourse of the bishop's, he published his work entitled 
Of Liberty and Necessity, the subject of the controversy 
being especially the question of the freedom of the will. 
The controversy continued, and in 1656 Hobbes published 
Questio?is concerning Liberty, Necessity, a?id Chance, again in 
answer to the bishop. The position on this question taken 
by Hobbes in this controversy is defined in the following 
words : " I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from 
itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent 
without itself. And that therefore, when first a man hath 
an appetite or will to something, to which immediately 
before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is 
not the will itself, but something else not in his own dispos- 
ing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of 
voluntary actions the will is the fiecessary cause, and by 



I o INTR OD UC TION. 

this, which is said, the will is also caused by other things 
whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary actions 
have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are neces- 
sitated." x 

Another controversy, bitter and undignified in character, 
which extended through a number of years almost to the 
time of his death, was a mathematical controversy with 
John Wallis, Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford. 
In this contest Hobbes met more than his match, and 
was undoubtedly defeated. Wallis, in his Elenchus and 
other writings, revealed the inconsistencies and fallacies 
involved in the mathematical reasoning of Hobbes. About 
a dozen works were brought forth by Hobbes in connection 
with this long and rather useless controversy. 

In 1668 a Latin edition of his collected works was 
published in Amsterdam. In this edition the Leviathan 
was considerably modified. In 1675 an English trans- 
lation of the Iliad and Odyssey was published by him. 
Another work belonging to this closing period of his life 
was the Behemoth : the History of the Causes of the Civil 
Wars of England, and of the Counsels and Artifices by which 
they were carried on from the year 1640 to 1660. The 
authorized edition of this work was not published before 
1679, shortly after his death. Some works also of a minor 
character belong to this period. These works, together 
with the controversial writings referred -to above, are evi- 
dence sufficient that the last twenty-five years of Hobbes's 
life constitute a period of great literary activity, evincing a 
good deal of mental vigor. 

The closing years of his life, 1675-79, were spent with 
the family of the Earl of Devonshire at Hardwick and 
Chadsworth. In October, 1679, ^ e became ill, and on 
December 4 of the same year death closed the long and 
varied career of Thomas Hobbes. 

1 Of Liberty and Necessity \ p. 274. 



INTR OB UC TION. 1 1 

II. 

Exposition of the Ethics of Hobbes. 

There can be very little reasonable doubt that Hobbes 
himself regarded his ethical philosophy as a constituent part 
of his philosophical system. His philosophical system is 
divided into three parts. In the first part, physical phe- 
nomena are treated under the head of "Body." In the 
second part, mental phenomena are treated under the head 
of " Man." In the third part, social or political phenomena 
are treated under the head of "The State." In this system 
social or political phenomena are regarded as dependent 
on the mental constitution of man ; hence the State, com- 
posed as it is of human individuals, has its foundation in 
human nature. Mental phenomena in turn are dependent 
on physical phenomena, inasmuch as all mental processes 
arise from sensations, which are merely the mental aspect 
of motions in the human body, which motions are occa- 
sioned by external bodies pressing upon the organs of 
sense. 1 These external bodies are explainable also in terms 
of motion. We have, then, " Body " as "the first term of a 
series leading up to Society or the State through Man. 
Man, since his nature contains the ground of civil institu- 
tions, stands out from among all other natural bodies. 
The State is not simply to be viewed in its existent form 
as body politic, but rather as it comes into being — the 
product of human wit for the satisfaction of human wants. 
Thus, between Nature and Society the bridge is Man ; and 
hence the profounder disposition of the whole work of the 
philosopher as a progression from Body (which remains 
natural) through Man to Citizen." 2 Although the last 

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. I. This mental aspect of bodily action 
Hobbes calls "appearance " and "fancy." See also Human Nature, 
chap. II., and Elements of Philosophy, Pt. IV., chap. I. 

2 Hobbes^ Robertson, p. 45, 



1 2 INTR OD UC TTON. 

part of this comprehensive system was developed before 
and, to a certain extent, independently of the first part, 
which contains Hobbes's views on " First Philosophy and 
Physics/' owing to conditions mentioned below, still, a 
study of the mental history of Hobbes, already briefly 
alluded to, and the following confession on the part of 
Hobbes himself are sufficient grounds for believing that he 
regarded his ethico-political philosophy as a part of a com- 
plete philosophical system such as has been described 
above. On this point Hobbes says : " I was studying 
Philosophy for my mind sake, and I had gathered together 
its first elements in all kinds ; and having digested them 
into three sections by degrees, I thought to have written 
them, so as in the first I would have treated of body and 
its general properties ; in the second, of man and his 
special faculties and affections ; in the third, of civil govern- 
ment and the duties of subjects. Wherefore, the first sec- 
tion would have contained the first philosophy, and certain 
elements of physic ; in it we would have considered the 
reasons of time, place, cause, power, relation, proportion, 
quantity, figure, and motion. In the second, we would 
have been conversant about imagination, memory, intellect, 
ratiocinatiofi, appetite, will, good a7id evil, honest and dishonest, 
and the like. . . . Whilst I contrive, order, pensively and 
slowly compose these matters (for I do only reason, I dis- 
pute not) ; it so happens in the interim, that my country, 
some few years before the Civil Wars did rage, was boiling 
hot with questions concerning the rights of dominion, and 
the obedience due from subjects ; the true forerunners of 
an approaching war ; and was the cause which, all those 
other matters deferred, ripened and plucked from me this 
third part. Therefore, it happens that what was last in 
order, is yet come forth first in time." 1 Of course, in a 

1 Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society, Pref- 
ace to the Reader ; also De Owe, Praefatio ad Lectores. 



INTR 01) UC TION. 1 3 

study of the ethical theory of Hobbes, we are more espe- 
cially concerned with the second and third parts of his phil- 
osophical system, which parts are very intimately related, 
and for a good understanding of which a knowledge of the 
first part is really not necessary. It is in the treatment of 
the origin and regulation of the State that his ethical 
theory is developed, and, as has just been stated, the State 
has its foundation in human nature. It is, therefore, very 
essential to a full understanding of his ethical theory to be 
acquainted with his view of human nature. 

Hobbes's conception of human nature is thoroughly ego- 
istic. In his psychological analysis he finds naught but 
self-regarding feelings impelling man's activity. Even 
those emotions of pity, reverence, love, etc., which seem to 
be altruistic in their nature, are ultimately explainable from 
an egoistic point of view, as the following definitions indi- 
cate : " Grief 1 for the calamity of another, is pity ; and 
ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may 
befall himself ; and therefore is called also compassion, and 
in the phrase of this present time a fellow-feeling." \ 
This is stated still more broadly elsewhere : " Pity is 
imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, pro- 
ceeding from the sense of another man's calamity. But 
when it #ghteth on such as we think have not deserved the 
same, the compassion is greater, because then there appear- 
eth more probabilif^ that the same may happen to us: for, 
the evil that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to 
every man." 2 The same self-interest is present in his defi- 
nition of reverence : " Reverence is the conception we have 
concerning another, that he hath the power to do unto us 
both good and hurt, but not the will to do us hurt." 3 Again, 
in his conception of love we see his thorough-going ego- 
ism : "There is yet another passion sometimes called love, 

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. VI. 

2 Human Nature, chap. IX. 3 Ibid., chap. VIII. 



1 4 INTRO D UCTION. 

but more properly called good will or charity. There can 
be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than 
to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, 
but also to assist other men in theirs : and this is that con- 
ception wherein consisteth charity. In which, first, is con- 
tained that natural affection of parents to their children . . . 
as also, that affection wherewith men seek to assist those 
that adhere unto them." * The affection which leads us to 
give help unto strangers is prompted by a desire to purchase 
their friendship, or, because of fear, to purchase peace. 
Thus, from the foregoing, it will be seen that, if we exam- 
ine the feelings which impel men to activity, we shall find 
all of them to be self-regarding in their nature. The same 
egoistic view of human nature manifests itself in Hobbes's 
conception of will. Will is "the last appetite in deliberat- 
ing " j " " an d of all voluntary acts the object is to every man 
his own good." 3 This explanation of the object of all vol- 
untary acts occurs in his account of why we give gifts. It 
is apparent, then, from his treatment of the " passions " and 
the will, that he regards man as thoroughly selfish — 
prompted in all that he does by motives of private interest. 
Bearing his views of human nature in mind, we shall gain a 
much more intelligent conception of his ethical theory than 
we should were we to study this theory independently of 
its psychological basis ; for it is really on this egoistic psy- 
chology that he constructs his theory. The "good" 
towards which man's selfish nature constantly inclines him 
is the good of self-preservation. 4 This "good " men recog- 

1 Human A r ature, chap. IX. 2 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. VI. 

3 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XV. 

4 He sometimes includes in his conception of this "good" "the 
means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it." Again, he speaks 
sometimes as if he really considered self-preservation and pleasure, 
as the ultimate good for which men really strive. Leviathan, Pt. I., 
chaps. VI., XIII., and XV. ; Human Nature, chap. VII. ; De Corp. 
Pol., Pt. I., chap. IV. Professor Sidgwick says : "There is, however, 
a noticeable — though perhaps unconscious — discrepancy between 



INTRO D UCTION. 1 5 

nize to be best attained through the State — hence its organ- 
ization, which, with its regulation, he explains as follows : 
Men with respect to physical and mental ability are born 
essentially equal. At least, there is so much native equal- 
ity among men " as that though there be one man some- 
times manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than 
another ; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference 
between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one 
man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which 
another may not pretend, as well as he." x Now, out of 
this essential equality of ability arises an equality of hope 
with reference to the attainment of ends ; hence, when 
the same thing is desired by any two men, which cannot, 
however, be possessed by both, enmity arises between them. 
The outcome is, that in the pursuit of these ends, which 
concern self-preservation and commodious living, men 
attempt the subjugation or destruction of one another.'- 
Hence, in a state of nature, where society is not organized 
in the form of the State, men are in a condition of war. 
Every man is against every man. In such a state of 
nature the life of man is " solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short." 3 Furthermore, under such circumstances, there is 
no such thing as justice or injustice, right or wrong. These 

Hobbes's theory of the ends that men naturally seek and his standard 
for determining their natural rights. This latter is never Pleasure 
simply, but always Preservation — though on occasion he enlarges the 
notion of 'preservation ' into 'preservation of life so as not to be weary 
of it.' " — Outlines of the History of Ethics, pp. 164-5. 

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIII.; also, De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. I.; 
also, Philosophical Rudiments, chap. I. 2 Ibid. 

3 Bluntschli {The Theory of the State, p. 267, trans.) says: "But 
these expressions of Hobbes (and Spinoza) are to be understood 
rather as a logical statement of what would be the condition of man 
apart from civil society, .than as distinctly implying a historical theory. 
They err from ignoring history rather than from asserting false history. 
The word ' natural ' is used merely in the negative sense of ' non-civil ' 
or ' non-political.' " Still Hobbes, while disclaiming a belief that there 
was ever a time when this state of nature as a state of mutual warfare 
universally existed, distinctly says, " there are many places where they 



1 6 INTR OB UC TION. 

are nonentities where civil law does not exist. They are 
the creatures of the State. Where civil government does 
not exist there is no mine and thine distinct from each 
other. That is mine which I can acquire and keep against 
the strength and wit of others. 1 

From such a horrible condition of things as the state of 
nature presents, men emerge by means of their passions and 
reason. Men possess certain " passions " which incline 
them to peace, such as the fear of death, a desire of the 
things necessary for commodious living, and a hope of attain- 
ing them by industry. Men also possess " reason " which 
dictates the means by which this peace may be secured. 
Reason dictates certain articles of peace on which men may 
agree, which articles Hobbes calls "Laws of Nature." 2 Of 
these laws he mentions twenty or more, only three of which, 

live so now," and refers to " the savage people in many places in Amer- 
ica." Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIII. This conception of man as essen- 
tially anti-social in his nature is contrary to the conception taken by 
many historians and anthropologists. Tylor, Anthropology, chap. XVI.; 
Bagehot, Physics and Politics, p. 136; Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law, 
p. 126; Ratzel, The History of Mankind, trans., Vol. I, § 12, seem to 
think that the evidence warrants the opposite view. Also McLennan, 
Primitive Marriage, chap. VIII., 1st ed., who holds the tribe rather 
than the family to be the original " social unit," says : "All the evidence 
we have goes to show that men were from the beginning gregarious." 
He says : " The geological record exhibits them in groups," and that 
" this testimony is confirmed by all history. We hear nothing in the 
most ancient times of individuals except as being members of groups." 
If this be so, it indicates the essential sociality of man. This testi- 
mony is confirmed also by psychology. A true psychological analysis 
reveals social feelings which are constitutional with man. Such critics 
of Hobbes as Cumberland, Shaftesbury, and Butler specially empha- 
sized this point in their opposition to him. 

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIII.; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. I.; 
also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. I. 

2 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIII. ; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. II.; 
also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. II. The reader will find an inter- 
esting chapter, "On the History of the Idea of 'Nature 'in Law and 
Politics " in Professor Ritchie's work on Nattiral Rights, chap. II. 
See also Maine's Ancient Law, chaps. III. and IV. ; also Woolsey, 
Political Science, Vol. I., Pt. I., chap. III.; also Salmond, Law Quar- 
terly Reviezu, April, 1895; also Willoughby, The State, chap. V. 



INTR OB UC TION. 1 7 

however, it is necessary to note here. The first or funda- 
mental law of nature is " to seek peace, and follow it." But 
joined to this law as the second part of a general rule of 
reason is what is called "the sum of the right of nature," 
which may be designated as the imperative of self-preserva- 
tion, which Hobbes expresses in these words : " by all 
means we can, to defend our selves.'" x The right of nature which 
every one possesses in a state of nature is the right to use 
every means at one's command to preserve one's life — even 
another man's body. In short, in a state of nature every 
one has a right to everything. " And because the condition 
of man ... is a condition of war of every one against every 
one ; in which case every one is governed by his own reason ; 
and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a 
help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies ; it 
followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right 
to everything; even to one another's body." 2 This right 
of nature is still more baldly stated elsewhere : " Every man 
by nature hath right to all things, that is to say, to do what- 
soever he listeth to whom he listeth, to possess, use, and 
enjoy all things he will and can." 3 Now, of course, the out- 
come of every man's possessing a right to everything is a 
state of insecurity, and, as man desires life and " the means 
of so preserving life as not to be weary of it|" it becomes a 
principle, or " general rule of reason," " that every man, ought 
to endeavour peace as far as he has hope of attaining it ; and 
when he camiot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps and 
advantages of 'war '." 4 In the preceding explanation of the 
fundamental law of nature, one cannot fail to note the ego- 
istic motive underlying it, — the self-preservation of the in- 
dividual and the enjoyment of life. 

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIV.; also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. II. 

2 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIV. 

3 De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. I. In this connection Hobbes says : 
" that irresistible might, in the state of nature, is right." 

4 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIV. 



1 8 INTRODUCTION. 

The second law of nature is derived from the fundamental 
law and reads as follows : " that a man be willing, when 
others are so too, as far forth, as for peace, and defence of Iwiiself 
he shall think it ?iecessary ; to lay down this right to all things, 
and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he 
would allow other me?i against himself." l The reason for this 
law he thinks apparent, for so long as every man enjoys the 
right of doing anything he likes, so long is the condition of 
mutual warfare continued. However, if other men will not 
consent to lay down their right to all things, also, then there 
is no reason why he should, for that would subject him to 
the prey of others, which is not obligatory upon him. Hobbes 
calls this the Golden Rule of the Gospel : Whatsoever yon 
reqirire that others should do to you, that do ye to them. 2 
To fully understand this second law, we must find out what 
Hobbes means by laying down a right to all things. Every 
man in a state of nature having a right to all things, A, in 
laying down this right to B, or to B, C, D, and others, 
simply removes the hindrances which, in asserting his 
right, he would place in the way of B or others in seeking 
their right to all things. This does not mean that A gives 
to B or others a right which they were not in possession of 
before, for in a state of nature every man has a right to all 
things. It simply means that A stands out of the way of 
B or others, so that they may enjoy their right to all things 
without hindrance on the part of A, who originally has the 
right also to all things. A man may lay down a right in 

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIV.; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. II.; 
also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. II. 

2 The careful student of Christian ethics would hardly admit the 
identity of the Golden Rule and Hobbes's second law of nature. The 
Golden Rule, neither in letter nor in spirit, can be interpreted with such 
qualifications as are embodied in Hobbes's second law. It does not 
read nor mean that we should do unto others, when they are willing to 
reciprocate, whatsoever we would have them do unto us. Neither does it 
give as the underlying motive of obedience to the command, self-defence 
and self -enjoyment. 



INTR OB UC TION. 1 9 

two ways : by simply renouncing it, caring not to whom the 
benefits of such a renouncement may accrue ; and by trans- 
ference, intending that the benefits should accrue to some 
particular person or persons. After a man abandons his 
right in either manner, he is then obliged not to hinder 
those to whom it has been surrendered from enjoying the 
advantages accruing, ^he reason why a man lays down 
his right is in consideration of a like performance on the 
part of another or others or for some good which he hopes 
to attain. This is evident because it is a voluntary act, 
" and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some 
good to himself." And the "good" which he hopes to 
attain by such a renunciation or transferrence of rights " is 
nothing else but the security of a man's person in his life, 
and in the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of 
it." l Here the egoism of Hobbes, which his psychological 
analysis revealed, forms the basis of his doctrine of laying 
down of rights, which lies at the foundation of his theory 
of the genesis and development of the State. 

Then follows his explanation of contract, which is the 
mutual transferrence of rights. When one of the contract- 
ing parties performs his part of the contract, and permits 
the other party to postpone performing his part until some 
specified time, trusting him meanwhile, then we have a cove- 
nant. This brings us to the third important law of nature: 
" that men perform their covenants made" If they do not, 
then the covenants are of no account, and all men, still 
possessing the right to all things, will continue in a state of 
war. This law Hobbes calls " the fountain and original of 
justice." 2 There are other laws of nature, also, such as 
equity, gratitude, modesty, mercy, etc., all of which may be 
summed up in one, viz. : Do not that to another, which thou 

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XV. 

2 Ibid.; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. III.; also Philosophical Rudi- 
ments, chap. III. 



2 o INTR OB UC TION. 

wouldest not have done to thyself} These laws of nature, 
which are the dictates of reason with reference to peace, 
are always obligatory upon man in foro interno, but not 
always obligatory in foro externo. That is, they always 
"bind to a desire they should take place," but not always 
"to the putting them in act." This is so because "he that 
should be modest, and tractable, and perform all he prom- 
ises, in such time, and place, where no man else should do 
so, should but make himself a prey to others, and procure 
his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of 
nature, which tend to nature's preservation. And again, 
he that having sufficient security, that others shall observe 
the same laws towards him, observes them not himself, 
seeketh not peace, but war ; and consequently the destruc- 
tion of his nature by violence." 2 Furthermore, the laws 
which bind in foro interno may be violated not only by act- 
ing contrary to them, but also when the act is in conformity 
to them but the purpose back of the act is in opposition to 
them. In such a case as this we have a breach of the law 
because the obligation is in foro interno. 3 Again, these laws 
of nature are eternal and unchangeable ; " for injustice, 
ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, 
and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never 
be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it." 4 

The three laws of nature which have been explained 
above are absolutely essential if man is to emerge from a 
state of nature, which is a state of war, into a state of 
peace, in which security of person and the means of enjoy- 
ing life are to be attained. It is on these three laws that 
the commonwealth, which exists for the attainment of these 
ends, is founded. The genesis and development of the 
commonwealth Hobbes describes as follows : The reason 
why men lay down their liberty and assume the restraints 
of a commonwealth is " the foresight of their own preserva- 
1 Leviathan, chap. XV. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 



INTR OD UC TION. 2 I 

tion, and a more contented life thereby." 1 The common- 
wealth is necessary for the realization of these ends, because 
they are not to be realized merely by entering into covenants, 
but by pel-forming them. However, it is not in accordance 
with our natural passions to perform such covenants. We, 
therefore, need some common power, possessed both of 
authority and means to cause men, through their fear of 
punishment, to keep their covenants. Such a common 
power may be established in the following manner : A 
large number of individuals may assemble together and 
" confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon 
one assembly of men, ... to bear their person ; and every 
one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of what- 
soever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to 
be acted, in those things which concern the common peace 
and safety ; and therein to submit their wills every one to 
his will, and their judgments to his judgment." 2 That is, 
every man must completely surrender his natural right to 
all things to one common power, so that the commands, 
decisions, and acts of this power must be regarded by 
every man as his own. This Hobbes calls real unity ; and 
a multitude thus united he calls a commonwealth. It is 
the great Leviathan. Or, speaking reverently, it is "that 
mortal god to which we owe under the immortal God, our 
peace and defence." In such a representative man (Hobbes 
here drops the words "or assembly of men " 3 ) consists the 

1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XVII. 

2 Ibid. ; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. VI.; also Philosophical Rudi- 
ments, chap. V. 

3 Of the various forms of government Hobbes undoubtedly had a 
decided preference for a monarchy. Sir Henry Maine says: "When 
with a keenness of intuition and lucidity of statement which have never 
been rivaled, he has made out a case for the universal theoretical exist- 
ence of sovereignty, it becomes clear that he has, to say the least, a 
strong preference for monarchies over aristocracies and democracies, 
or (to use the phraseology of the school which he founded) for individual 
over corporate sovereignty. Those of his intellectual followers who 
would have repudiated his politics have often asserted that he has been 






2 2 INTR OD UC TION. 

essence of the commonwealth, which may be denned as 
" one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual cove- 
nants one with another, have made themselves every one the 
author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them 
all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common 
defence." 1 Such a common power is the sovereign. Those 
who have thus surrendered their rights are the subjects ; 
and the kind of commonwealth thus denned is a political 
commonwealth, or a commonwealth by institution, 2 as dis- 
tinguished from a commonwealth by acquisition, which is 
based not on mutual covenant, but on natural force. 

The " rights " of the sovereign as sovereign are derived 
from the "institution of the commonwealth." Among 

misunderstood, and, no doubt, some superficial readers have supposed 
that he was pointing at despotism when he was really referring to the 
essentially unqualified power of the Sovereign, whatever the form of 
the sovereignty. But I do not think it can in candour be denied that 
his strong dislike of the Long Parliament and of the English Common 
Law, as the great instrument of resistance to the Stuart kings, has occa- 
sionally coloured the language which he uses in examining the nature 
of Sovereignty, Law, and Anarchy." — Early History of Institutions, 
Lee. XII. However, notwithstanding his decided preference for a 
monarchical form of government, Hobbes says, after pointing out the 
nature of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, that " of the three 
sorts, which is the best, is not to be disputed, where any one of them is 
already established ; but the present ought always to be preferred, 
maintained, and accounted best ; because it is against both the law of 
nature, and the divine positive law, to do anything tending to the sub- 
version thereof." — Leviathan, Pt. III., chap. XLII. 

1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XVII. How widely removed is this con- 
ception of the origin of the State from that of Aristotle. The Greek 
philosopher regarded man as constitutionally political. He says : 
" "ApdpwTros 4>vaei ttoXctlkov Z&ov." Grotius also says that the " appetite 
for society " is a " property peculiar to man." 

2 Mr. Ritchie {Natural Rights, p. n) calls attention to the fact that 
" while Hobbes does not seem to ascribe any historical character to the 
social contract, which is at the basis of all political society, and while 
Rousseau expressly disclaims the attempt to offer an historical explana- 
tion {Contrat Social, I., c. I.) of how governments came into exist- 
ence, Locke seeks to give historical proofs of the origin of political 
society by means of contract, referring to the cases of Rome and Venice 
{Treatise of Civil Goverimient, II., § 102), and speaks of the state of 
nature as a golden age in the past." 



INTR OD UC TION. 2 3 

these rights the following may be mentioned : In the first 
place, he has a right to the loyalty of his subjects, to the 
extent that no change of authority should be effected with- 
out his consent. His subjects may not establish a new cov- 
enant among themselves to render obedience to another ; 
because, were one man to dissent from such action, then 
all others participating in such disobedience would break 
their covenant with this man, which would be injustice. 
It would also be injustice to the sovereign, for his sover- 
eignty was given to him by every man implicated in the 
covenant by which the commonwealth was formed, and, 
therefore, to depose the sovereign is to take from him 
"that which is his own." Again, if any one attempting 
to depose the sovereign were to be killed or punished for 
such an attempt by the sovereign, this would be merely 
self-punishment, for previously he has made himself author 
of the sovereign's action. And since self-punishment is 
unjust, to depose the sovereign would be unjust from this 
point of view. In the second place, the sovereign cannot 
be guilty of a breach of covenant with his subjects, because 
he has made no covenant with them. The covenant simply 
exists between his subjects. Hence, " none of his subjects, 
by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his sub- 
jection." 1 In the next place, the sovereign's acts are to 
be regarded as just, for everything he does was authorized 
by his subjects when the commonwealth was formed ; hence, 
his actions are really the actions of his subjects. 2 Again, 
the sovereign may not be put to death or punished in 
any manner by his subjects. For this would be punishing 
another for our own actions, inasmuch as the actions of 
the sovereign are the actions of the subject, by virtue of 
the covenant by which sovereignty was established. 3 The 
sovereign has also the right to judge of " the means of 
peace and defence " of his subjects, " and also of the 
1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XVIII. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid . 



2 4 INTR OD UC TIOiV. 

hindrances and disturbances of the same," and to do 
whatsoever he may deem to be necessary for the preserva- 
tion of peace and security, or " the recovery of the same " 
when lost. 1 Furthermore, it belongs to sovereignty to 
judge "of what opinions and doctrines are averse and 
what conducive to peace " ; to determine the rules of pro- 
priety, " or meum and tuum, and of good, evil, lawful and 
unlawful in the actions of subjects." These rules of pro- 
priety "are the civil laws." 2 The right of judicature 
belongs also to sovereignty ; i.e., sovereignty has the right 
to hear and to decide " all controversies which may arise 
concerning law, either civil or natural, or concerning 
fact." 3 The sovereign power possesses the right to make 
war and peace with foreign nations, and is generalissimo 
of the army of the commonwealth. 4 The sovereign power 
has the right to choose " all counsellors, ministers, magis- 
trates, and officers" of the commonwealth, "both in peace 
and war." 5 In the sovereign is vested the power to re- 
ward and punish the subject; and also to "give titles of 
honor ; and to appoint what order of place and dignity 
each man shall hold ; and what signs of respect in public 
or private meetings they shall give to one another." 6 All 
of the foregoing rights belong to the sovereign power. 
They are of the very essence of sovereignty. They are 
"incommunicable and inseparable." 7 Thus we see that 
with reference to his subjects the sovereign is supreme. 
His will, in a sense, is the measure of all things to his 
subjects. "As, for example ; of what is to be called right, 
what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what 
meum and tuum, what a pound, what a quart, &c." 8 

1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XVIII. 

2 Ibid. a Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 

7 Ibid. On the subject of the " rights of the sovereign," consult also 
De Corp. Pol., Pt. II., chap. I.; also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. VI. 

8 De Corp. Pol, Pt. II., chap. X.; see also Leviathan, Pt. II., chap 
XVIII. 



INTR ODUC TION. 2 5 

Even the claims of the individual conscience are not to 
be regarded when they are in opposition to the will of the 
sovereign. He says : " I observe the diseases of a com- 
monwealth, that proceed from the poison of seditious doc- 
trines, whereof one is, That every private ?nan is judge of 
good and evil actions." And again, ''Another doctrine 
repugnant to civil society, is, that whatsoever a man does 
against his conscience, is sin • and it dependeth on the 
presumption of making himself judge of good and evil. 
. . . Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law, 
sinneth in all he does against his conscience, because he 
has no other rule to follow but his own reason ; yet it is 
not so with him that lives in a commonwealth ; because the 
law is the public conscience by which he hath already 
undertaken to be guided." 2 Of course the sovereign's 
power does not extend to the feelings, opinions, and beliefs 
of men, for these he cannot reach. It only extends to the 
manifestation of these in external conduct. The sover- 
eign's will is the measure of all things to the individual, so 
far as his external conduct is concerned, within the limits 
indicated by the covenant. 

This absoluteness of the sovereign pertains not only to 
things civil, but also to things religious. There is no 
church exercising authority independent of the State. The 
State indeed is the church. The " civil sovereign is the 
supreme pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his sub- 
jects is committed." All other pastors get their authority 
from him. In a commonwealth, as supreme pastor, the 
sovereign has authority to preach, to baptize, to consecrate 
temples and pastors to the service of God. He has 
supreme power in matters of policy and religion and can 
make what laws he deems fit for the government of his 
subjects. He has the right to determine what doctrines 
are to be taught and who is to teach them. If in things 

1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XXIX. 



26 INTR OD UC TION. 

religious the sovereign hands over the government of his 
subjects to a pope, or a supreme pastor, or an " assembly 
of pastors," these then exercise their charge not jure divino, 
but jure civili, — not in God's right, but in the right of the 
sovereign. Whereas, the sovereign himself performs his 
office as supreme pastor jure divino. The sovereign, then, is 
supreme in things religious with reference to the government 
of his subjects. 1 But here again appears the question of the 
individual conscience. We have seen that in things civil ex- 
ternal actions in defiance of the sovereign's will cannot be 
tolerated on the ground of the claims of the individual 
conscience. Is this so also in matters of religion ? Hobbes's 
position on this difficult question is admirably stated by 
Professor Robertson as follows : " It is impossible that 
the state by any machinery of instruction or of penalties 
should control the thoughts and feelings of the subject. On 
the subject's side, with freedom of thought left ever un- 
touched, the claim of anything that can be called conscience 
to override the sovereign's commands must be at once 
rejected. This is plain so far as temporal affairs are con- 
cerned ; for the laws of nature enjoin civil obedience as the 
elementary condition of human welfare. In case of reli- 
gion, if natural religion is meant, it is not otherwise, because 
the law of nature is but another name for the law of God ; 
if revealed religion, everything depends upon a true under- 
standing of its import. Now what, according to Scripture, 
is really necessary for salvation ? Only the confession 
that Jesus is the Christ, with whatever is involved therein, 
but excluding all the vain dogmas invented by church doc- 
tors under the influence of pagan philosophy. The sover- 
eign power which utters any command trenching on the 
religious sphere is either Christian or it is not. If Chris- 
tian, it will not go against the fundamental tenet. What- 
ever it enjoins is, therefore, either indifferent, or is likely 
1 Leviathan, Pt. III., chap. XLIL; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. II., chap. VI. 



INTR OD UC TION. 2 7 

to have as much Scriptural warrant as can be adduced 
for the opinions of private men or for the injunctions of any 
pretended universal church ; not to say that some determi- 
nation of controversial points in religion is necessary. In 
either case, the subject may safely follow its command, 
more especially as no mental assent — only outward con- 
formity — is extorted ; and would do wrong not to follow it, 
because otherwise civil anarchy must result. If, on the 
other hand, the sovereign power is not professedly Chris- 
tian, the subject cannot indeed be expected, in a case where 
something is required involving damnation, to obey man 
rather than God. Let him then be ready, if need be, to 
lay down his life, expecting the reward in heaven of his 
martyrdom ; but in any case let him not resist a power which, 
whether Christian or not, is divinely appointed, since it has 
its origin in reason uttering the law of nature, which is 
the law of God." 1 

But although the sovereign is in no way subject to the 
people of a commonwealth, nor in any manner subject to 
the civil laws, he is, however, subject to the law of nature ; 
and is accountable to God, who is author of the law of 
nature, for his conduct. 2 The duty to which he is obliged 
by the law of nature is to secure the end for which sover- 
eignty was established: "the procuration of the safety of 
the people" " By safety here, is not meant a bare preser- 
vation, but also all other contentments of life, which every 
man by lawful industry, without danger, or hurt to the 
commonwealth, shall acquire to himself." 3 This is to be 
done mainly "by a general providence contained in public 
instruction, both of doctrine and example ; and in the mak- 
ing and executing of good laws, to which individual persons 
may apply their own cases." 4 It is contrary to the duty of 

1 Hobbes, Edinburgh, 1886, pp. 1 54-55- 

2 Leviathan, Pt. II., chaps. XXIX. and XXX. 

3 Ibid.; also Be Corp. Pol., chap. IX. 

4 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XXX. 



28 INTRODUCTION. 

the sovereign to transfer or to relinquish his rights, because 
this would mean the dissolution of the commonwealth and 
a return to a state of nature, which is a state of war, which 
is the greatest evil possible to life. The sovereign must 
maintain his rights in their entirety. Again, it is contrary 
to his duty to allow the people to be in ignorance or 
wrongly informed in regard to the grounds of his rights, 
because through ignorance and wrong information men are 
seduced and influenced to resistance when the common- 
wealth calls for their use and exercise. The sovereign, then, 
is under obligation only to the law of nature — accountable 
only to God who is the author of this law. 1 The measure 
of his obligation is determined by the end for which sover- 
eignty is established. 

But with this absoluteness of the sovereign goes a certain 
"liberty" of the subject. Because, "whensoever a man 
transferreth his right, or renounceth it ; it is either in con- 
sideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself ; 
or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a 
voluntary act : and of the voluntary acts of every man, the 
object is some good to himself. And therefore there be 
some rights, which no man can be understood by any words, 
or other signs, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first 
a man cannot lay down the right of resisting thern, that 
assault him by force, to take away his life ; because he can- 
not be understood to aim thereby, at any good to himself. 
The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and impris- 
onment." 2 Not, then, having renounced all rights by his 
submission to the sovereign, a certain amount of "liberty" 
is his while subject to the sovereign. That is to say, there 
are some things " which, though commanded by the sover- 

1 The right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth 
those that break his laws, is to be derived, not from his creating them, 
as if he required obedience as of gratitude for bis benefits; but from 
his irresistible power. — Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XXXI. 

2 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIV. 



INTR 0£> UC TION. 



29 



eign, he may, nevertheless, without injustice refuse to do." 
A man is at liberty to disobey the command of the sover- 
eign, though justly condemned, "to kill, wound, or maim 
himself" ; or, when he is commanded, "not to resist those 
that assault him ; or to abstain from the use of food, air, 
medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot 
live." l He is not under obligation, when guilty of crime, to 
confess it when interrogated by the sovereign, unless assured 
of pardon. Neither is he under obligation to yield obedi- 
ence to the sovereign's command, to "execute any danger- 
ous or dishonorable office," if disobedience does not frus- 
trate the end for which sovereign power was established. 
And, finally, when the sovereign power is no longer able to 
protect the subject, then the subject's obligation to the 
sovereign ceases. In short, man's chief end is self-preser- 
vation. For the better realization of this end he forsakes 
a state of nature and becomes a member of the common- 
wealth according to the manner already described. When 
the State, whether justly or unjustly, seeks to destroy or 
injure him, then man has the right to resist the State. He 
has entered into no covenant which obliges him to submit 
to death or injury of the character described above ; but, 
rather, into a covenant whereby security of life and person 
may better be attained than in a state of nature. In his " act 
of submission " he has not surrendered all rights, but only 
a right to all things. He has given up only those rights 
which, if retained, would make against "the peace of man- 
kind " which the laws of nature dictate to be essential for 
the security of his person ; but has retained the right to 
defend himself against death, wounds, imprisonment, etc., 
even in defiance of the command of the sovereign. And if 
sovereignty fails in its power to protect the subject — to 
procure his safety — then the subject is no longer under 
obligation to the sovereign, for no man can relinquish the 

1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XXI. 



3° INTRODUCTION. 

right which he has by nature to protect himself when there 
is no one else to protect him. 1 To the liberty of the sub- 
ject mentioned above must also be added the freedom to 
govern himself as he pleases in all of those things concern- 
ing which the sovereign has made no provision in the 
form of laws for the regulation of the conduct of his sub- 
jects. 

We notice, then, in what precedes that there are two 
parts to the ethical philosophy of Hobbes. He speaks of 
a morality founded on reason and a morality founded 
on the will of the sovereign. These two aspects of his 
ethical teaching have not always been recognized by 
students of his system. A number of his critics, if con- 
scious of this twofold division at all, have at least treated 
Hobbes in their criticism as though he simply taught 
a positive, institutional, political morality, — a morality 
founded on the will of the sovereign. That Hobbes by his 
inconsistencies and his baldness of statement has sometimes 
furnished grounds for such an interpretation no one familiar 
with his works can deny. He says, for example : " The 
desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. 
No more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, 
till they know a law that forbids them : which till laws be 
made they cannot know : nor can any law be made, till they 
have agreed upon the person that shall make it." 2 He 
speaks here, of course, of civil law, and not of law im- 
posed upon man by his moral personality. Again, he says, 
speaking of men in a state of nature : " The notions of 
right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. 
Where there is no common power, there is no law : where 
no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two 
cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the 
faculties, neither of the body, nor mind. ]f they were, they 

1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XXI. 

2 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIII. 



INTR OD UC TION. 3 1 

might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well 
as his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate 
to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also 
to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no 
dominion, no mine and thine distinct ; but only that to be 
every man's, that he can get ; and for so long, as he can 
keep it." 1 Here, at least, the surface interpretation of his 
teaching would indicate that right and wrong are merely the 
creatures of the sovereign's fiat. In the De Cive his words 
are essentially the same : " Doctrinas de justo et injusto, 
bono et malo, praeter leges in unaquaque civitate constitutas 
authenticas esse nullas." And also in the following : "Ad 
civitatem pertinet etiam Christianam quid sit justitia, quid 
injustitia, sive peccatum contra justitiam determinare." Once 
more he says : "pleasure therefore, or delight, is the appar- 
ence or sense of good ; ... Of pleasures or delights, some 
arise from the sense of an object present ; and those may 
be called pleasure of sense; the word sensual, as it is used by 
those only that condemn them, having no place till there 
be laws." 2 He speaks here again of civil laws. But while 
these statements and others like them, which are numerous 
in the writings of Hobbes, seem to furnish some ground for 
the interpretation of Hobbes as teaching merely an institu- 
tional morality, no careful student of his ethical philosophy 
can fail to recognize that Hobbes emphatically taught a 
morality of reason which is antecedent to and independent 
of a political morality. This is evident from his general 
teaching concerning "the laws of nature," which, accord- 
ing to Hobbes, are obligatory upon man as man. " A law 
of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule, found 
out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, 
which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means 
of preserving the same ; and to omit that, by which he 

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIII. 

2 Ibid., chap. VI. 



3 2 INTR OD UC TION. 

thinketh it may be best preserved." 1 We have already 
seen that these "laws of nature," according to Hobbes, are 
always binding inforo interno. They are not always bind- 
ing in foro externo, as, for example, when others do not obey 
them, and we, by yielding obedience to them under such 
circumstances, would subject ourselves to the prey of others. 
We have also seen that the laws are immutable and eternal. 
Hobbes further tells us that " he that is subject to no civil 
law " sins " in all he does against his conscience, because 
he has no other rule to follow but his own reason." 2 Again, 
he says : " Every man by natural passion, calleth that good 
which pleaseth him for the present, or so far forth as he 
can foresee ; and in like manner, that which displeaseth 
him, evil. And therefore he that foreseeth the whole way 
to his preservation, which is the end that every one by 
nature aimeth at, must also call it good, and the contrary 
evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man 
in passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And there- 
fore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason, and the 
breaking of them evil. And so also the habit, or disposition, 
or intention to fulfill them good ; and the neglect of them 
evil." 3 Again, he says: "And seeing that the laws of 
nature concern the conscience, not he only breaketh them 
that doth any action contrary, but also he whose action is 
conformable to them, in case he thinketh it contrary. For 
though the action chance to be right, yet in his judgment 
he despiseth the law." 4 Thus we see that Hobbes believed 
in a morality independent of and antecedent to the will of 
the sovereign, in an eternal and immutable morality which 
is binding upon the conscience of man. A morality founded 
upon reason. To ignore this aspect of Hobbes's teaching, 
in criticising his ethical philosophy, is manifestly unjust. 
But we have also seen that he teaches an institutional 

i Leviathan., Pt. I., chap. XIV. 2 Ibid., Pt. II., chap. XXIX. 

3 De Corp. Pol, Pt. I., chap. IV. i Ibid. 



INTR OD UC TION. 3 3 

morality to which apparently the scruples of the individual 
conscience must give way — the sovereign's will being the 
measure of virtue, good and evil, right and wrong. Is 
there any consistency in such teaching ? Are not these 
two aspects of Hobbes's ethical philosophy positively 
antithetical ? These questions can best be answered by 
examining more closely the nature of the two kinds (if 
we may so speak) of morality of which Hobbes treats. The 
morality of reason may be described as follows : Every 
man's chief good is self-preservation, and every man is 
obliged by the laws of nature (the morality of reason) to 
do those things which reason dictates to be the best means 
for the attainment of this end, and to refrain from those 
things which he thinks may make against this good. He 
is, therefore, in the first place, under moral obligation to 
preserve himself even against himself. The man as reason 
must preserve himself against the man as passion. Be- 
cause the man as passion seeks his own destruction, which 
of course is against the man's chief good, — self-preserva- 
tion. On this point Hobbes says, after unfolding the laws 
of nature with reference to the preservation " of men in 
multitudes," that "there be other things tending to the 
destruction of particular men ; as drunkenness, and all other 
parts of intemperance ; which may therefore also be reck- 
oned amongst those things which the law of nature hath 
forbidden ; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are 
pertinent enough to this place." 1 But, in the second place, 
man is under moral obligation, i.e., is obligated by a law of 
his rational nature, to seek and maintain his chief good, — 
self-preservation, — against the assaults actual or possible 
of other men. And whatever is necessary for the accom- 
plishment of this task, even though it involve the destruc- 
tion of the goods and bodies of other men, his rational 
nature commands. And what is commanded by his rational 

1 Leviathan, chap. XV. 



3 4 INTR OD UC TION. 

nature is morally right. This is undoubtedly what Hobbes 
means when he says that in a state of nature there is no 
right or wrong, justice or injustice. He means, not that 
there is ho moral law for the individual with reference to 
himself. As a being whose chief good is self-preservation, 
he is under obligation to his rational nature to use the best 
means, so far as his knowledge goes, to realize this good. 
But he owes nothing to anybody else. Others have no 
moral claims upon him. He may use any man in any 
manner possible to attain his own end, — self-preservation. 
Indeed, reason obliges him to do so. In such an endeavor 
to realize the end one cannot do wrong, or be unjust to 
another. This is the ethics of reason which is man's sole 
guide in a state of nature. But the ethics of reason in- 
volves something more. Man's rational nature dictates 
that the good which is his chief end cannot be attained 
in a state of nature ; for such a state is one of continual 
war in which man's chief good is threatened. It can best 
be attained in a society organized under government, — 
in a commonwealth where men surrender their right to 
all things (the exercise of which on the part of all men 
endangers the safety of each) to a sovereign whose office is 
to secure them this good. Hence, reason dictates that men 
should take upon themselves the government of themselves 
according to the dictates of political morality, the nature 
of which consists in submission to the sovereign's will as 
the measure of all things, even of right and wrong, good 
and evil, to the extent indicated by the covenant by which 
the commonwealth was founded, because in this way they 
can best realize the end to which they are ordained by 
nature. In other words, the morality of reason binds man 
to "put on " the institutional morality, because the morality 
of reason has to do with the means of man's self-preservation, 
and reason points out that existence in a commonwealth, 
with all the surrender that this implies, is a better means 



INTR OD UC TION. 3 5 

to this end than is existence in a state of nature in which 
a man has a right to all things. The State, then, is a moral 
institution. It subserves a moral purpose, — " the procu- 
ration of the safety of the people." It rests upon moral 
laws, — the laws of nature or the laws of reason. Outward 
submission to all that the State decrees, as long as it accom- 
plishes the end for which it is established, is the most moral 
thing a man can do. The will of the sovereign, inasmuch 
as it makes for peace, which makes for the preservation of 
men, is morally binding. The sovereign's commands, in 
that they make for peace, are rational. And what is thus 
rational is morally obligatory. Thus we see that the 
relation between the two aspects of Hobbes's ethical philos- 
ophy is not an artificial, but an exceedingly natural one. In 
fact, there is really only one kind of morality, — the morality 
of reason ; and the political morality, founded on the will 
of the sovereign, is, in the final analysis, merely a form of 
the morality of reason. 



III. 

Considerations in Studying the Ethics of Hobbes. 

To fully appreciate the ethical and political philosophy 
of Hobbes, we must take into consideration the nature of 
the man as it affected his speculations. Hobbes was a 
creature of fear. He himself says, speaking of his birth 
and disposition, " I was the victim of unjust time, and 
along with me numerous ills were also born. For the 
report was spread abroad among our towns that with that 
fleet [the Spanish Armada] the last day of our nation 
was at hand. And then my mother conceived such fear 
that she gave birth to twins, myself and Fear. Hence it 
is, as I believe, that I detest my country's enemies, and 
love peace, in the company of the Muses and pleasant 



3 6 INTR OD UC TION. 

companions." 1 This fear, which held Hobbes in its vice- 
like grip, did not simply manifest itself in a detestation of 
his country's enemies and in a general inclination for 
peace, but in an almost constant concern with regard to 
his personal safety and in an almost morbid terror of 
death. This anxiety for his personal safety and horrible 
fear of death, intensified by the uncertain and troublous 
condition of the times, had a tendency to beget in him a 
general distrust of men, so that the unworthy conceptions 
of human nature which underlie his ethical and political 
philosophy must be studied in the light of this fact. 

A second thing which must be taken into consideration 
in studying the ethical and political philosophy of Hobbes 
is the character of the times in which he lived. Hardly 
any fact is more familiar to the student of the history of 
speculative thought than the influence of an age upon the 
reflective thought of that age. Speculative thinkers do 
not escape the effects of environment. Hobbes is no 
exception to the rule. He lived in one of the most unset- 
tled and stormy periods of English history. It was a 
period of confusion and strife. The State was torn with 
political and ecclesiastical contentions. Parliament con- 
tended with the Crown. The Church contended with the 
State- Politics had bred a number of hostile factions. 
The Church had split into a variety of warring sects. So 
that Hobbes lived almost constantly in an atmosphere of 
strife. Such a condition of things undoubtedly had its 
influence upon him, both in suggesting for consideration 
problems of an ethico-political character as well as affect- 
ing his thought in the solution of the same. Studying his 
ethical and political philosophy in the light of the condi- 
tions under which he reflected and wrote, one can, in a 
measure, at least, understand how he was led to form a 
conception of human nature so utterly selfish and unsocial. 

1 Quoted from Morris's British Thought and Thinkers, chap. VI. 



INTR OB UC 770 AT. 3 7 

It would be extravagant, of course, to suppose that his 
conclusions concerning the nature of men revealed in his 
psychological analysis were merely the product of his sur- 
roundings. But, on the other hand, it would be erroneous 
to suppose they were merely the result of self-examination, 
as he informs us, 1 or of speculations born of "the den." 
Hobbes, to a very large extent, dealt with human nature 
as he constantly observed it in the men of his time. He 
did not so much deal with human nature in the abstract 
as in the concrete ; not so much with man as with men ; 
and with men as they came under his observation. And 
what an exhibition of human nature did these men afford. 
As one has said, " the men by whom he was surrounded 
were distrustful of each other. Anarchy, as he judged, 
had gained the ascendency. In the civil wars men had 
returned to the state of nature. Hobbes saw them as chil- 
d?-en of wrath, hateful and hating each other." 2 This sel- 
fishness and unsociality, so manifest in his day, undoubtedly 
appealed to Hobbes as of the very essence of human nature. 
And with such a conception of the essential nature of men 
we can further understand how Hobbes was led to form 
what many of his critics regarded as extreme and danger- 
ous views of the nature of sovereignty. What, human 
nature being the Ishmaelitish thing the age is constantly 
demonstrating it to be, is to help men out of this state of 
strife ? Nothing, thought Hobbes, but the establishment 
of a supreme authority, possessed of sufficient power to 
compel men, through fear of penalty, to live like creatures 
of " reason " rather than like creatures of " passion." This, 
and this only, is the means by which men are to emerge 
from a state of nature which is a state of war, into a state 
of peace which is a state of safety and contentment. This, 
and this only, is the means by which men, who are already 

1 Introduction to the Leviathan. 

2 Hunt, Religious Thought in England, Vol. I., p. 385. 



3 8 INTR OD UC TION. 

members of an organized society, can be kept from relaps- 
ing into a state of nature. A sovereign power is necessary 
for peace, and the sovereign power must be sovereign. It 
must be the measure of all things necessary for the " pro- 
curation of the safety of the people." 

Another point to be considered in an attempt to properly 
understand the practical philosophy of Hobbes is its rela- 
tion to preceding and contemporary thought. Concerning 
the former, there is comparatively little to be said. Hobbes 
was not an erudite man. He was wont to say that had he 
read as much as others he would be as ignorant as they. 
Still, he was more or less acquainted with the works of 
some of his predecessors in these departments of thought. 
This is undoubtedly true with reference to Aristotle. He 
was acquainted with both the Ethics and Politics of the 
Greek philosopher, and had no respect for either. He 
criticises some of the positions taken by Aristotle in the 
Politics} It is quite probable also that he was familiar 
with the views of Bodin, as expressed in his somewhat 
famous work entitled Six Livres de la Republique, and 
was to a certain extent influenced by them. 2 Concerning 
his relation to contemporary thought, it may be said, that 
the age of Hobbes was signalized by a decided revolt 
against scholasticism, and especially against the scholastic 
conceptions and methods of studying nature. The phi- 
losophy of nature which had long prevailed was dominated 
by the conceptions of Aristotle. Physical phenomena were 
explained from the standpoint of final causes. Against this 
method of dealing with nature the new philosophy set 
itself. It pursued a different course. The scientific mind 
had begun to appreciate the value of mathematics for the 
explanation of physical phenomena. As a result, mechan- 

1 Leviathan, Pt. IV., chap. XLVI. 

2 Cf. Dunning, Jean Bodin on Sovereignty, &c, Pol. Science Quar., 
Vol. XL, No. i." 



INTRODUCTION. 39 

ism rather than final cause was the principle applied in 
accounting for the constitution and construction of things. 
Greatly impressed by the mechanical conception of nature, 
Hobbes not only made use of the principle of mechanism 
in the explanation of so-called physical phenomena, but ex- 
tended it beyond the sphere of physical science into the 
domain of psychological, social, political, and ethical phe- 
nomena ; and, as before stated, quoting the words of 
Falckenberg, " Mechanism applied to the world gives mate- 
rialism ; applied to knowledge, sensationalism of a mechan- 
ical type ; applied to the will, determinism ; to morality 
and the State, ethical and political naturalism." It is 
indeed in the application of this principle of mechanism, 
which he had received from his age, to the explanation of 
ethical and political life, resulting in "ethical and political 
naturalism," that much of Hobbes's historical significance 
as a writer on ethical and political subjects lies. One of 
the principal reasons why he is called the father of modern 
ethics is his treatment of ethics from this naturalistic stand- 
point, and thus he proves to be the first to liberate ethics 
from the domination of theology. Even Bacon, who stands 
out so conspicuously as the foe of scholasticism, did not 
succeed in freeing ethics entirely from theology. Indeed, 
he acknowledges " that a great part of the law moral is of 
that perfection whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire." 
The "light of nature" is simply "sufficient to check the 
vice, not to inform the duty." x We are dependent on 
revelation for the latter. 

IV. 

Influence of the Speculations of Hobbes. 

The doctrines of Hobbes exerted a marked influence on 
contemporary and subsequent thought. Warburton says : 

1 Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. 158. 



40 IXTRODUCTION. 

" The philosopher of Malmesbury was the terror of the last 
age, as Tindal and Collins have been of this. The press 
sweat with controversy ; and every young churchman mili- 
tant would needs try his arms in thundering upon Hobbes's 
steel cap." Mackintosh says: "The answers to the 
Leviathan would form a library." In the ethical field 
the opposition moved along two lines. In the first place, 
his institutional morality, which made the sovereign's will 
the measure of right and wrong, called forth specially 
the opposition of Cudworth and Clarke. In opposition to 
it, they proclaimed an eternal and immutable morality, 
founded on the nature of things. Moral relations are not 
the creations of the sovereign's will or the result of legis- 
lative enactment. They are antecedent to and independ- 
ent of the sovereign's will or civil law. They are inherent 
in the very nature of things. In the second place, Hobbes's 
theory of constitutional egoism, which, as we have seen, 
underlies his theory of morality, met with very vigorous 
opposition. These opponents of Hobbes met him on his 
own ground. That is, they entered into a psychological 
analysis of man, endeavoring to show that such an analysis 
reveals not a constitutional egoism, as Hobbes claims, 
but rather that man is by nature social and capable of 
altruistic conduct. Among the first, if not the first, to meet 
Hobbes on these grounds was Richard Cumberland. In his 
De Legibus Natitrae Disquisitio Philosophica, he contends 
that man by nature is social, and, therefore, a state of 
nature is not one of mutual warfare. This is plainly 
indicated both in the bodily and mental constitution of 
man. He also regards the universal good, instead of 
the individual's good, as the great end of conduct for 
rational beings. Indeed, he holds that the good of 
each is absolutely dependent upon the "good of all." 
Shaftesbury was another writer who opposed Hobbes, 
mainly on psychological grounds. In his treatise, enti- 



TNTR OD UC TION. 4 * 

tied An Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit, he . endeavors 
to show that an analysis of man reveals the fact that he 
has "natural affections " which impel him to activity for 
the public good, as well as self-affections which impel him 
to seek his own private good. Bishop Butler, also, even 
more strongly than Shaftesbury, attempts to refute the 
psychological egoism of Hobbes. In his famous Sermons 
on Human Nature he endeavors to establish the thesis 
"that there are as real and the same kind of indications 
in human nature, that we were made for society and to do 
good to our fellow-creatures ; as that we were intended to 
take care of our own life and health and private good ; and 
that the same objections lie against one of these assertions, 
as against the other." This psychological treatment of 
ethics, which resulted from Hobbes founding moral relations 
ultimately on the essential constitution of man, has largely 
characterized English ethics from that day to the present 
time. 1 

In the field of political speculative thought we find 
the influence of Hobbes's speculations very manifest. In 
Great Britain, Clarenden, in his Brief Views and Survey 
of the Dangerous and Pernicious Errors to Church and 
State, in Mr. Hobbes's Book entitled "Leviathan," vigorously 
opposed the theory of Hobbes concerning sovereignty. 
The sovereign's absolute independence of his subjects was 
an especially objectionable feature of Hobbes's theory in 
the opinion of Clarenden. On the Continent the influ- 
ence of Hobbes's speculations are manifest, especially in 
the writings of Spinoza and Rousseau. Spinoza, both in 
his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and his Tractatus Politicus, 
adopts a number of the cardinal features of the theory 
of Hobbes concerning the organization of the common- 
wealth. 2 He agrees with Hobbes in his conception of 

1 Cf. Robertson, Hobbes, chap. IX. 

2 For an excellent comparison between the main features of the 
political theories of Hobbes and Spinoza, consult Sir F. Pollock's Spi- 



42 IXTRODUCTIOX. 

men in a state of nature. "Homines ex natura hostes," 1 
says Spinoza. Again, he is in agreement with Hobbes 
with regard to the motive which impels men to organize 
the State. It is the motive of self-preservation. He differs 
from Hobbes, however, in his views on the form of govern- 
ment. In the Tractatus I'heologico- Politicus, he favors a 
democratic form of government. Later, in his Iractatus 
Politicus, he inclines to an aristocracy. Rousseau, in his 
Discourse sur Vinegalite des conditions pariun ks homines, as 
well as in his Conirat Social, reveals the influence of the 
English thinker. He adheres to the social contract theory, 
but differs materially from Hobbes in his application of it. 2 
Later, the influence of Hobbes's political philosophy may 
be found in the writings of Bentham and Austin. Speaking 
of Spinoza's "philosophy of law and government," Pollock 

noza : His Life and Philosophy, chap. X. See also Spinoza's Works, 
edited by Bruder, Vol. II., Epist. I., p. 298. for Spinoza's conception of 
the difference between some of his views and those of Hobbes. 

1 Tractatus Politicus, chap. II., § 14. 

2 Bluntschli gives a rather interesting comparison between Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau in their application of this theory. " It should 
be noted," he says, "that the Theory of Contract is applied in quite 
different ways by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. According to Hobbes 
{Leviathan, chap. XVII.), men only pass from 'the state of nature ' to 
the social state by surrendering their rights to a sovereign (one, few, or 
many); Locke {Treatises on Government, Bk. II., §6) supposes rights, 
e.g., of liberty and property, to exist in a state of nature ; by the 'original 
compact ' a form of government is instituted to secure these rights 
(chap. VIII.). According to Rousseau, men pass from the state of 
nature to the social state by the social contract (as in Hobbes's theory), 
but the sovereign to whom each surrenders his rights is 'the people,' 
so that each is sovereign as well as subject (Contr. Soc, I., C. 6). 
This sovereignty is inalienable (II., C. 1); a government is not insti- 
tuted by a contract (III., C. 16), as in Locke's theory; the govern- 
ment is only the minister of the General Will. Thus, according to 
Hobbes, a revolution against the de facto government, which he identi- 
fies with the sovereign, implies a return to the state of nature, anarchy, 
and is quite unjustifiable. Accoi'ding to Locke, a revolution may be 
justifiable where the government has ceased to fulfill its part of the 
contract, i.e., to protect personal rights. According to Rousseau, a revo- 
lution would be only a change of ministry." — The Theory of the State, 
6th ed., trans., Bk. IV., chap. IX. For a brief account of the develop- 



INTR OD UC TION. 43 

it belongs to " the general doctrine characteristic of 
the English school of jurisprudence.'' He then adds: 
" This doctrine was first clearly given out by Hobbes, then 
taken up after a long interval by Bentham, then carried 
on with additions into a new generation by Austin ; it has 
in our own time been endowed, by the work of Sir Henry 
Maine and others, with the breadth and flexibility that were 
wanting in its earlier stages, and is now accepted, with more 
or less development and modification, by nearly all English 
writers who pay any serious attention to the scientific study 
of law." 1 

ment of the social contract theory in the eighteenth century, see F. Pol- 
lock's History of the Science of Politics, pp. 65-92. Willoughby gives a 
brief history of the theory in The State, chap. IV. For a criticism of the 
theory, consult Bluntschli, loc. cit. ; Woolsey, Political Science, Vol. I., 
Pt. II., chap. II.; Willoughby, op. cit., chap. V. The principal argu- 
ments urged against the theory are, that it is conducive to anarchy ; that 
it lacks historical foundation ; and that it is illogical. 

1 Spinoza : His Life and Philosophy, chap. X. On this point, see also 
Robertson, Hobbes, chap. X. 



LEVIATHAN -SELECTIONS. 



PART I. — OF MAN 



CHAPTER I. 
Of Sense. 

Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them 
first singly, and afterwards in train, or dependence upon 
one another. Singly, they are every one a " representa- 
tion " or "appearance," of some quality, or other acci- 
dent of a body without us, which is commonly called an 
"object." Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and 
other parts of a man's body ; and by diversity of working, 
produceth diversity of appearances. 

The original of them all, is that which we call "sense," 
for there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath 
not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the 
organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original. 

To know the natural cause of sense, is not very neces- 
sary to the business now in hand ; and I have elsewhere 
written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each 
part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same 
in this place. 

The cause of sense, is the external body, or object, 
which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either 
immediately, as in the taste and touch ; or mediately, as in 
seeing, hearing, and smelling ; which pressure, by the 
mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes 
of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, 



40 OF MAN. 

causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour 
of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because 
" outward," seemeth to be some matter without. And this 
"seeming," or "fancy," is that which men call "sense"; 
and consisteth, as to the eye, in a "light," or " colour fig- 
ured " ; to the ear, in a " sound " ; to the nostril, in an 
" odour " ; to the tongue and palate, in a " savour " ; and to 
the rest of the body, in "heat," " cold," " hardness," "soft- 
ness," and such other qualities as we discern by "feeling." 
All which qualities, called "sensible," are in the object, 
that causeth them, but so many several motions of the 
matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither 
in us that are pressed, are they anything else, but divers 
motions ; for motion produceth nothing but motion. But 
their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking, that 
dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye, 
makes us fancy a light ; and pressing the ear, produceth 
a din ; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the 
same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if 
those colours and sounds were in the bodies, or objects that 
cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by 
glasses, and in echoes by reflection, we see they are; where 
we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in 
another. And though at some certain distance, the real 
and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in 
us ; yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy 
is another. So that sense, in all cases, is nothing else 
but original fancy, caused, as I have said, by the pressure, 
that is, by the motion, of external things upon our eyes, 
ears, and other organs thereunto ordained. 

But the philosophy-schools, through all the universities 
of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, 
teach another doctrine, and say, for the cause of " vision," 
that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a " visible 
species," in English, a "visible show," "apparition," or 



OF IMAGINATION. 49 

"aspect," or " a being seen"; the receiving whereof into 
the eye, is "seeing." And for the cause of "hearing," that 
the thing heard, sendeth forth an "audible species," that 
is an "audible aspect," or "audible being seen"; which 
entering at the ear, maketh " hearing." Nay, for the cause of 
"understanding " also, they say the thing understood, send- 
eth forth an "intelligible species," that is, an "intelligible 
being seen "; which, coming into the understanding, makes 
us understand. I say not this, as disproving the use of 
universities ; but because I am to speak hereafter of their 
office in a commonwealth, I must let you see on all occa- 
sions by the way, what things would be amended in them ; 
amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one. 

CHAPTER II. 

Of Imagination. 

That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, 
it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. 
But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in 
motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be 
the same, namely, that nothing can change itself, is not 
so easily assented to. For men measure, not only other 
men, but all other things, by themselves ; and because they 
find themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, 
think everything else grows weary of motion, and seeks 
repose of its own accord ; little considering, whether it be 
not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they 
find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that the 
schools say, heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appe- 
tite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place 
which is most proper for them ; ascribing appetite, and 
knowledge of what is good for their conservation, which is 
more than man has, to things inanimate, absurdly. 



50 OF MAN. 

When a body is once in motion, it moveth, unless some- 
thing else hinder it, eternally ; and whatsoever hindreth it, 
cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees, quite 
extinguish it ; and as we see in the water, though the wind 
cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after : 
so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the 
internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, &c. 
For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still 
retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure 
than when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call " imagi- 
nation," from the image made in seeing; and apply the 
same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the 
Greeks call it "fancy" ; which signifies "appearance," and 
is as proper to one sense, as to another. " Imagination " 
therefore is nothing but "decaying sense " ; and is found 
in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, 
as waking. 

The decay of sense in men waking, is not the decay of 
the motion made in sense ; but an obscuring of it, in such 
manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the 
stars ; which stars do no less exercise their virtue, by 
which they are visible, in the day than in the night. But 
because amongst many strokes, which our eyes, ears, and 
other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant 
only is sensible ; therefore, the light of the sun being pre- 
dominant, we are not affected with the action of the stars. 
And any object being removed from our eyes, though the 
impression it made in us remain, yet other objects more 
present succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of 
the past is obscured, and made weak, as the voice of a man 
is in the noise of the day. From whence it followeth, that 
the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any 
object, the weaker is the imagination. For the continual 
change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in 
sense were moved : so that distance of time, and of place, 



OF IMAGINATION. 51 

hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great dis- 
tance of place, that which we look at appears dim, and 
without distinction of the smaller parts ; and as voices 
grow weak, and inarticulate ; so also, after great distance 
of time, our imagination of the past is weak ; and we lose, 
for example, of cities we have seen, many particular streets, 
and of actions, many particular circumstances. This "de- 
caying sense," when we would express the thing itself, 
I mean "fancy" itself, we call "imagination," as I said 
before : but when we would express the decay, and signify 
that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called "mem- 
ory." So that imagination and memory are but one thing, 
which for divers considerations hath divers names. 

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called " ex- 
perience." Again, imagination being only of those things 
which have been formerly perceived by sense, either all at 
once, or by parts at several times ; the former, which is 
the imagining the whole object as it was presented to the 
sense, is "simple" imagination, as when one imagineth a 
man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is 
"compounded " ; as when, from the sight of a man at one 
time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a 
Centaur. So when a man compoundeth the image of his 
own person with the image of the actions of another man, 
as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexan- 
der, which happeneth often to them that are much taken 
with reading of romances, it is a compound imagination, 
and properly but a fiction of the mind. There be also 
other imaginations that rise in men, though waking, from 
the great impression made in sense : as from gazing upon 
the sun, the impression leaves an image of the sun before 
our eyes a long time after ; and from being long and vehe- 
mently attent upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the 
dark, though awake, have the images of lines and angles 
before his eyes ; which kind of fancy hath no particular 



52 OF MAN. 

name, as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into 
men's discourse. 

The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call 
"dreams." And these also, as all other imaginations, 
have been before, either totally or by parcels, in the sense. 
And because in sense, the brain and nerves, which are the 
necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep, as not 
easily to be moved by the action of external objects, there 
can happen in sleep no imagination, and therefore no 
dream, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward 
parts of man's body ; which inward parts, for the connec- 
tion they have with the brain, and other organs, when they 
be distempered, do keep the same in motion ; whereby the 
imaginations there formerly made, appear as if a man were 
waking ; saving that the organs of sense being now be- 
numbed, so as there is no new object, which can ' master 
and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a 
dream must needs be more clear, in this silence of sense, 
than our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass, 
that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impos- 
sible, to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. 
For my part, when I consider that in dreams I do not 
often nor constantly think of the same persons, places, 
objects, and actions, that I do waking ; nor remember so 
long a train of coherent thoughts, dreaming, as at other 
times ; and because waking I often observe the absurd- 
ity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my 
waking thoughts ; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I 
know I dream not, though when I dream I think myself 
awake. 

And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some 
of the inward parts of the body, divers distempers must 
needs cause different dreams. And hence it is that lying 
cold breedeth dreams of fear, and raiseth the thought and 
image of some fearful object, the motion from the brain to 



OF IMAGINATION. 53 

the inner parts and from the inner parts to the brain being 
reciprocal ; and that as anger causeth heat in some parts 
of the body when we are awake, so when we sleep the over- 
heating of the same parts causeth anger, and raiseth up in 
the brain the imagination of an enemy. In the same man- 
ner, as natural kindness, when we are awake, causeth desire, 
and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body ; 
so also too much heat in those parts, while we sleep, rais- 
eth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shown. 
In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking imagina- 
tions ; the motion when we are awake beginning at one end, 
and when we dream at another. 

The most difficult discerning of a man's dream, from his 
waking thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe 
not that we have slept : which is easy to happen to a man 
full of fearful thoughts, and whose conscience is much 
troubled ; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances of 
going to bed or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth 
in a chair. For he that taketh pains, and industriously 
lays himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant 
fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a 
dream. We read of Marcus Brutus, (one that had his life 
given him by Julius Caesar, and was also his favourite, and 
notwithstanding murdered him), how at Philippi, the night 
before he gave battle to Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearful 
apparition, which is commonly related by historians as a 
vision ; but considering the circumstances, one may easily 
judge to have been but a short dream. For sitting in his 
tent, pensive and troubled with the horror of his rash act, 
it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream 
of that which most affrighted him ; which fear, as by de- 
grees it made him wake, so also it must needs make the ap- 
parition by degrees to vanish ; and having no assurance 
that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a dream, 
or anything but a vision. And this is no very rare acci- 



54 OF MAN. 

dent ; for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be 
timorous and superstitious, possessed with fearful tales, and 
alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and 
believe they see spirits and dead men's ghosts walking in 
churchyards ; whereas it is either their fancy only, or else 
the knavery of such persons as make use of such super- 
stitious fear, to pass disguised in the night, to places they 
would not be known to haunt. 

From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and 
other strong fancies, from vision and sense, did arise the 
greatest part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past, 
that worshipped satyrs, fawns, nymphs, and the like ; and 
now-a-days the opinion that rude people have of fairies, 
ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches. For as 
for witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any real 
power ; but yet that they are justly punished, for the false 
belief they have that they can do such mischief, joined 
with their purpose to do it if they can ; their trade being 
nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science. And 
for fairies, and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has, 
I think, been on purpose either taught or not confuted, to 
keep in credit the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, 
and other such inventions of ghostly men. Nevertheless, 
there is no doubt, but God can make unnatural apparitions ; 
but that he does it so often, as men need to fear such 
things, more than they fear the stay or change of the 
course of nature, which he also can stay, and change, is 
no point of Christian faith. But evil men under pretext 
that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing 
when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue ; it 
is the part of a wise man, to believe them no farther, than 
right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. 
If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and 
with it, prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and 
many other things depending thereon, by which crafty 



TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS. 55 

ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would 
be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience. 

And this ought to be the work of the schools : but they 
rather nourish such doctrine. For, not knowing what 
imagination or the senses are, what they receive, they 
teach : some saying, that imaginations rise of themselves, 
and have no cause ; others, that they rise most commonly 
from the will ; and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) 
into a man by God, and evil thoughts by the devil ; or that 
good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God, and 
evil ones by the devil. Some say the senses receive the 
species of things, and deliver them to the common sense ; 
and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and 
the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment, 
like handing of things from one to another, with many 
words making nothing understood. 

The imagination that is raised in man, or any other crea- 
ture indued with the faculty of imagining, by words, or other 
voluntary signs, is that we generally call "understanding"; 
and is common to man and beast. For a dog by custom 
will understand the call, or the rating of his master ; and so 
will many other beasts. That understanding which is pecul- 
iar to man, is the understanding not only his will, but his 
conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of 
the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other 
forms of speech ; and of this kind of understanding I shall 
speak hereafter. 

CHAPTER III. 

Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations. 

By "consequence," or "train" of thoughts, I understand 
that succession of one thought to another, which is called, 
to distinguish it from discourse in words, " mental discourse." 



56 OF MAN. 

When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next 
thought after, is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. 
Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. 
But as we have no imagination, whereof we have not for- 
merly had sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no transi- 
tion from one imagination to another, whereof we never had 
the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this. 
All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in 
the sense : and those motions that immediately succeeded 
one another in the sense, continue also together after 
sense : insomuch as the former coming again to take place, 
and be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of 
the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plane 
table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by 
the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing 
perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another suc- 
ceedeth, it comes to pass in time, that in the' imagining of 
anything, there is no certainty what we shall imagine next; 
only this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded 
the same before, at one time or another. 

This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two 
sorts. The first is "unguided," "without design," and 
inconstant ; wherein there is no passionate thought, to 
govern and direct those that follow, to itself, as the end and 
scope of some desire, or other passion : in which case the 
thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to 
another, as in a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts 
of men, that are not only without company, but also without 
care of anything ; though even then their thoughts are as 
busy as at other times, but without harmony ; as the sound 
which a lute out of tune would yield to any man ; or in tune, 
to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of 
the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and 
the dependence of one thought upon another. For in a 
discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more 



TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS. 57 

impertinent, than to ask, as one did, what was the value of 
a Roman penny ? Yet the coherence to me was manifest 
enough. For the thought of the war, introduced the thought 
of the delivering up the king to his enemies ; the thought of 
that, brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ ; 
and that again the thought of the thirty pence, which was 
the price of that treason ; and thence easily followed that 
malicious question, and all this in a moment of time ; for 
thought is quick. 

The second is more constant ; as being " regulated " by 
some desire, and design. For the impression made by such 
things as we desire, or fear, is strong, and permanent, or, if 
it cease for a time, of quick return : so strong it is some- 
times, as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire, 
ariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce 
the like of that which we aim at ; and from the thought of 
that, the thought of means to that mean ; and so continu- 
ally, till we come to some beginning within our own power. 
And because the end, by the greatness of the impression, 
comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, 
they are quickly again reduced into the way : which ob- 
served by one of the seven wise men, made him give men 
this precept, which is now worn out, Respice jiiiem ; that is 
to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would 
have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way 
to attain it. 

The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds ; one, 
when of an effect imagined we seek the causes, or means 
that produce it : and this is common to man and beast. 
The other is, when imagining anything whatsoever, we seek 
all the possible effects, that can by it be produced ; that is 
to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it. 
Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man 
only ; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature 
of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual, 



58 OF MAN. 

such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the 
discourse of the mind, when it is governed by design, is 
nothing but "seeking," or the faculty of invention, which 
the Latins called sagacitas, and solertia; a hunting out of the 
causes, of some effect, present or past ; or of the effects, of 
some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what 
he hath lost ; and from that place, and time, wherein he 
misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time 
to time, to find where, and when he had it ; that is to say, 
to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which 
to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his 
thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what 
action, or other occasion might make him lose it. This we 
call "remembrance," or calling to mind: the Latins call it 
"reminiscentia," as it were a "re-conning" of our former 
actions. 

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the 
compass whereof he is to seek ; and then his thoughts run 
over all the parts thereof, in the same manner as one would 
sweep a room, to find a jewel ; or as a spaniel ranges the 
field, till he find a scent ; or as a man should run over the 
alphabet, to start a rhyme. 

Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action ; 
and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the 
events thereof one after another ; supposing like events will 
follow like actions. As he that foresees what will become of 
a criminal, reckons what he has seen follow on the like 
crime before ; having this order of thoughts, the crime, the 
officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Which kind 
of thoughts, is called "foresight," and "prudence," or 
"providence"; and sometimes "wisdom"; though such 
conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circum- 
stances, be very fallacious. But this is certain ; by how 
much one man has more experience of things past, than 
another, by so much also he is more prudent, and his ex- 



TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS. 59 

pectations the seldomer fail him. The " present " only has 
a being in nature ; things " past " have a being in the mem- 
ory only, but things to "come" have no being at all; the 
"future" being but a fiction of the mind, applying the 
sequels of actions past, to the actions that are present; 
which with most certainty is done by him that has most 
experience, but not with certainty enough. And though it 
be called prudence, when the event answereth our expecta- 
tion ; yet in its own nature, it is but presumption. For the 
foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs 
only to him by whose will they are to come. From him 
only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best 
prophet naturally is the best guesser ; and the best guesser, 
he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses 
at : for he hath most "signs " to guess by. 

A "sign " is the evident antecedent of the consequent ; and 
contrarily, the consequent of the antecedent, when the like 
consequences have been observed before : and the oftener 
they have been observed, the less uncertain is the sign. 
And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of 
business, has most signs, whereby to guess at the future 
time ; and consequently is the most prudent : and so much 
more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, 
as not to be equalled by any advantage of natural and 
extemporary wit : though perhaps many young men think 
the contrary. 

Nevertheless it is not prudence that distinguisheth man 
from beast. There be beasts, that at a year old observe 
more, and pursue that which is for their good, more pru- 
dently, than a child can do at ten. 

As prudence is a " presumption " of the "future," con- 
tracted from the "experience " of time "past " : so there is 
a presumption of things past taken from other things, not 
future, but past also. For he that hath seen by what 
courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come into 



60 OF MAN. 

civil war, and then to ruin ; upon the sight of the ruins of 
any other state, will guess, the like war, and the like courses 
have been there also. But this conjecture, has the same 
uncertainty almost with the conjecture of the future ; both 
being grounded only upon experience. 

There is no other act of man's mind, that I can remem- 
ber, naturally planted in him, so as to need no other thing, 
to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with 
the use of his five senses. Those other faculties, of which 
I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man 
only, are acquired and increased by study and industry ; 
and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline ; 
and proceed all from the invention of words, and speech. 
For besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, 
the mind of man has no other motion ; though by the help 
of speech, and method, the same faculties may be improved 
to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living 
creatures. 

Whatsoever we imagine is "finite." Therefore there is 
no idea, or conception of anything we call "infinite." No 
man can have in his mind an image of infinite magni- 
tude ; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infi- 
nite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is 
infinite, we signify only, that we are not able to conceive 
the ends, and bounds of the things named ; having no con- 
ception of the thing, but of our own inability. And there- 
fore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him, 
for he is incomprehensible ; and his greatness, and power 
are unconceivable ; but that we may honour him. Also 
because, whatsoever, as I said before, we conceive, has been 
perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts ; a 
man can have no thought, representing any thing, not sub- 
ject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, 
but he must conceive it in some place ; and indued with 
some determinate magnitude ; and which may be divided 



OF SPEECH. . 6 1 

into parts ; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all 
in another place at the same time ; nor that two, or more 
things can be in one, and the same place at once : for none 
of these things ever have, nor can be incident to sense ; but 
are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any signifi- 
cation at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived, or 
deceiving schoolmen. 



CHAPTER IV. 
Of Speech. 

The invention of "printing," though ingenious, compared 
with the invention of "letters," is no great matter. But 
who was the first that found the use of letters, is not known. 
He that first brought them into Greece, men say was Cad- 
mus, the son of Agenor, king of Phoenicia. A profitable 
invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the 
conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and dis- 
tant regions of the earth ; and withal difficult, as proceed- 
ing from a watchful observation of the divers motions of 
the tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of speech ; whereby 
to make as many differences of characters, to remember 
them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all 
other, was that of "speech," consisting of "names" or 
" appellations," and their connection ; whereby men register 
their thoughts ; recall them when they are past ; and also 
declare them one to another for mutual utility and conver- 
sation ; without which, there had been amongst men, neither 
commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no 
more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves. The first 
author of " speech " was God himself, that instructed Adam 
how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight ; 
for the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this 
was sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the ex- 






62 OF MAN. 

perience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; 
and to join them in such manner by degrees, as to make 
himself understood ; and so by succession of time, so much 
language might be gotten, as he had found use for ; though 
not so copious, as an orator or philosopher has need of: for 
I do not rind any thing in the Scripture, out of which, 
directly or by consequence, can be gathered, that Adam 
was taught the names of all figures, numbers, measures, 
colours, sounds, fancies, relations ; much less the names of 
words and speech, as "general," "special," " affirmative," 
"negative," "interrogative," "optative," "infinitive," all 
which are useful; and least of all, of "entity," " intention- 
ality," "quiddity," and other insignificant words of the 
school. 

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam 
and his posterity, was again lost at the Tower of Babel, 
when, by the hand of God, every man was stricken, for his 
rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And 
being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several 
parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of 
tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in 
such manner, as need, the mother of all inventions, taught 
them ; and in tract of time grew everywhere more copious. 

The general use of speech, is to transfer our mental dis- 
course, into verbal ; or the train of our thoughts, into a 
train of words ; and that for two commodities, whereof 
one is the registering of the consequences of our thoughts ; 
which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a 
new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they 
were marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve 
for "marks," or "notes" of remembrance. Another is, 
when many use the same words, to signify, by their con- 
nection and order, one to another, what they conceive, or 
think of each matter ; and also what they desire, fear, or 
have any other passion for. And for this use they are called 



OF SPEECH. 63 

" signs." Special uses of speech are these ; first, to register, 
what by cogitation, we find to be the cause of any thing, 
present or past ; and what we find things present or past 
may produce, or effect ; which in sum, is acquiring of 
arts. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge which 
we have attained, which is, to counsel and teach one 
another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills and 
purposes, that we may have the mutual help of one another. 
Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves and others, by 
playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, inno- 
cently. 

To these uses, there are also four correspondent abuses. 
First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the 
inconstancy of the signification of their words ; by which 
they register for their conception, that which they never 
conceived, and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when 
they use words metaphorically ; that is, in other sense than 
that they are ordained for ; and thereby deceive others. 
Thirdly, by words, when they declare that to be their will, 
which is not. Fourthly, 'when they use them to grieve one 
another ; for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, 
some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, 
to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech, to grieve 
him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged 
to govern ; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and 
amend. 

The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of 
the consequence of causes and effects, consisteth in the 
imposing of "names," and the "connection " of them. 

Of names, some are "proper," and singular to one only 
thing, as "Peter," "John," "this man," "this tree"; and 
some are "common" to many things, "man," "horse," 
" tree " ; every of which, though but one name, is never- 
theless the name of divers particular things ; in respect of 
all which together, it is called an "universal " ; there being 



64 OF MAN. 

nothing in the world universal but names ; for the things 
named are every one of them individual and singular. 

One universal name is imposed on many things, for their 
similitude in some quality, or other accident ; and whereas 
a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals 
recall any one of those many. 

And of names universal, some are of more, and some of 
less extent ; the larger comprehending the less large ; and 
some again of equal extent, comprehending each other recip- 
rocally. As for example: the name "body" is of larger 
signification than the word "man," and comprehendeth it; 
and the names "man" and "rational," are of equal extent, 
comprehending mutually one another. But here we must 
take notice, that by a name is not always understood, as 
in grammar, one only word ; but sometimes, by circumlo- 
cution, many words together. For all these words, " he that 
in his actions observeth the laws of his country," make but 
one name, equivalent to this one word, "just." 

By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of 
stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the conse- 
quences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning 
of the consequences of appellations. For example : a man 
that hath no use of speech at all, such as is born and remains 
perfectly deaf and dumb, if he set before his eyes a triangle, 
and by it two right angles, such as are the corners of a 
square figure, he may, by meditation, compare and find, that 
the three angles of that triangle, are equal to those two right 
angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shown 
him, different in shape from the former, he cannot know, 
without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also 
be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words, 
when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not 
to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing 
in his triangle ; but only to this, that the sides were straight, 
and the angles three ; and that that was all, for which he 



OF SPEECH. 65 

named it a triangle ; will boldly conclude universally, that 
such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever ; and 
register his invention in these general terms, "every triangle 
hath its three angles equal to two right angles." And thus 
the consequence found in one particular, comes to be reg- 
istered and remembered, as a universal rule, and discharges 
our mental reckoning, of time and place, and delivers us 
from all labour of the mind, saving the first, and makes that 
which was found true " here," and " now," to be true in " all 
times" and "places." 

But the use of words in registering our thoughts is in 
nothing so evident as in numbering. A natural fool that 
could never learn by heart the order of numeral words, as 
"one," "two," and "three," may observe every stroke of 
the clock, and nod to it, or say "one," "one," "one," but 
can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems, there 
was a time when those names of number were not in use ; 
and men were fain to apply their fingers of one or both hands, 
to those things they desired to keep account of ; and that 
thence it proceeded, that now our numeral words are but 
ten, in any nation, and in some but five ; and then they 
begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them 
out of order, will lose himself, and not know when he has 
done. Much less will he be able to add, and subtract, and 
perform all other operations of arithmetic. So that without 
words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers ; much 
less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things, 
the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well- 
being of mankind. 

When two names are joined together into a consequence, 
or affirmation, as thus, "a man is a living creature"; or 
thus, "if he be a man, he is a living creature "; if the latter 
name, "living creature," signify all that the former name 
"man " signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence, is 
"true"; otherwise "false." For "true" and "false" are 



66 OF MAN. 

attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is 
not, there is neither "truth" nor "falsehood"; "error" 
there may be, as when we expect that which shall not be, or 
suspect what has not been ; but in neither case can a man 
be charged with untruth. 

Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of 
names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth 
had need to remember what every name he uses stands for, 
and to place it accordingly, or else he will find himself 
entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs, the more he 
struggles the more belimed. And therefore in geometry, 
which is the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto 
to bestow on mankind, men begin at settling the significa- 
tions of their words ; which settling of significations they 
call "definitions," and place them in the beginning of their 
reckoning. 

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that 
aspires to true knowledge, to examine the definitions of 
former authors ; and either to correct them, where they are 
negligently set down, or to make them himself. For the 
errors of definitions multiply themselves according as the 
reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which 
at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew 
from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their 
errors. From whence it happens, that they which trust to 
books do as they that cast up many little sums into a 
greater, without considering whether those little sums were 
rightly cast up or not ; and at last finding the error visible, 
and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which 
way to clear themselves, but spend time in fluttering over 
their books ; as birds that entering by the chimney, and 
finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false 
light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which 
way they came in. So that in the right definition of names 
lies the first use of speech ; which is the acquisition of 



OF SPEECH. 67 

science : and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first 
abuse ; from which proceed all false and senseless tenets ; 
which make those men that take their instruction from the 
authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to 
be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men 
endued with true science are above it. For between true 
science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. 
Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. 
Nature itself cannot err ; and as men abound in copiousness 
of language, so they become more wise, or more mad than 
ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters for any man to 
become either excellently wise, or, unless his memory be 
hurt by disease or ill constitution of organs, excellently 
foolish. For words are wise men's counters, they do but 
reckon by them ; but they are the money of fools, that value 
them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, 
or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man. 

"Subject to names," is whatsoever can enter into or be 
considered in an account, and be added one to another to 
make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a 
remainder. The Latins called accounts of money rationes, 
and accounting ratiocinatio ; and that which we in bills or 
books of account call "items," they call nomina, that is 
"names " ; and thence it seems to proceed, that they extended 
the word " ratio " to the faculty of reckoning in all other 
things. The Greeks have but one word, Aoyos, for both 
" speech " and " reason "; not that they thought there was 
no speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech: 
and the act of reasoning they called "syllogism," which 
signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to 
another. And because the same thing may enter into 
account for divers accidents, their names are, to show that 
diversity, diversely wrested and diversified. This diversity 
of names may be reduced to four general heads. 

First, a thing may enter into account for " matter " or 



68 OF MAN. 

"body"; as "living," "sensible," "rational," "hot," "cold," 
"moved," " quiet " ; with all which names the word "matter," 
or "body," is understood ; all such being names of matter. 

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for 
some accident or quality which we conceive to be in it ; as 
for "being moved," for "being so long," for "being hot," 
&c. ; and then, of the name of the thing itself, by a little 
change or wresting, we make a name for that accident, 
which we consider ; and for " living " put into the account 
"life"; for "moved," "motion"; for "hot," "heat"; for 
"long," " length," and the like : and all such names are the 
names of the accidents and properties by which one matter 
and body is distinguished from another. These are called 
"names abstract," because severed, not from matter, but 
from the account of matter. 

Thirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own 
bodies, whereby we make such distinction ; as when any- 
thing is seen by us, we reckon not the thing itself, but the 
sight, the colour, the idea of it in the fancy : and when any- 
thing is heard, we reckon it not, but the hearing or sound 
only, which is our fancy or conception of it by the ear ; and 
such are names of fancies. 

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, 
to " names " themselves, and to " speeches " : for " general," 
"universal," "special," "equivocal," are names of names. 
And "affirmation," "interrogation," "commandment," "nar- 
ration," "syllogism," "sermon," "oration," and many other 
such, are names of speeches. And this is all the variety of 
names " positive " ; which are put to mark somewhat which 
is in nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as 
bodies that are, or may be conceived to be ; or of bodies, 
the properties that are, or may be feigned to be ; or words 
and speech. 

There be also other names, called " negative," which are 
notes to signify that a word is not the name of the thing in 



OF SPEECH. 69 

question ; as these words, " nothing," " no man," " infinite," 
"indocible," "three want four," and the like; which are 
nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckon- 
ing, and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be 
not names of anything, because they make us refuse to admit 
of names not rightly used. 

All other names are but insignificant sounds ; and those 
of two sorts. One when they are new, and yet their mean- 
ing not explained by definition ; whereof there have been 
abundance coined by schoolmen, and puzzled philosophers. 

Another, when men make a name of two names, whose 
significations are contradictory and inconsistent ; as this 
name, an "incorporeal body," or, which is all one, an 
"incorporeal substance,' 5 and a great number more. For 
whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which 
it is composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at 
all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say " a quad- 
rangle is round," the word "round quadrangle" signifies 
nothing, but is a mere sound. So likewise, if it be false to 
say that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, the 
words "inpoured virtue," "inblown virtue," are as absurd 
and insignificant as a " round quadrangle." And therefore 
you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant 
word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. 
A Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour called by the name 
of parole, but by the name of verbe often ; yet verbe and 
parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French. 

When a man, upon the hearing of any speech, hath those 
thoughts which the words of that speech and their connec- 
tion were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is 
said to understand it ; "understanding " being nothing else 
but conception caused by speech. And therefore if speech 
be peculiar to man, as for aught I know it is, then is under- 
standing peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd 
and false affirmations, in case they be universal, there can 



70 OF MAN. 

be no understanding ; though many think they understand 
then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them 
in their mind. 

What kinds of speeches signify the appetites, aversions, 
and passions of man's mind ; and of their use and abuse, I 
shall speak when I have spoken of the passions. 

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which 
please and displease us, because all men be not alike 
affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all 
times, are in the common discourses of men of " inconstant " 
signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify 
our conceptions, and all our affections are but conceptions, 
when we conceive the same things differently, we can 
hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the 
nature of that we conceive, be the same ; yet the diversity 
of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions 
of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a 
tincture of our different passions. And therefore in rea- 
soning a man must take heed of words ; which besides the 
signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a sig- 
nification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the 
speaker ; such as are the names of virtues and vices ; for 
one man calleth "wisdom," what another calleth "fear"; 
and one " cruelty," what another "justice"; one "prodi- 
gality," what another "magnanimity " ; and one "gravity," 
what another "stupidity," &c. And therefore such names 
can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more 
can metaphors, and tropes of speech ; but these are less 
dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy ; which 
the other do not. 



OF REASON AND SCIENCE. 71 

CHAPTER V. 
Of Reason and Science. 

When a man "reasoneth," he does nothing else but con- 
ceive a sum total, from " addition " of parcels ; or con- 
ceive a remainder, from " subtraction " of one sum from 
another ; which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of the 
consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of 
the whole ; or from the names of the whole and one part, 
to the name of the other part. And though in some things, 
as in numbers, besides adding and subtracting, men name 
other operations, as "multiplying" and "dividing," yet 
they are the same ; for multiplication, is but adding together 
of things equal ; and division, but subtracting of one thing, 
as often as we can. These operations are not incident to 
numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be 
added together, and taken one out of another. For as 
arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in "numbers"; so 
the geometricians teach the same in "lines," "figures," solid 
and superficial, "angles," "proportions," "times," degrees 
of "swiftness," "force," "power," and the like ; the logi- 
cians teach the same in " consequences of words " ; adding 
together two "names" to make an "affirmation," and two 
"affirmations" to make a "syllogism"; and many "syllo- 
gisms " to make a "demonstration " ; and from the "sum," 
or "conclusion" of a "syllogism," they subtract one 
" proposition " to find the other. Writers of politics add 
together "pactions " to find men's "duties " ; and lawyers, 
" laws " and " facts," to find what is " right " and " wrong " 
in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter 
soever there is place for "addition" and "subtraction," 
there also is place for " reason " ; and where these have 
no place, there " reason " has nothing at all to do. 



72 OF MAN. 

Out of all which we may define, that is to say determine, 
what that is, which is meant by this word "reason," when 
we reckon it amongst the faculties of the mind. For " rea- 
son," in this sense, is nothing but "reckoning," that is add- 
ing and subtracting, of the consequences of general names 
agreed upon for the " marking " and " signifying " of our 
thoughts ; I say " marking " them when we reckon by our- 
selves, and " signifying, " when we demonstrate or approve 
our reckonings to other men. 

And, as in arithmetic, unpractised men must, and profes- 
sors themselves may often, err, and cast up false ; so also in 
any other subject of reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, 
and most practised men may deceive themselves, and infer 
false conclusions ; not but that reason itself is always right 
reason, as well as arithmetic is a certain and infallible art : 
but no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one num- 
ber of men, makes the certainty ; no more than an account 
is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have 
unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when there is 
a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own 
accord, set up, for right reason, the reason of some arbitra- 
tor, or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or 
their controversy must either come to blows, or be unde- 
cided, for want of a right reason constituted by nature ; so 
is it also in all debates of what kind soever. And when 
men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamour 
and demand. right reason for judge, yet seek no more, but 
that things should be determined by no other men's reason 
but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as 
it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every 
occasion, that suit whereof they have most in their hand. 
For they do nothing else, that will have every of their 
passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for 
right reason, and that in their own controversies : bewray- 
ing their want of right reason, by the claim they lay to it. 



OF REASON AND SCIENCE. 73 

The use and end of reason, is not the finding of the sum 
and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the 
first definitions, and settled significations of names, but 
to begin at these, and proceed from one consequence to 
another. For there can be no certainty of the last con- 
clusion, without a certainty of all those affirmations and 
negations on which it was grounded and inferred. As 
when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up 
the sums of all the bills of expense into one sum, and not 
regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give 
them in account ; nor what it is he pays for ; he advantages 
himself no more, than if he allowed the account in gross, 
trusting to every of the accountants' skill and honesty : so 
also in reasoning of all other things, he that takes up con- 
clusions on the trust of authors, and doth not fetch them 
from the first items in every reckoning, which are the sig- 
nifications of names settled by definitions, loses his labour ; 
and does not know anything, but only believeth. 

When a man reckons without the use of words, which 
may be done in particular things, as when upon the sight 
of any one thing, we conjecture what was likely to have 
preceded, or is likely to follow upon it ; if that which he 
thought likely to follow, follows not, or that which he 
thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this 
is called " error " ; to which even the most prudent men are 
subject. But when we reason in words of general signifi- 
cation, and fall upon a general inference which is false, 
though it be commonly called "error," it is indeed an 
" absurdity," or senseless speech. For error is but a decep- 
tion, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come ; of 
which, though it were not past, or not to come, yet there 
was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a 
general assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of 
it is inconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing 
but the sound, are those we call "absurd," "insignificant," 



74 OF MAN. 

and " nonsense." And therefore if a man should talk to 
me of a " round quadrangle " ; or " accidents of bread in 
cheese " ; or " immaterial substances " ; or of " a free sub- 
ject " ; "a free will"; or any "free," but free from being 
hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an 
error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to 
say, absurd. 

I have said before, in the second chapter, that a man 
did excel all other animals in this faculty, that when he 
conceived anything whatsoever, he was apt to inquire the 
consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. 
And now I add this other degree of the same excellence, 
that he can by words reduce the consequences he finds to 
general rules, called "theorems," or "aphorisms"; that is, 
he can reason, or reckon, not only in number, but in all 
other things, whereof one may be added unto, or subtracted 
from another. 

But this privilege is allayed by another ; and that is, by 
the privilege of absurdity ; to which no living creature is 
subject, but man only. And of men, those are of all most 
subject to it, that profess philosophy. For it is most true 
that Cicero saith of them somewhere ; that there can be 
nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of phi- 
losophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not 
one of them that begins his ratiocination from the defini- 
tions, or explications of the names they are to use ; which 
is a method that hath been used only in geometry ; whose 
conclusions have thereby been made indisputable. 

i. The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to the 
want of method ; in that they begin not their ratiocination 
from definitions ; that is, from settled significations of their 
words : as if they could cast account, without knowing the 
value of the numeral words, "one," "two," and "three." 

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers 
considerations, which I have mentioned in the precedent 



OF REASON AND SCIENCE. 75 

chapter ; these considerations being diversely named, divers 
absurdities proceed from the confusion, and .unfit connec- 
tion of their names into assertions. And therefore, 

ii. The second cause of absurd assertions, I ascribe to 
the giving of names of " bodies " to " accidents " ; or of 
"accidents" to "bodies"; as they do, that say, "faith is 
infused," or " inspired " ; when nothing can be "poured " or 
" breathed " into anything, but body ; and that, " exten- 
sion " is "body"; that "phantasms" are "spirits," &c. 

in. The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the 
"accidents" of "bodies without jus," to the "accidents" 
of our "own bodies ".; as they do that say, "the colour is 
in the body " ; "the sound is in the air," &c. 

iv. The fourth, to the giving of the names of "bodies " 
to "names," or "speeches"; as they do that say, that 
" there be things universal " ; that " a living creature is 
genus," or "a general thing," &c. 

v. The fifth, to the giving of the names of " accidents " 
to "names" and "speeches"; as they do that say, "the 
nature of a thing is its definition ; a man's command is his 
will " ; and the like. 

vi. The sixth, to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other 
rhetorical figures, instead of words proper. For though it 
be lawful to say, for example, in common speech, " the way 
goeth, or leadeth hither or thither"; "the proverb says 
this or that," whereas ways cannot go, nor proverbs speak ; 
yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are 
not to be admitted. 

vn. The seventh, to names that signify nothing ; but are 
taken up, and learned by rote from the schools, as "hypo- 
statical," "transubstantiate," " consubstantiate," "eternal- 
now," and the like canting of schoolmen. 

To him that can avoid these things it is not easy to fall 
into any absurdity, unless it be by the length of an account ; 
wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all 



76 OF MAN. 

men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good 
principles. For who is so stuoid, as both to mistake in 
geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects 
his error to him ? 

By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and mem- 
ory, born with us ; nor gotten by experience only, as pru- 
dence is ; but attained by industry ; first in apt imposing 
of names ; and secondly by getting a good and orderly 
method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, 
to assertions made by connection of one of them to another ; 
and to syllogisms, which are the connections of one asser- 
tion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the con- 
sequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand ; 
and that is it, men call "science." And whereas sense and 
memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past 
and irrevocable. " Science " is the knowledge of conse- 
quences, and dependence of one fact upon another : by 
which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do 
something else when we will, or the like another time ; 
because when we see how anything comes about, upon what 
causes, and by what manner ; when the like causes come 
into our power, we see how to make it produce the like 
effects. 

Children therefore are not endued with reason at all, till 
they have attained the use of speech ; but are called rea- 
sonable creatures, for the possibility apparent of having 
the use of reason in time to come. And the most part of 
men, though they have the use of reasoning a little way, as 
in numbering to some degree ; yet it serves them to little 
use in common life ; in which they govern themselves, some 
better, some worse, according to their differences of expe- 
rience, quickness of memory, and inclinations to several 
ends ; but specially according to good or evil fortune, and 
the errors of one another. For as for "science," or certain 
rules of their actions, they are so far from it, that they 



OF REASON AND SCIENCE. 77 

know not what it is. Geometry they have thought conjur- 
ing : but for other sciences, they who have not been taught 
the beginnings and some progress in them, that they may 
see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point 
like children, that having no thought of generation, are 
made believe by the women that their brothers and sisters 
are not born, but found in the garden. 

But yet they that have no "science," are in better, and 
nobler condition, with their natural prudence ; than men, 
that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, 
fall upon false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of 
causes, and of rules, does not set men so far out of their 
way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what 
they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of 
the contrary. 

To conclude, the light of human minds is perspicuous 
words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged 
from ambiguity ; " reason " is the " pace " ; increase of 
"science," the "way"; and the benefit of mankind, the 
"end." And, on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless 
and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui; and reasoning 
upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities ; 
and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt. 

As much experience, is "prudence"; so, is much 
science "sapience." For though we usually have one name 
of wisdom for them both, yet the Latins did always distin- 
guish between prudentia and sapientia ; ascribing the former 
to experience, the latter to science. But to make their dif- 
ference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued 
with an excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his 
arms ; and another to have added to that dexterity, an 
acquired science, of where he can offend, or be offended by 
his adversary, in every possible posture or guard : the abil- 
ity of the former, would be to the ability of the latter, as 
prudence to sapience ; both useful ; but the latter infallible. 



78 OF MAN. 

But they that trusting only to the authority of books, fol- 
low the blind blindly, are like him that, trusting to the 
false rules of a master of fence, ventures presumptuously 
upon an adversary, that either kills or disgraces him. 

The signs of science are some, certain and infallible ; 
some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the 
science of anything, can teach the same ; that is to say, 
demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another ; 
uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his 
pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he says 
they must. Signs of prudence are all uncertain ; because 
to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances 
that may alter the success, is impossible. But in any busi- 
ness, whereof a man has not infallible science to proceed 
by ; to forsake his own natural judgment, and be guided by 
general sentences read in authors, and subject to many 
exceptions, is a sign of folly, and generally scorned by the 
name of pedantry. And even of those men themselves, 
that in councils of the commonwealth love to show their 
reading of politics and history, very few do it in their 
domestic affairs, where their particular interest is con- 
cerned ; having prudence enough for their private affairs : 
but in public they study more the reputation of their own 
wit, than the success of another's business. 



CHAPTER VI. 

Of the Interior Begi?inings of Voluntary Motions; commonly 
called the Passions ; and the Speeches by which they are 
expressed. 

There be in animals, two sorts of "motions " peculiar to 
them: one called "vital"; begun in generation, and con- 
tinued without interruption through their whole life ; such 
as are the "course" of the "blood," the "pulse," the 



OF THE PASSIONS. 79 

"breathing," the "concoction, nutrition, excretion," &c, 
to which motions there needs no help of imagination : the 
other is "animal motion," otherwise called "voluntary 
motion"; as to "go," to "speak," to "move" any of our 
limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. 
That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of 
man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, 
&c. ; and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion, 
remaining after sense, has been already said in the first 
and second chapters. And because "going," "speaking," 
and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a 
precedent thought of "whither," "which way," and 
"what"; it is evident, that the imagination is the first 
internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And although 
unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be 
there, where the thing moved is invisible ; or the space it is 
moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible ; yet that doth 
not hinder, but that such motions are. For let a space be 
never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, 
whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over 
that. These small beginnings of motion, within the body of 
man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and 
other visible actions, are commonly called "endeavour." 

This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes 
it, is called "appetite," or "desire"; the latter, being the 
general name ; and the other oftentimes restrained to signify 
the desire of food, namely "hunger" and "thirst." And 
when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally 
called "aversion." These words, "appetite" and "aver- 
sion," we have from the Latins ; and they both of them 
signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of re- 
tiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are 
opfiT) and acf>opfX7]. For nature itself does often press upon 
men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for 
somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. For the Schools 



So OF MAN. 

find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion at 
all : but because some motion they must acknowledge, they 
call it metaphorical motion ; which is but an absurd speech : 
for though words may be called metaphorical ; bodies and 
motions cannot. 

That which men desire, they are also said to "love": 
and to "hate" those things for which they have aversion. 
So that desire and love are the same thing ; save that by 
desire, we always signify the absence of the object ; by love, 
most commonly the presence of the same. So also by 
aversion, we signify the absence ; and by hate, the presence 
of the object. 

Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men ; as 
appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration, 
which may also and more properly be called aversions, 
from somewhat they feel in their bodies ; and some other 
appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites of 
particular things, proceed from experience, and trial of 
their effects upon themselves or other men. For of things 
we know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no 
further desire, than to taste and try. But aversion we have 
for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but also 
that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not. 

Those things which we neither desire, nor hate, we are 
said to " contemn " ; " contempt " being nothing else but 
an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the 
action of certain things ; and proceeding from that the 
heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent 
objects ; or from want of experience of them. 

And because the constitution of a man's body is in con- 
tinual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things 
should always cause in him the same appetites, and aver- 
sions : much less can all men consent, in the desire of 
almost any one and the same object. 

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or 



OF THE PASSIONS. 81 

desire, that is it which he for his part calleth "good " : and 
the object of his hate and aversion, " evil " ; and of his con- 
tempt, "vile" and "inconsiderable." For these words of 
good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to 
the person that useth them : there being nothing simply 
and absolutely so ; nor any common rule of good and evil, 
to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves ; but 
from the person of the man, where there is no common- 
wealth ; or, in a commonwealth, from the person that 
representeth it ; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men 
disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence 
the rule thereof. 

The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations 
approach to those of good and evil ; but are not precisely 
the same ; and those are pulchrutn and turpe. Whereof 
the former signifies that, which by some apparent signs 
promiseth good ; and the latter, that which promiseth evil. 
But in our tongue we have not so general names to express 
them by. But for pulchrutn we say in some things, " fair " ; 
in others, "beautiful," or "handsome," or "gallant," or 
"honourable," or "comely," or "amiable"; and for turpe, 
"foul," "deformed," "ugly," "base," "nauseous," and the 
like, as the subject shall require ; all which words, in their 
proper places, signify nothing else but the "mien," or 
countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of 
good there be three kinds ; good in the promise, that is 
pulchrum ; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called 
jucundum, " delightful " ; and good as the means, which is 
called utile, " profitable " ; and as many of evil : for " evil " 
in promise, is that they call turpe ; evil in effect, and end, 
is molestum, "unpleasant," "troublesome"; and evil in the 
means, inutile, "unprofitable," "hurtful." 

As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, as I have 
said before, only motion, caused by the action of external 
objects, but in appearance ; to the sight, light and colour ; 



82 OF MAN. 

to the ear, sound ; to the nostril, odour, &c. : so, when the 
action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, 
and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is 
nothing but motion, or endeavour ; which consisteth in 
appetite, or aversion, to or from the object moving. But 
the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that we either 
call "delight," or "trouble of mind." 

This motion, which is called appetite, and for the appar- 
ence of it "delight," and "pleasure," seemeth to be a 
corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto ; and 
therefore such things as caused delight, were not improperly 
called jucunda, a jnva?ido, from helping or fortifying ; and 
the contrary, molesta, "offensive," from hindering, and 
troubling the motion vital. 

"Pleasure " therefore, or "delight," is the apparence, or 
sense of good; and "molestation," or "displeasure," the 
apparence, or sense of evil. And consequently all appetite, 
desire, and love, is accompanied with some delight more 
or less ; and all hatred and aversion, with more or less 
displeasure and offence. 

Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an 
object present ; and those may be called " pleasure of 
sense " ; the word " sensual," as it is used by those only that 
condemn them, having no place till there be laws. Of this 
kind are all onerations and exonerations of the body ; as 
also all that is pleasant, in the " sight," "hearing," "smell," 
"taste," or "touch." Others arise from the expectation, 
that proceeds from foresight of the end, or consequence of 
things ; whether those things in the sense please or dis- 
please. And these are "pleasures of the mind" of him 
that draweth those consequences, and are generally called 
"joy." In the like manner, displeasures are some in the 
sense, and called "pain"; others in the expectation of 
consequences, and are called "grief." 

These simple passions called "appetite," "desire," 



OF THE PASSIONS. 83 

"love," "aversion," "hate," "joy," and "grief," have their 
names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when 
they one succeed another, they are diversely called from 
the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what 
they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. 
Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. 
Fourthly, from the alteration or succession itself. 

For "appetite," with an opinion of attaining, is called 
"hope." 

The same, without such opinion, "despair." 

"Aversion," with opinion of "hurt "from the object, "fear." 

The same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, 
"courage." 

Sudden "courage," "anger." 

Constant "hope," "confidence" of ourselves. 

Constant "despair," "diffidence" of ourselves. 

"Anger " for great hurt done to another, when we con- 
ceive the same to be done by injury, " indignation." 

"Desire" of good to another, "benevolence," "good 
will," "charity." If to man generally, "good-nature." 

" Desire " of riches, " covetousness " ; a name used always 
in signification of blame ; because men contending for them, 
are displeased with one another attaining them ; though 
the desire in itself, be to be blamed, or allowed, according 
to the means by which these riches are sought. 

"Desire" of office, or precedence, "ambition": a name 
used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned. 

" Desire " of things that conduce but a little to our ends, 
and fear of things that are but of little hindrance, "pusil- 
lanimity." 

" Contempt " of little helps and hindrances, " magna- 
nimity." 

"Magnanimity," in danger of death or wounds, "valour," 
"fortitude." 

" Magnanimity " in the use of riches, "liberality." 



84 OF MAN. 

"Pusillanimity" in the same, "wretchedness," "misera- 
bleness," or "parsimony " ; as it is liked or disliked. 

"Love " of persons for society, "kindness." 

" Love " of persons for pleasing the sense only, " natural 
lust." 

" Love " of the same, acquired from rumination, that is, 
imagination of pleasure past, "luxury." 

" Love " of one singularly, with desire to be singularly 
beloved, "the passion of love." The same, with fear that 
the love is not mutual, "jealousy." 

"Desire," by doing hurt to another, to make him con- 
demn some fact of his own, "revengefulness." 

" Desire " to know why, and how, " curiosity " ; such as 
is in no living creature but " man " : so that man is dis- 
tinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular 
passion from other " animals " ; in whom the appetite of 
food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take 
away the care of knowing causes ; which is a lust of the 
mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual 
and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the 
short vehemence of any carnal pleasure. 

" Fear " of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or 
imagined from tales publicly allowed, " religion " ; not 
allowed, "superstition." And when the power imagined, 
is truly such as we imagine, "true religion." 

"Fear," without the apprehension of why, or what, 
"panic terror," called so from the fables, that make Pan 
the author of them ; whereas, in truth, there is always in 
him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, 
though the rest run away by example, every one supposing 
his fellow to know why. And therefore this passion happens 
to none but in a throng, or multitude of people. 

"Joy," from apprehension of novelty, "admiration"; 
proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing 
the cause. 



OF THE PASSIONS. 85 

"Joy," arising from imagination of a man's own power 
and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called 
"glorying": which if grounded upon the experience of his 
own former actions, is the same with " confidence " : but if 
grounded on the flattery of others ; or only supposed by 
himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called 
"vain-glory": which name is properly given; because a 
well-grounded "confidence" begetteth attempt; whereas 
the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly 
called "vain." 

"Grief," from opinion of want of power, is called "dejec- 
ti<?n " of mind. 

The " vain-glory " which consisteth in the feigning or 
supposing of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, 
is most incident to young men, and nourished by the 
histories, or fictions of gallant persons ; and is corrected 
oftentimes by age, and employment. 

"Sudden glory," is the passion which maketh those 
" grimaces " called " laughter " ; and is caused either by 
some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them ; or 
by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, 
by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. 
And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the 
fewest abilities in themselves ; who are forced to keep 
themselves in their own favor, by observing the imperfec- 
tions of other men. And therefore much laughter at the 
defects of others, is a sign of pusillanimity. For of great 
minds, one of the proper works is, to help and free others 
from scorn ; and compare themselves only with the most 
able. 

On the contrary, " sudden dejection," is the passion that 
causeth " weeping " ; and is caused by such accidents, as 
suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of 
their power : and they are most subject to it, that rely 
principally on helps external, such as are women, and 



86 OF MAN. 

children. Therefore some weep for the loss of friends ; 
others for their unkindness ; others for the sudden stop 
made to their thoughts of revenge, by reconciliation. But 
in all cases, both laughter, and weeping, are sudden 
motions ; custom taking them both away. For no man 
laughs at old jests ; or weeps for an old calamity. 

"Grief," for the discovery of some defect of ability, is 
"shame," or the passion that discovereth itself in "blush- 
ing " ; and consisteth in the apprehension of something 
dishonourable ; and in young men is a sign of the love of 
good reputation, and commendable : in old men it is a 
sign of the same ; but because it comes too late, not 
commendable. 

The " contempt " of good reputation is called " impu- 
dence." 

"Grief," for the calamity of another, is "pity"; and 
ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may 
befall himself; and therefore is called also "compassion," 
and in the phrase of this present time a " fellow-feeling " : 
and therefore for calamity arriving from great wickedness, 
the best men have the least pity ; and for the same calam- 
ity, those hate pity, that think themselves least obnoxious 
to the same. 

"Contempt," or little sense of the calamity of others, is 
that which men call " cruelty " ; proceeding from security 
of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleas- 
ure in other men's great harms ; without other end of his 
own, I do not conceive it possible. 

" Grief," for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, 
or other good, if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our 
own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called " emulation " : 
but joined with endeavour to supplant, or hinder a com- 
petitor, "envy." 

When in the mind of man, appetites, and aversions, 
hopes, and fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise 



OF THE PASSIONS. 87 

alternately ; and divers good and evil consequences of the 
doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come succes- 
sively into our thoughts ; so that sometimes we have an 
appetite to it ; sometimes an aversion from it ; sometimes 
hope to be able to do it ; sometimes despair, or fear to 
attempt it ; the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and 
fears continued till the thing be either done, or thought 
impossible, is that we call "deliberation." 

Therefore of things past, there is no " deliberation " ; be- 
cause manifestly impossible to be changed : nor of things 
known to be impossible, or thought so ; because men know, 
or think such deliberation vain. But of things impossible, 
which we think possible, we may deliberate ; not knowing 
it is in vain. And it is called " deliberation " ; because it is a 
putting an end to the "liberty" we had of doing, or omit- 
ting, according to our own appetite, or aversion. 

This alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes 
and fears, is no less in other living creatures than in man : 
and therefore beasts also deliberate. 

Every "deliberation" is then said to "end," when that 
whereof they deliberate, is either done, or thought impossi- 
ble ; because till then, we retain the liberty of doing, or 
omitting ; according to our appetite, or aversion. 

In "deliberation," the last appetite, or aversion, imme- 
diately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, 
is that we call the " will " ; the act, not the faculty, of " will- 
ing." And beasts that have "deliberation," must neces- 
sarily also have "will." The definition of the "will," given 
commonly by the Schools, that it is a " rational appetite," is 
not good. For if it were, then could there be no voluntary 
act against reason. For a "voluntary act" is that, which 
proceedeth from the "will," and no other. But if instead 
of a rational appetite, we shall say an appetite resulting 
from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the 
same that I have given here. Will therefore, is the last 



88 OF MAN. 

appetite in deliberating. And though we say in common 
discourse, a man had a will once to do a thing, that never- 
theless he forbore to do ; yet that is properly but an incli- 
nation, which makes no action voluntary ; because the 
action depends not of it, but of the last inclination, or appe- 
tite. For if the intervenient appetites, make any action 
voluntary ; then by the same reason, all intervenient aver- 
sions, should make the same action involuntary ; and so 
one and the same action should be both voluntary and 
involuntary. 

By this it is manifest, that not only actions that have 
their beginning from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other 
appetites to the thing propounded ; but also those that 
have their beginning from aversion, or fear of those con- 
sequences that follow the omission, are " voluntary actions." 

The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed, 
are partly the same, and partly different from those, by 
which we express our thoughts. And first, generally all 
passions may be expressed " indicatively " ; as "I love," " I 
fear," " I joy," " I deliberate," " I will," " I command " : but 
some of them have particular expressions by themselves, 
which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when 
they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the pas- 
sion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed " sub- 
junctively " ; which is a speech proper to signify supposi- 
tions, with their consequences ; as, " if this be done, then 
this will follow " ; and differs not from the language of 
reasoning, save that reasoning is in general words ; but 
deliberation for the most part is of particulars. The lan- 
guage of desire, and aversion, is " imperative " ; as " do 
this," "forbear that " ; which when the party is obliged to 
do, or forbear, is "command"; otherwise "prayer"; or 
else "counsel." The language of vain-glory, of indigna- 
tion, pity and revengefulness, " optative " : but of the desire 
to know, there is a peculiar expression, called "interroga- 



OF THE PASSIONS. 89 

tive " ; as, "what is it," "when shall it," "how is it done," 
and "why so ? " other language of the passions I find none : 
for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like, do not signify 
as speech ; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed. 

These forms of speech, I say, are expressions, or volun- 
tary significations of our passions : but certain signs they 
be not ; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they 
that use them have such passions or not. The best signs 
of passions present, are either in the countenance, motions 
of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise 
know the man to have. 

And because in deliberation, the appetites, and aversions, 
are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, 
and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate ; the good 
or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long 
chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is 
able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if 
the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, 
the whole chain is that which writers call "apparent," or 
"seeming good." And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth 
the good, the whole is "apparent," or "seeming evil ": so 
that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and 
surest prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself; and 
is able when he will, to give the best counsel unto others. 

" Continual success " in obtaining those things which a 
man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual 
prospering, is that men call "felicity " ; I mean the felicity 
of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual tran- 
quility of mind, while we live here ; because life itself is 
but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without 
fear, no more than without sense. What kind of felicity 
God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour Him, a 
man shall no sooner know, than enjoy ; being joys, that 
now are as incomprehensible, as the word of schoolmen 
" beatifical vision " is unintelligible. 



9° OF MAN. 

The form of speech whereby men signify their opinion of 
the goodness of anything, is "praise." That whereby 
they signify the power and greatness of anything, is 
" magnifying." And that whereby they signify the opinion 
they have of a man's felicity, is by the Greeks called n*Ka- 
pLo-fios, for which we have no name in our tongue. And 
thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have 
been said of the "passions." 



CHAPTER VII. 

Of the Ends, or Resolutions of Discourse. 

Of all "discourse," governed by desire of knowledge, 
there is at last an "end," either by attaining, or by giving 
over. And in the chain of discourse, wheresoever it be 
interrupted, there is an end for that time. 

If the discourse be merely mental, it consisteth of 
thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be ; or that it 
has been, and has not been, alternately. So that where- 
soever you break off the chain of a man's discourse, you 
leave him in a presumption of "it will be," or, "it will not 
be " ; or, "it has been," or, "has not been." All which is 
"opinion." And that which is alternate appetite, in delib- 
erating concerning good and evil ; the same is alternate 
opinion, in the enquiry of the truth of "past," and "fu- 
ture." And as the last appetite in deliberation, is called the 
"will " ; so the last opinion in search of the truth of past, and 
future, is called the "judgment," or "resolute" and "final 
sentence" of him that " discourseth." And as the whole 
chain of appetites alternate, in the question of good, or bad, 
is called " deliberation " ; so the whole chain of opinions 
alternate, in the question of true, or false, is called "doubt." 

No discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge 
of fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of fact, 



OF THE ENDS OF DISCOURSE. 91 

it is originally, sense ; and ever after, memory. And for 
the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is 
called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man 
can know by discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or 
will be ; which is to know absolutely : but only, that if this 
be, that is ; if this has been, that has been ; if this shall be, 
that shall be : which is to know conditionally ; and that 
not the consequence of one thing to another ; but of one 
name of a thing, to another name of the same thing. 

And therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, 
and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by 
connection of the same into general affirmations, and of 
these again into syllogisms ; the end or last sum is called 
the conclusion ; and the thought of the mind by it signified, 
is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the conse- 
quence of words, which is commonly called "science." But 
if the first ground of such discourse, be not definitions ; or if 
the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms, 
then the end or conclusion, is again "opinion," namely of 
the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd 
and senseless words, without possibility of being under- 
stood. When two, or more men know of one and the same 
fact, they are said to be " conscious " of it one to another ; 
which is as much as to know it together. And because such 
are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a 
third ; it was, and ever will be reputed a very evil act, for any 
man to speak against his " conscience " : or to corrupt or 
force another so to do : insomuch that the plea of conscience, 
has been always harkened unto very diligently in all times. 
Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphori- 
cally, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret 
thoughts ; and therefore it is rhetorically said, that the 
conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, 
vehemently in love with their own new opinions, though 
never so absurd, and obstinately bent to maintain them, 



92 OF MAN. 

gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of 
conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change 
or speak against them ; and so pretend to know they are 
true, when they know at most, but that they think so. 

When a man's discourse beginneth not at definitions, it 
beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, 
and then it is still called opinion ; or it beginneth at some 
saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and 
of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and 
then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing, as 
the person; and the resolution is called "belief," and 
"faith": "faith," in the man; "belief," both of the man, 
and of the truth of what he says. So that in belief are 
two opinions ; one of the saying of the man ; the other of 
his virtue. To "have faith in," or "trust to," or "believe 
a man," signify the same thing; namely, an opinion of the 
veracity of the man: but to "believe what is said," signi- 
fieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we 
are to observe that this phrase, " I believe in " ; as also the 
Latin, credo in; and the Greek, 7narev(D ets, are never used 
but in the writings of divines. Instead of them, in other 
writings are put, " I believe him," "I trust him " ; "I have 
faith in him " ; "I rely on him " : and in Latin, credo Mi: 
fido Mi: and in Greek, Trio-rivco aww: and that this singu- 
larity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many 
disputes about the right object of the Christian faith. 

But by "believing in," as it is in the creed, is meant, not 
trust in the person ; but confession and acknowledgment 
of the doctrine. For not only Christians, but all manner of 
men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth they hear 
him say, whether they understand it, or not ; which is all the 
faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatso- 
ever : but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed. 

From whence we may infer, that when we believe any 
saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, 



INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. 93 

not from the thing itself, or from the principles of natural 
reason, but from the authority, and good opinion we have, 
of him that hath said it ; then is the speaker, or person we 
believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object 
of our faith ; and the honour done in believing, is done to 
him only. And consequently, when we believe that the 
Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate 
revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and trust is 
in the Church ; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. 
And they that believe that which a prophet relates unto 
them in the name of God, take the word of the prophet, do 
honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the 
truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false 
prophet. And so it is also with all other history. For if 
I should not believe all that is written by historians, of the 
glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar ; I do not think the 
ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, had any just cause to be 
offended ; or anybody else, but the historian. If Livy say 
the gOds made once a cow speak, and we believe it not ; we 
distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, 
that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason than what 
is drawn from authority of men only, and their writings ; 
whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

Of the Virtues commonly called Intellectual, and their contrary 

Defects. 

Virtue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat 
that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. 
For if all things were equal in all men, nothing would be 
prized. And by "virtues intellectual," are always under- 
stood such abilities of the mind, as men praise, value, and 
desire should be in themselves ; and go commonly under 



94 OF MAN. 

the name of a "good wit"; though the same word "wit," 
be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest. 

These "virtues" are of two sorts; " natural," and "ac- 
quired." By natural, I mean not, that which a man hath 
from his birth : for that is nothing else but sense ; wherein 
men differ so little one from another, and from brute beasts, 
as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues. But I mean, 
that "wit," which is gotten by use only, and experience; 
without method, culture, or instruction. This "natural 
wit," consisteth principally in two things; "celerity of 
imagining," that is, swift succession of one thought to 
another ; and steady direction to some approved end. On 
the contrary a slow imagination, maketh that defect, or 
fault of the mind, which is commonly called "dulness," 
"stupidity," and sometimes by other names that signify 
slowness of motion, or difficulty to be moved. 

And this difference of quickness, is caused by the differ- 
ence of men's passions ; that love and dislike, some one 
thing, some another : and therefore some men's thoughts 
run one way, some another ; and are held to, and observe 
differently the things that pass through their imagination. 
And whereas in this succession of men's thoughts, there is 
nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either 
in what they be "like one another," or in what they be 
"unlike," or "what they serve for," or "how they serve to 
such a purpose " ; those that observe their similitudes, in 
case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, 
are said to have a "good wit " ; by which, in this occasion, 
is meant a "good fancy." But they that observe their 
differences, and dissimilitudes ; which is called " distin- 
guishing," and "discerning," and "judging" between thing 
and thing ; in case, such discerning be not easy, are said to 
have a " good judgment " : and particularly in matter of con- 
versation and business ; wherein, times, places, and persons 
are to be discerned, this virtue is called "discretion." The 



INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. 95 

former, that is, fancy, without the help of judgment, is not 
commended as a virtue : but the latter which is judgment, 
and discretion, is commended for itself, without the help of 
fancy. Besides the discretion of times, places, and persons, 
necessary to a good fancy, there is required also an often 
application of his thoughts to their end ; that is to say, to 
some use to be made of them. This done ; he that hath 
this virtue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will 
please, not only by illustrations of his discourse, and adorn- 
ing it with new and apt metaphors ; but also, by the rarity 
of their invention. But without steadiness, and direction 
to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madness ; such 
as they have, that entering into any discourse, are snatched 
from their purpose, by everything that comes in their 
thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and paren- 
theses, that they utterly lose themselves : which kind of 
folly, I know no particular name for : but the cause of it is, 
sometimes want of experience ; whereby that seemeth to a 
man new and rare, which doth not so to others : some- 
times pusillanimity ; by which that seems great to him, 
which other men think a trifle : and whatsoever is new, or 
great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdraws a man 
by degrees from the intended way of his discourse. 

In a good poem, whether it be "epic," or "dramatic"; 
as also in "sonnets," "epigrams," and other pieces, both 
judgment and fancy are required : but the fancy must be 
more eminent ; because they please for the extravagancy ; 
but ought not to displease by indiscretion. 

In a good history, the judgment must be eminent ; 
because the goodness consisteth, in the method, in the 
truth, and in the choice of the actions that are most profit- 
able to be known. Fancy has no place, but only in adorn- 
ing the style. 

In orations of praise, and in invectives, the fancy is pre- 
dominant ; because the design is not truth, but to honour or 



96 OF MAN. 

dishonour ; which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons. 
The judgment does but suggest what circumstances make 
an action laudable, or culpable. 

In hortatives, and pleadings, as truth, or disguise serveth 
best to the design in hand ; so is the judgment, or the fancy 
most required. 

In demonstration, in counsel, and all rigorous search of 
truth, judgment does all, except sometimes the understand- 
ing have need to be opened by some apt similitude ; and 
then there is so much use of fancy. But for metaphors, 
they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they 
openly profess deceit ; to admit them into counsel, or rea- 
soning, were manifest folly. 

And in any discourse whatsoever, if the effect of discre- 
tion be apparent, how extravagant soever the fancy be, the 
whole discourse be taken for a sign of want of wit ; and so 
will it never when the discretion is manifest, though the 
fancy be never so ordinary. 

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, 
profane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or 
blame ; which verbal discourse cannot do, farther than the 
judgment shall approve of the time, place, and persons. 
An anatomist, or a physician may speak, or write his judg- 
ment of unclean things ; because it is not to please, but 
profit : but for another man to write his extravagant, and 
pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being 
tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himself 
before good company. And it is the want of discretion 
that makes the difference. Again, in professed remissness 
of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with 
the sounds, and equivocal significations of words ; and that 
many times with encounters of extraordinary fancy : but in 
a sermon, or in public, or before persons unknown, or whom 
we ought to reverence ; there is no gingling of words that 
will not be accounted folly : and the difference is only in 



INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. 97 

the want of discretion. So that where wit is wanting, it is 
not fancy that is wanting, but discretion. Judgment there- 
fore without fancy is wit, but fancy without judgment, 
not. 

When the thoughts of a man, that has a design in hand, 
running over a multitude of things, observes how they con- 
duce to that design ; or what design they may conduce 
unto ; if his observations be such as are not easy, or usual, 
this wit of his is called " prudence " ; and depends on much 
experience, and memory of the like things, and their conse- 
quences heretofore. In which there is not so much differ- 
ence of men ; as there is in their fancies and judgment ; 
because the experience of men equal in age, is not much 
unequal, as to the quantity ; but lies in different occasions ; 
every one having his private designs. To govern well a 
family, and a kingdom, are not different degrees of pru- 
dence ; but different sorts of business ; no more than to 
draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater than the life, 
are different degrees of art. A plain husbandman is more 
prudent in affairs of his own house, than a privy-councillor 
in the affairs of another man. 

To prudence, if you add the use of unjust, or dishonest 
means, such as usually are prompted to men by fear, or 
want ; you have that crooked wisdom, which is called 
" craft " ; which is a sign of pusillanimity. For magna- 
nimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And 
that which the Latins call versutia, translated into English, 
"shifting," and is a putting off of a present danger or 
incommodity, by engaging into a greater, as when a man 
robs one to pay another, is but a shorter-sighted craft, 
called versutia, from versura, which signifies taking money 
at usury for the present payment of interest. 

As for "acquired wit," I mean acquired by method and 
instruction, there is none but reason ; which is grounded on 
the right use of speech, and produceth the sciences. But 



98 OF MAN. 

of reason and science I have already spoken, in the fifth 
and sixth chapters. 

The causes of this difference of wits, are in the passions ; 
and the difference of passions proceedeth, partly from the 
different constitution of the body, and partly from different 
education. For if the difference proceeded from the tem- 
per of the brain, and the organs of sense, either exterior or 
interior, there would be no less difference of men in their 
sight, hearing, or other senses, than in their fancies and 
discretions. It proceeds therefore from the passions ; which 
are different, not only from the difference of men's com- 
plexions ; but also from their difference of customs, and 
education. 

The passions that most of all cause the difference of wit, 
are principally, the more or less desire of power, of riches, 
of knowledge, and of honour. All which may be reduced 
to the first, that is, desire of power. For riches, knowledge, 
and honour, are but several sorts of power. 

And therefore, a man who has no great passion for any 
of these things ; but is, as men term it, indifferent ; though 
he may be so far a good man, as to be free from giving 
offence ; yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy, 
or much judgment. For the thoughts are to the desires, 
as scouts, and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to 
the things desired : all steadiness of the mind's motion, and 
all quickness of the same, proceeding from thence : for as 
to have no desire, is to be dead : so to have weak passions, 
is dulness ; and to have passions indifferently for every- 
thing, "giddiness," and "distraction"; and to have 
stronger and more vehement passions for anything, that is 
ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call " madness." 

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the pas- 
sions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and extrav- 
agant passion, proceedeth from the evil constitution of the 
organs of the body, or harm done them ; and sometimes the 



INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. 99 

hurt, and indisposition of the organs, is caused by the 
vehemence, or long continuance of the passion. But in 
both cases the madness is of one and the same nature. 

The passion, whose violence, or continuance, maketh 
madness, is either great " vain-glory " ; which is commonly 
called "pride," and "self-conceit"; or great "dejection" 
of mind. 

Pride, subjecteth a man to anger, the excess whereof, is 
the madness called "rage "and "fury." And thus it 
comes to pass that excessive desire of revenge, when it 
becomes habitual, hurteth the organs, and becomes rage : 
that excessive love, with jealousy, becomes also rage : exces- 
sive opinion of a man's own self, for divine inspiration, 
for wisdom, learning, form and the like, becomes distrac- 
tion and giddiness : the same, joined with envy, rage : 
vehement opinion of the truth of anything, contradicted by 
others, rage. 

Dejection subjects a man to causeless fears ; which is a 
madness, commonly called " melancholy " ; apparent also 
in divers manners ; as in haunting of solitudes and graves ; 
in superstitious behaviour ; and in fearing, some one, some 
another particular thing. In sum, all passions that pro- 
duce strange and unusual behaviour, are called by the gen- 
eral name of madness. But of the several kinds of madness, 
he that would take the pains, might enrol a legion. And 
if the excesses be madness, there is no doubt but the pas- 
sions themselves, when they tend to evil, are degrees of the 
same. 

For example, though the effect of folly, in them that are 
possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible 
always in one man, by any very extravagant action, that 
proceedeth from such passion ; yet, when many of them 
conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visi- 
ble enough. For what argument of madness can there be 
greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our 



ioo OF MAN. 

best friends ? Yet this is somewhat less than such a mul- 
titude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and 
destroy those, by whom all their life time before, they have 
been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be 
madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular 
man. For as in the midst of the sea, though a man per- 
ceive no sound of that part of the water next him, yet he is 
well assured, that part contributes as much to the roaring 
of the sea, as any other part of the same quantity ; so also, 
though we perceive no great unquietness in one or two 
men, yet we may be well assured, that their singular pas- 
sions, are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled 
nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed 
their madness ; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to 
themselves, is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam 
should entertain you with sober discourse ; and you desire 
in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might 
another time requite his civility ; and he should tell you, he 
were God the Father ; I think you need expect no extrava- 
gant action for argument of his madness. 

This opinion of inspiration, called commonly, private 
spirit, begins very often, from some lucky finding of an 
error generally held by others ; and not knowing, or not 
remembering, by what conduct of reason, they came to so 
singular a truth, (as they think it, though it may be many 
times an untruth they light on) they presently admire 
themselves, as being in the special grace of God Almighty, 
who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his 
Spirit. 

Again, that madness is nothing else, tut too much 
appearing passion, may be gathered out of the effects of 
wine, which are the same with those of the evil disposi- 
tion of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men 
that have drunk too much, is the same with that of mad- 
men : some of them raging, others loving, others laughing, 



INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. loi 

all extravagantly, but according to their several domineer- 
ing passions : for the effect of the wine, does but remove 
dissimulation, and take from them the sight of the deform- 
ity of their passions. For, I believe, the most sober men, 
when they walk alone without care and employment of the 
mind, would be unwilling the vanity and extravagance of 
their thoughts at that time should be publicly seen ; which 
is a confession, that passions unguided, are for the most 
part mere madness. 

The opinions of the world, both in ancient and later 
ages, concerning the cause of madness, have been two. 
Some deriving them from the passions ; some, from demons, 
or spirits, either good or bad, which they thought might 
enter into a man, possess him, and move his organs in 
such strange and uncouth manner, as madmen used to do. 
The former sort therefore, called such men, madmen : but 
the latter, called them sometimes "demoniacs," that is, 
possessed with spirits ; sometimes enur gumeni, that is, agi- 
tated or moved with spirits ; and now in Italy they are 
called, not only pazzi, madmen ; but also spiritati, men pos- 
sessed. 

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a 
city of the Greeks, at the acting of the tragedy of " Androm- 
eda," upon an extreme hot day; whereupon, a great many 
of the spectators falling into fevers, had this accident from 
the heat, and from the tragedy together, that they did 
nothing but pronounce iambics, with the names of Perseus 
and Andromeda ; which, together with the fever, was cured 
by the coming on of winter ; and this madness was thought 
to proceed from the passion imprinted by the tragedy. 
Likewise there reigned a fit of madness in another Grecian 
city, which seized only the young maidens ; and caused 
many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then 
thought an act of the devil. But one that suspected, that 
contempt of life in them, might proceed from some passion 



102 OF MAN. 

of the mind, and supposing that they did not contemn also 
their honour, gave counsel to the magistrates, to strip such 
as so hanged themselves, and let them hang out naked. 
This, the story says, cured that madness. But on the other 
side, the same Grecians, did often ascribe madness to the 
operation of Eumenides, or Furies ; and sometimes of Ceres, 
Phoebus, and other gods ; so much did men attribute to 
phantasms, as to think them aerial living bodies ; and gen- 
erally to call them spirits. And as the Romans in this, held 
the same opinion with the Greeks, so also did the Jews ; for 
they call madmen prophets, or, according as they thought 
the spirits good or bad, demoniacs : and some of them 
called both prophets and demoniacs, madmen ; and some 
called the same man both demoniac, and madman. But for 
the Gentiles it is no wonder, because diseases and health, 
vices and virtues, and many natural accidents, were with 
them termed, and worshipped as demons. So that a man 
was to understand by demon, as well, sometimes an ague, as 
a devil. But for the Jews to have such opinion, is some- 
what strange. For neither Moses nor Abraham pretended 
to prophesy by possession of a spirit ; but from the voice of 
God ; or by a vision or dream : nor is there anything in his 
law, moral or ceremonial, by which they were taught, there 
was any such enthusiasm, or any possession. When God 
is said, (Numb. xi. 25) to take from the spirit that was in 
Moses, and give to the seventy elders, the Spirit of God 
(taking it for the substance of God) is not divided. The 
Scriptures, by the Spirit of God in man, mean a man's 
spirit, inclined to godliness. And where it is said, (Exod. 
xxiii. 8) "whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom to 
make garments for Aaron," is not meant a spirit put into 
them, that can make garments, but the wisdom of their own 
spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit 
of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily 
called an unclean spirit, and so other spirits, though not 



INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. 103 

always, yet as often as the virtue or vice so styled, is extra- 
ordinary, and eminent. Neither did the other prophets of 
the Old Testament pretend enthusiasm ; or, that God spake 
in them ; but to them, by voice, vision, or dream ; and the 
"burthen of the Lord " was not possession, but command. 
How then could the Jews fall into this opinion of posses- 
sion ? I can imagine no reason, but that which is common 
to all men ; namely, the want of curiosity to search natural 
causes : and their placing felicity in the acquisition of the 
gross pleasures of the senses, and the things that most 
immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any 
strange, and unusual ability, or defect, in a man's mind ; 
unless they see withal, from what cause it may probably 
proceed, can hardly think it natural ; and if not natural, 
they must needs think it supernatural ; and then what can it 
be, but that either God or the devil is in him ? And hence it 
came to pass, when our Saviour (Mark iii. 21) was com- 
passed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted 
he was mad, and went out to hold him : but the Scribes 
said he had Beelzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out 
devils ; as if the greater madman had awed the lesser : and 
that (John x. 20) some said, "he hath a devil, and is 
mad " ; whereas others holding him for a prophet, said, 
"these are not the words of one that hath a devil." So in 
the Old Testament he that came to anoint Jehu, (2 Kings 
ix. 11) was a prophet ; but some of the company asked 
Jehu, "what came that madman for ? " So that in sum, it 
is manifest, that whosoever behaved himself in extraordi- 
nary manner, was thought by the Jews to be possessed either 
with a good, or evil spirit ; except by the Sadduces, who 
erred so far on the other hand, as not to believe there were 
at all any spirits, which is very near to direct atheism ; 
and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to term 
such men demoniacs, rather than madmen. 

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of 



104 OF MAN. 

them, as if they were possessed ; and not as if they were 
mad ? To which I can give no other kind of answer, but 
that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like 
manner against the opinion of the motion of the earth. 
The Scripture was written to show unto men the kingdom 
of God, and to prepare their minds to become his obedient 
subjects ; leaving the world, and the philosophy thereof, to 
the disputation of men, for the exercising of their natural 
reason. Whether the earth's, or sun's motion make the day, 
and night ; or whether the exorbitant actions of men, pro- 
ceed from passion, or from the devil, so we worship him 
not, it is all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to 
God Almighty ; which is the thing for which the Scripture 
was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease, 
as to a person ; it is the usual phrase of all that cure by 
words only, as Christ did, and enchanters pretend to do, 
whether they speak to a devil or not. For is not Christ 
also said (Matt. viii. 26) to have rebuked the winds? Is 
not he said also (Luke iv. 39) to rebuke a fever? Yet 
this does not argue that a fever is a devil. And whereas 
many of the devils are said to confess Christ ; it is not 
necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that 
those madmen confessed him. And whereas our Saviour 
(Matt. xii. 43) speaketh of an unclean spirit, that having 
gone out of a man, wandereth through dry places, seeking 
rest, and rinding none, and returning into the same man, 
with seven other spirits worse than himself ; it is manifestly 
a parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to 
quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them ; and 
becomes seven times worse than he was. So that I see 
nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a belief, that 
demoniacs were any other thing but madmen. 

There is yet another fault in the discourses of some men ; 
which may also be numbered amongst the sorts of madness ; 
namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before 



INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. 105 

in the fifth chapter, by the name of absurdity. And that 
is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in 
them no signification at all ; but are fallen upon by some, 
through misunderstanding of the words they have received, 
and repeat by rote ; by others from intention to receive by 
obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that 
converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the 
schoolmen ; or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The 
common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and 
are therefore, by those other egregious persons counted 
idiots. But to be assured their words are without anything 
correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some 
examples ; which if any man require, let him take a school- 
man in his hands and see if he can translate any one 
chapter concerning any difficult point, as the Trinity ; the 
Deity ; the nature of Christ ; transubstantiation ; free-will, 
&c. into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the 
same intelligible ; or into any tolerable Latin, such as they 
were acquainted withal, that lived when the Latin tongue 
was vulgar. What is the meaning of these words, "The 
first cause does not necessarily inflow anything into 
the second, by force of the essential subordination of the 
second causes, by which it may help it to work " ? They 
are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of 
Suarez' first book, " Of the concourse, motion, and help of 
God." When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are 
they not mad, or intend to make others so ? And par- 
ticularly, in the question of transubstantiation ; where after 
certain words spoken ; they that say, the white/z^s^, round- 
ness, magnitude, qualify, corruptibili(r, all which are incor- 
poreal, &c. go out of the wafer, into the body of our 
blessed Saviour, do they not make those " nesses," " tudes," 
and "ties," to be so many spirits possessing his body? 
For by spirits, they mean always things, that being incor- 
poreal, are nevertheless movable from one place to another. 



106 OF MAN. 

So that this kind of absurdity, may rightly be numbered 
amongst the many sorts of madness ; and all the time that 
guided by clear thoughts of their worldly lust, they for- 
bear disputing, or writing thus, but lucid intervals. And 
thus much of the virtues and defects intellectual. 



CHAPTER IX. 

Of the Several Subjects of Knowledge. 

There are of " knowledge " two kinds ; whereof one is 
" knowledge of fact " : the other " knowledge of the con- 
sequence of one affirmation to another." The former is 
nothing else, but sense and memory, and is " absolute 
knowledge " ; as when we see a fact doing, or remember it 
done : and this is the knowledge required in a witness. 
The latter is called " science " ; and is " conditional " ; as 
when we know, that, " if the figure shown be a circle, then 
any straight line through the centre shall divide it into 
two equal parts." And this is the knowledge required 
in a philosopher; that is to say, of him that pretends to 
reasoning. 

The register of "knowledge of fact " is called "history." 
Whereof there be two sorts : one called " natural history " ; 
which is the history of such facts, or effects of nature, as 
have no dependence on man's " will " ; such as are the 
histories of "metals," "plants," "animals," "regions," 
and the like. The other, is " civil history " ; which is the 
history of the voluntary actions of men in commonwealths. 

The registers of science, are such " books " as contain 
the " demonstrations " of consequences of one affirmation, 
to another ; and are commonly called " books of philos- 
ophy "; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diver- 
sity of the matter ; and may be divided in such manner as 
I have divided them in the following table, (pp. 108, 109). 



OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, ETC. 107 

CHAPTER X. 

Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and Worthiness. 

The "power of a man," to take it universally, is his 
present means ; to obtain some future apparent good ; and 
is either "original" or "instrumental." 

"Natural power," is the eminence of the faculties of 
body, or mind : as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, 
arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. " Instrumental " are 
those powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are 
means and instruments to acquire more : as riches, reputa- 
tion, friends, and the secret working of God, which men 
call good luck. For the nature of power is in this point, 
like to fame, increasing as it proceeds ; or like the motion 
of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the 
more haste. 

The greatest of human powers, is that which is com- 
pounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in 
one person, natural, or civil, that has the use of all their 
powers depending on his will ; such as is the power of a 
commonwealth : or depending on the wills of each particu- 
lar ; such as is the power of a faction or of divers factions 
leagued. Therefore to have servants, is power ; to have 
friends, is power : for they are strengths united. 

Also riches joined with liberality, is power : because it 
procureth friends, and servants : without liberality, not so ; 
because in this case they defend not ; but expose men to 
envy, as a prey. 

Reputation of power, is power ; because it draweth with 
it the adherence of those that need protection. 

So is reputation of love of a man's country, called 
popularity, for the same reason. 

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or 
feared of many ; or the reputation of such quality, is 



io8 



TABLES OF THE SEVERAL 



SCIENCE, 
that is, knowl- 
edge of con- 
sequences ; 
which is 
called also 

PHILOSOPHY. 



Consequences 
from the 
accidents of 
bodies natu- 
ral; which is 
called NAT- 
URAL PHI- 
LOSOPHY. 



Consequences from the accidents common to all 
bodies natural; which are quantity and 
motion 



Physics 
or conse- 
quences 
from qual- 
^ ities. 



Consequences from the qualities of 
bodies transient, such as some- 
times appear, sometimes vanish, 

Meteorology . . . 

Consequences from 
the qualities of the 
stars 



Conse- 
quences 
from the 
qualities 
of bodies 
perma- 
nent. 



Consequences 
from the 
accidents of 
politic bod- 
ies; which is<J 
called pol- 
itics, and 

CIVIL PHI- 

L. losophy. L 



Consequences of the 
qualities from liquid 
bodies, that fill the 
space between the 
stars; such as are 
the air, or sub- 
stances ethereal. 

Consequences from 
the qualities of bod- 
ies terrestrial . 



Of consequences from the institution of 
Commonwealths, to the rights, and duties 
of the body politic or sovereign. 

Of consequences from the same, to the duty 
and right of the subjects. 



SUBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 



09 



'Consequences from quantity, and motion indeterminate ; which r 



Philoso- 



being the principles or first foundation of philosophy, is^ * — ~~ 
called Philosophia Prima _ ^phia Prima. 



'Consequences f By Figure 
from quan- j 
tity, and< 
motion de- | 
termined. l^By Number 



r- Mathematics. 

I 



Consequences 
from motion 
and quantity ' 
determined, 



Consequences 
from the 
motion, and 
quantity of 
b o d i es in 
special. 



( Consequences " 
from the 
motion and 
quantity of 
the greater } Cosmography, 
parts of the 
world, as the 
earth and 
stars. 



Consequences 1 
from the mo- I , * 7 
tions of spe- [Mechanics 
cial kinds, fDoctrmeof 
and figures I we ^ ht 
of body. J 



TGeometry. 



I Arith- 

^ METIC. 



Astronomy. 
Geography. 



(Science of 
I Engineers. 



Architec- 



f Consequences from the light of the stars, 
] motion of the sun, is made the science of 



TURE. 

Naviga- 
tion. 

. Meteor- 
ology. 
Out of this, and the "1^ 



iography 



[^Consequences from the 



innuences 



of the stars 



Astrology. 



f Consequences 
from the 
parts of the 
earth, that* 
are without 
sense. 



Consequences from the qualities of minerals, as 
stones, metals, etc. 



^Consequences from the qualities of vegetables. 

'Consequences ( Consequences from vision . Optics. 

from the | Consequences from sounds . Music, 
qualities of<{ 

animals in j Consequences from the rest of the 
general. y_ senses. 



Consequences ^ 
from the 
qualities of 
animals. 



Consequences 
from the qual- 
ities of men 
in special. 



Consequences from the passions 
of men 



Ethics. 



r In magnifying, J p OFTRY 
Consequences | vilifying, etc. j XWE - iIV • 
from speech. ■{ In persuading, Rhetoric. 
j In reasoning , Logic. 
\lxv contracting, The Science of 
Just& Unjust. 



no OF MAN. 

power ; because it is a means to have the assistance, and 
service of many. 

Good success is power ; because it maketh reputation of 
wisdom, or good fortune ; which makes men either fear him, 
or rely on him. 

Affability of men already in power, is increase of power ; 
because it gaineth love. 

Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war, is 
power; because to prudent men, we commit the govern- 
ment of ourselves, more willingly than to others. 

Nobility is power, not in all places, but only in those 
commonwealths, where it has privileges : for in such privi- 
leges, consisteth their power. 

Eloquence is power, because it is seeming prudence. 

Form is power ; because being a promise of good, it 
recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers. 

The sciences, are small power ; because not eminent ; and 
therefore, not acknowledged in any man ; nor are at all, 
but in a few, and in them, but of a few things. For science 
is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such 
as in a good measure have attained it. 

Arts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, 
and other instruments of war ; because they confer to 
defence, and victory, are power : and though the true 
mother of them, be science, namely the mathematics ; yet, 
because they are brought into the light, by the hand of the 
artificer, they be esteemed, the midwife passing with the 
vulgar for the mother, as his issue. 

The "value," or "worth" of a man, is as of all other 
things, his price ; that is to say, so much as would be given 
for the use of his power : and therefore is not absolute ; but 
a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another. 
An able conductor of soldiers, is of great price in time of 
war present, or imminent ; but in peace not so. A learned 
and uncorrupt judge, is much worth in time of peace ; but 



OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, ETC. Ill 

not so much in war. And as in other things, so in men, 
not the seller, but the buyer determines the price. For 
let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at the highest 
value they can ; yet their true value is no more than it is 
esteemed by others. 

The manifestation of the value we set on one another, is 
that which is commonly called honouring, and dishonouring. 
To value a man at a high rate, is to "honour" him; at a 
low rate, is to " dishonour " him. But high, and low, in 
this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate 
that each man setteth on himself. 

The public worth of a man, which is the value set on 
him by the commonwealth, is that which men commonly 
call "dignity." And this value of him by the common- 
wealth, is understood, by offices of command, judicature, 
public employment ; or by names and titles, introduced for 
distinction of such value. 

To pray to another, for aid of any kind, is " to honour " ; 
because a sign we have an opinion he has power to help ; 
and the more difficult the aid is, the more is the honour. 

To obey, is to honour, because no man obeys them, whom 
they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And 
consequently to disobey, is to "dishonour." 

To give great gifts to a man, is to honour him ; because 
it is buying of protection, and acknowledging of power. 
To give little gifts, is to dishonour ; because it is but alms, 
and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps. 

To be sedulous in promoting another's good ; also to 
flatter, is to honour ; as a sign we seek his protection or 
aid. To neglect, is to dishonour. 

To give way, or place to another, in any commodity, is to 
honour ; being a confession of greater power. To arrogate, 
is to dishonour. 

To show any sign of love, or fear of another, is to honour ; 
for both to love, and to fear, is to value. To contemn, or 



112 OF MAN. 

less to love or fear, than he expects, is to dishonour ; for it 
is undervaluing. 

To praise, magnify, or call happy, is to honour ; because 
nothing but goodness, power, and felicity is valued. To 
revile, mock, or pity, is to dishonour. 

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before 
him with decency, and humility, is to honour him ; as signs 
of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do any- 
thing before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to dis- 
honour. 

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to honour him; 
sign of opinion of his virtue and power. To distrust, or 
not believe, is to dishonour. 

To hearken to a man's counsel, or discourse of what kind 
soever is to honour ; as a sign we think him wise, or elo- 
quent, or witty. To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is 
to dishonour. 

To do those things to another, which he takes for signs 
of honour, or which the law or custom makes so, is to 
honour ; because in approving the honour done by others, 
he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. 
To refuse to do them, is to dishonour. 

To agree with in opinion, is to honour ; as being a sign 
of approving his judgment, and wisdom. To dissent, is dis- 
honour, and an upbraiding of error ; and, if the dissent be 
in many things, of folly. 

To imitate, is to honour ; for it is vehemently to approve. 
To imitate one's enemy, is to dishonour. 

To honour those another honours, is to honour him ; as 
a sign of approbation of his judgment. To honour his ene- 
mies, is to dishonour him. 

To employ in counsel, or in actions of difficulty, is to 
honour ; as a sign of opinion of his wisdom, or other power. 
To deny employment in the same cases, to those that seek 
it, is to dishonour. 



OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, ETC. 113 

All these ways of honouring, are natural ; and as well 
within, as without commonwealths. But in commonwealths, 
where he, or they that have the supreme authority, can 
make whatsoever they please, to stand for signs of honour, 
there be other honours. 

A sovereign doth honour a subject, with whatsoever title, 
or office, or employment, or action, that he himself will have 
taken for a sign of his will to honour him. 

The king of Persia, honoured Mordecai, when he appointed 
he should be conducted through the streets in the king's 
garment, upon one of the king's horses, with a crown on his 
head, and a prince before him, proclaiming, " thus shall it 
be done to him that the king will honour." And yet another 
king of Persia, or the same another time, to one that 
demanded for some great service, to wear one of the king's 
robes, gave him leave so to do ; but with this addition, that 
he should wear it as the king's fool ; and then it was dis- 
honour. So that of civil honour, the fountain is in the 
person of the commonwealth, and dependeth on the will of 
the sovereign ; and is therefore temporary, and called " civil 
honour"; such as magistracy, offices, titles; and in some 
places coats and scutcheons painted : and men honour such 
as have them, as having so many signs of favour in the 
commonwealth ; which favour is power. 

" Honourable " is whatsoever possession, action, or qual- 
ity, is an argument and sign of power. 

And therefore to be honoured, loved, or feared of many, 
is honourable ; as arguments of power. To be honoured 
of few or none, "dishonourable." 

Dominion, and victory is honourable ; because acquired 
by power ; and servitude, for need, or fear, is dishonourable. 

Good fortune, if lasting, honourable ; as a sign of the 
favour of God. Ill fortune, and losses, dishonourable. 
Riches, are honourable ; for they are power. Poverty, dis- 
honourable. Magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, con- 



H4 OF MAN. 

fidence, are honourable ; for they proceed from the con- 
science of power. Pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, diffidence, 
are dishonourable. 

Timely resolution, or determination of what a man is to 
do, is honourable ; as being the contempt of small difficul- 
ties, and dangers. And irresolution, dishonourable ; as a 
sign of too much valuing of little impediments, and little 
advantages : for when a man has weighed things as long as 
the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight 
is but little ; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues 
little things, which is pusillanimity. 

All actions, and speeches, that proceed, or seem to pro- 
ceed, from much experience, science, discretion, or wit, 
are honourable ; for all these are powers. Actions, or 
words that proceed from error, ignorance, or folly, dis- 
honourable. 

Gravity, as far forth as it seems to proceed from a mind 
employed on something else, is honourable; because employ- 
ment is a sign of power. But if it seem to proceed from a 
purpose to appear grave, it is dishonourable. For the 
gravity of the former, is like the steadiness of a ship laden 
with merchandize ; but of the latter, like the steadiness of 
a ship ballasted with sand, and other trash. 

To be conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for wealth, 
office, great actions, or any eminent good, is honourable ; 
as a sign of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the 
contrary, obscurity, is dishonourable. 

To be descended from conspicuous parents, is honourable ; 
because they the more easily attain the aids, and friends of 
their ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from 
obscure parentage, is dishonourable. 

Actions proceeding from equity, joined with loss, are 
honourable ; as signs of magnanimity : for magnanimity is 
a sign of power. On the contrary, craft, shifting, neglect 
of equity, is dishonourable. 



OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, ETC. 115 

Covetousness of great riches, and ambition of great hon- 
ours, are honourable ; as signs of power to obtain them. 
Covetousness, and ambition, of little gains, or preferments, 
is dishonourable. 

Nor does it alter the case of honour, whether an action, 
so it be great and difficult, and consequently a sign of much 
power, be just or unjust : for honour consisteth only in the 
opinion of power. Therefore the ancient heathen did not 
think they dishonoured, but greatly honoured the Gods, 
when they introduced them in their poems, committing 
rapes, thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts : 
insomuch as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as 
his adulteries ; nor in Mercury, as his frauds, and thefts : 
of whose praises, in a hymn of Homer, the greatest is this, 
that being born in the morning, he had invented music at 
noon, and before night, stolen away the cattle of Apollo, 
from his herdsmen. 

Also amongst men, till there were constituted great com- 
monwealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a pirate, or 
a highway thief ; but rather a lawful trade, not only amongst 
the Greeks, but also amongst all other nations ; as is mani- 
fest by the histories of ancient time. And at this day, in 
this part of the world, private duels are, and always will be 
honourable, though unlawful, till such time as there shall 
be honour ordained for them that refuse, and ignominy for 
them that make the challenge. For duels also are many 
times effects of courage ; and the ground of courage is 
always strength or skill, which are power ; though for the 
most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear 
of dishonour, in one, or both the combatants ; who engaged 
by rashness, are driven into the lists to avoid disgrace. 

Scutcheons, and coats of arms hereditary, where they 
have any eminent privileges, are honourable ; otherwise 
not : for their power consisteth either in such privileges, or 
in riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured in other 



n6 OF MAN. 

men. This kind of honour, commonly called gentry, hath 
been derived from the ancient Germans. For there never 
was any such thing known, where the German customs were 
unknown. Nor is it now anywhere in use, where the Ger- 
mans have not inhabited. The ancient Greek commanders, 
when they went to war, had their shields painted with such 
devices as they pleased ; insomuch as an unpainted buck- 
ler was a sign of poverty, and of a common soldier ; but 
they transmitted not the inheritance of them. The Romans 
transmitted the marks of their families : but they were the 
images, not the devices of their ancestors. Amongst the 
people of Asia, Africa, and America, there is not, nor was 
ever, any such thing. The Germans only had that custom ; 
from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain, 
and Italy, when in great numbers they either aided the 
Romans, or made their own conquests in these western 
parts of the world. 

For Germany, being anciently, as all other countries, in 
their beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of 
little lords, or masters of families, that continually had wars 
one with another ; those masters, or lords, principally to 
the end they might, when they were covered with arms, be 
known by their followers ; and partly for ornament, both 
painted their armour, or their scutcheon, or coat, with the 
picture of some beast, or other thing ; and also put some 
eminent and visible mark upon the crest of their helmets. 
And this ornament both of the arms, and crest, descended 
by inheritance to their children ; to the eldest pure, and to 
the rest with some note of diversity, such as the old master, 
that is to say in Dutch, the " Here-alt " thought fit. But 
when many such families, joined together, made a greater 
monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish scutch- 
eons, was made a private office apart. And the issue of 
these lords, is the great and ancient gentry ; which for the 
most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and 



OF PO WER, WOR TH, DIGNITY, ETC. 117 

rapine ; or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars, pali- 
sadoes, and other notes of war ; nothing being then in 
honour, but virtue military. Afterwards, not only kings, 
but popular commonwealths, gave divers manners of scutch- 
eons, to such as went forth to the war, or returned from it, 
for encouragement, or recompense to their service. All 
which, by an observing reader, may be found in such ancient 
histories, Greek and Latin, as make mention of the German 
nation and manners, in their times. 

Titles of "honour," such as are duke, count, marquis, 
and baron, are honourable ; as signifying the value set upon 
them by the sovereign power of the commonwealth : which 
titles, were in old time titles of office, and command, derived 
some from the Romans, some from the Germans and French : 
dukes, in Latin "duces," being generals in war: counts, 
" comites," such as bear the general company out of friend- 
ship, and were left to govern and defend places conquered, 
and pacified : marquises, " marchiones," were counts that 
governed the marches, or bounds of the empire. Which 
titles of duke, count, and marquis, came into the empire, 
about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customs 
of the German "militia." But baron, seems to have been a 
title of the Gauls, and signifies a great man ; such as were 
the king's, or prince's men, whom they employed in war 
about their persons; and seems to be derived from "vir," 
to " ber," and " bar," that signified the same in the language 
of the Gauls, that "vir" in Latin; and thence to "bero," 
and "baro " : so that such men were called "berones," and 
after " barones " ; and, in Spanish, " varones." But he that 
would know more particularly the original of titles of hon- 
our, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Selden's most 
excellent treatise of that subject. In process of time these 
offices of honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of 
good and peaceable government, were turned into mere 
titles ; serving for the most part, to distinguish the prece- 



n8 OF MAN. 

dence, place, and order of subjects in the commonwealth : 
and men were made dukes, counts, marquises, and barons 
of places, wherein they had neither possession, nor com- 
mand : and other titles also, were devised to the same end. 

" Worthiness," is a thing different from the worth, or value 
of a man ; and also from his merit, or desert, and consisteth 
in a particular power, or ability for that, whereof he is said 
to be worthy : which particular ability, is usually named 
"fitness," or "aptitude." 

For he is worthiest to be a commander, to be a judge, or 
to have any other charge, that is best fitted, with the qual- 
ities required to the well discharging of it ; and worthiest 
of riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the well 
using of them : any of which qualities being absent, one 
may nevertheless be a worthy man, and valuable for some- 
thing else. Again, a man may be worthy of riches, office, and 
employment, that nevertheless, can plead no right to have it 
before another ; and therefore cannot be said to merit or 
deserve it. For merit presupposeth a right, and that the 
thing deserved is due by promise : of which I shall say more 
hereafter, when I shall speak of contracts. 



CHAPTER XI. 

Of the Difference of Manners. 

By manners, I mean not here, decency of behaviour ; as 
how one should salute another, or how a man should wash 
his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other 
points of the "small morals"; but those qualities of man- 
kind, that concern their living together in peace, and unity. 
To which end we are to consider, that the felicity of this 
life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For 
there is no such finis ultii7ius, utmost aim, nor summum bonum, 
greatest good, as is spoken of in the books of the old moral 



OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS. 119 

philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose desires 
are at an end, than he, whose senses and imaginations are 
at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, 
from one object to another ; the attaining of the former, being 
still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is, that 
the object of man's desire, is not to enjoy once only, and 
for one instant of time ; but to assure for ever, the way of 
his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and 
inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but 
also to the assuring of a contented life ; and differ only in 
the way : which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, 
in divers men ; and partly from the difference of the knowl- 
edge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce 
the effect desired. 

So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination 
of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after 
power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, 
is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight 
than he has already attained to ; or that he cannot be con- 
tent with a moderate power : but because he cannot assure 
the power and means to live well, which he hath present, 
without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, 
that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours 
to the assuring it at home by laws, or abroad by wars : 
and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire ; 
in some, of fame from new conquest ; in others, of ease 
and sensual pleasure ; in others, of admiration, or being 
flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of 
the mind. 

Competition of riches, honour, command, or other power, 
inclineth to contention, enmity, and war ; because the way 
of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, 
subdue, supplant, or repel the other. Particularly, competi- 
tion of praise, inclineth to a reverence of antiquity. For 
men contend with the living, not with the dead ; to these 



120 . OF MAN. 

ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory 
of the other. 

Desire of ease, and sensual delight, disposeth men to 
obey a common power : because by such desires, a man doth 
abandon the protection that might be hoped for from his 
own industry, and labour. Fear of death, and wounds, 
disposeth to the same ; and for the same reason. On the 
contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their 
present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of mili- 
tary command, are inclined to continue the causes of war ; 
and to stir up trouble and sedition : for there is no honour 
military but by war ; nor any such hope to mend an ill 
game, as by causing a new shuffle. 

Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to 
obey a common power : for such desire, containeth a desire 
of leisure ; and consequently protection from some other 
power than their own. 

Desire of praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as 
please them whose judgment they value ; for of those men 
whom we contemn, we contemn also the praises. Desire 
of fame after death does the same. And though after 
death, there be no sense of the praise given us on earth, as 
being joys, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable 
joys of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments 
of hell : yet is not such fame vain ; because men have a 
present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of 
the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity : 
which though they now see not, yet they imagine ; 
and anything that is pleasure to the sense, the same 
also is pleasure in the imagination. 

To have received from one, to whom we think ourselves 
equal, greater benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth 
to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred ; and puts a man 
into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the 
sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him there, where he 



OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS. 121 

might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and obliga- 
tion is thraldom ; and unrequitable obligation perpetual 
thraldom ; which is to one's equal, hateful. But to have 
received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge for 
superior, inclines to love ; because the obligation is no 
new depression : and cheerful acceptation, which men call 
"gratitude," is such an honour done to the obliger, as is 
taken generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, 
though from an equal, or inferior, as long as there is hope 
of requital, disposeth to love : for in the intention of the 
receiver, the obligation is of aid and service mutual ; from 
whence proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed in 
benefiting ; the most noble and profitable contention pos- 
sible ; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and 
the other revenged by confessing it. 

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is 
willing to expiate, incliheth the doer to hate the sufferer. 
For he must expect revenge, or forgiveness ; both which 
are hateful. 

Fear of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to 
seek aid by society : for there is no other way by which a 
man can secure his life and liberty. 

Men that distrust their own subtlety, are, in tumult and 
sedition, better disposed for victory, than they that sup- 
pose themselves wise, or crafty. For these love to consult, 
the other, fearing to be circumvented, to strike first. And 
in sedition, men being always in the precincts of battle, to 
hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better 
stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtlety of wit. 

Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to 
themselves of great sufficiency, delight in supposing them- 
selves gallant men, are inclined only to ostentation ; but 
not to attempt : because when danger or difficulty appears, 
they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency dis- 
covered. 



122 OF MAN. 

Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by 
the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent 
action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowl- 
edge of themselves, are inclined to rash engaging ; and in 
the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can : 
because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather 
hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse ; 
than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient. 

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in 
matter of government, are disposed to ambition. Because 
without public employment in council or magistracy, the 
honour of their wisdom is lost. And therefore eloquent 
speakers are inclined to ambition ; for eloquence seemeth 
wisdom, both to themselves and others. 

Pusillanimity disposeth men to irresolution, and conse- 
quently to lose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of 
action. For after men have been in deliberation till the 
time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is 
best to be done, it is a sign, the difference of motives, the 
one way and the other, are not great : therefore not to 
resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles ; 
which is pusillanimity. 

Frugality, though in poor men a virtue, maketh a man 
unapt to achieve such actions as require the strength of 
many men at once : for it weakeneth their endeavour, 
which is to be nourished and kept in vigour by reward. 

Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in 
them that have it ; because the former is seeming wisdom, 
the latter seeming kindness. Add to them military reputa- 
tion, and it disposeth men to adhere, and subject them- 
selves to those men that have them. The two former 
having giving them caution against danger from him ; the 
latter gives them caution against danger from others. 

Want of science, that is, ignorance of causes, disposeth, 
or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advice, and 



OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS. 123 

authority of others. For all men whom the truth concerns, 
if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of 
some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and 
see not why he should deceive them. 

Ignorance of the signification of words, which is want of 
understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not only 
the truth they know not ; but also the errors ; and which 
is more, the nonsense of them they trust : for neither error 
nor nonsense, can without a perfect understanding of 
words, be detected. 

From the same it proceedeth, that men give different 
names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of 
their own passions : as they that approve a private opinion, 
call it opinion ; but they that mislike it, heresy : and yet 
heresy signifies no more than private opinion ; but has 
only a greater tincture of choler. 

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot 
distinguish, without study and great understanding, 
between one action of many men, and many actions of one 
multitude ; as for example, between one action of all the 
senators of Rome in killing Cataline, and the many actions 
of a number of senators in killing Caesar ; and therefore are 
disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a 
multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led per- 
haps by the persuasion of one. 

Ignorance of the causes, and original constitution of 
right, equity, law, and justice, disposeth a man to make 
custom and example the rule of his actions ; in such man- 
ner, as to think that unjust which it hath been the custom 
to punish ; and that just, of the impunity and approbation 
whereof they can produce an example, or, as the lawyers 
which only use this false measure of justice barbarously 
call it, a precedent ; like little children, that have no other 
rule of good and evil manners, but the correction they 
receive from their parents and masters ; save that children 



124 OF MAN. 

are constant to their rule, whereas, men are not so ; because 
grown old, and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason, 
and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn ; reced- 
ing from custom when their interest requires it, and setting 
themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them : 
which is the cause, that the doctrine of right and wrong, is 
perpetually disputed, both by the pen and the sword : 
whereas the doctrine of lines, and figures, is not so ; 
because men care not, in that subject, what be truth, as a 
thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit or lust. For 
I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any 
man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have 
dominion, " that the three angles of a triangle, should be 
equal to two angles of a square " ; that doctrine should have 
been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of geom- 
etry, suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was able. 

Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all 
events, to the causes immediate, and instrumental ; for 
these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it 
comes to pass, that in all places, men that are grieved with 
payments to the public, discharge their anger upon the 
publicans, that is to say, farmers, collectors, and other 
officers of the public revenue ; and adhere to such as find 
fault with the public government ; and thereby, when they 
have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall 
also upon the supreme authority, for fear of punishment, 
or shame of receiving pardon. 

Ignorance of natural causes, disposeth a man to credu- 
lity, so as to believe many times impossibilities : for such 
know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true ; 
being unable to detect the impossibility. And credulity, 
because men like to be hearkened unto in company, dis- 
poseth them to lying : so that ignorance itself without 
malice, is able to make a man both to believe lies, and tell 
them ; and sometimes also to invent them. 



OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS. 125 

Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to inquire 
into the causes of things : because the knowledge of them, 
maketh men the better able to order the present to their 
best advantage. 

Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a 
man from the consideration of the effect, to seek the cause ; 
and again, the cause of that cause ; till of necessity he 
must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, 
whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal ; which is 
it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any 
profound inquiry into natural causes, without being inclined 
thereby to believe there is one God eternal ; though they 
cannot have any idea of him in their mind, answerable to 
his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men 
talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought 
to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and 
assure himself, there is somewhat there, which men call 
"fire," and is the cause of the heat he feels; but cannot 
imagine what it is like ; nor have an idea of it in his mind, 
such as they have that see it : so also by the visible things 
in this world, and their admirable order, a man may con- 
ceive there is a cause of them, which men call God ; and 
yet not have an idea, or image of him in his mind. 

And they that make little, or no inquiry into the natural 
causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the 
ignorance itself, of what it is that hath the power to do 
them much good or harm, are inclined to suppose, and 
feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible ; 
and to stand in awe of their own imaginations ; and in 
time of distress to invoke them ; as also in the time of an 
expected good success, to give them thanks ; making the 
creatures of their own fancy, their gods. By which means 
it hath come to pass, that from the innumerable variety of 
fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of 
gods. And this fear of things invisible, is the natural seed 



126 OF MAN. 

of that, which every one in himself calleth religion ; and in 
them that worship, or fear that power otherwise than they 
do, superstition. 

And this seed of religion, having been observed by 
many ; some of those that have observed it, have been 
inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form it into laws ; 
and to add to it of their own invention, any opinion of the 
causes of future events, by which they thought they should 
be best able to govern others, and make unto themselves 
the greatest use of their powers. 



CHAPTER XII. 
Of Religion. 

Seeing there are no signs, nor fruit of "religion," but in 
man only ; there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of 
"religion," is also only in man; and consisteth in some 
peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof, 
not to be found in any other living creatures. 

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of man, to be 
inquisitive into the causes of the events they see, some 
more, some less ; but all men so much, as to be curious in 
the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune. 

Secondly, upon the sight of anything that hath a begin- 
ning, to think also it had a cause, which determined the 
same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or 
later. 

Thirdly, whereas there is no other felicity of beasts, but 
the enjoying of their quotidian food, ease, and lusts; as 
having little or no foresight of the time to come, for want 
of observation, and memory of the order, consequence, 
and dependence of the things they see ; man observeth 
how one event hath been produced by another ; and reraem- 
bereth in them antecedence and consequence ; and when 



OF RELIGION. 127 

he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things, (for 
the causes of good and evil fortune for the most part are 
invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his 
own fancy suggesteth ; or trusteth the authority of other 
men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than 
himself. 

The two first, make anxiety. For being assured that 
there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or 
shall arrive hereafter, it is impossible for a man, who con- 
tinually endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he 
fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a 
perpetual solicitude of the time to come ; so that every 
man, especially those that are over-provident, are in a state 
like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, which 
interpreted, is, "the prudent man," was bound to the hill 
Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an eagle feeding 
on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repaired 
in the night : so that man, which looks too far before him, 
in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long 
gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity ; and 
has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep. 

This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in 
the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs 
have for object something. And therefore when there is 
nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of 
their good, or evil fortune, but some "power," or agent 
"invisible"; in which sense perhaps it was, that some of 
the old poets said, that the gods were at first created by 
human fear : which spoken of the gods, that is to say, of 
the many gods of the Gentiles, is very true. But the 
acknowledging of one God, eternal, infinite, and omni- 
potent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men 
have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their 
several virtues, and operations; than from the fear of what 
was to befall them in time to come. For he that from any 



128 OF MAN. 

effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and 
immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of 
that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit 
of causes, shall at last come to this, that there must be, as 
even the heathen philosophers confessed, one first mover ; 
that is, a first and an eternal cause of all things; which is 
that which men mean by the name of God ; and all this 
without thought of their fortune ; the solicitude whereof 
both inclines to fear, and hinders them from the search 
of the causes of other things, and thereby gives occasion 
of feigning of as many gods, as there be men that feign 
them. 

And for the matter, or substance of the invisible agents, 
so fancied ; they could not by natural cogitation, fall upon 
any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of 
the soul of man ; and that the soul of man, was of the same 
substance with that which appeareth in a dream, to one 
that sleepeth ; or in a looking-glass, to one that is awake ; 
which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing 
else but creatures of the fancy, think to be real, and external 
substances ; and therefore call them ghosts ; as the Latins 
called them imagines, and umbra ; and thought them spirits, 
that is, thin aerial bodies ; and those invisible agents which 
they feared, to be like them, save that they appear, and 
vanish when they please. But the opinion that such spirits 
were incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the 
mind of any man by nature ; because, though men may put 
together words of contradictory signification, as "spirit," 
and " incorporeal " ; yet they can never have the imagina- 
tion of anything answering to them : and therefore, men 
that by their own meditation arrive to the acknowledg- 
ment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God, chose 
rather to confess he is incomprehensible, and above their 
understanding, than to define his nature by " spirit incor- 
poreal," and then confess their definition to be unintelligi- 



OF RELIGION. 129 

ble ; or, if they give him such a title, it is not "dogmatic- 
ally," with intention to make the divine nature understood ; 
but "piously," to honor him with attributes, of significa- 
tions, as remote as they can from the grossness of bodies 
visible. 

Then, for the way by which they think these invisible 
agents wrought their effects ; that is to say, what immediate 
causes they used, in bringing things to pass, men that know 
not what it is that we call "causing," that is, almost all 
men, have no other rule to guess by, but by observing, and 
remembering what they have seen to precede the like effect 
at some other time, or times before, without seeing between 
the antecedent and subsequent event, any dependence or 
connection at all : and therefore from the like things past, 
they expect the like things to come ; and hope for good or 
evil luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at 
all in the causing of it : as the Athenians did for their 
war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio ; the Pompeian 
faction for their war in Africa, another Scipio ; and others 
have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner 
they attribute their fortune to a stander-by, to a lucky or 
unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of 
God be amongst them ; as charming and conjuring, the 
liturgy of witches ; inasmuch as to believe, they have power 
to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or anything 
into anything. 

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibit to 
powers invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions 
of their reverence, as they would use towards men ; gifts, 
petitions, thanks, submission of body, considerate addresses, 
sober behaviour, premeditated words, swearing, that is, 
assuring one another of their promises, by invoking them. 
Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing ; but leaves them 
either to rest there ; or for further ceremonies, to rely on 
those they believe to be wiser than themselves. 



130 OF MAN. 

Lastly, concerning how these invisible powers declare 
to men the things which shall hereafter come to pass, 
especially concerning their good or evil fortune in general, 
or good or ill success in any particular undertaking, men 
are naturally at a stand ; save that using to conjecture of 
the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not 
only to take casual things, after one or two encounters, 
for prognostics of the like encounter ever after, but also to 
believe the like prognostics from other men, of whom they 
have once conceived a good opinion. 

And in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance 
of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and 
taking of things casual for prognostics, consisteth the 
natural seed of " religion ; " which by reason of the differ- 
ent fancies, judgments, and passions of several men, hath 
grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are 
used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another. 

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of 
men. One sort have been they, that have nourished, and 
ordered them, according to their own invention. The 
other have done it, by God's commandment, and direction : 
but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those 
men that relied on them, the more apt to obedience, laws, 
peace, charity, and civil society. So that the religion of 
the former sort, is a part of human politics ; and teacheth 
part of the duty which earthly kings require of their sub- 
jects. And the religion of the latter sort is divine politics ; 
and containeth precepts to those that have yielded them- 
selves subjects in the kingdom of God. Of the former sort, 
were all the founders of commonwealths, and the lawgivers 
of the Gentiles : of the latter sort, were Abraham, Moses, 
and our blessed Saviour ; by whom have been derived unto 
us the laws of the kingdom of God. 

And for that part of religion, which consisteth in opinions 
concerning the nature of powers invisible, there is almost 



OF RELIGION. 13 1 

nothing that has a name, that has not been esteemed 
amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a god, or 
devil; or by their poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, 
or possessed by some spirit or other. 

The unformed matter of the world, was a god, by the 
name of Chaos. 

The heaven, the ocean, the planets, the fire, the earth, 
the winds, were so many gods. 

Men, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dog, a snake, 
an onion, a leek, were deified. Besides that, they filled 
almost all places, with spirits called "demons "; the plains, 
with Pan and Panises, or Satyrs ; the woods, with Fauns, 
and Nymphs ; the sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs ; 
every river, and fountain, with a ghost of his name, and 
with Nymphs; every house with its "Lares," or familiars; 
every man with his " Genius " ; hell with ghosts, and 
spiritual officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies ; 
and in the night-time, all places with "larvae," "lemures," 
ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdom of fairies 
and bugbears. They have also ascribed divinity, and built 
temples to mere accidents, and qualities ; such as are time, 
night, day, peace, concord, love, contention, virtue, honour, 
health, rust, fever, and the like ; which when they prayed 
for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were ghosts of 
those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or 
withholding that good, or evil, for or against which they 
prayed. They invoked also their own wit, by the name of 
Muses ; their own ignorance, by the name of Fortune ; their 
own lusts by the name of Cupid ; their own rage, by the 
name of Furies ; their own privy members, by the name of 
Priapus ; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and 
Succubae : insomuch as there was nothing, which a poet 
could introduce as a person in his poem, which they did 
not make either a "god," or a "devil." 

The same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, observ- 



I3 2 OF MAN. 

ing the second ground for religion, which is men's ignorance 
of causes ; and thereby their aptness to attribute their 
fortune to causes, on which there was no dependence at 
all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, 
instead of second causes, a kind of second and ministerial 
gods ; ascribing the cause of fecundity, to Venus ; the cause 
of arts, to Apollo ; of subtlety and craft, to Mercury ; of 
tempests and storms, to ./Eolus ; and of other effects, to 
other gods ; insomuch as there was amongst the heathen 
almost as great variety of gods, as of business. 

And to the worship, which naturally men conceived fit 
to be used towards their gods, namely, -oblations, prayers, 
thanks, and the rest formerly named ; the same legislators 
of the Gentiles have added their images, both in picture, 
and sculpture ; that the more ignorant sort, that is to say, 
the most part or generality of the people, thinking the 
gods for whose representation they were made, were really 
included, and as it were housed within them, might so 
much the more stand in fear of them : and endowed them 
with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set 
apart from all other human uses ; that is, consecrated, and 
made holy to those their idols ; as caverns, groves, woods, 
mountains, and whole islands ; and have attributed to 
them, not only the shapes, some of men, some of beasts, 
some of monsters ; but also the faculties, and passions of 
men and beasts : as sense, speech, sex, lust, generation, 
and this not only by mixing one with another, to propagate 
the kind of gods ; but also by mixing with men, and women, 
to beget mongrel gods, and but inmates of heaven, as 
Bacchus, Hercules, and others ; besides anger, revenge, 
and other passions of living creatures, and the actions 
proceeding from them, as fraud, theft, adultery, sodomy, 
and any vice that may be taken for an effect of power, or 
a cause of pleasure ; and all such vices, as amongst men 
are taken to be against law, rather than against honour. 



OF RELIGION. 133 

Lastly, to the prognostics of time to come ; which are 
naturally, but conjectures upon experience of time past ; 
and supernaturally, divine revelation ; the same authors of 
the religion of the Gentiles, partly upon pretended experi- 
ence, partly upon pretended revelation, have added innu- 
merable other superstitious ways of divination ; and made 
men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in 
the ambiguous or senseless answers of the priests at Delphi, 
Delos, Amnion, and other famous oracles ; which answers, 
were made ambiguous by design, to own the event both 
ways ; or absurd, by the intoxicating vapour of the place, 
which is very frequent in sulphurous caverns : sometimes 
in the leaves of the Sybils ; of whose prophecies, like those 
perhaps of Nostradamus (for the fragments now extant 
seem to be the invention of later times), there were some 
books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republic : 
sometimes in the insignificant speeches of madmen, sup- 
posed to be possessed with a divine spirit, which possession 
they called enthusiasm ; and these kinds of foretelling events, 
were accounted theomancy, or prophecy : sometimes in the 
aspect of the stars at their nativity ; which was called 
horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary astrology : 
sometimes in their own hopes and fears, called thumo- 
mancy, or presage : sometimes in the prediction of witches, 
that pretended conference with the dead ; which is called 
necromancy, conjuring, and witchcraft ; and is but juggling 
and confederate knavery : sometimes in the casual flight, or 
feeding of birds ; called augury : sometimes in the entrails 
of a sacrificed beast ; which was " aruspicina " : sometimes 
in dreams : sometimes in croaking of ravens, or chattering 
of birds : sometimes in the lineaments of the face ; which 
was called metoposcopy ; or by palmistry in the lines of 
the hand; in casual words, called "omina": sometimes in 
monsters, or unusual accidents ; as eclipses, comets, rare 
meteors, earthquakes, inundations, uncouth births, and the 



134 OF MAN. 

like, which they called "portenta," and "ostenta," because 
they thought them to portend, or foreshow some great 
calamity to come ; sometimes, in mere lottery, as cross and 
pile, counting holes in a sieve ; dipping of verses in Homer, 
and Virgil ; and innumerable other such vain conceits. So 
easy are men to be drawn to believe anything, from such 
men as have gotten credit with them ; and can with gen- 
tleness, and dexterity take hold of their fear and ignorance. 
And therefore the first founders, and legislators of com- 
monwealths among the Gentiles, whose ends were only to 
keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places 
taken care ; first, to imprint in their minds a belief, that 
those precepts which they gave concerning religion, might 
not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from 
the dictates of some god, or other spirit ; or else that they 
themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortals, that 
their laws might the more easily be received : so Numa 
Pompilius pretended to receive the ceremonies he instituted 
amongst the Romans, from the nymph Egeria : and the 
first king and founder of the kingdom of Peru, pretended 
himself and his wife to be the children of the Sun ; and 
Mahomet, to set up his new religion, pretended to have 
conferences with the Holy Ghost, in form of a dove. 
Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that 
the same things were displeasing to the gods, which were 
forbidden by the laws. Thirdly, to prescribe ceremonies, 
supplications, sacrifices, and festivals, by which they were 
to believe, the anger of the gods might be appeased ; and 
that ill success in war, great contagions of sickness, earth- 
quakes, and each man's private misery, came from the 
anger of the gods, and their anger from the neglect of 
their worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking some point 
of the ceremonies required. And though amongst the 
ancient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that 
which in the poets is written of the pains and pleasures 



OF RELIGION. 135 

after this life : which divers of great authority, and gravity 
in that state have in their harangues openly derided ; yet 
that belief was always more cherished, than the contrary. 

And by these, and such other institutions, they obtained 
in order to their end, which was the peace of the common- 
wealth, that the common people in their misfortunes, laying 
the fault on neglect, or error in their ceremonies, or on 
their own disobedience to the laws, were the less apt to 
mutiny against their governors ; and being entertained 
with the pomp, and pastime of festivals, and public games, 
made in honour of the gods, needed nothing else but bread 
to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion 
against the state. And therefore the Romans, that had 
conquered the greatest part of the then known world, made 
no scruple of tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city 
of Rome itself; unless it had something in it, that could 
not consist with their civil government ; nor do we read, 
that any religion was there forbidden, but that of the 
Jews ; who, being the peculiar kingdom of God, thought it 
unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king or 
state whatsoever. And thus you see how the religion of 
the Gentiles was part of their policy. 

But where God himself, by supernatural revelation, 
planted religion ; there he also made to himself a peculiar 
kingdom ; and gave laws, not only of behaviour towards 
himself, but also towards one another ; and thereby in the 
kingdom of God, the policy, and laws civil, are a part of 
religion ; and therefore the distinction of temporal and 
spiritual domination, hath there no place. It is true that 
God is king of all the earth : yet may he be king of a pecul- 
iar, and chosen nation. For there is no more incongruity 
therein, than that he that hath the general command of 
the whole army, should have withal a peculiar regiment, or 
company of his own. God is king of all the earth by his 
power : but by his chosen people he is king by covenant. 



136 OF MAN. 

But to speak more largely of the kingdom of God, both by 
nature, and covenant, I have in the following discourse 
assigned another place (chapter xxxv.). 

From the propagation of religion, it is not hard to under- 
stand the causes of the resolution of the same into its first 
seeds, or principles ; which are only an opinion of a deity, 
and powers invisible, and supernatural ; that can never be 
so abolished out of human nature, but that new religions 
may again be made to spring out of them, by the culture of 
such men, as for such purpose are in reputation. 

For seeing all formed religion, is founded at first, upon 
the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom 
they believe not only to be a wise man, and to labour to 
procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to 
whom God himself vouchsafeth to declare his will super- 
naturally ; it followeth necessarily, when they that have the 
government of religion, shall come to have either the wis- 
dom of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected ; 
or when they shall be unable to show any probable token 
of divine revelation ; that the religion which they desire to 
uphold, must be suspected likewise ; and, without the fear 
of the civil sword, contradicted and rejected. 

That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom, in 
him that formeth a religion, or addeth to it when it is 
already formed, is the enjoining of a belief of contradic- 
tories ; for both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be 
true : and therefore to enjoin the belief of them, is an argu- 
ment of ignorance ; which detects the author in that ; and 
discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from 
revelation supernatural : which revelation a man may indeed 
have of many things above, but of nothing against natural 
reason. 

That which taketh away the reputation of sincerity, is 
the doing or saying of such things, as appear to be signs, 
that what they require other men to believe, is not believed 



OF RELIGION. 137 

by themselves ; all which doings or sayings are therefore 
called scandalous ; because they be stumbling-blocks, that 
make men to fall in the way of religion ; as injustice, 
cruelty, profaneness, avarice, and luxury. For who can 
believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions as proceed 
from any of these roots, believeth there is any such invis- 
ible power to be feared, as he afrrighteth other men withal 
for lesser faults ? 

That which taketh away the reputation of love, is the 
being detected of private ends : as when the belief they 
require of others, conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the 
acquiring of dominion, riches, dignity, or secure pleasure, 
to themselves only, or specially. For that which men reap 
benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their 
own sakes, and not for love of others. 

Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine call- 
ing, can be no other, than the operation of miracles ; or true 
prophecy, which also is a miracle ; or extraordinary felicity. 
And therefore, to those points of religion, which have, been 
received from them that did such miracles ; those that are 
added by such, as approve not their calling by some mira- 
cle, obtain no greater belief, than what the custom and laws 
of the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into 
them. For as in natural things, men of judgment require 
natural signs, and arguments ; so in supernatural things, 
they require signs supernatural, which are miracles, before 
they consent inwardly, and from their hearts. 

All which causes of the weakening of men's faith, do mani- 
festly appear in the examples following. First, we have the 
example of the children of Israel ; who when Moses, that 
had approved his calling to them by miracles, and by the 
happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but forty 
days, revolted from the worship of the true God, recom- 
mended to them by him ; and setting up (Exod. xxxiii. 1,2) 
a golden calf for their god, relapsed into the idolatry of the 



138 OF MAN. 

Egyptians ; from whom they had been so lately delivered. 
And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that genera- 
tion which had seen the great works of God in Israel, 
(Judges ii. 11) were dead; another generation arose, and 
served Baal. So that miracles failing, faith also failed. 

Again, when the sons of Samuel, (1 Sam. viii. 3) being 
constituted by their father judges in Bersabee, received 
bribes, and judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused any 
more to have God to be their king, in other manner than 
he was king of other people ; and therefore cried out to 
Samuel, to chose them a king after the manner of the 
nations. So that justice failing, faith also failed : insomuch, 
as they deposed their God from reigning over them. 

And whereas in the planting of Christian religion, the 
oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman empire, and the 
number of Christians increased wonderfully every day, and 
in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles, and Evan- 
gelists ; a great part of that success may reasonably be 
attributed, to the contempt into which the priests of the 
Gentiles, of that time had brought themselves, by their 
uncleanness, avarice, and juggling between princes. Also 
the religion of the Church of Rome, was partly for the same 
cause abolished in England, and many other parts of 
Christendom ; insomuch, as the failing of virtue in the pas- 
tors, maketh faith fail in the people : and partly from bring- 
ing of the philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle into religion, 
by the Schoolmen ; from whence there arose so many con- 
tradictions and absurdities, as brought the clergy into a 
reputation both of ignorance, and of fraudulent intention ; 
and inclined people to revolt from them, either against 
the will of their own princes, as in France and Holland ; or 
with their will, as in England. 

Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome 
declared necessary for salvation, there be so many, mani- 
festly to the advantage of the Pope, and of his spiritual 



NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND. 139 

subjects, residing in the territories of other Christian 
princes, that were it not for the mutual emulation of those 
princes, they might without war, or trouble, exclude all 
foreign authority, as easily as it had been excluded in Eng- 
land. For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit 
it conduceth, to have it believed, that a king hath not his 
authority from Christ, unless a bishop crown him ? That 
a king, if he be a priest, cannot marry ? That whether a 
prince be born in lawful marriage, or not, must be judged 
by authority from Rome ? That subjects may be freed 
from their allegiance, if by the Court of Rome, the king be 
judged an heretic ? That a king, as Chilperic of France, 
may be deposed by a pope, as Pope Zachary, for no cause ; 
and his kingdom given to one of his subjects ? That the 
clergy and regulars, in what country soever, shall be exempt 
from the jurisdiction of their king in cases criminal ? Or 
who does not see, to whose profit redound the fees of pri- 
vate masses, and vales of purgatory ; with other signs of 
private interest, enough to mortify the most lively faith, if, 
as I said, the civil magistrate, and custom did not more sus- 
tain it, than any opinion they have of the sanctity, wisdom, 
•or probity of their teachers ? So that I may attribute all 
the changes of religion in the world, to one and the same 
cause ; and that is, unpleasing priests ; and those not only 
amongst Catholics, but even in that Church that hath pre- 
sumed most of reformation. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

Of the Natural Conditio7i of Mankind as concernitig their 
Felicity, and Misery. 

Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the 
body, and mind ; as that though there be found one man 
sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind 



14° OF MAN. 

than another ; yet when all is reckoned together, the differ- 
ence between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that 
one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to 
which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to 
the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough 
to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by 
confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with 
himself. 

And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts 
grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceed- 
ing upon general, and infallible rules, called science ; which 
very few have, and but in few things ; as being not a native 
faculty, born with us ; nor attained, as prudence, while we 
look after somewhat else, I find yet a greater equality 
amongst men, than that of strength. For prudence, is but 
experience ; which equal time, equally bestows on all men, 
in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That 
which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a 
vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think 
they have in a greater degree, than the vulgar ; that is, than 
all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or 
for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is 
the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge 
many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more 
learned ; yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise 
as themselves ; for they see their own wit at hand, and 
other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that 
men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is 
not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of 
anything, than that every man is contented with his share. 

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in 
the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men 
desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both 
enjoy, they become enemies ; and in the way to their end, 
which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes 



NATURAL- CONDITION OF MANKIND. 141 

their delectation only, endeavour to destroy, or subdue one 
another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an 
invader hath no more to fear, than another man's single 
power ; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient 
seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared 
with forces united, to dispossess and deprive him, not 
only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or 
liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of 
another. 

And from this difference of one another, there is no way 
for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation ; 
that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he 
can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endan- 
ger him : and this is no more than his own conservation 
requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be 
some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own 
power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther 
than their security requires ; if others, that otherwise would 
be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by 
invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long 
time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by 
consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men 
being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be 
allowed him. 

Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a 
great deal of grief, in keeping company, where there is no 
power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh 
that his companion should value him, at the same rate he 
sets upon himself : and upon all signs of contempt, or under- 
valuing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares, (which 
amongst them that have no common power to keep them in 
quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to 
extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage ; and 
from others, by the example. 

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal 



142 OF MAN. 

causes of quarrel. ' First, competition ; secondly, diffidence ; 
thirdly, glory. 

The first, maketh men invade for gain ; the second, for 
safety ; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, 
to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, 
children, and cattle ; the second, to defend them ; the third, 
for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any 
other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, 
or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, 
their profession, or their name. 

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live 
without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are 
in that condition which is called war ; and such a war, as is 
of every man, against every man. For "war," consisteth 
not in battle only, or the act of fighting ; but in a tract of 
time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently 
known: and therefore the notion of "time," is to be con- 
sidered in the nature of war ; as it is in the nature of weather. 
For as the nature of foul weather, lieth not in a shower or 
two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days 
together ; so the nature of war, consisteth not in actual 
fighting ; but in the known disposition thereto, during all 
the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other 
time is "peace." 

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, 
where every man is enemy to every man ; the same is con- 
sequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, 
than what their own strength, and their own invention shall 
furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place 
for industry ; because the fruit thereof is uncertain : and 
consequently no culture of the earth ; no navigation, nor 
use of the commodities that may be imported by sea ; no 
commodious building; no instruments of moving, and remov- 
ing such things, as require much force ; no knowledge of the 
face of the earth ; no account of time ; no arts ; no letters ; 



NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND. 143 

no society ; and, which is worst of all, continual fear, and , 
danger of violent death ; and the life of man, solitary, poor, I 
nasty, brutish, and short. 

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well 
weighed these things ; that nature should thus dissociate, 
and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another : 
and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made 
from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same con- 
firmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with 
himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks 
to go well accompanied ; when going to sleep, he locks his 
doors ; when even in his house he locks his chests ; and this 
when he knows there be laws, and public officers, armed, to 
revenge all injuries shall be done him ; what opinion he has 
of his fellow-subjects, when he rides armed ; of his fellow- 
citizens, when he locks his doors ; and of his children, and 
servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as 
much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my 
words ? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. 
The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves 
no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those 
passions, till they know a law that forbids them : which 
till laws be made they cannot know : nor can any law be 
made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall 
make it. 

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a 
time, nor condition of war as this ; and I believe it was 
never generally so, over all the world ; but there are many 
places, where they live. so now. For the savage people in 
many places of America, except the government of small 
families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, 
have no government at all ; and live at this day in that 
brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be 
perceived what manner of life there would be, where there 
were no common power to fear, by the manner of life, which 



144 OF MAN. 

men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government, 
use to degenerate into, in a civil war. 

But though there had never been any time, wherein par- 
ticular men were in a condition of war one against another; 
yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, 
because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, 
and in the state and posture of gladiators ; having their 
weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another ; that 
is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their 
kingdoms ; and continual spies upon their neighbours ; 
which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby, 
the industry of their subjects ; there does not follow from 
it, that misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular 
men. 

To this war of every man, against every man, this also is 
consequent ; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of 
right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. 
Where there is no common power, there is no law : where 
no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two 
cardinal virtues, justice, and injustice are none of the fac- 
ulties neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they 
might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as 
his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate to 
men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to 
the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, 
no " mine " and " thine " distinct ; but only that to be every 
man's, that he can get ; and for so long, as he can keep it. 
And thus much for the ill condition, which man by mere 
nature is actually placed in ; though with a possibility to 
come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in 
his reason. 

The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; 
desire of such things as are necessary to commodious liv- 
ing ; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And 
reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which 



NATURAL LAWS. 145 

men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, 
which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature : whereof I 
shall speak more particularly, in the two following chapters. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts. 

"The right of nature," which writers commonly call 
Jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own 
power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own 
nature ; that is to say, of his own life ; and consequently, 
of doing anything, which in his own judgment, and reason, 
he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. 

By "liberty," is understood, according to the proper sig- 
nification of the word, the absence of external impediments: 
which impediments, may oft take away part of a man's 
power to do what he would ; but cannot hinder him from 
using the power left him, according as his judgment, and 
reason shall dictate to him. 

A "law of nature," lex naturalis, is a precept or general 
rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to 
do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the 
means of preserving the same ; and to omit that, by which 
he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they 
that speak of this subject, use to confound jus, and lex, 
"right" and "law": yet they ought to be distinguished; 
because " right," consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear ; 
whereas "law," determineth, and bindeth to one of them; 
so that law, and right, differ as much as obligation, and 
liberty ; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent. 

And because the condition of man, as hath been declared 
in the precedent chapter, is a condition of war of every one 
against every one ; in which case every one is governed by 
his own reason ; and there is nothing he can make use 



146 OF MAN. 

of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life 
against his enemies ; it followeth, that in such a condition, 
every man has a right to everything ; even to one another's 
body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every 
man to everything endureth, there can be no security to 
any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the 
time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And 
consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, " that 
every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope 
of obtaining it ; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may 
seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war." The first 
branch of which rule, containeth the first, and fundamental 
law of nature; which is, "to seek peace, and follow it." 
The second, the sum of the right of nature: which is, "by 
all means we can, to defend ourselves." 

From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are 
commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law; 
"that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, 
as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it neces- 
sary, to lay down this right to all things ; and be contented 
with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow 
other men against himself." For as long as every man 
holdeth this right, of doing anything he liketh ; so long are 
all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not 
lay down their right, as well as he ; then there is no reason 
for any one, to divest himself of his : for that were to expose 
himself to prey, which no man is bound to, rather than to 
dispose himself to peace. This is the law of the Gospel ; 
" whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that 
do ye to them." And that law of all men, quod tibi fieri ' non 
vis, alteri nefeceris. 

To "lay down" a man's "right" to anything, is to 
"divest" himself of the "liberty," of hindering another of 
the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that 
renounceth, or passeth away his right, giveth not to any 



NATURAL LAWS. 147 

other man a right which he had not before ; because there 
is nothing to which every man had not right by nature : 
but only standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his 
own original right, without hindrance from him ; not without 
hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth 
to one man, by another man's defect of right, is but so much 
diminution of impediments to the use of his own right 
original. 

Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it ; or 
by transferring it to another. By " simply renouncing " ; 
when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. 
By " transferring " ; when he intendeth the benefit thereof 
to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath 
in either manner abandoned, or granted away his right ; 
then is he said to be " obliged," or "bound," not to hinder 
those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from 
the benefit of it : and that he " ought," and it is his " duty," 
not to make void that voluntary act of his own : and that 
such hindrance is "injustice," and "injury," as being sine 
jure ; the right being before renounced, or transferred. So 
that "injury," or "injustice," in the controversies of the 
world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations 
of scholars is called "absurdity." For as it is there called 
an absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the 
beginning : so in the world, it is called injustice, and injury 
voluntarily to undo, that from the beginning he had volun- 
tarily done. The way by which a man either simply 
renounceth, or transferred! his right, is a declaration, or 
signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or 
signs, that he doth so renounce, or transfer ; or hath so 
renounced, or transferred the same, to him that accepteth 
it. And these signs are either words only, or actions only; 
or, as it happeneth most often, both words, and actions. And 
the same are the "bonds," by which men are bound, and 
obliged : bonds, that have their strength, not from their own 



148 OF MAN. 

nature, for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word, 
but from fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture. 

Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth 
it ; it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally 
transferred to himself ; or for some other good he hopeth 
for thereby. For it is a voluntary act : and of the volun- 
tary acts of every man, the object is some " good to him- 
self." And therefore there be some rights, which no man 
can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have 
abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down 
the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to 
take away his life ; because he cannot be understood to aim 
thereby, at any good to himself. The same may be said of 
wounds, and chains, and imprisonment ; both because there 
is no benefit consequent to such patience ; as there is to 
the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or impris- 
oned : as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth 
men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend 
his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which 
this renouncing, and transferring of right is introduced, is 
nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life, 
and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary 
of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signs, 
seem to despoil himself of the end, for which those signs 
were intended ; he is not to be understood as if he meant 
it, or that it was his will ; but that he was ignorant of how 
such words and actions were to be interpreted. 

The mutual transferring of right, is that which men call 
" contract." 

There is difference between transferring of right to the 
thing ; and transferring, or tradition, that is delivery of 
the thing itself. For the thing may be delivered together 
with the translation of the right; as in buying and selling 
with ready money ; or exchange of goods, or lands : and it 
may be delivered some time after. 



NATURAL LAWS. ' 149 

Again, one of the contractors, may deliver the thing con- 
tracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his 
part at some determinate time after, and in the meantime 
be trusted ; and then the contract on his part, is called 
"pact," or "covenant": or both parts may contract now, 
to perform hereafter ; in which cases, he that is to perform 
in time to 4 * come, being trusted, his performance is called 
" keeping of promise," or faith ; and the failing of perform- 
ance, if it be voluntary, "violation of faith." 

When the transferring of right, is not mutual : but one of 
the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, 
or service from another, or from his friends ; or in hope to 
gain the reputation of charity, or magnanimity ; or to deliver 
his mind from the pain of compassion ; or in hope of reward 
in heaven; this is not contract, but "gift," "free gift," 
" grace " : which words signify one and the same thing. 

Signs of contract, are either " express," or " by inference." 
Express, are words spoken with understanding of what they 
signify: and such words are either of the time "present," 
or " past " ; as, " I give," " I grant," " I have given," " I have 
granted," "I will that this be yours ": or of the future, as, 
"I will give," "I will grant"; which words of the future 
are called "promise." 

Signs by inference, are sometimes the consequence of 
words ; sometimes the consequence of silence ; sometimes 
the consequence of actions ; sometimes the consequence of 
forbearing an action : and generally a sign by inference, of 
any contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the 
contractor. 

Words alone,, if they be of the time to come, and contain 
a bare promise, are an insufficient sign of a free gift, and 
therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to 
come, as "to-morrow I will give," they are a sign I have 
not given yet, and consequently that my right is not trans- 
ferred, but remaineth till I transfer it by some other act. 



15° OF MAN. 

But if the words be of the time present, or past, as, " I have 
given," or, "do give to be delivered to-morrow," then is my 
to-morrow's right given away to-day ; and that by the virtue 
of the words, though there were no other argument of my 
will. And there is a great difference in the signification of 
these words, volo hoc tuum esse eras, and eras dabo ; that is, 
between "I will that this be thine to-morrow," and, "I will 
give it thee to-morrow": for the word "I will," in the 
former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will present ; 
but in the latter, it signifies a promise of an act of the will 
to come : and therefore the former words, being of the 
present, transfer a future right ; the latter, that be of the 
future, transfer nothing. But if there be other signs of the 
will to transfer a right, besides words ; then, though the gift 
be free, yet may the right be understood to pass by words 
of the future : as if a man propound a prize to him that 
comes first to the end of a race, the gift is free ; and though 
the words be of the future, yet the right passeth : for if he 
would not have his words so be understood, he should not 
have let them run. 

In contracts, the right passeth, not only where the words 
are of the time present, or past, but also where they are of 
the future : because all contract is mutual translation, or 
change of right ; and therefore he that promiseth only, 
because he hath already received the benefit for which he 
promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the right 
should pass : for unless he had been content to have his 
words so understood, the other would not have performed 
his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, 
and other acts of contracts, a promise is equivalent to a 
covenant ; and therefore obligatory. 

He that performeth first in the case of a contract, is said 
to " merit " that which he is to receive by the performance 
of the other; and he hath it as "due." Also when a prize 
is propounded to many,- which is to be given to him only 



NATURAL LAWS. 151 

that winneth ; or money is thrown amongst many, to be 
enjoyed by them that catch it ; though this be a free gift ; 
yet so to win, or so to catch, is to "merit," and to have it 
as "due." For the right is transferred in the propounding 
of the prize, and in throwing down the money ; though it 
be not determined to whom, but by the event of the con- 
tention. But there is between these two sorts of merit, this 
difference, that in contract, I merit by virtue of my own 
power, and the contractor's need ; but in this case of free 
gift, I am enabled to merit only, by the benignity of the 
giver : in contract, I merit at the contractor's hand that he 
should depart with his right ; in this case of gift, I merit 
not that the giver should part with his right ; but that when 
he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than another's. 
And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the 
Schools, between meritum congrni, and meritiim co7idigni. For 
God Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men, 
hoodwinked with carnal desires, that can walk through this 
world according to the precepts, and limits prescribed by 
him ; they say, he that shall so walk, shall merit Paradise 
ex congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, 
by his own righteousness, or any other power in himself, 
but by the free grace of God only ; they say, no man can 
merit Paradise ex condigno. This I say, I think is the 
meaning of that distinction ; but because disputers do not 
agree upon the signification of their own terms of art, longer 
than it serves their turn ; I will not affirm anything of their 
meaning: only this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, 
as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth meriteth, 
and may claim the prize as due. 

If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties 
perform presently, but trust one another ; in the condition 
of mere nature, which is a condition of war of every man 
against every man, upon any reasonable suspicion, it is 
void : but if there be a common power set over them both, 



152 OF MAN. 

with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it 
is not void. For he that performeth first, has no assurance 
the other will perform after ; because the bonds of words 
are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and 
other passions, without the fear of some coercive power ; 
which in the condition of mere nature, where all men are 
equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot 
possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth 
first, does not betray himself to his enemy ; contrary to the 
right, he can never abandon, of defending his life, and 
means of living. 

But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to 
constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, 
that fear is no more reasonable ; and for that cause, he 
which by the covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do. 

The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, 
must be always something arising after the covenant 
made ; as some new fact, or other sign of the will not to 
perform : else it cannot make the covenant void. For that 
which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not 
to be admitted as a hindrance of performing. 

He that transferreth any right, transferreth the means 
of enjoying it, as far as lieth in his power. As he that 
selleth land, is understood to transfer the herbage, and 
whatsoever grows upon it : nor can he that sells a mill 
turn away the stream that drives it. And they that give 
to a man the right of government in sovereignty, are 
understood to give him the right of levying money to 
maintain soldiers ; and of appointing magistrates for the 
administration of justice. 

To make covenants with brute beasts, is impossible ; 
because not understanding our speech, they understand 
not, nor accept of any translation of right ; nor can trans- 
late any right to another : and without mutual acceptation, 
there is no covenant. 



NATURAL LAWS. 153 

To make covenant with God, is impossible, but by 
mediation of such as God speaketh to, either by revelation 
supernatural, or by his lieutenants that govern under him, 
and in his name : for otherwise we know not whether our 
covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that 
vow anything contrary to any law of nature, vow in vain ; 
as being a thing unjust to pay such vow. And if it be a 
thing commanded by the law of nature, it is not the vow, 
but the law that binds them. 

The matter, or subject of a covenant, is always some- 
thing that falleth under deliberation ; for to covenant, is 
an act of the will ; that is to say, an act, and the last act 
of deliberation ; and is therefore always understood to be 
something to come ; and which is judged possible for him 
that covenanteth, to perform. 

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be 
impossible, is no covenant. But if that prove impossible 
afterwards, which before was thought possible, the cove- 
nant is valid, and bindeth, though not to the thing itself, 
yet to the value ; or, if that also be impossible, to the 
unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible : 
for to more no man can be obliged. 

Men are freed of their covenants two ways ; by perform- 
ing, or by being forgiven. For performance, is the natural 
end of obligation ; and forgiveness, the restitution of liberty ; 
as being a retransferring of that right, in which the obliga- 
tion consisted. 

Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere 
nature, are obligatory. For example, if I covenant to pay 
a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy ; I am bound 
by it, for it is a contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit 
of life ; the other is to receive money, or service for it ; and 
consequently, where no other law, as in the condition of 
mere nature, forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is 
valid. Therefore prisoners of war, if trusted with the pay- 



154 OF MAN. 

ment of their ransom, are obliged to pay it : and if a weaker 
prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for 
fear, he is bound to keep it ; unless, as hath been said 
before, there ariseth some new, and just cause of fear, to 
renew the war. And even in commonwealths, if I be forced 
to redeem myself from a thief by promising him money, I 
am bound to pay it, till the civil law discharge me. For 
whatsoever I may lawfully do without obligation, the same 
I may lawfully covenant to do through fear, and what I 
lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break. 

A former covenant, makes void a later. For a man that 
hath passed away his right to one man to-day, hath it not 
to pass to-morrow to another : and therefore the later 
promise passeth no right, but is null. 

A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is 
always void. For, as I have shown before, no man can 
transfer, or lay down his right to save himself from death, 
wounds, and imprisonment, the avoiding whereof is the only 
end of laying down any right ; and therefore the promise 
of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any 
right ; nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant 
thus, "unless I do so, or so, kill me " ; he cannot covenant 
thus, "unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when 
you come to kill me." For man by nature chooseth 
the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting ; rather 
than the greater, which is certain and present death in not 
resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in 
that they lead criminals to execution, and prison, with 
armed men, notwithstanding that such criminals have 
consented to the law, by which they are condemned. 

A covenant to accuse oneself, without assurance of 
pardon, is likewise invalid. For in the condition of nature, 
where every man is judge, there is no place for accusation: 
and in the civil state, the accusation is followed with 
punishment ; which being force, a man is not obliged not 



NATURAL LAWS. 15 5 

to resist. The same is also true, of the accusation of those 
by whose condemnation a man falls into misery ; as of a 
father, wife, or benefactor. For the testimony of such an 
accuser, if it be not willingly given, is presumed to be 
corrupted by nature ; and therefore not to be received : and 
where a man's testimony is not to be credited, he is not 
bound to give it. Also accusations upon torture, are not 
to be reputed as testimonies. For torture is to be used but 
as means of conjecture, and light, in the further examination 
and search of truth ; and what is in that case confessed, 
tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured ; not to the 
informing of the torturers : and therefore ought not to have 
the credit of a sufficient testimony : for whether he deliver 
himself by true, or false accusation, he does it by the right 
of preserving his own life. 

The force of words, being, as I have formerly noted, too 
weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants ; 
there are in man's nature, but two imaginable helps to 
strengthen it. And those are either a fear of the conse- 
quence of breaking their word ; or a glory, or pride in appear- 
ing not to need to break it. This latter is a generosity too 
rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers 
of wealth, command, or sensual pleasure ; which are the 
greatest part of mankind. The passion to be reckoned 
upon is fear ; whereof there be two very general objects : 
one, the power of spirits invisible ; the other, the power of 
those men they shall therein offend. Of these two, though 
the former be the greater power, yet the fear of the latter 
is commonly the greater fear. The fear of the former is in 
every man, his own religion ; which hath place in the nature 
of man before civil society. The latter hath not so ; at 
least not place enough, to. keep men to their promises; 
because in the condition of mere nature, the inequality of 
power is not discerned, but by the event of battle. So 
that before the time of civil society, or in the interruption 



156 OF MAN. 

thereof by war, there is nothing can strengthen a covenant 
of peace agreed on, against the temptations of avarice, 
ambition, lust, or other strong desire, but the fear of that 
invisible power, which they every one worship as God ; and 
fear as a revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can 
be done between two men not subject to civil power, is to 
put one another to swear by the God he feareth : which 
"swearing," or "oath," is "a form of speech, added to a 
promise ; by which he that promiseth, signifieth, that unless 
he perform, he renounceth the mercy of his God, or calleth 
to him for vengeance on himself." Such was the heathen 
form, "Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this beast." So is 
our form, "I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God." 
And this, with the rites and ceremonies, which every one 
useth in his own religion, that the fear of breaking faith 
might be the greater. 

By this it appears, that an oath taken according to any 
other form, or rite, than his, that sweareth, is in vain ; and 
no oath : and that there is no swearing by anything which 
the swearer thinks not God. For 'though men have some- 
times used to swear by their kings, for fear, or flattery ; 
yet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed 
to them divine honour. And that swearing unnecessarily 
by God, is but profaning of his name : and swearing by 
other things, as men do in common discourse, is not 
swearing, but an impious custom, gotten by too much 
vehemence of talking. 

It appears also, that the oath adds nothing to the obliga- 
tion. For a covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of God, 
without the oath, as much as with it : if unlawful, bindeth 
not at all ; though it be confirmed with an oath. 



LAWS OF NATURE. 157 

CHAPTER XV. 
Of other Laws of Nature. 

From that law of nature, by which we are obliged to 
transfer to another, such rights, as being retained, hinder 
the peace of mankind, there followeth a third ; which is 
this, "that men perform their covenants made"; without 
which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words ; and 
the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in 
the condition of war. 

And in this law of nature, consisteth the fountain and 
original of "justice." For where no covenant hath pre- 
ceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man 
has right to every thing ; and consequently, no action can 
be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it 
is " unjust " : and the definition of " injustice," is no other 
than "the not performance of covenant." And whatsoever 
is not unjust, is "just." 

But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a 
fear of not performance on either part, as hath been said 
in the former chapter, are invalid ; though the original of 
justice be the making of covenants ; yet injustice actually 
there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken 
away ; which while men are in the natural condition of war, 
cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just, and 
unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power, 
to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, 
by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit 
they expect by the breach of their covenant ; and to make 
good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire, 
in recompense of the universal right they abandon : and 
such power there is none before the erection of a common- 
wealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the 
ordinary definition of justice in the Schools : for they say, 



158 OF MAN. 

that "justice is the constant will of giving to every man 
his own." And therefore where there is no "own," that 
is no propriety, there is no injustice ; and where there is no 
coercive power erected, that is, where there is no common- 
wealth, there is no propriety ; all men having right to all 
things : therefore where there is no commonwealth, there 
nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice, consisteth 
in keeping of valid covenants: but the validity of covenants 
begins not but with the constitution of a civil power, 
sufficient to compel men to keep them ; and then it is also 
that propriety begins. 

The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as 
justice ; and sometimes also with his tongue ; seriously 
alleging, that every man's conservation, and contentment, 
being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, 
why every man might not do what he thought conduced 
thereunto : and therefore also to make, or not make ; keep, 
or not keep covenants, was not against reason, when it 
conduced to one's benefit. He does not therein deny, that 
there be covenants ; and that they are sometimes broken, 
sometimes kept ; and that such breach of them may be 
called injustice, and the observance of them justice ; but he 
questioneth, whether injustice, taking away the fear of God, 
for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God, 
may not sometimes stand with that reason, which dictateth 
to every man his own good ; and particularly then, when it 
conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a con- 
dition, to neglect not only the dispraise, and revilings, but 
also the power of other men. The kingdom of God is 
gotten by violence : but what if it could be gotten by 
unjust violence? were it against reason so to get it, when 
it is impossible to receive hurt by it ? and if it be not 
against reason, it is not against justice ; or else justice is 
not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as 
this, successful wickedness hath obtained the name of 



LAWS OF NATURE. 159 

virtue ; and some that in all other things have disallowed 
the violation of faith ; yet have allowed it, when it is for the 
getting of a kingdom. And the heathen that believed, that 
Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed neverthe- 
less the same Jupiter to be the avenger of injustice : some- 
what like to a piece of law in Coke's " Commentaries on 
Littleton " ; where he says, if the right heir of the crown 
be attainted of treason ; yet the crown shall descend to him, 
and eo instante the attainder be void : from which instances 
a man will be very prone to infer, that when the heir 
apparent of a kingdom shall kill him that is in posses- 
sion, though his father ; you may call it injustice, or by 
what other name you will ; yet it can never be against 
reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the 
benefit of themselves ; and those actions are most reasonable, 
that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning 
is nevertheless false. 

For the question is not of promises mutual, where there 
is no security of performance on either side ; as when there 
is no civil power erected over the parties promising ; for 
such promises are no covenants : but either where one of 
the parties has performed already ; or where there is a 
power to make him perform ; there is the question whether 
it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the 
other to perform, or not. And I say it is not against rea- 
son. For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider ; 
first, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding 
anything can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to his 
own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could 
not expect, arriving may turn it to his benefit ; yet such 
events do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, 
that in a condition of war, wherein every man to every 
man, for want of a common power to keep them all in awe, 
is an enemy, there is no man who can hope by his own 
strength, or wit, to defend himself from destruction, with- 



160 OF MAN. 

out the help of confederates ; where every one expects the 
same defence by the confederation, that any one else does : 
and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to 
deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other 
means of safety, than what can be had from his own single 
power. He therefore that breaketh his covenant, and con- 
sequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do 
so, cannot be received into any society, that unite them- 
selves for peace and defence, but by the error of them that 
receive him ; nor when he is received, be retained in it, 
without seeing the danger of their error ; which errors a 
man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his 
security : and therefore if he be left, or cast out of society, 
he perisheth ; and if he live in society, it is by the errors 
of other men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon ; 
and consequently against the reason of his preservation ; 
and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, 
forbear him only out of ignorance of what is good for 
themselves. 

As for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetual 
felicity of heaven, by any way ; it is frivolous : there being 
but one way imaginable ; and that is not breaking, but 
keeping of covenant. 

And for the other instance of attaining sovereignty by 
rebellion ; it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet 
because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the 
contrary ; and because by gaining it so, others are taught 
to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is 
against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, keeping 
of covenant, is a rule of reason, by which we are forbidden 
to do anything destructive to our life ; and consequently a 
law of nature. 

There be some that proceed further ; and will not have 
the law of nature, to be those rules which conduce to the 
preservation of man's life on earth ; but to the attaining 



LAWS OF NATURE. 161 

of an eternal felicity after death ; to which they think the 
breach of covenant may conduce ; and consequently be 
just and reasonable; such are they that think it a work of 
merit to kill, or depose, or rebel against, the sovereign 
power constituted over them by their own consent. But 
because there is no natural knowledge of man's estate after 
death ; much less of the reward that is then to be given to 
breach of faith; but only a belief grounded upon other 
men's saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they 
know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it 
supernaturally ; breach of faith cannot be called a precept 
of reason, or nature. 

Others, that allow for a law of nature, the keeping of 
faith, do nevertheless make exception of certain persons ; 
as heretics, and such as use not to perform their covenant 
to others : and this also is against reason. For if any 
fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our covenant 
made ; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to 
have hindered the making of it. 

The names of just, and unjust, when they are attributed 
to men, signify one thing ; and when they are attributed 
to actions, another. When they are attributed to men, 
they signify conformity, or inconformity of manners, to 
reason. But when they are attributed to actions, they 
signify the conformity, or inconformity to reason, not of 
manners, or manner of life, but of particular actions. A 
just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can, 
that his actions may be all just : and an unjust man, is he 
that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our 
language styled by the names of righteous, and unrighteous ; 
than just, and unjust ; though the meaning be the same. 
Therefore a righteous man, does not lose that title, by one 
or a few unjust actions, that proceed from sudden passion, 
or mistake of things, or persons : nor does an unrighteous 
man, lose his character, for such actions, as he does, or 



1 62 OF MAN. 

forbears to do, for fear ; because his will is not framed by 
the justice; but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. 
That which gives to human actions the relish of justice, is 
a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage, rarely found, 
by which a man scorns to be beholden for the contentment 
of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise. This justice of 
the manners, is that which is meant, where justice is called 
a virtue ; and injustice a vice. 

But the justice of actions denominates men, not just, but 
"guiltless'': and the injustice of the same, which is also 
called injury, gives them but the name of "guilty." 

Again, the injustice of manners, is the disposition, or 
aptitude to do injury ; and is injustice before it proceeds 
to act ; and without supposing any individual person 
injured. But the injustice of an action, that is to say 
injury, supposeth an individual person injured ; namely him, 
to whom the covenant was made : and therefore many 
times the injury is received by one man, when the damage 
redoundeth to another. As when the master commandeth 
his servant to give money to a stranger ; if it be not done, 
the injury is done to the master, whom he had before 
covenanted to obey ; but the damage redoundeth to the 
stranger, to whom he had no obligation ; and therefore 
could not injure him. And so also in commonwealths, 
private men may remit to one another their debts ; but not 
robberies or other violences, whereby they are endamaged ; 
because the detaining of debt, is an injury to themselves ; 
but robbery and violence, are injuries to the person of the 
commonwealth. 

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own 
will signified to the doer, is no injury to him. For if he 
that doeth it, hath not passed away his original right to do 
what he please, by some antecedent covenant, there is no 
breach of covenant ; and therefore no injury done him. 
And if he have ; then his will to have it done being signi- 



LAWS OF NATURE. 163 

fied, is a release of that covenant : and so again there is no 
injury done him. 

Justice of actions, is by writers divided into " commuta- 
tive," and "distributive": and the former they say con- 
sisteth in proportion arithmetical ; the latter in proportion 
geometrical. Commutative therefore, they place in the 
equality of value of the things contracted for ; and distribu- 
tive, in the distribution of equal benefit, to men of equal 
merit. As if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy ; 
or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all 
things contracted for, is measured by the appetite of the 
contractors : and therefore the just value, is that which 
they be contented to give. And merit, besides that which 
is by covenant, where the performance on one part, merit- 
eth the performance of the other part, and falls under jus- 
tice commutative, not distributive, is not due by justice ; 
but is rewarded of grace only. And therefore this distinc- 
tion, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not 
right. To speak properly, commutative justice, is the jus- 
tice, of a contractor ; that is, a performance of covenant, 
in buying, and selling ; hiring, and letting to hire ; lending, 
and borrowing ; exchanging, bartering, and other acts of 
contract. 

And distributive justice, the justice of an arbitrator ; 
that is to say, the act of denning what is just. Wherein, 
being trusted by them that make him arbitrator, if he per- 
form his trust, he is said to distribute to every man his 
own : and this is indeed just distribution, and may be 
called, though improperly, distributive justice ; but more 
properly equity ; which also is a law of nature, as shall be 
shown in due place. 

As justice dependeth on antecedent covenant ; so does 
"gratitude" depend on antecedent grace ; that is to say, 
antecedent free gift : and is the fourth law of nature ; 
which may be conceived in this form, "that a man which 



164 OF MAN. 

receiveth benefit from another of mere grace, endeavour 
that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent 
him of his good will." For no man giveth, but with inten- 
tion of good to himself ; because gift is voluntary ; and of 
all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good ; 
of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be 
no beginning of benevolence, or trust ; nor consequently of 
mutual help ; nor of reconciliation of one man to another ; 
and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of 
"war," which is contrary to the first and fundamental law 
of nature, which commandeth men to "seek peace." The 
breach of this law, is called "ingratitude," and hath the 
same relation to grace that injustice hath to obligation by 
covenant. 

A fifth law of nature, is " complaisance " ; that is to say, 
"that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest." 
For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there 
is in men's aptness to society, a diversity of nature, rising 
from their diversity of affections ; not unlike to that we 
see in stones brought together for building of an edifice. 
For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity 
of figure, takes more room from others, than itself fills ; and 
for the hardness, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby 
hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as 
unprofitable, and troublesome : so also, a man that by asper- 
ity of nature, will strive to retain those* things which to 
himself are superfluous, and to others necessary ; and for 
the stubbornness of his passions, cannot be corrected, is to 
be left, or cast out of society, as cumbersome thereunto. 
For seeing every man, not only by right, but also by neces- 
sity of nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to 
obtain that which is necessary for his conservation ; he that 
shall oppose himself against it, for things superfluous, is guilty 
of the war that thereupon is to follow ; and therefore doth 
that, which is contrary to the fundamental law of nature, 



LAWS OF NATURE. 165 

which commandeth "to seek peace." The observers of 
this law, may be called " sociable," the Latins call them 
commodi ; the contrary, "stubborn," " insociable," "fro- 
ward," "intractable." 

A sixth law of nature, is this, " that upon caution of the 
future time, a man ought to ' pardon ' the offences past of 
them that repenting, desire it." For "pardon," is nothing 
but granting of peace ; which though granted to them that 
persevere in their hostility, be not peace, but fear ; yet not 
granted to them that give caution of the future time, is 
sign of an aversion to peace ; and therefore contrary to 
the law of nature. 

A seventh is, "that in revenges," that is, retribution of 
evil for evil, "men look not at the greatness of the evil 
past, but the greatness of the good to follow." Whereby 
we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other 
design, than for correction of the offender, or direction of 
others. For this law is consequent to the next before it, 
that commandeth pardon, upon security of the future time. 
Besides, revenge without respect to the example, and 
profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of 
another, tending to no end ; for the end is always some- 
what to come ; and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and 
contrary to reason, and to hurt without reason, tendeth to 
the introduction of war ; which is against the law of 
nature; and is commonly styled by the name of "cruelty." 

And because all signs of hatred, or contempt, provoke to 
fight ; insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard 
their life, than not to be revenged ; we may in the eighth 
place, for a law of nature, set down this precept, " that no 
man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred, 
or contempt of another." The breach of which law is 
commonly called "contumely." 

The question who is the better man, has no place in the 
condition of mere nature ; where, as has been shown before, 



1 66 OF MAN. 

all men are equal. The inequality that now is, has been 
introduced by the laws civil. I know that Aristotle in the 
first book of his "Politics," for a foundation of his doctrine, 
maketh men by nature, some more worthy to command, 
meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be 
for his philosophy ; others to serve, meaning those that 
had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he ; as if 
master and servant were not introduced by consent of men, 
but by difference of wit : which is not only against reason ; 
but also against experience. For there are very few so 
foolish, that had not rather govern themselves, than be 
governed by others : not when the wise in their own con- 
ceit, contend by force, with them who distrust their own 
wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost at any time, 
get the victory. If nature therefore have made men equal, 
that equality is to be acknowledged : or if nature have 
made men unequal ; yet because men that think themselves 
equal, will not enter into conditions of peace, but upon 
equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And there- 
fore for the ninth law of nature, I put this, " that every 
man acknowledge another for his equal by nature." The 
breach of this precept is "pride." 

On this law, dependeth another, "that at the entrance 
into conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to him- 
self any right, which he is not content should be reserved 
to every one of the rest." As it is necessary for all men 
that seek peace, to lay down certain rights of nature ; that 
is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list : so is it 
necessary for man's life, to retain some, as right to govern 
their own bodies ; enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go 
from place to place ; and all things else, without which a 
man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the 
making of peace, men require for themselves, that which 
they would not have to be granted to others, they do con- 
trary to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowl- 



LAWS OF NATURE. 167 

edgment of natural equality, and therefore also against 
the law of nature. The observers of this law, are those we 
call " modest," and the breakers "arrogant" men. The 
Greeks call the violation of this law ttX^ov^U ; that is, a 
desire of more than their share. 

Also if " a man be trusted to judge between man and 
man," it is a precept of the law of nature, "that he deal 
equally between them." For without that, the contro- 
versies of men cannot be determined but by war. He 
therefore that is partial in judgment, doth what in him 
lies, to deter men from the use of judges, and arbitrators ; 
and consequently, against the fundamental law of nature, 
is the cause of war. 

The observance of this law, from the equal distribution 
to each man, of that which in reason belongeth to him, is 
called "equity," and, as I have said before, distributive 
justice : the violation, " acception of persons," Trpoa-onroX^xl/ia, 

And from this followeth another law, " that such things 
as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in common, if it can be ; 
and if the quantity of the thing permit, without stint; 
otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have 
right." For otherwise the distribution is unequal, and 
contrary to equity. 

But some things there be, that can neither be divided, 
nor enjoyed in common. Then, the law of nature, which 
prescribeth equity, requireth " that the entire right ; or else, 
making the use alternate, the first possession, be deter- 
mined by lot." For equal distribution, is of the law of 
nature, and other means of equal distribution cannot be 
imagined. 

Of "lots" there be two sorts, "arbitrary," and "natural." 
Arbitrary, is that which is agreed on by the competitors : 
natural, is either "primogeniture," which the Greeks call 
Kkrjpovofxca, which signifies, "given by lot," or "first 
seizure." 



1 68 OF MAN. 

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in 
common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the first 
possessor ; and in some cases to the first born, as acquired 
by lot. 

It is also a law of nature, "that all men that mediate 
peace, be allowed safe conduct." For the law that com- 
mandeth peace, as the end, commandeth intercession, as the 
" means " ; and to intercession the means is safe conduct. 

And because, though men be never so willing to observe 
these laws, there may nevertheless arise questions concern- 
ing a man's action ; first, whether it were done, or not 
done ; secondly, if done, whether against the law, or not 
against the law ; the former whereof, is called a question 
"of fact"; the latter a question "of right," therefore 
unless the parties to the question, covenant mutually to 
stand to the sentence of another, they are as far from 
peace as ever. This other to whose sentence they sub- 
mit is called an "arbitrator." And therefore it is of the 
law of nature, " that they that are at controversy, submit 
their right to the judgment of an arbitrator." 

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in 
order to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his 
own cause ; and if he were never so fit ; yet equity allow- 
ing to each party equal benefit, if one be admitted to be 
judge, the other is to be admitted also ; and so the contro- 
versy, that is, the cause of war, remains against the law of 
nature. 

For the same reason no man in any cause ought to be 
received for arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, 
or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one 
party, than of the other : for he hath taken, though an 
unavoidable bribe, yet a bribe ; and no man can be 
obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversy, 
and the condition of war remaineth, contrary to the law 
of nature. 



LAWS OF NATURE. 109 

And in a controversy of "fact," the judge being to give 
no more credit to one, than to the other, if there be no 
other arguments, must give credit to a third ; or to a third 
and fourth ; or more : for else the question is undecided, 
and left to force, contrary to the law of nature. 

These are the laws of nature, dictating peace, for a 
means of the conservation of men in multitudes ; and 
which only concern the doctrine of civil society. There 
be other things tending to the destruction of particular 
men ; as drunkenness, and all other parts of intemperance ; 
which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those 
things which the law of nature hath forbidden ; but are 
not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough 
to this place. 

And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the 
laws of nature, to be taken notice of by all men ; whereof 
the most part are too busy in getting food, and the rest 
too negligent to understand ; yet to leave all men inexcus- 
able, they have been contracted into one easy sum, intelli- 
gible even to the meanest capacity ; and that is, " Do not 
that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to 
thyself " ; which showeth him that he has no more to do 
in learning the laws of nature, ,but, when weighing the 
actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, 
he put them into the other part of the balance, and his 
own into their place, that his own passions, and self-love, 
may add nothing to the weight ; and then there is none of 
these laws of nature that will not appear unto him very 
reasonable. 

The laws of nature oblige in foro interno ; that is to say, 
they bind to a desire they should take place : but in foro 
externo ; that is, to the putting them in act, not always. 
For he that should be modest, and tractable, and perform 
all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man else 
should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, 



17° OF MAN. 

and procure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground 
of all laws of nature, which tend to nature's preservation. 
And again, he that having sufficient security, that others 
shall observe the same laws towards him, observes them 
not himself, seeketh not peace, but war ; and consequently 
the destruction of his nature by violence. 

And whatsoever laws bind i?iforo interno, may be broken, 
not only by a fact contrary to the law, but also by a fact 
according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For 
though his action in this case, be according to the law, yet 
his purpose was against the law ; which, where the obliga- 
tion is in foro interno, is a breach. 

The laws of nature are immutable and eternal ; for 
injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, accep- 
tion of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. 
For it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace 
destroy it. 

The same laws, because they oblige only to a desire, and 
endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, 
are easy to be observed. For in that they require nothing 
but endeavour, he that endeavoureth their performance, 
fulfilleth them ; and he that fulfilleth the law, is just. 

And the science of them, is the true and only moral 
philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the 
science of what is "good," and "evil," in the conversation 
and society of mankind. "Good," and "evil," are names 
that signify our appetites, and aversions; which in differ- 
ent tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different : 
and divers men, differ not only in their judgment, on the 
senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the taste, 
smell, hearing, touch, and sight ; but also of what is con- 
formable, or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of com- 
mon life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from 
himself; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what 
another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil : from whence 



OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, ETC. 171 

arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And there- 
fore so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, 
which is a condition of war, as private appetite is the 
measure of good and evil: and consequently all -men agree 
on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way or 
means of peace, which, as I have showed before, are 
"justice," "gratitude," "modesty," "equity," "mercy," 
and the rest of the laws of nature, are good ; that is to 
say; "moral virtues"; and their contrary "vices," evil. 
Now the science of virtue and vice, is moral philosophy ; 
and therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature, is 
the true moral philosophy. But the writers of moral philos- 
ophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices; 
yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodness ; nor that 
they come to be praised, as the means of peaceable, socia- 
ble, and comfortable living, place them in a mediocrity of 
passions : as if not the cause, but the degree of daring, 
made fortitude ; or not the cause, but the quantity of a 
gift, made liberality. 

These dictates of reason, men used to call by the name 
of laws, but improperly : for they are but conclusions, or 
theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation 
and defence of themselves ; whereas law, properly, is the 
word of him, that by right hath command over others. But 
yet if we consider the same theorems, as delivered in the 
word of God, that by right commandeth all things ; then 
are they properly called laws. 

CHAPTER XVI. 

Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated. 

A person is he, "whose words or actions are considered, 
either as his own, or as representing the words or actions 
of another man, or of any other thing, to whom they are 
attributed, whether truly or by fiction." 



172 OF MAN. 

When they are considered as his own, then is he called 
a " natural person " : and when they are considered as 
representing the words and actions of another, then is 
he a "feigned" or "artificial person." 

The word person is Latin : instead whereof the Greeks 
have 7rpoo-(07rov, which signifies the "face," as persona in 
Latin signifies the "disguise," or "outward appearance" 
of a man, counterfeited on the stage ; and sometimes more 
particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a 
mask or vizard : and from the stage, hath been translated 
to any representer of speech and action, as well in tribu- 
nals, as theatres. So that a "person," is the same that an 
" actor " is, both on the stage and in common conversa- 
tion ; and to "personate," is to "act," or "represent" 
himself, or another ; and he that acteth another, is said to 
bear his person, or act in his name ; in which sense Cicero 
useth it where he says, Unus sustineo tres personas • met, 
adversary, et judieis : I bear three persons ; my own, my 
adversary's, and the judge's ; and is called in divers occa- 
sions, diversely ; as a "representer," or "representative," 
a "lieutenant," a "vicar," an "attorney," a "deputy," a 
"procurator," an "actor," and the like. 

Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions 
"owned" by those whom they represent. And then the 
person is the "actor"; and he that owneth his words and 
actions, is the "author": in which case the actor acteth by 
authority. For that which in speaking of goods and pos- 
sessions, is called an "owner," and in Latin dominus, in 
Greek Kvptos speaking of actions, is called author. And as 
the right of possession, is called dominion ; so the right of 
doing any action, is called "authority." So that by 
authority, is always understood a right of doing any act; 
and "done by authority," done by commission, or licence 
from him whose right it is. 

From hence it followeth, that when the actor maketh a 






OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, ETC. 173 

covenant by authority, he bindeth thereby the author, no 
less than if he had made it himself; and no less subjecteth 
him to all the consequences of the same. And therefore all 
that hath been said formerly, (chap, xiv) of the nature of 
covenants between man and man in their natural capacity, 
is true also when they are made by their actors, represen- 
tors, or procurators, that have authority from them, so far 
forth as is in their commission, but no further. 

And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, 
or representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it 
at his own peril. For no man is obliged by a covenant 
whereof he is not author ; nor consequently by a covenant 
made against, or beside the authority he gave. 

When the actor doth anything against the law of nature 
by command of the author, if he be obliged by former 
covenant to obey him, not he, but the author breaketh the 
law of nature; for though the action be against the law of 
nature ; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to do it, 
is against the law of nature, that forbiddeth breach of 
covenant. 

And he that maketh a covenant with the author, by 
mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he 
hath, but only takes his word ; in case such authority be 
not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer 
obliged ; for the covenant made with the author, is not 
valid, without his counter-assurance. But if he that so 
covenanteth, knew beforehand he was to expect no other 
assurance, than the actor's word ; then is the covenant 
valid ; because the actor in this case maketh himself the 
author. And therefore, as when the authority is evident, 
the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when 
the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor only ; there 
being no author but himself. 

There are few things that are incapable of being repre- 
sented by fiction. Inanimate things, as a church, an hos- 



174 OF MAN. 

pital, a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master, or 
overseer. But things inanimate, cannot be authors, nor 
therefore give authority to their actors ; yet the actors 
may have authority to procure their maintenance, given 
them by those that are owners, or governors of those things. 
And therefore, such things cannot be personated, before 
there be some state of civil government. 

Likewise children, fools, and madmen that have no use 
of reason, may be personated by guardians, or curators ; 
but can be no authors, during that time, of any action 
done by them, longer than, when they shall recover the 
use of reason, they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet 
during the folly, he that hath right of governing them, may 
give authority to the guardian. But this again has no 
place but in a state civil, because before such estate, there 
is no dominion of persons. 

An idol, or mere figment of the brain, may be personated ; 
as were the gods of the heathen : which by such officers as 
the state appointed, were personated, and held possessions, 
and other goods, and rights, which men from time to time 
dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot be 
authors : for an idol is nothing. The authority proceeded 
from the state : and therefore, before introduction of civil 
government, the gods of the heathen could not be per- 
sonated. 

The true God may be personated. As he was ; first, by 
Moses ; who governed the Israelites, that were not his, but 
God's people, not in his own name, with hoc dicit Moses ; 
but in God's name, with hoc dicit Dominus. Secondly, by 
the Son of man, his own Son, our blessed Saviour Jesus 
Christ, that came to reduce the Jews, and induce all 
nations into the kingdom of his Father ; not as of him- 
self, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the 
Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working in the 
Apostles : which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came 



OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, ETC. 175 

not of himself ; but was sent, and proceeded from them 
both. 

A multitude of men, are made "one "-person, when they 
are by one man, or one person represented ; so that it be 
done with the consent of every one of that multitude in 
particular. For it is the "unity" of the representer, not 
the "unity" of the represented, that maketh the person 
" one." And it is the representer that beareth the person, 
and but one person: and "unity," cannot otherwise be 
understood in multitude. 

And because the multitude naturally is not "one," but 
"many"; they cannot be understood for one; but many 
authors, of everything their representative saith, or doth 
in their name ; every man giving their common representer, 
authority from himself in particular, and owning all the 
actions the representer doth, in case they give him author- 
ity without stint : otherwise, when they limit him in what, 
and how far he shall represent them, none of them owneth 
more than they gave him commission to act. 

And if the representative consist of many men, the voice 
of the greater number, must be considered as the voice of 
them all. For if the lesser number pronounce, for example, 
in the affirmative, and the greater in the negative, there 
will be negatives more than enough to destroy the affirma- 
tives ; and thereby the excess of negatives, standing uncon- 
tradicted, are the only voice the representative hath. 

And a representative of even number, especially when 
the number is not great, whereby the contradictory voices 
are oftentimes equal, is therefore oftentimes mute, and 
incapable of action. Yet in some cases contradictory 
voices equal in number, may determine a question ; as in 
condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that 
they condemn not, do absolve ; but not on the contrary 
condemn, in that they absolve not. For when a cause 
is heard ; not to condemn is to absolve : but on the con- 



176 OF MAN. 

trary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. 
The like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or 
deferring till another time : for when the voices are equal, 
the not decreeing execution, is a decree of dilation. 

Or if the number be odd, as three, or more, men or 
assemblies ; whereof every one has by a negative voice, 
authority to take away the effect of all the affirmative voices 
of the rest, this number is no representative ; because by 
the diversity of opinions, and interests of men, it becomes 
oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a 
mute person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the 
government of a multitude, especially in time of war. 

Of authors there be two sorts. The first simply so 
called ; which I have before defined to be him, that owneth 
the action of another simply. The second is he, that 
owneth an action or covenant of another conditionally ; 
that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it 
not, at, or before a certain time. And these authors con- 
ditional, are generally called "sureties," in Latin, fidejussors, 
and sponsores ; and particularly for debt, fi?-cedes ; and for 
appearance before a judge, or magistrate, vades. 



PART II. — OF COMMONWEALTH. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth. 

The final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally 
love liberty, and dominion over others, in the introduction 
of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them 
live in commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preser- 
vation, and of a more contented life thereby ; that is to 
say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condi- 
tion of war, which is necessarily consequent, as hath been 
shown in chapter xiii, to the natural passions of men, 
when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and 
tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their 
covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set 
down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters. 

Forthe laws of nature, as "justice," "equity," "modesty," 
"mercy," and, in sum "doing to others, as we would be 
done to," of themselves, without the terror of some power, 
to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural 
passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and 
the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but 
words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. There- 
fore notwithstanding the laws of nature, which every one 
hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when 
he can do it safely, if there be no power erected, or not 
great enough for our security ; every man will, and may 
lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution 



178 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

against all other men. And in all places, where men have 
lived by small families, to rob and spoil one another, has 
been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the 
law of nature, that the greater spoils they gained, the 
greater was their honour ; and men observed no other laws 
therein, but the laws of honour; that is, to abstain from 
cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of 
husbandry. And as small families did then; so now do 
cities and kingdoms, which are but greater families, for 
their own security, enlarge their dominions, upon all pre- 
tences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that 
may be given to invaders, and endeavour as much as they 
can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, 
and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are 
remembered for it in after ages with honour. 

Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men, 
that gives them this security ; because in small numbers, 
small additions on the one side or the other, make the 
advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the 
victory ; and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion. 
The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security, is 
not determined by any certain number, but by comparison 
with the enemy we fear ; and is then sufficient, when the 
odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous 
moment, to determine the event of war, as to move him to 
attempt. 

And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their 
actions be directed according to their particular judg- 
ments, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no 
defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, 
nor against the injuries of one another. For being dis- 
tracted in opinions concerning the best use and application 
of their strength, they do not help but hinder one another; 
and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing: 
whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few 






CAUSES, ETC. OF A COMMONWEALTH. 179 

that agree together; but also when there is no common 
enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular 
interests. For if we could suppose a great multitude of 
men to consent in the observation of justice, and other 
laws of nature, without a common power to keep them all 
in awe; we might as well suppose all mankind to do the 
same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be any 
civil government, or commonwealth at all; because there 
would be peace without subjection. 

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire 
should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, 
and directed by one judgment, for a limited time ; as in one 
battle, or one war. For though they obtain a victory by 
their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy ; yet 
afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or 
he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another 
part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference 
of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst 
themselves. 

It is true, that certain living creatures, as bees, and ants, 
live sociably one with another, which are therefore by 
Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures ; and yet 
have no other direction, than their particular judgments 
and appetites ; nor speech, whereby one. of them can signify 
to another, what he thinks expedient for the common 
benefit : and therefore some man may perhaps desire to 
know, why mankind cannot do the same. To which I 
answer, 

First, that men are continually in competition for honour 
and dignity, which these creatures are not; and conse- 
quently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy 
and hatred, and finally war ; but amongst these not so. 

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the common 
good differeth not from the private ; and being by nature 
inclined to their private, they procure thereby the common 






180 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

benefit. But man, whose joy consisteth in comparing 
himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is 
eminent. 

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not, as man, the 
use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, 
in the administration of their common business ; whereas 
amongst men, there are very many, that think themselves 
wiser, and abler to govern the public, better than the 
rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this 
way, another that way ; and thereby bring it into distrac- 
tion and civil war. 

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some 
use of voice, in making known to one another their desires, 
and other affections ; yet they want that art of words, by 
which some men can represent to others, that which is 
good, in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness of 
good ; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of 
good and evil ; discontenting men, and troubling their 
peace at their pleasure. 

Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between- 
" injury," and "damage"; and therefore as long as they 
be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows : whereas 
man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease ; 
for then it is that he loves to show his wisdom, and control 
the actions of them that govern the commonwealth. 

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that 
of men, is by covenant only, which is artificial : and there- 
fore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, 
besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and 
lasting ; which is a common power, to keep them in awe, 
and to direct their actions to the common benefit. 

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be 
able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and 
the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in 
such sort, as that by their own industry, and* by the fruits 



CAUSES, ETC. OF A COMMONWEALTH. 181 

of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live con- 
tentedly ; is, to confer all their power and strength upon 
one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce 
all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will : which 
is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of 
men, to bear their person ; and every one to own, and 
acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so 
beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in 
those things which concern the common peace and safety ; 
and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and 
their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than 
consent, or concord ; it is a real unity of them all, in one 
and the same person, made by covenant of every man with 
every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to 
every man, " I authorize and give up my right of governing 
myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this con- 
dition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize 
all his actions in like manner." This done, the multitude so 
united in one person, is called a "commonwealth," in Latin 
civitas. This is the generation of that great "leviathan," 
or rather, to speak more reverently, of that "mortal god," 
to which we owe under the "immortal God," our peace 
and defence. For by this authority, given him by every 
particular man in the commonwealth, he/nath the use of 
so much power and strength conferred on him, that by 
terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the wills of them 
all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies 
abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the common- 
wealth ; which, to define it, is " one person, of whose acts 
a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, 
have made themselves every one the author, to the end 
he may use the strength and means of them all, as he 
shall think expedient, for their peace and common de-,, 
fence." 

And he that carrieth this person, is called "sovereign," 



102 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

and said to have " sovereign power " ; and every one 
besides, his "subject." 

The attaining to this sovereign power, is by two ways. 
One, by natural force ; as when a man maketh his children, 
to submit themselves, and their children, to his govern- 
ment, as being able to destroy them if they refuse ; or by 
war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their 
lives on that condition. The other is, when men agree 
amongst themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of 
men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him 
against all others. This latter, may be called a political 
commonwealth, or commonwealth by " institution " ; and 
the former, a commonwealth by "acquisition." And first, 
I shall speak of a commonwealth by institution. 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

Of the ■ Rights of Sovereigns by Institution. 

A "commonwealth" is said to be "instituted," when a 
" multitude " of men do agree, and " covenant, every one, 
with every one," that to whatsoever "man," or "assembly 
of men," shall be given by the major part, the "right " to 
"present" the person of them all, that is to say, to be 
their " representative " ; every one, as well he that " voted 
for it," as he that "voted against it," shall "authorize " all 
the actions and judgments, of that man, or assembly of 
men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the 
end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected 
against other men. 

From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all 
the "rights," and "faculties" of him, or them, on whom 
sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people 
assembled. 

First, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they 



RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS. 183 

are not obliged by former covenant to anything repugnant 
hereunto. And consequently they that have already insti- 
tuted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant, 
to own the actions, and judgments of one, cannot lawfully 
make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to 
any other, in anything whatsoever, without his permission. 
And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot 
without his leave cast off monarchy, and return to the con- 
fusion of a disunited multitude ; nor transfer their person 
from him that beareth it, to another man, or other assembly 
of men : for they are bound, every man to every man, to 
own, and be reputed author of all, that he that already is 
their sovereign, shall do, and judge fit to be done : so that 
anyone man dissenting, all the rest should break their cov- 
enant made to that man, which is injustice : and they have 
also every man given the sovereignty to him that beareth 
their person ; and therefore if they depose him, they take 
from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. 
Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his sovereign, be 
killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of 
his own punishment, as being by the institution, author of all 
his sovereign shall do : and because it is injustice for a man 
to do anything, for which he may be punished by his own 
authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas 
some men have pretended for their disobedience to their 
sovereign, a new covenant, made, not with men, but with 
God ; this also is unjust : for there is no covenant with 
God, but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's 
person ; which none doth but God's lieutenant, who hath 
the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant 
with God, is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders' own 
consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also 
of a vile, and unmanly disposition. 

Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them 
all, is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only 



1 84 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

of one to another, and not of him to any of them ; there can 
happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign ; 
and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of 
forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he 
which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his 
subjects beforehand, is manifest ; because either he must 
make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the cove- 
nant ; or he must make a several covenant with every man. 
With the whole, as one party, it is impossible ; because as 
yet they are not one person : and if he make so many sev- 
eral covenants as there be men, those covenants after he 
hath sovereignty are void ; because what act soever can be 
pretended by any one of them for breach tjiereof, is the act 
both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the per- 
son, and by the right of every one of them in particular. 
Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of 
the covenant made by the sovereign at his institution ; and 
others, or one other of his subjects, or himself alone, pre- 
tend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no 
judge to decide the controversy ; it returns therefore to 
the sword again ; and every man recovereth the right of 
protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the 
design they had in the institution. It is therefore in vain 
to grant sovereignty by way of precedent covenant. The 
opinion that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, 
that is to say, on condition, proceedeth from want of under- 
standing this easy truth, that covenants being but words 
and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or 
protect any man, but what it has from the public sword ; 
that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of 
men that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are 
avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of 
them all, in him united. But when an assembly of men is 
made sovereign; then no man imagineth any such covenant 
to have passed in the institution ; for no man is so dull as 



RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS. 185 

to say, for example, the people of Rome made a covenant 
with the Romans, to hold the sovereignty on such or such 
conditions ; which not performed, the Romans might law- 
fully depose the Roman people. That men see not the rea- 
son to be alike in a monarchy, and in a popular govern- 
ment, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are 
kinder to the government of an assembly, whereof they 
may hope to participate, than of monarchy, which they 
despair to enjoy. 

Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting 
voices declared a sovereign ; he that dissented must now 
consent with the rest ; that is, be contented to avow all the 
actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. 
For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them 
that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his 
will, and therefore tacitly covenanted, to stand to what the 
major part should ordain : and therefore if he refuse to 
stand thereto, or make protestation against any of their 
decrees, he do3s^ contrary to his covenant, and therefore 
unjustly. And whether he be of the congregation, or not ; 
and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either 
submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of war 
he was in before ; wherein he might without injustice be 
destroyed by any man whatsoever. 

Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution 
author of all the actions, and judgments of the sovereign 
instituted, it follows, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no 
injury to any of his subjects ; nor ought he to be by any of 
them accused of injustice. For he that doth anything by 
authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by 
whose authority he acteth : but by this institution of a 
commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the 
sovereign doth : and consequently he that complaineth of 
injury from his sovereign, complaineth of that whereof he 
himself is author ; and therefore ought not to accuse any 



186 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

man but himself; no nor himself of injury; because to do 
injury to one's self, is impossible. It is true that they that 
have sovereign power may commit iniquity ; but not injus- 
tice, or injury in the proper signification. 

Fifthly, and consequently to that which was said last, no 
man that hath sovereign power can justly be put to death, 
or otherwise in any manner by his subjects punished. For 
seeing every subject is author of the actions of his sovereign ; 
he punisheth another for the actions committed by himself. 

And because the end of this institution, is the peace and 
defence of them all ; and whosoever has right to the end, 
has right to the means ; it belongeth of right, to whatsoever 
man, or assembly that hath the sovereignty to be judge 
both of the means of peace and defence, and also of the 
hindrances, and disturbances of the same ; and to do what- 
soever he shall think necessary to be done, both before- 
hand, for the preserving of peace and security, by prevention 
of discord at home, and hostility from abroad ; and, when 
peace and security are lost, for the recovery of the same. 
And therefore, 

Sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of 
what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conduc- 
ing to peace ; and consequently, on what occasions, how 
far, and what men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to 
multitudes of people ; and who shall examine the doctrines 
of all books before they be published. For the actions of 
men proceed from their opinions ; and in the well governing 
of opinions, consisteth the well-governing of men's actions, 
in order to their peace, and concord. And though in 
matter of doctrine nothing ought to be regarded but the 
truth ; yet this is not repugnant to regulating the same by 
peace. For doctrine repugnant to peace, can be no more 
true than peace and concord can be against the law of 
nature. It is true, that in a commonwealth, where by the 
negligence, or unskilfulness of governors, and teachers, false 



RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS. 187 

doctrines are by time generally received ; the contrary 
truths may be generally offensive. Yet the most sudden, 
and rough bursting in of a new truth, that can be, does 
never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the war. 
For those men that are so remissly governed, that they dare 
take up arms to defend, or introduce an opinion, are still in 
war ; and their condition not peace, but only a cessation of 
arms for fear of one another ; and they live, as it were, in 
the precincts of battle continually. It belongeth therefore 
to him that hath the sovereign power, to be judge, or con- 
stitute all judges of opinions and doctrines, as a thing nec- 
essary to peace ; thereby to prevent discord and civil war. 

Seventhly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the whole power 
of prescribing the rules, whereby every man may know, 
what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, 
without being molested by any of his fellow-subjects ; and 
this is it men call "propriety." For before constitution of 
sovereign power, as hath already been shown, all men had 
right to all things ; which necessarily causeth war : and 
therefore this propriety, being necessary to peace, and 
depending on sovereign power, is the act of that power, in 
order to the public peace. These rules of propriety, or 
meum and tuum, and of "good," "evil," "lawful," and "un- 
lawful " in the actions of subjects, are the civil laws ; that 
is to say, the laws of each commonwealth in particular ; 
though the name of civil law be now restrained to the 
ancient civil laws of the city of Rome ; which being the 
head of a great part of the world, her laws at that time were 
in these parts the civil law. 

Eighthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the right of 
judicature ; that is to say, of hearing and deciding all con- 
troversies, which may arise concerning law, either civil, or 
natural, or concerning fact. For without the decision of 
controversies, there is no protection of one subject, against 
the injuries of another ; the laws concerning meum and tuum 



I OS OF COMMONWEALTH. 

are in vain, and to every man remaineth, from the natural 
and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right 
of protecting himself by his private strength, which is the 
condition of war, and contrary to the end for which every 
commonwealth is instituted. 

Ninthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the right of mak- 
ing war and peace with other nations, and commonwealths ; 
that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, 
and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid 
for that end ; and to levy money upon the subjects, to 
defray the expenses thereof. For the power by which the 
people are to be defended, consisteth in their armies, and 
the strength of an army, in the union of their strength 
under one command, which command the sovereign insti- 
tuted, therefore hath ; because the command of the " mili- 
tia," without other institution, maketh him that hath it 
sovereign. And therefore whosoever is made general of an 
army, he that hath the sovereign power is always general- 
issimo. 

Tenthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the choosing of 
all counsellors, ministers, magistrates, and officers, both in 
peace, and war. For seeing the sovereign is charged with 
the end, which is the common peace and defence, he is 
understood to have power to use such means, as he shall 
think most fit for his discharge. 

Eleventhly, to the sovereign is committed the power of 
rewarding with riches, or honour, and of punishing with 
corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, Cvtry 
subject according to the law he hath formerly made ; or if 
there be no law made, according as he shall judge most to 
conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the common- 
wealth, or deterring of them from doing disservice to the 
same. 

Lastly, considering what value men are naturally apt to 
set upon themselves ; what respect they look for from others ; 



RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS. 189 

and how little they value other men ; from whence contin- 
ually arise amongst them, emulation, quarrels, factions, and 
at last war, to the destroying of one another, and diminution 
of their strength against a common enemy ; it is necessary 
that there be laws of honour, and a public rate of the worth 
of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of 
the commonwealth ; and that there be force in the hands 
of some or other, to put those laws in execution. But it 
hath already been shown, that not only the whole " militia," 
or forces of the commonwealth ; but also the judicature of 
all controversies, is annexed to the sovereignty. To the 
sovereign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of hon- 
our ; and to appoint what order of place, and dignity, each 
man shall hold ; and what signs of respect, in public or 
private meetings, they shall give to one another. 

These are the rights, which make the essence of sov- 
ereignty ; and which are the marks, whereby a man may dis- 
cern in what man, or assembly of men, the sovereign 
power is placed and resideth. For these are incommuni- 
cable, and inseparable. The power to coin money ; to dis- 
pose of the estate and persons of infant heirs ; to have 
pre-emption in markets ; and all other statute prerogatives, 
may be transferred by the sovereign ; and yet the power to 
protect his subjects be retained. But if he transfer the 
"militia," he retains the judicature in vain, for want of 
execution of the laws : or if he grant away the power of 
raising money ; the "militia " is in vain ; or if he give away 
the government of doctrines, men will be frighted into 
rebellion with the fear of spirits. And so if we consider 
any one of the said rights, we shall presently see, that the 
holding of all the rest will produce no effect, in the conser- 
vation of peace and justice, the end for which all common- 
wealths are instituted. And this division is it, whereof it 
is said, " a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand " : for 
unless this division precede, division into opposite armies 



190 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

can never happen. If there had not first been an opinion 
\\ received of the greatest part of England, that these powers 

were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the 
House of Commons, the people had never been divided and 
fallen into this, civil war ; first between those that disa- 
greed in politics; and after between the dissenters about 
the liberty of religion ; which have so instructed men in this 
point of sovereign right; that there be few now in England 
that do not see, that these rights are inseparable, and will be 
so generally acknowledged at the next return of peace ; and 
continue, till their miseries are forgotten ; and no longer, 
except the vulgar be better taught than they have hitherto 
been. 

And because they are essential and inseparable rights, 
it follows necessarily, that in whatsoever words any of 
them seem to be granted away, yet if the sovereign power 
itself be not in direct terms renounced, and the name of 
sovereign no more given by the grantees to him that 
grants them, the grant is void : for when he has granted all 
he can, if we grant back the sovereignty, all is restored, as 
inseparably annexed thereunto. 

This great authority being indivisible, and inseparably 
annexed to the sovereignty, there is little ground for the 
opinion of them, that say of sovereign kings, though they 
be singulis majo?rs, of greater power than every one of their 
subjects, yet they be universis minores, of less power than 
them all together. For if by "all together," they mean not 
the collective body as one person, then "all together," and 
"every one," signify the same; and the speech is absurd. 
But if by "all together," they understand them as one 
person, which person the sovereign bears, then the power 
of all together, is the same with the sovereign's power; 
and so again the speech is absurd : which absurdity they 
see well enough, when the sovereignty is in an assembly of 
the people ; but in a monarch they see it not ; and yet the 



RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS. 191 

power of sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be 
placed. 

And as the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, 
ought to be greater, than that of any, or all the subjects. 
For in the sovereignity is the fountain of honour. The 
dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince are his creatures. 
As in the presence of the master, the servants are equal, 
and without any honour at all ; so are the subjects, in the 
presence of the sovereign. And though they shine some 
more, some less, when they are out of his sight •; yet in his 
presence, they shine no more than the stars in the presence 
of the sun. 

But a man may here object, that the condition of sub- 
jects is very miserable ; as being obnoxious to the lusts, 
and other irregular passions of him, or them that have so 
unlimited a power in their hands. And commonly they 
that live under a monarch, think it the fault of monarchy ; 
and they that live under the government of democracy, or 
other sovereign assembly, attribute all the inconvenience 
to that form of commonwealth ; whereas the power in all 
forms, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the 
same : not considering that the state of man can never be 
without some incommodity or other ; and that the greatest, 
that in any form of government can possibly happen to the 
people in general, is scarce sensible, in respect of the 
miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a civil 
war, or that dissolute condition of masterless men, without 
subjection to laws, and a coercive power to tie their hands 
from rapine and revenge : nor considering that the great- 
est pressure of sovereign governors, proceedeth not from 
any delight, or profit they can expect in the damage or 
weakening of their subjects, in whose vigour, consisteth their 
own strength and glory ; but in the restiveness of them- 
selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, 
make it necessary for their governors to draw from them 



192 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

what they can in time of peace, that they may have means 
on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or 
take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by 
nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, that is their 
passions and self-love, through which, every little payment 
appeareth a great grievance ; but are destitute of those 
prospective glasses, namely moral and civil science, to 
see afar off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot 
without such payments be avoided. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

Of the Several Kinds of Commonwealth by Institution, and of 
Succession to the Sovereign Power. 

The difference of commonwealths, consisteth in the dif- 
ference of the sovereign, or the person representative of all 
and every one of the multitude. And because the sover- 
eignity is either in one man, or in an assembly of more 
than one ; and into that assembly either every man hath 
right to enter, or not every one, but certain men distin- 
guished from the rest ; it is manifest, there can be but 
three kinds of commonwealth. For the representative 
must needs be one man, or more : and if more, then it is 
the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the represen- 
tative is one man, then is the commonwealth a "monar- 
chy " : when an assembly of all that will come together, 
then it is a "democracy," or popular commonwealth : when 
an assembly of a part only, then it is called an " aristoc- 
racy." Other kind of commonwealth there can be none : 
for either one, or more, or all, must have the sovereign 
power, which I have shown to be indivisible, entire. 

There be other names of government, in the histories, and 
books of policy ; as "tyranny," and "oligarchy " : but they 
are not the names of other forms of government, but of the 



KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH. 193 

same forms misliked. For they that are discontented under 
"monarchy," call it "tyranny'" ; and they that are dis- 
pleased with " aristocracy," call it "oligarchy": so also, 
they which find themselves grieved under a "democracy," 
call it "anarchy," which signifies want of government; 
and yet I think no man believes, that want of government 
is any new kind of government : nor by the same reason 
ought they to believe, that the government is of one kind 
when they like it, and another when they dislike it, or are 
oppressed by the governors. 

It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, 
if they please, give authority to one man, to represent them 
every one ; as well as give such authority to any assembly 
of men whatsoever ; and consequently may subject them- 
selves, if they think good, to a monarch, as absolutely, as to 
any other representative. Therefore, where there is already 
erected a sovereign power, there can be no other represen- 
tative of the same people, but only to certain particular 
ends, by the sovereign limited. For that were to erect 
two sovereigns ; and every man to have his person repre- 
sented by two actors, that by opposing one another, must 
needs divide that power, which, if men will live in peace, 
is indivisible ; and thereby reduce the multitude into the 
condition of war, contrary to the end for which all sover- 
eignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to think 
that a sovereign assembly, inviting the people of their 
dominion, to send up their deputies, with power to make 
known their advice, or desires, should therefore hold such 
deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute represen- 
tatives of the people : so it is absurd also to think the same 
in a monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a 
truth, should of late be so little observed ; that in a monar- 
chy, he that had the terepclgnty from a descent of six 
hundred years, was alone called sovereign, had the title of 
Majesty from every one of his subjects, and was unques- 



194 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

tionably taken by them for their king, was notwithstand- 
ing never considered as their representative ; the name 
without contradiction passing for the title of those men, 
which at his command were sent up by the people to carry 
their petitions, and give him, if he permitted it, their 
advice. Which may serve as an admonition, for those that 
are the true, and absolute representative of a people, to 
instruct men in the nature of that office, and to take heed 
how they admit of any other general representation upon 
any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the 
trust committed to them. 

The difference between these three kinds of common- 
wealth, consisteth not in the difference of power ; but in 
the difference of convenience, or aptitude to produce the 
peace, and security of the people ; for which end they were 
instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, 
we may observe ; first, that whosoever beareth the person 
of the people, or is one of that assembly that bears it, 
beareth also his own natural person. And though he be 
careful in his politic person to procure the common interest ; 
yet he is more, or no less careful to procure the private 
good of himself, his family, kindred and friends; and for 
the most part, if the public interest chance to cross the 
private, he prefers the private : for the passions of men, 
are commonly more potent than their reason. From 
whence it follows, that where the public and private inter- 
est are most closely united, there is the public most 
advanced. Now in monarchy, the private interest is the 
same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a 
monarch arise only from the riches, strength and reputa- 
tion of his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, 
nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, 
or too weak through want or dissension, to maintain a war 
against their enemies : whereas in a democracy, or aristoc- 
racy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the 



KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH. 195 

private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth 
many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a 
civil war. 

Secondly, that a monarch receiveth counsel of whom, 
when, and where he pleaseth ; and consequently may hear 
the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he 
deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long 
before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he 
will. But when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel, 
none are admitted but such as have a right thereto from 
the beginning ; which for the most part are of those who 
have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of 
knowledge ; and are to give their advice in long discourses, 
which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not 
govern them in it. For the " understanding " is by the 
flame of the passions, never enlightened, but dazzled. Nor 
is there any place, or time, wherein an assembly can receive 
counsel with secrecy, because of their own multitude. 

Thirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch, are subject 
to no other inconstancy, than that of human nature ; but 
in assemblies, besides that of nature, there ariseth an 
inconstancy from the number. For the absence of a few, 
that would have the resolution once taken, continue firm, 
which may happen by security, negligence, or private 
impediments, or the diligent appearance of a few of the 
contrary opinion, undoes to-day, all that was concluded 
yesterday. 

Fourthly, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself, 
out of envy, or interest ; but an assembly may ; and that to 
such a height, as may produce a civil war. 

Fifthly, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience ; 
that any subject, by the power of one man, for the enrich- 
ing of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he 
possesseth ; which I confess is a great and inevitable incon- 
venience. Rut the same may as well happen, where the 



196 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

sovereign power is an assembly : for their power is the 
same ; and they are as subject to evil counsel, and to be 
seduced by orators, as a monarch by flatterers ; and 
becoming one another's flatterers, serve one another's 
covetousness and ambition by turns. And whereas the 
favourites of monarchs, are few, and they have none else to 
advance but their own kindred ; the favourites of an assem- 
bly, are many ; and the kindred much more numerous, than 
of any monarch. Besides, there is no favourite of a mon- 
arch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his 
enemies ; but orators, that is to say, favourites of sovereign 
assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have 
little to save. For to accuse, requires less eloquence, such 
is man's nature, than to excuse ; and condemnation, than 
absolution more resembles justice. 

Sixthly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy, that 
the sovereignty may descend upon an infant, or one that 
cannot discern between good and evil: and consisteth in 
this, that the use of his power, must be in the hand of 
another man, or of some assembly of men, which are to 
govern by his right, and in his name ; as curators, and pro- 
tectors of his person, and authority. But to say there is 
inconvenience, in putting the use of the sovereign power, 
into the hand of a man, or an assembly of men; is to say 
that all government is more inconvenient, than confusion 
and civil war. And therefore all the danger that can be 
pretended, must arise from the contention of those, that for 
an office of so great honour, and profit, may become com- 
petitors. To make it appear, that this inconvenience, pro- 
ceedeth not from that form of government we call monar- 
chy, we are to consider, that the precedent monarch hath 
appointed who shall have the tuition of his infant suc- 
cessor, either expressly by testament, or tacitly, by not 
controlling the custom in that case received: and then 
such inconvenience, if it happen, is to be attributed, not to 



KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH. 197 

the monarchy, but to the ambition, and injustice of the 
subjects ; which in all kinds of government, where the peo- 
ple are not well instructed in their duty, and the rights of 
sovereignty, is the same. Or else the precedent monarch 
hath not at all taken order for such tuition; and then the 
law of nature hath provided this sufficient rule, that the 
tuition shall be in him, that hath by nature most interest 
in the preservation of the authority of the infant, and to 
whom least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. 
For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit, 
and promotion ; to put an infant into the power of those, 
that can promote themselves by his destruction, or damage, 
is not tuition, but treachery. So that sufficient provision 
being taken, against all just quarrel about the government 
under a child, if any contention arise to the disturbance 
of the public peace, it is not to be attributed to the form 
of monarchy, but to the ambition of subjects, and igno- 
rance of their duty. On the other side, there is no great 
commonwealth, the sovereignty whereof is in a great 
assembly, which is not, as to consultations of peace, and 
war, and making of laws, in the same condition, as if the 
government were in a child. For as a child wants the 
judgment to dissent from counsel given him, and is thereby 
necessitated to take the advice of them, or him, to whom 
he is committed : so an assembly wanteth the liberty, to 
dissent from the counsel of the major part, be it good, or 
bad. And as a child has need of a tutor, or protector, to 
preserve his person and authority : so also, in great com- 
monwealths, the sovereign assembly, in all great dangers 
and troubles, have need of custodes libertatis ; that is of 
dictators, or protectors of their authority ; which are as 
much as temporary monarchs, to whom for a time, they 
may commit the entire exercise of their power ; and have, 
at the end of that time, been oftener deprived thereof, than 
infant kings, by their protectors, regents, or any other tutors. 



198 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

Though the kinds of sovereignty be, as I have now 
shown, but three : that is to say, monarchy, where one 
man has it ; or democracy, where the general assembly of 
subjects hath it ; or aristocracy, where it is in an assembly 
of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished 
from the rest : yet he that shall consider the particular 
commonwealths that have been, and are in the world, will 
not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby 
be inclined to think there be other forms, arising from 
these mingled together. As for example, elective king- 
doms ; where kings have the sovereign power put into their 
hands for a time ; or kingdoms, wherein the king hath a 
power limited : which governments, are nevertheless, by 
most writers, called monarchy. Likewise if a popular, or 
aristocratical commonwealth, subdue an enemy's country, 
and govern the same, by a president, procurator, or other 
magistrate : this may seem perhaps at . first sight, to be a 
democratical, or aristocratical government. But it is not 
so. For elective kings, are not sovereigns, but ministers of 
the sovereign; nor limited kings, sovereigns, but ministers 
of them that have the sovereign power: nor are those 
provinces which are in subjection to a democracy, or aris- 
tocracy of another commonwealth, democratically or aristo- 
cratically governed, but monarchically. 

And first, concerning an elective king, whose power is 
limited to his life, as it is in many places of Christendom 
at this day ; or to certain "years or months, as the dictator's 
power amongst the Romans ; if he have right to appoint 
his successor, he is no more elective but hereditary. But 
if he have no power to elect his successor, then there is 
some other man, or assembly known, which after his 
decease may elect anew, or else the commonwealth dieth, 
and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of 
war. If it be known who have the power to give the 
sovereignty after his death, it is known also that the sover- 



KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH. 199 

eignty was in them before : for none have right to give 
that which they have not right to possess, and keep to 
themselves, if they think good. But if there be none that 
can give the sovereignty, after the decease of him that was 
first elected ; then has he power, nay, he is obliged by the 
law of nature, to provide, by establishing his successor, to 
keep those that had trusted him with the government, from 
relapsing into the miserable condition of civil war. And 
consequently he was, when elected, a sovereign absolute. 

Secondly, that king whose power is limited, is not supe- 
rior to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he 
that is not superior, is not supreme, that is to say not 
sovereign. The sovereignty therefore was always in that 
assembly which had the right to limit him; and by conse- 
quence the government not monarchy, but either democ- 
racy, or aristocracy ; as of old time in Sparta ; where the 
kings had a privilege to lead their armies ; but the sov- 
ereignty was in the Ephori. 

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman people governed 
the land of Judea, for example, by a president; yet was 
not Judea therefore a democracy; because they were not 
governed by any assembly, into the which, any of them, had 
right to enter ; nor an aristocracy ; because they were not 
governed by any assembly, into which, any man could enter 
by their election : but they were governed by one person, 
which, though as to the people of Rome, was an assembly 
of the people, or democracy ; yet as to the people of Judea, 
which had no right at all of participating in the govern- 
ment, was a monarch. For though where the people are 
governed by an assembly, chosen by themselves out of 
their own number, the government is called a democracy, 
or aristocracy; yet when they are governed by an assembly, 
not of their own choosing, it is a monarchy ; not of " one " 
man, over another man ; but of one people, over another 
people. 



200 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

Of all these forms of government, the matter being 
mortal, so that not only monarchs, but also whole assemblies 
die, it is necessary, for the conservation of the peace of 
men, that as there was order taken for an artificial man, 
so there be order also taken, for an artificial eternity of 
life : without which, men that are governed by an assembly, 
should return into the condition of war in every age; and 
they that are governed by one man, as soon as their gov- 
ernor dieth. This artificial eternity, is that which men call 
the right of "succession." 

There is no perfect form of government, where the dis- 
posing of the succession is not in the present sovereign. 
For if it be in any other particular man, or private assem- 
bly, it is in a person subject, and may be assumed by the 
sovereign at his pleasure ; and consequently the right is in 
himself. And if it be no particular man, but left to a new 
choice ; then is the commonwealth dissolved ; and the right 
is in him that can get it ; contrary to the intention of them 
that did institute the commonwealth, for their perpetual, 
and not temporary security. 

In a democracy, the whole assembly cannot fail, unless 
the multitude that are to be governed fail. And therefore 
questions of the right of succession, have in that form of 
government no place at all. 

In an aristocracy, when any of the assembly dieth, the 
election of another into his room belongeth to the assem- 
bly, as the sovereign, to whom belongeth the choosing of all 
counsellors and officers. For that which the representative 
doth, as actor, every one of the subjects doth, as author. 
And though the sovereign assembly may give power to 
others, to elect new men, for supply of their court ; yet it is 
still by their authority, that the election is made; and by the 
same it may, when the public shall require it, be recalled. 

The greatest difficulty about the right of succession, is in 
monarchy: and the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first 



KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH. 201 

sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the successor ; 
nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed. For 
in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratioci- 
nation, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the 
question, who shall appoint the successor, of a monarch 
that hath the sovereign authority ; that is to say, who shall 
determine of the right of inheritance, (for elective kings and 
princes have not the sovereign power in propriety, but in 
use only,) we are to consider, that either he that is in pos- 
session, has right to dispose of the succession, or else that 
right is again in the dissolved multitude. For the death 
of him that hath the sovereign power in propriety, leaves 
the multitude without any sovereign at all ; that is, without 
any representative in whom they should be united, and be 
capable of doing any one action at all : and therefore they 
are incapable of election of any new monarch ; every man 
having equal right to submit himself to such as he thinks 
best able to protect him ; or if he can, protect himself by 
his own sword ; which is a return to confusion, and to the 
condition of a war of every man against every man, con- 
trary to the end for which monarchy had its first institution. 
Therefore it is manifest, that by the institution of monarchy, 
the disposing of the successor, is always left to the judgment 
and will of the present possessor. 

And for the question, which may arise sometimes, who it 
is that the monarch in possession, hath designed to the 
succession and inheritance of his power ; it is determined 
by his express words, and testament ; or by other tacit signs 
sufficient. 

By express words, or testament, when it is declared by 
him in his lifetime, viva voce, or by writing ; as the first 
emperors of Rome declared who should be their heirs. For 
the word heir does not of itself imply the children, or near- 
est kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any way 
declare, he would have to succeed him in his estate. If 



202 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

therefore a monarch declare expressly, that such a man 
shall be his heir, either by word or writing, then is that 
man immediately after the decease of his predecessor, 
invested in the right of being monarch. 

But where testament, and express words are wanting, 
other natural signs of the will are to be followed : whereof 
the one is custom. And therefore where the custom is, that 
the next of kindred absolutely succeedeth, there also the 
next of kindred hath right to the succession ; for that, if the 
will of him that was in possession had been otherwise, he 
might easily have declared the same in his life-time. And 
likewise where the custom is, that the next of the male 
kindred succeedeth, there also the right of succession is in 
the next of the kindred male, for the same reason. And so 
it is if the custom were to advance the female. For what- 
soever custom a man may by a word control, and does not, 
it is a natural sign he would have that custom stand. 

But where neither custom, nor testament hath preceded, 
there it is to be understood, first, that a monarch's will is, 
that the government remain monarchical; because he hath 
approved that government in himself. Secondly, that a 
child of his own, male, or female, be preferred before any 
other ; because men are presumed to be more inclined by 
nature, to advance their own children, than the children of 
other men ; and of their own, rather a male than a female ; 
because men, are naturally fitter than women, for actions of 
labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own issue faileth, 
rather a brother than a stranger ; and so still the nearer in 
blood, rather than the more remote ; because it is always 
presumed that the nearer of kin, is the nearer in affection ; 
and it is evident that a man receives always, by reflection, 
the most honour from the greatness of his nearest kindred. 

But if it be lawful for a monarch to dispose of the succes- 
sion by words of contract, or testament, men may perhaps 
object a great inconvenience: for he may sell, or give his 



DOMINION PATERNAL, ETC. 203 

right of governing to a stranger ; which, because strangers, 
that is, men not used to live under the same government, 
nor speaking the same language, do commonly undervalue 
one another, may turn to the oppression of his subjects ; 
which is indeed a great inconvenience : but it proceedeth 
not necessarily from the subjection to a stranger's govern- 
ment, but from the unskilfulness of the governors, ignorant 
of the true rules of politics. And therefore the Romans 
when they had subdued many nations, to make their gov- 
ernment digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, 
as much as they thought necessary, by giving sometimes to 
whole nations, and sometimes to principal men of every 
nation they conquered, not only the privileges, but also the 
name of Romans ; and took many of them into the senate, 
and offices of charge, even in the Roman city. And this 
was it our most wise king, king James, aimed at, in endeav- 
ouring the union of his two realms of England and Scotland. 
Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood 
prevented the civil wars, which make both those kingdoms, 
at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to 
the people, for a monarch to dispose of the succession by 
will; though by the fault of many princes, it hath been some- 
times found inconvenient. Of the lawfulness of it, this also 
is an argument, that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive 
by giving a kingdom to a stranger, may arrive also by so 
marrying with strangers, as the right of succession may 
descend upon them : yet this by all men is accounted 
lawful. 

CHAPTER XX. 
Of Dominion Paternal, a?id Despotical. 

A commonwealth "by acquisition," is that, where the 
sovereign power is acquired by force; and it is acquired by 
force, when men singly, or many together by plurality of 



204 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

voices, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorize all the 
actions of that man, or assembly, that hath their lives and 
liberty in his power. 

And this kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differeth from 
sovereignty by institution, only in this, that men who choose 
their sovereign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him 
whom they institute : but in this case, they subject them- 
selves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it 
for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such 
covenants, as proceed from fear of death or violence, void : 
which if it were true, no man, in any kind of commonwealth, 
could be obliged to obedience. It is true, that in a com- 
monwealth once instituted, or acquired, promises proceed- 
ing from fear of death or violence, are no covenants, nor 
obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the laws ; 
but the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but 
because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing 
promised. Also, when he may lawfully perform, and doth 
not, it is not the invalidity of the covenant, that absolveth 
him, but the sentence of the sovereign. Otherwise, when- 
soever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh : 
but when the sovereign, who is the actor, acquitteth him, 
then he is acquitted by him that extorted the promise, as 
by the author of such absolution. 

But the rights, and consequences of sovereignty, are the 
same in both. His power cannot, without his consent, be 
transferred to another ; he cannot forfeit it : he cannot 
be accused by any of his subjects of injury : he cannot be 
punished by them : he is judge of what is necessary for 
peace ; and judge of doctrines : he is sole legislator ; and 
supreme judge of controversies; and of the times, and occa- 
sions of war, and peace : to him it belongeth to choose 
magistrates, counsellors, commanders, and all other officers, 
and ministers ; and to determine of rewards, and punish- 
ments, honour, and order. The reasons whereof, are the 



DOMINION PATERNAL, ETC. 205 

same which are alleged in the precedent chapter, for the 
same rights, and consequences of sovereignty by institu- 
tion. 

Dominion is acquired two ways ; by generation, and by 
conquest. The right of dominion by generation, is that, 
which the parent hath over his children, and is called 
"paternal." And is not so derived from the generation, as 
if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because 
he begat him ; but from the child's consent, either express, 
or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the 
generation, God hath ordained to man a helper ; and there 
be always two that are equally parents : the dominion 
therefore over the child, should belong equally to both; and 
he be equally subject to both, which is impossible ; for no 
man can obey two masters. And whereas some have attrib- 
uted the dominion to the man only, as being of the more 
excellent sex ; they misreckon in it. For there is not always 
that difference of strength, or prudence between the man 
and the woman, as that the right can be determined with- 
out war. In commonwealths, this controversy is decided 
by the civil law ; and for the most part, but not always, the 
sentence is in favour of the father ; because for the most 
part commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not 
by the mothers of families. But the question lieth now in 
the state of mere nature ; where there are supposed no 
laws of matrimony ; no laws for the education of children ; 
but the law of nature, and the natural inclination of the 
sexes, one to another, and to their children. In this con- 
dition of mere nature, either the parents between themselves 
dispose of the dominion over the child by contract ; or do 
not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right 
passeth according to the contract. We find in history that 
the Amazons contracted with the men of the neighbouring 
countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the 
issue male should be sent back, but the female remain with 



206 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

themselves : so that the dominion of the females was in the 
mother. 

If there be no contract, the dominion is in the mother. 
For in the condition of mere nature, where there are no 
matrimonial laws, it cannot be known who is the father, 
unless it be declared by the mother: and therefore the right 
of dominion over the child dependeth on her will, and is 
consequently hers. Again, seeing the infant is first in the 
power of the mother, so as she may either nourish or expose 
it ; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the mother ; and is 
therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other ; and 
by consequence the dominion over it is hers. But if she 
expose it, and another find and nourish it, the dominion is 
in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by 
whom it is preserved ; because preservation of life being the 
end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every 
man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose 
power it is to save, or destroy him. 

If the mother be the father's subject, the child is in the 
father's power: and if the father be the mother's subject, as 
when a sovereign queen marrieth one of her subjects, the 
child is subject to the mother; because the father also is 
her subject. 

If a man and woman, monarchs of two several kingdoms, 
have a child, and contract concerning who shall have the 
dominion of him, the right of the dominion passeth by the 
contract. If they contract not, the dominion followeth the 
dominion of the place of his residence. For the sovereign 
of each country hath dominion over all that reside therein. 

He that hath the dominion over the child, hath dominion 
also over the children of the child ; and over their child- 
ren's children. For he that hath dominion over the person 
of a man, hath dominion over all that is his ; without 
which, dominion were but a title, without the effect. 

The right of succession to paternal dominion, proceedeth 



DOMINION PATERNAL, ETC. 207 

in the same manner as doth the right of succession of mon- 
archy ; of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the 
precedent chapter. 

Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is 
that which some writers call "despotical," from /^ea-n-oTr}^, 
which signifieth a "lord," or "master"; and is the domin- 
ion of the master over his servant. And this dominion is 
then acquired to the victor, when the vanquished, to avoid 
the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in express 
words, .or by other sufficient signs of the will, that so long 
as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the 
victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after 
such covenant made, the vanquished is a "servant," and 
not before: for by the word "servant," whether it be 
derived from servire, to serve, or from servare, to save, which 
I leave to grammarians to dispute, is not meant a cap- 
tive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him 
that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider 
what to do with him : for such men, commonly called slaves, 
have no obligation at all ; but may break their bonds, or the 
prison ; and kill, or carry away captive their master, justly: 
but one, that being taken, hath corporal liberty allowed 
him ; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence 
to his master, is trusted by him. 

It is not therefore the victory, that giveth the right of 
dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor 
is he obliged because he is conquered ; that is to say, beaten, 
and taken, or put to flight ; but because he cometh in, and 
submitteth to the victor ; nor is the victor obliged by an 
enemy's rendering himself, without promise of life, to spare 
him for this his yielding to discretion, which obliges not 
the victor longer, than in his own discretion he shall think 
fit. 

And that which men do, when they demand, as it is now 
called, "quarter," which the Greeks called Zwypia, staking 



208 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

alive," is to evade the present fury of the victor, by sub- 
mission, and to compound for their life, with ransom, or 
service ; and therefore he that hath quarter, hath not his 
life given, but deferred till farther deliberation ; for it is not 
a yielding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then 
only is his life in security, and his service due, when the 
victor hath trusted him with his corporal liberty. For 
slaves that work in prisons, or fetters, do it not of duty, but 
to avoid the cruelty of their taskmasters. 

The master of the servant, is master also of all he hath ; 
and may exact the use thereof ; that is to say, of his goods, 
of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, so often 
as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his master, 
by the covenant of obedience ; that is, of owning, and 
authorizing whatsoever the master shall do. And in case 
the master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or 
otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himself the 
author of the same ; and cannot accuse him of injury. 

In sum, the rights and consequences of both " paternal " 
and "despotical " dominion, are the very same with those 
of a sovereign by institution ; and for the same reasons : 
which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter. 
So that for a man that is monarch of divers nations, where- 
of he hath, in one the sovereignty by institution of the peo- 
ple assembled, and in another by conquest, that is by the 
submission of each particular, to avoid death or bonds; to 
demand of one nation more than of the other, from the 
title of conquest, as being a conquered nation, is an act of 
ignorance of the rights of sovereignty ; for the sovereign is 
absolute over both alike ; or else there is no sovereignty at 
all ; and so every man may lawfully protect himself, if he 
can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war. 

By this it appears ; that a great family, if it be not part of 
some commonwealth, is of itself, as to the rights of sover- 
eignty, a little monarchy ; whether that family consist of 



DOMINION PATERNAL, ETC. 209 

a man and his children ; or of a man and his servants ; or 
of a man, and his children, and servants together ; wherein 
the father or master is the sovereign. But yet a family is 
not properly a commonwealth ; unless it be of that power by 
its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be 
subdued without the hazard of war. For where a number 
of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, 
every one may use his own reason in time of danger to save 
his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, 
as he shall think best ; in the same manner as a very small 
company of soldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down 
their arms, and demand quarter, or run away, rather than 
be put to the sword. And thus much shall suffice concern- 
ing what I find by speculation, and deduction, of sovereign 
rights, from the nature, need, and designs of men, in erect- 
ing of commonwealths, and putting themselves under mon- 
archs, or assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their 
protection. 

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the 
same point. To Moses, the children of Israel say thus : 
" Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee ; but let not God 
speak to us, lest we die " (Exod. xx. 19). This is absolute 
obedience to Moses. Concerning the right of kings, God 
Himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith (1 Sam. viii. 11, 12, 
&c.) " This shall be the right of the king you will have to 
reign over you. He shall take your sons, and set them to 
drive his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run 
before his chariots ; and gather in his harvest ; and to make 
his engines of war, and instruments of his chariots ; and 
shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his 
cooks, and bakers. He shall take your fields, your vine- 
yards, and your olive yards, and give them to his servants. 
He shall take the tithe of your corn and wine, and give it 
to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He 
shall take your manservants, and your maidservants, and the 



210 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

choice of your youth, and employ them in his business. 
He shall take the tithe of your flocks ; and you shall be his 
servants." This is absolute power, and summed up in the 
last words, "you shall be his servants." Again, when the 
people heard what power their king was to have, yet they 
consented thereto, and say thus (verse 10) "We will be 
as all other nations, and our king shall judge our causes, 
and go before us, to conduct our wars." Here is confirmed 
the right that sovereigns have, both to the "militia," and to 
all "judicature " ; in which is contained as absolute power, 
as one man can possibly transfer to another. Again, the 
prayer of king Solomon to God, was this (i Kings, iii. 9) : 
" Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, 
and to discern between good and evil." It belongeth 
therefore to the sovereign to be "judge," and to prescribe 
the rules of "discerning good " and "evil": which rules 
are laws ; and therefore in him is the legislative power. 
Saul sought the life of David ; yet when it was in his power 
to slay Saul, and his servants would have done it, David 
forbad them, saying, (1 Sam. xxiv. 6) "God forbid I 
should do such an act against my lord, the anointed of 
God." For obedience of servants St. Paul saith, (Col. iii. 
22) "Servants obey your masters in all things"; and, 
(Col. iii. 20) "Children obey your parents in all things." 
There is simple obedience in those that are subject to 
paternal, or despotical dominion. Again, (Matt, xxiii. 2, 
3) " The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' chair, and 
therefore all that they shall bid you observe, that observe 
and do." There again is simple obedience. And St. Paul, 
(Titus iii. 2) "Warn them that they subject themselves to 
princes, and to those that are in authority, and obey them." 
This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himself 
acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by 
kings imposed, where he says, " Give to Caesar that which 
is Caesar's " ; and paid such taxes himself. And that the 



DOMINION PATERNAL, ETC. 211 

king's word, is sufficient to take anything from any subject, 
when there is need ; and that the king is judge of that 
need, for he himself, as king of the Jews, commanded his 
disciples to take the ass, and ass's colt to carry him into 
Jerusalem, saying, (Matt. xxi. 2, 3) "Go into the village 
over against you, and you shall find a she-ass tied, and her 
colt with her ; untie them, and bring them to me. And if 
any man ask you, what you mean by it, say the Lord hath 
need of. them : and they will let them go." They will not 
ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title ; nor whether 
he be judge of that necessity ; but acquiesce in the will of 
the Lord. 

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (iii. 
5) "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." And 
(verse 1 1 ) "Who told thee that thou wast naked ? hast thou 
eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou should- 
est not eat ? " For the cognizance or judicature of "good " 
and "evil," being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the 
tree of knowledge, as a trial of Adam's obedience ; the devil 
to inflame the ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit 
already seemed beautiful, told her that by tasting it, they 
should be as gods, knowing "good " and "evil." Where- 
upon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them 
God's office, which is judicature of good and evil; but 
acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. 
And whereas it is said, that having eaten, they saw they were 
naked ; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they 
had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins : the 
meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their 
nakedness, wherein it was God's will to create them, to be 
uncomely ; and by being ashamed, did tacitly censure God 
himself. And thereupon God saith ; " Hast thou eaten, 
&c." as if he should say, doest thou that owest me obedi- 
ence, take upon thee to judge of my commandments ? 
Whereby it is clearly, though allegorically, signified, that 



212 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

the commands of them that have the right to command, 
are not by their subjects to be censured, nor disputed. 

So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both 
from reason and Scripture, that the sovereign power, 
whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one 
assembly of men, as in popular, and aristocratical common- 
wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to 
make it. And though of so unlimited a power, men may 
fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the 
want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his 
neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this 
life shall never be without inconveniences ; but there hap- 
peneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience, but 
what proceeds from the subject's disobedience, and breach 
of those covenants, from which the commonwealth has its 
being. And whosoever thinking sovereign power too great, 
will seek to make it less, must subject himself, to the power 
that can limit it ; that is to say, to a greater. 

The greatest objection is, that of the practice ; when men 
ask, where, and when, such power has by subjects been 
acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when, or 
where has there been a kingdom long free from sedition and 
civil war. In those nations whose commonwealths have 
been long-lived, and not being destroyed but by foreign 
war, the subjects never did dispute of the sovereign power. 
But howsoever, an argument from the practice of men, that 
have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason 
weighed the causes, and nature of commonwealths, and suf- 
fer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance 
thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, 
men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, 
it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. The 
skill of making, and maintaining commonwealths, consisteth 
in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry ; not, as 
tennis-play, on practice only : which rules, neither poor 



OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS. 213 

men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, 
have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find 
out. 

CHAPTER XXI. 

Of the Liberty of Subjects. 

Liberty, or "freedom," signifleth, properly, the absence of 
opposition ; by opposition, I mean external impediments of 
motion ; and may be applied no less to irrational, and inani- 
mate creatures, than to rational. For whatsoever is so tied, 
or environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space, 
which space is determined by the opposition of some exter- 
nal body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so 
of all living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or 
restrained, with walls, or chains ; and of the water whilst it 
is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread 
itself into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at 
liberty, to move in such manner, as without those external 
impediments they would. But when the impediment of 
motion, is in the constitution of the thing itself, we use not 
to say ; it wants the liberty ; but the power to move ; as 
when a stone lieth still, or a man is fastened to his bed by 
sickness. 

And according to this proper, and generally received 
meaning of the word, a " freeman, is he, that in those 
things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is 
not hindered to do what he has a will to." But when the 
words "free," and "liberty," are applied to anything but 
"bodies," they are abused ; for that which is not subject to 
motion, is not subject to impediment : and therefore, when 
if it is said, for example, the way is free, no liberty of the way 
is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. And 
when we say a gift is free, there is not meant any liberty of 
the gift, but of the giver, that was not bound by any law 



214 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

or covenant to give it. So when we "speak freely," it is 
not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, 
whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did. 
Lastly, from the use of the word "free-will," no liberty can 
be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty 
of the man ; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, 
in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do. 

Fear and liberty are consistent ; as when a man throw- 
eth his goods into the sea for "fear" the ship should sink, 
he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to do 
it if he will : it is therefore the action of one that was 
" free " : so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for " fear" 
of imprisonment, which because nobody hindered him from 
detaining, was the action of a man at "liberty." And 
generally all actions which men do in commonwealths, 
for " fear " of the law, are actions, which the doers had 
" liberty " to omit. 

"Liberty," and "necessity" are consistent: as in the 
water, that hath not only "liberty," but a "necessity" 
of descending by the channel ; so likewise in the actions 
which men voluntarily do : which, because they proceed 
from their will, proceed from " liberty " ; and yet, because 
every act of man's will, and every desire, and inclination 
proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, 
in a continual chain, whose first link is in the hand of God 
the first of all causes, proceed from "necessity." So that 
to him that could see the connection of those causes, the 
" necessity " of all men's voluntary actions, would appear 
manifest. And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all 
things, seeth also that the "liberty " of man in doing what 
he will, is accompanied with the " necessity " of doing that 
which God will, and no more, nor less. For though men may 
do many things, which God does not command, nor is 
therefore author of them ; yet they can have no passion, nor 
appetite to anything, of which appetite God's will is not 



OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS. 215 

the cause. And did not his will assure the " necessity " of 
man's will, and consequently of all that on man's will 
dependeth, the " liberty " of men would be a contradiction, 
and impediment to the omnipotence and " liberty " of God. 
And this shall suffice, as to the matter in hand, of that nat- 
ural "liberty," which only is properly called "liberty." 

But as men, for the attaining of peace, and conservation 
of themselves thereby, have made an artificial man, which 
we call a commonwealth ; so also have they made artificial 
chains, called "civil laws," which they themselves, by mu- 
tual covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips of that 
man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign 
power ; and at the other end to their own ears. These 
bonds, in their own nature but weak, may nevertheless be 
made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty 
of breaking them. 

In relation to these bonds only it is, that I am to speak 
now, of the "liberty" of "subjects." For seeing there is 
no commonwealth in the world, wherein there be rules 
enough set down, for the regulating of all the actions, and 
words of men ; as being a thing impossible : it followeth 
necessarily, that in all kinds of actions by the laws preter- 
mitted, men have the liberty, of doing what their own rea- 
sons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. 
For if we take liberty in the proper sense, for corporal 
liberty ; that is to say, freedom from chains and prison ; it 
were very absurd for men to clamour as they do, for the 
liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Again, if we take liberty, 
for an exemption from laws, it is no less absurd, for men 
to demand as they do, that liberty, by which all other men 
may be masters of their lives. And yet, as absurd as it is, 
this is it they demand ; not knowing that the laws are of no 
power to protect them, without a sword in the hands of a 
man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. 
The liberty of a subject, lieth therefore only in those things, 



216 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

which in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath preter- 
mitted : such as is the liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise 
contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their 
own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children 
as they themselves think fit ; and the like. 

Nevertheless we are not to understand, that by such 
liberty, the sovereign power of life and death, is either 
abolished, or limited. For it has been already shown, that 
nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on 
what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice, or 
injury ; because every subject is author of every act the 
sovereign doth; so that he never wanteth right to anything, 
otherwise, than as he himself is the subject of God, and 
bound thereby to observe the laws of nature. And there- 
fore it may, and doth often happen in commonwealths, that 
a subject may be put to death, by the command of the sov- 
ereign power; and yet neither do the other wrong: as when 
Jephtha caused his daughter to be sacrificed : in which, and 
the like cases, he that so dieth, had liberty to do the action, 
for which he is nevertheless, without injury put to death. 
And the same holdeth also in a sovereign prince, that put- 
teth to death an innocent subject. For though the action 
be against the law of nature, as being contrary to equity, 
as was the killing of Uriah, by David ; yet it was not an 
injury to Uriah, but to God. Not to Uriah, because the 
right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah him- 
self : and yet to God, because David was God's subject, 
and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature : which 
distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, 
evidently confirmed, saying, "To thee only have I sinned." 
In the same manner, the people of Athens, when they ban- 
ished the most potent of their commonwealth for ten years, 
thought they committed no injustice ; and yet they never 
questioned what crime he had done ; but what hurt he 
would do : nay they commanded the banishment of they 



OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS. 217 

knew not whom ; and every citizen bringing his oyster-shell 
into the market-place, written with the name of him he 
desired should be banished, without actually accusing him, 
sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of jus- 
tice ; and sometimes a scurrilous jester, as Hyperbolus, to 
make a jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the sovereign 
people of Athens wanted right to banish them; or an Athe- 
nian the liberty to jest, or to be just. 

The liberty, whereof there is so frequent and honourable 
mention, in the histories, and philosophy of the ancient 
Greeks, and Romans, and in the writings, and discourse of 
those that from them have received all their learning in the 
politics, is not the liberty of particular men ; but the liberty 
of the commonwealth : which is the same with that which 
every man then should have, if there were no civil laws,, nor 
commonwealth at all. And the effects of it also be the 
same. For as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual 
war, of every man against his neighbour ; no inheritance, 
to transmit to the son, nor to expect from the father ; no 
propriety of goods, or lands ; no security ; but a full and 
absolute liberty in every particular man : so in states, and 
commonwealths not dependent on one another, every com- 
monwealth, not every man, has an absolute liberty, to do 
what it shall judge, that is to say, what that man, or assem- 
bly that representeth it, shall judge most conducing to their 
benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpet- 
ual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers 
armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours round 
about. The Athenians, and Romans were free; that is, free 
commonwealths: not that any particular men had the liberty 
to resist their own representative; but that their represen- 
tative had the liberty to resist, or invade other people. 
There is written on the turrets of the city of Lucca in great 
characters, at this day, the word " Libertas " ; yet no man 
can thence infer, that a particular man has more liberty, or 



218 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

immunity from the service of the commonwealth there, than 
in Constantinople. Whether a commonwealth be monar- 
chical, or popular, the freedom is still the same. 

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the 
specious name of liberty ; and for want of judgment to dis- 
tinguish, mistake that for their private inheritance, and 
birthright, which is the right of the public only. And when 
the same error is confirmed by the authority of men in 
reputation for their writings on this subject, it is no wonder 
if it produce sedition, and change of government. In these 
western parts of the world, we are made to receive our 
opinions concerning the institution, and rights of common- 
wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and 
Romans, that living under popular states, derived those 
rights, not from the principles of nature, but transcribed 
them into their books, out of the practice of their own 
commonwealths, which were popular ; as the grammarians 
describe the rules of language, out of the practice of the 
time ; or the rules of poetry, out of the poems of Homer and 
Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, to keep 
them from desire of changing their government, that they 
were free men, and all that lived under monarchy were 
slaves ; therefore Aristotle put it down in his " Politics," 
(lib. 6, cap. ii.) "In democracy, 'liberty ' is to be supposed : 
for it is commonly held, that no man is ' free ' in any other 
government." And as Aristotle, so Cicero, and other writers 
have grounded their civil doctrine, on the opinions of the 
Romans, who were taught to hate monarchy, at first, by them 
that having deposed their sovereign, shared amongst them 
the sovereignty of Rome ; and afterwards by their successors. 
And by reading of these Greek, and Latin authors, men from 
their childhood have gotten a habit, under a false show of 
liberty, of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the 
actions of their sovereigns, and again of controlling those 
controllers ; with the effusion of so much blood, as I think 



OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS. 219 

I may truly say, there was never anything so dearly bought, 
as these western parts have bought the learning of the 
Greek and Latin tongues. 

t To come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a 
subject ; that is to say, what are the things, which though 
commanded by the sovereign, he may nevertheless, without 

; injustice, refuse to do ; we are to consider, what rights we 
pass away, when we make a commonwealth ; or, which is 
all one, what liberty we deny ourselves, by owning all the 
actions, without exception, of the man, or assembly we 
make our sovereign. For in the act of our " submission," 
consisteth both our "obligation," and our "liberty"; 
which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from 
thence ; there being no obligation on any man, which 
ariseth not from some act of his own ; for all men equally, 
are by nature free. And because such arguments, must 
either be drawn from the express words, I " authorize all 
his actions," or from the intention of him that submitteth 
himself to his power, which intention is to be understood 
by the end for which he so submitteth ; the obligation, and 
liberty of the subject, is to be derived, either from those 
words, or others equivalent ; or else from the end of the 
institution of sovereignty, namely, the peace of the subjects 
within themselves, and their defence against a common 
enemy. 

First therefore, seeing sovereignty by institution, is by 
covenant of every one to every one ; and sovereignty by 
acquisition, by covenants of the vanquished to the victor, 
or child to the parent; it is manifest, that every subject has 
liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by 
covenant be transferred. I have shown before in the 14th 
chapter, that covenants, not to defend a man's own body, 
are void. Therefore, 

If the sovereign command a man, though justly con- 
demned, to kill, wound, or maim himself ; or not to resist 



220 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

those that assault him ; or to abstain from the use of food, 
air, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot 
live ; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey. 

If a man be interrogated by the sovereign, or his author- 
ity, concerning a crime done by himself, he is not bound, 
without assurance of pardon, to confess it; because no man, 
as I have shown in the same chapter, can be obliged by 
covenant to accuse himself. 

Again, the consent of a subject to sovereign power, is 
contained in these words, " I authorize, or take upon me, 
all his actions " ; in which there is no restriction at all, of 
his own former natural liberty: for by allowing him to "kill 
me," I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me. 
It is one thing to say, "kill me, or my fellow, if you please "; 
another thing to say, "I will kill myself, or my fellow." It 
followeth therefore, that 

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill 
himself, or any other man ; and consequently, that the 
obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command 
of the sovereign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable 
office, dependeth not on the words of our submission ; but 
on the intention, which is to be understood by the end 
thereof. When therefore our refusal to obey, frustrates the 
end for which the sovereignty was ordained ; then there is 
no liberty to refuse : otherwise there is. 

Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a soldier 
to fight against the enemy, though his sovereign have right 
enough to punish his refusal with death, may nevertheless 
in many cases refuse, without injustice ; as when he substi- 
tuted a sufficient soldier in his place : for in this case he 
deserteth not the service of the commonwealth. And there 
is allowance to be made for natural timorousness ; not only 
to women, of whom no such dangerous duty is expected, 
but also to men of feminine courage. When armies fight, 
there is on one side, or both, a running away ; yet when 



OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS. 221 

they do it not out of treachery, but fear, they are not 
esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the 
same reason, to avoid battle, is not injustice, but cowardice. 
But he that enrolleth himself a soldier, or taketh impressed 
money, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature ; and 
is obliged, not only to go to the battle, but also not to run 
from it, without his captain's leave. And when the defence 
of the commonwealth, requireth at once the help of all that 
are able to bear arms, every one is obliged ; because other- 
wise the institution of the commonwealth, which they have 
not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain. 

To resist the sword of the commonwealth, in defence of 
another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath liberty ; 
because such liberty, takes away from the sovereign, the 
means of protecting us ; and is therefore destructive of the 
very essence of government. But in case a great many 
men together, have already resisted the sovereign power 
unjustly, or committed some capital crime, for which every 
one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the 
liberty then to join together, and assist, and defend one 
another ? Certainly they have : for they but defend their 
lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the innocent. 
There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; 
their bearing of arms subsequent to it, though it be to 
maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And 
if it be only to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. 
But the offer of pardon taketh from them, to whom it is 
offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their persever- 
ance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawful. 

As for other liberties, they depend on the silence of the 
law. In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, 
there the subject hath the liberty to do, or forbear, accord- 
ing to his own discretion. And therefore such liberty is in 
some places more, and in some less ; and in some times 
more, in other times less, according as they that have the 



222 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

sovereignty shall think most convenient. As for example, 
there was a time, when in England a man might enter into 
his own land, and dispossess such as wrongfully possessed 
it, by force. But in aftertimes, that liberty of forcible 
entry, was taken away by a statute made, by the king, in 
parliament. And in some places of the world, men have 
the liberty of many wives : in other places, such liberty is 
not allowed. 

If a subject have a controversy with his sovereign, of debt, 
or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning 
any service required at his hands, or concerning any pen- 
alty, corporal, or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent law ; 
he hath the same liberty to sue for his right, as if it were 
against a subject ; and before such judges, as are appointed 
by the sovereign. For seeing the sovereign demandeth by 
force of a former law, and not by virtue of his power ; he 
declareth thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall 
appear to be due by that law. The suit therefore is not 
contrary to the will of the sovereign ; and consequently the 
subject hath the liberty to demand the hearing of his cause; 
and sentence, according to that law. But if he demand, or 
take anything by pretence of his power ; there lieth, in that 
case, no action of law ; for all that is done by him in virtue 
of his power, is done by the authority of every subject, and 
consequently he that brings an action against the sovereign, 
brings it against himself. 

If a monarch, or sovereign assembly, grant a liberty to 
all, or any of his subjects, which grant standing, he is dis- 
abled to provide for their safety, the grant is void ; unless 
he directly renounce, or transfer the sovereignty to another. 
For in that he might openly, if it had been his will, and in 
plain terms, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not ; 
it is to be understood it was not his will, but that the grant 
proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such 
a liberty and the sovereign power ; and therefore the sover- 



OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS. 223 

eignty is still retained ; and consequently all those powers, 
which are necessary to the exercising thereof ; such as are 
the power of war, and peace, of judicature, of appointing 
officers, and councillors, of levying money, and the rest 
named in the 18th chapter. 

The obligation of subjects to the sovereign, is understood 
to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by 
which he is able to protect them. For the right men have 
by nature to protect themselves, when none else can pro- 
tect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. The sover- 
eignty is the soul of the commonwealth ; which once 
departed from the body, the members do no more receive 
their motion from it. The end of obedience is protection ; 
which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own or in 
another's sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and 
his endeavour to maintain it. And though sovereignty, in 
the intention of them that make it, be immortal ; yet is it 
in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by 
foreign war, but also through the ignorance, and passions 
of men, it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds 
of a natural mortality, by intestine discord. 

If a subject be taken prisoner in war, or his person, or 
his means of life be within the guards of the enemy, and 
hath his life and corporal liberty given him, on condition 
to be subject to the victor, he hath liberty to accept the 
condition ; and having accepted it, is the subject of him 
that took him, because he had no other way to preserve 
himself. The case is the same, if he be detained on the 
same terms, in a foreign country. But if a man be held in 
prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the liberty of his 
body, he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant 
to subjection ; and therefore may, if he can, make his 
escape by any means whatsoever. 

If a monarch shall relinquish the sovereignty, both for 
himself, and his heirs ; his subjects return to the absolute 



224 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

liberty of nature; because, though nature may declare who 
are his sons, and who are the nearest of his kin ; yet it 
dependeth on his own will, as hath been said in the pre- 
cedent chapter, who shall be his heir. If therefore he will 
have no heir, there is no sovereignty, nor subjection. The 
case is the same, if he die without known kindred, and 
without declaration of his heir. For then there can no 
heir be known, and consequently no subjection be due. 

If the sovereign banish his subject, during the banish- 
ment, he is not subject. But he that is sent on a message, 
or hath leave to travel, is still subject; but it is, by contract 
between sovereigns, not by virtue of the covenant of sub- 
jection. For whosoever entereth into another's dominion, 
is subject to all the laws thereof, unless he have a privilege 
by the amity of the sovereigns, or by special license. 

If a monarch subdued by war render himself subject to 
the victor, his subjects are delivered from their former obli- 
gation, and become obliged to the victor. But if he be 
held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own body, he 
is not understood to have given away the right of sover- 
eignty ; and therefore his subjects are obliged to yield 
obedience to the magistrates formerly placed, governing 
not in their own name, but in his. For, his right remain- 
ing, the question is only of the administration ; that is to 
say, of the magistrates and officers ; which, if he have not 
means to name, he is supposed to approve those which he 
himself had formerly appointed. 



CHAPTER XXII. 

Of Systems Subject, Political, and Private. 

Having spoken of the generation, form, and power of a 
commonwealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts 
thereof. And first of systems, which resemble the similar 



SYSTEMS SUBJECT, POLITICAL, ETC. 225 

parts, or muscles of a body natural. By "systems," I 
understand any numbers of men joined in one interest, or 
one business. Of which, some are "regular," and some 
"irregular." "Regular" are those, where one man, or 
assembly of men, is constituted representative of the whole 
number. All other are "irregular." 

Of regular, some are " absolute," and " independent," sub- 
ject to none but their own representative : such are only 
commonwealths ; of which I have spoken already in the 
five last precedent chapters. Others are dependent ; that 
is to say, subordinate to some sovereign power, to which 
every one, as also their representative is "subject." 

Of systems subordinate, some are "political," and some 
"private." "Political," otherwise called "bodies politic," 
and "persons in law," are those, which are made by author- 
ity from the sovereign power of the commonwealth. " Pri- 
vate," are those, which are constituted by subjects amongst 
themselves, or by authority from a stranger. For no 
authority derived from foreign power, within the dominion 
of another, is public there, but private. 

And of private systems, some are "lawful"; some 
"unlawful." " Lawful," are those which are allowed by the 
commonwealth: all other are "unlawful." "Irregular" 
systems, are those which having no representative, consist 
only in concourse of people ; which if not forbidden by the 
commonwealth, nor made on evil design, such as are con- 
flux of people to markets, or shows, or any other harmless 
end, are lawful. But when the intention is evil, or (if the 
number be considerable), unknown, they are unlawful. 

In bodies politic, the power of the representative is 
always limited : and that which prescribeth the limits 
thereof, is the power sovereign. For power unlimited, is 
absolute sovereignty. And the sovereign in every common- 
wealth, is the absolute representative of all the subjects ; 
and therefore no other can be representative of any part of 



226 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

them, but so far forth, as he shall give leave. And to give 
leave to a body politic of subjects, to have an absolute 
representative to all intents and purposes, were to abandon 
the government of so much of the commonwealth, and to 
divide the dominion, contrary to their peace and defence ; 
which the sovereign cannot be understood to do, by any 
grant, that does not plainly, and directly discharge them of 
their subjection. For consequences of words, are not~the 
signs of his will, when other consequences are signs of the 
contrary ; but rather signs of error, and misreckoning ; to 
which all mankind is too prone. 

The bounds of that power, which is given to the repre- 
sentative of a body politic, are to be taken notice of, from 
two things. One is their writ, or letters from the sovereign : 
the other is the law of the commonwealth. 

For though in the institution or acquisition of a common- 
wealth, which is independent, there needs no writing, 
because the power of the representative has there no other 
bounds, but such as are set out by the unwritten law of 
nature ; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversi- 
ties of limitation necessary, concerning their business, 
times, and places, as can neither be remembered without 
letters, nor taken notice of, unless such letters be patent, 
that they may be read to them, and withal sealed, or testi- 
fied, with the seals, or other permanent signs of the author- 
ity sovereign. 

And because such limitation is not always easy, or per- 
haps possible to be described in writing ; the ordinary laws, 
common to all subjects, must determine what the represen- 
tative may lawfully do, in all cases, where the letters them- 
selves are silent. And therefore, 

In a body politic, if the representative be one man, 
whatsoever he does in the person of the body, which is not 
warranted in his letters, nor by the laws, is his own act, 
and not the act of the body, nor of any other member 



SYSTEMS SUBJECT, TO LI TIC A L, ETC. 227 

thereof besides himself : because further than his letters, or 
the law's limit, he representeth no man's person, but his 
own. But what he does according to these, is the act of 
every one : for the act of the sovereign every one is author, 
because he is their representative unlimited ; and the act 
of him that recedes not from the letters of the sovereign, is 
the act of the sovereign, and therefore every member of the 
body is author of it. 

But if the representative be an assembly ; whatsoever 
that assembly shall decree, not warranted by their letters, or 
the laws, is the act of the assembly, or body politic, and 
the act of every one by whose vote the decree was made ; 
but not the act of any man that being present voted to the 
contrary ; nor of any man absent, unless he voted it by 
procuration. It is the act of the assembly, because voted 
by the major part ; and if it be a crime, the assembly may 
be punished, as far forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, 
or forfeiture of their letters (which is to such artificial, and 
fictitious bodies, capital) or, if the assembly have a com- 
mon stock, wherein none of the innocent members have 
propriety, by pecuniary mulct. For from corporal penal- 
ties nature hath exempted all bodies politic. But they 
that gave not their vote, are therefore innocent, because 
the assembly cannot represent any man in things unwar- 
ranted by their letters, and consequently are not involved 
in their votes. 

If the person of the body politic being in one man, 
borrow money of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of 
the same body, (for no letters need limit borrowing, seeing 
it is left to men's own inclinations to limit lending), the 
debt is the representative's. For if he should have author- 
ity from his letters, to make the members pay what he bor- 
roweth, he should have by consequence the sovereignty of 
them ; and therefore the grant were either void, as pro- 
ceeding from error, commonly incident to human nature, 



228 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

and an insufficient sign of the will of the granter ; or if it 
be avowed by him, then is the representer sovereign, and 
falleth not under the present question, which is only of 
bodies subordinate. No member therefore is obliged to 
pay the debt so borrowed, but the representative himself : 
because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the letters, 
and to the qualification of the body, understandeth those 
only for his debtors, that are engaged : and seeing the 
representer can engage himself, and none else, has him only 
for debtor ; who must therefore pay him, out of the com- 
mon stock, if there be any, or, if there be none, out of his 
own estate. 

If he come into debt by contract, or mulct, the case is 
the same. 

But when the representative is an assembly, and the 
debt to a stranger ; all they, and only they are responsible 
for the debt that gave their votes to the borrowing of it, 
or to the contract that made it due, or to the fact for which 
the mulct was imposed ; because every one of those in 
voting did engage himself for the payment : for he that is 
author of the borrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of 
the whole debt, though when paid by any one, he be dis- 
charged. 

But if the debt be to one of the assembly, the assembly 
only is obliged to the payment, out of their common stock, 
if they have any ; for having liberty of vote, if he vote the 
money shall be borrowed, he votes it shall be paid ; if he 
vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in 
lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his 
former vote, and. is obliged by the latter, and becomes both 
borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand 
payment from any particular man, but from the common 
treasure only ; which failing he hath no remedy, nor com- 
plaint, but against himself, that being privy to the acts of 
the assembly, and to their means to pay, and not being 



SYSTEMS SUBJECT, POLITICAL, ETC. 229 

enforced, did nevertheless through his own folly lend his 
money. 

It is manifest by this, that in bodies politic subordinate, 
"and subject to a sovereign power, it is sometimes not only 
lawful, but expedient, for a particular man to make open 
protestation against the decrees of the representative 
assembly, and cause their descent to be registered, or to 
take witness of it ; because otherwise they may be obliged 
to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes 
committed by other men. But in a sovereign assembly, 
that liberty is taken away, both because he that protesteth 
there, denies their sovereignty ; and also because whatso- 
ever is commanded by the sovereign power, is as to the sub- 
ject, though not so always in the sight of God, justified by the 
command; for of such command every subject is the author. 

The variety of bodies politic, is almost infinite : for they 
are not only distinguished by the several affairs, for which 
they are constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diver- 
sity ; but also by the times, places, and numbers, subject 
to many limitations. And as to their affairs, some are 
ordained for government ; as first, the government of a 
province may be committed to an assembly of men, where- 
in all resolutions shall depend on the votes of the major 
part ; and then this assembly is a body politic, and their 
power limited by commission. This word province signi- 
fies a charge, or care of business, which he whose business 
it is, committeth to another man, to be administered for, 
and under him ; and therefore when in one commonwealth 
there be divers countries, that have their laws distinct one 
from another, or are far distant in place, the administration 
of the government being committed to divers persons, those 
countries where the sovereign is not resident, but governs 
by commission, are called provinces. But of the govern- 
ment of a province, by an assembly residing in the province 
itself, there be few examples. The Romans who had the 



230 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

sovereignty of many provinces, yet governed them always 
by presidents, and praetors ; and not by assemblies, as they 
governed the city of Rome, and territories adjacent. In 
like manner, when there were colonies sent from England, 
to plant Virginia, and Sommer-Islands ; though the govern- 
ments of them here were committed to assemblies in Lon- 
don, yet did those assemblies never commit the government 
under them to any assembly there, but did to each planta- 
tion send one governor. For though every man, where he 
can be present by nature, desires to participate of govern- 
ment ; yet where they cannot be present, they are by nature 
also inclined, to commit the government of their common 
interest rather to a monarchical, than a popular form of 
government : which is also evident in those men that have 
great private estates ; who when they are unwilling to take 
the pains of administering the business that belongs to 
them, chuse rather to trust one servant, than an assembly 
either of their friends or servants. But howsoever it be in 
fact, yet we may suppose the government of a province, or 
colony committed to an assembly : and when it is, that 
which in this place I have to say, is this ; that whatsoever 
debt is by that assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlaw- 
ful act is decreed, is the act only of those that assented, and 
not of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons 
before alleged. Also that an assembly residing out of the 
bounds of that colony whereof they have the government, 
cannot execute any power over the persons, or goods of any 
of the colony, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in 
any place without the colony itself, as having no jurisdic- 
tion, nor authority elsewhere, but are left to the remedy, 
which the law of the place alloweth them. And though the 
assembly have right, to impose a mulct upon any of their 
members, that shall break the laws they make ; yet out of 
the colony itself, they have no right to execute the same. 
And that which is said here, of the rights of an assembly, for 



SYSTEMS SUBJECT, POLITICAL, ETC. 231 

the government of a province or a colony, is appliable also 
to an assembly for the government of a town, an university, 
or a college, or a church, or for any other government over 
the persons of men. 

And generally, in all bodies politic, if any particular 
member conceive himself injured by the body itself, the 
cognizance of his cause belongeth to the sovereign, and 
those the sovereign hath ordained for judges in such causes, 
or shall ordain for that particular cause ; and not to the 
body itself. For the whole body is in this case his fellow- 
subject, which in a sovereign assembly, is otherwise : for 
there, if the sovereign be not judge, though in his own 
cause, there can be no judge at all. 

In a body politic, for the well ordering of foreign traffic, 
the most commodious representative is an assembly of all 
the members ; that is to say, such a one, as every one that 
adventureth his money, may be present at all the delibera- 
tions, and resolutions of the body, if they will themselves. 
For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which 
men that are merchants, and may buy arid sell, export, and 
import their merchandize, according to their own discre- 
tions, do nevertheless bind themselves up in one corpora- 
tion. It is true, there be few merchants, that with the 
merchandize they buy at home, can freight a ship, to 
export it ; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home ; 
and have therefore need to join together in one society ; 
where every man may either participate of the gain, accord- 
ing to the proportion of his adventure ; or take his own, 
and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he 
thinks fit. But this is no body politic, there being no com- 
mon representative to oblige them to any other law, than 
that which is common to all other subjects. The end of 
their incorporating, is to make their gain the greater ; which 
is done two ways ; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at 
home and abroad. So that to grant to a company of mer- 



232 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

chants to be a corporation, or body politic, is to grant 
them a double monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers ; 
another to be sole sellers. For when there is a company 
incorporate for any particular foreign country, they only 
export the commodities vendible in that country ; which is 
sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at home 
there is but one buyer and abroad but one that selleth : 
both which is gainful to the merchant, because thereby they 
buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates : and 
abroad there is but one buyer of foreign merchandize, and 
but one that sells them at home ; both which again are 
gainful to the adventurers. 

Of this double monopoly one part is disadvantageous to 
the people at home, the other to foreigners. For at home 
by their sole exportation they set what price they please on 
the husbandry and handiworks of the people ; and by the 
sole importation, what price they please on all foreign com- 
modities the people have need of ; both which are ill for 
the people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the 
native commodities abroad, and sole buying the foreign 
commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those, 
and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the 
foreigner : for where but one selleth, the merchandize is the 
dearer ; and where but one buyeth, the cheaper. Such 
corporations therefore are no other than monopolies ; though 
they would be very profitable for a commonwealth, if being 
bound up into one body in foreign markets they were at 
liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he 
could. 

The end of these bodies of merchants, being not a com- 
mon benefit to the whole body, which have in this case no 
common stock, but what is deducted out of the particular 
adventures, for building, buying, victualling and manning 
of ships, but the particular gain of every adventurer, it is 
reason that every one be acquainted with the employment 






SYSTEMS SUBJECT, POLITICAL, ETC. 233 

of his own ; that is, that every one be of the assembly, 
that shall have the power to order the same ; and be 
acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the repre- 
sentative of such a body must be an assembly, where every 
member of the body may be present at the consultations, if 
he will. 

If a body politic of merchants, contract a debt to a stran- 
ger by the act of their representative assembly, every mem- 
ber is liable by himself for the whole. For a stranger can 
take no notice of their private laws, but considereth them 
as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole 
payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the 
rest : but if the debt be to one of the company, the creditor 
is debtor for the whole to himself, and cannot therefore 
demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there 
be any. 

If the commonwealth impose a tax upon the body, it is 
understood to be laid upon every member proportionably 
to his particular adventure in the company. For there is 
in this case no other common stock, but what is made of 
their particular adventures. 

If a mulct be laid upon the body for some unlawful act, 
they only are liable by whose votes the act was decreed, or 
by whose assistance it was executed ; for in none of the rest 
is there any other crime but being of the body ; which if a 
crime, because the body was ordained by the authority of 
the commonwealth, is not his. 

If one of the members be indebted to the body, he may 
be sued by the body ; but his goods cannot be taken, nor 
his person imprisoned by the authority of the body ; but 
only by authority of the commonwealth : for if they can do 
it by their own authority, they can by their own authority 
give judgment that the debt is due ; which is as much as 
to be judge in their own cause. 

Those bodies made for the government of men, or of 



234 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

traffic, be either perpetual, or for a time prescribed by 
writing. But there be bodies also whose times are limited, 
and that only by the nature of their business. For exam- 
ple, if a sovereign monarch, or a sovereign assembly, shall 
think fit to give command to the towns, and other several 
parts of their territory, to send to him their deputies, to 
inform him of the condition, and necessities of the subjects, 
or to advise with him for the making of good laws, or for 
any other cause, as with one person representing the whole 
country, such deputies, having a place and time of meeting 
assigned them, are there, and at that time, a body politic, 
representing every subject of that dominion ; but it is only 
for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that 
man, or assembly, that by the sovereign authority sent for 
them ; and when it shall be declared that nothing more 
shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the body is dis- 
solved. For if they were the absolute representatives of 
the people, then were it the sovereign assembly ; and so 
there would be two sovereign assemblies, or two sovereigns, 
over the same people ; which cannot consist with their 
peace. And therefore where there is once a sovereignty, 
there can be no absolute representation of the people, but 
by it. And for the limits of how far such a body shall rep- 
resent the whole people, they are set forth in the writing by 
which they were sent for. For the people cannot choose 
their deputies to other intent, than is in the writing directed 
to them from their sovereign expressed. 

Private bodies regular, and lawful, are those that are con- 
stituted without letters, or other written authority, saving 
the laws common to all other subjects. And because they 
be united in one person representative, they are held for 
regular ; such as are all families, in which the father, or 
master ordereth the whole family. For he obligeth his 
children, and servants, as far as the law permitteth, though 
not further, because none of them are bound to obedience 



SYSTEMS SUBJECT, POLITICAL, ETC. 235 

in those actions, which the law hath forbidden to be done. 
In all other actions, during the time they are under domestic 
government, they are subject to their fathers, and masters, 
as to their immediate sovereigns. For the father and mas- 
ter, being before the institution of commonwealth, absolute 
sovereigns in their own families, they lose afterward no more 
of their authority, than the law of the commonwealth taketh 
from them. 

Private bodies regular, but unlawful, are those that unite 
themselves into one person representative, without any 
public authority at all ; such as are the corporations of beg- 
gars, thieves and gypsies, the better to order their trade of 
begging and stealing ; and the corporations of men, that by 
authority from any foreign person, unite themselves in 
another's dominion, for the easier propagation of doctrines, 
and for making a party, against the power of the common- 
wealth. 

Irregular systems, in their nature but leagues, or some- 
times mere concourse of people, without union to any 
particular design, not by obligation of one to another, but 
proceeding only from a similitude of wills and inclinations, 
become lawful, or unlawful, according to the lawfulness, or 
unlawfulness of every particular man's design therein : and 
his design is to be understood by the occasion. 

The leagues of subjects, because leagues are commonly 
made for mutual defence, are in a commonwealth, which is 
no more than a league of all the subjects together, for the 
most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawful design ; and 
are for that cause unlawful, and go commonly by the name 
of factions, or conspiracies. For a league being a connec- 
tion of men by covenants, if there be no power given to 
any one man or assembly, as in the condition of mere 
nature, to compel them to performance, is so long only 
valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and there- 
fore leagues between commonwealths, over whom there is 



236 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

no human power established, to keep them all in awe, are not 
only lawful, but also profitable for the time they last. But 
leagues of the subjects of one and the same commonwealth, 
where every one may obtain his right by means of the sov- 
ereign power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of peace 
and justice, and, in case the design of them be evil or 
unknown to the commonwealth, unlawful. For all uniting 
of strength by private men, is, if for evil intent, unjust ; if 
for intent unknown, dangerous to the public, and unjustly 
concealed. 

If the sovereign power be in a great assembly, and a num- 
ber of men, part of the assembly, without authority, consult 
apart, to contrive the guidance of the rest; this is a faction, 
or conspiracy unlawful, as being a fraudulent seducing of 
the assembly for their particular interest. But if he, whose 
private interest is to be debated and judged in the assem- 
bly, make as many friends as he can ; in him it is no injus- 
tice ; because in this case he is no part of the assembly. 
And though he hire such friends with money, unless there 
be an express law against it, yet it is not injustice. For 
sometimes, as men's manners are, justice cannot be had 
without money ; and every man may think his own cause 
just, till it be heard, and judged. 

In all commonwealths, if private men entertain more 
servants, than the government of his estate, and lawful 
employment he has for them requires, it is faction, and 
unlawful. For having the protection of the commonwealth, 
he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas 
in nations not thoroughly civilized, several numerous fami- 
lies have lived in continual hostility, and invaded one 
another with private force ; yet it is evident enough that 
they have done unjustly ; or else they had no commonwealth. 

And as factions for kindred, so also factions for govern- 
ment of religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of state, 
as patricians, and plebeians of old time in Rome, and of 



SYSTEMS SUBJECT, POLITICAL, ETC 237 

aristocraticals and democraticals of old time in Greece, are 
unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the 
people, and a taking of the sword out of the hand of the 
sovereign. 

Concourse of people is an irregular system, the lawfulness, 
or unlawfulness, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on 
the number of them that are assembled. If the occasion be 
lawful, and manifest, the concourse is lawful ; as the usual 
meeting of men at church, or at a public show, in usual 
numbers : for if the numbers be extraordinarily great, the 
occasion is not evident ; and consequently he that cannot 
render a particular and good account of his being amongst 
them, is to be judged conscious of an unlawful, and tumul- 
tuous design. It may be lawful for a thousand men, to join 
to a petition to be delivered to a judge, or magistrate ; yet if 
a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous assem- 
bly ; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. 
But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes 
the assembly unlawful, but such a number as the present 
officers are not able to suppress, and bring to justice. 

When an unusual number of men, assemble against a man 
whom they accuse ; the assembly is an unlawful tumult ; 
because they may deliver their accusation to the magistrate 
by a few, or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul at 
Ephesus ; where Demetrius and a great number of other men, 
brought two of Paul's companions before the magistrate, 
saying with one voice, " Great is Diana of the Ephesians " ; 
which was their way of demanding justice against them 
for teaching the people such doctrine, as was against their 
religion, and trade. The occasion here, considering the 
laws of that people, was just ; yet was their assembly judged 
unlawful, and the magistrate reprehended them for it in 
these words (Acts xix. 38-40.) "If Demetrias and the 
other workmen can accuse any man of anything, there be 
pleas, and deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you 



238 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged 
in an assembly lawfully called. For we are in danger to be 
accused for this day's sedition ; because there is no cause 
by which any man can render any reason of this concourse 
of people." Where he calleth an assembly, whereof men 
can give no just account, a sedition, and such as they 
could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concern- 
ing "systems," and assemblies of people, which may be 
compared, as I said, to the similar parts of man's body ; 
such as be lawful, to the muscles ; such as are unlawful, to 
wens, biles, and apostems, engendered by the unnatural 
conflux of evil humours. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

Of the Public Ministers of Sovereign Power. 

In the last chapter I have spoken of the similar parts of 
a commonwealth : in this I shall speak of the parts organical, 
which are public ministers. 

A "public minister," is he, that by the sovereign, whether 
a monarch or an assembly, is employed in any affairs, with 
authority to represent in that employment, the person of the 
commonwealth. And whereas every man, or assembly that 
hath sovereignty, representeth two persons, or, as the more 
common phrase is, has two capacities, one natural, and 
another politic : as a monarch, hath the person not only of 
the commonwealth, but also of a man ; and a sovereign 
assembly hath the person not only of the commonwealth, 
but also of the assembly : they that be servants to them in 
their natural capacity, are not public ministers ; but those 
only that serve them in the administration of the public 
business. And therefore neither ushers, nor sergeants, nor 
other officers that wait on the assembly, for no other pur- 
pose, but for the commodity of the men assembled, in an 



OF PUBLIC MINISTERS. 239 

aristocracy, or democracy ; nor stewards, chamberlains, 
cofferers, or any other officers of the household of a mon- 
arch, are public ministers in a monarchy. 

Of public ministers, some have charge committed to 
them of a general administration, either of the whole 
dominion, or of a part thereof. Of the whole, as to a 
protector, or regent, may be committed by the predecessor 
of an infant king, during his minority, the whole adminis- 
tration of his kingdom. In which case, every subject is 
so far obliged to obedience, as the ordinances he shall 
make, and the commands he shall give be in the king's 
name, and not inconsistent with his sovereign power. Of 
a part, or province ; as when either a monarch, or a 
sovereign assembly, shall give the general charge thereof 
to a governor, lieutenant, prefect, or viceroy : and in this 
case also, every one of that province is obliged to all he 
shall do in the name of the sovereign, and that not incom- 
patible with the sovereign's right. For such protectors, 
viceroys, and governors, have no other right, but what 
depends on the sovereign's will ; and no commission that 
can be given them, can be interpreted for a declaration of 
the will to transfer the sovereignty, without express and 
perspicuous words to that purpose. And this kind of 
public ministers resembleth the nerves, and tendons that 
move the several limbs of a body natural. 

Others have special administration ; that is to say, 
charges of some special business, either at home, or abroad : 
as at home, first, for the economy of a commonwealth, 
they that have authority concerning the "treasure," as 
tributes, impositions, rents, fines, or whatsoever public 
revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the accounts 
thereof, are public ministers : ministers, because they serve 
the person representative, and can do nothing against his 
command, nor without his authority : public, because they 
serve him in his political capacity. 



240 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

Secondly, they that have authority concerning the 
" militia " ; to have the custody of arms, forts, ports ; to 
levy, pay, or conduct soldiers ; or to provide for any 
necessary thing for the use of war, either by land or sea, 
are public ministers. But a soldier without command, 
though he fight for the commonwealth, does not therefore 
represent the person of it ; because there is none to repre- 
sent it to. For every one that hath command, represents 
it to them only whom he commandeth. 

They also that have authority to teach, or to enable 
others to teach the people their duty to the sovereign 
power, and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just, 
and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to live in 
godliness, and in peace amongst themselves, and resist 
the public enemy, are public ministers : ministers, in that 
they do it not by their own authority, but by another's ; 
and public, because they do it, or should do it, by no 
authority but that of the sovereign. The monarch, or the 
sovereign assembly only hath immediate authority from 
God, to teach and instruct the people; and no man but the 
sovereign, receiveth his power Dei gratia simply ; that is 
to say, from the favour of none but God : all other, receive 
theirs from the favour and providence of God, and their 
sovereigns ; as in a monarchy Dei gratia et regis ; or Dei 
firovidentia et voluntate regis. 

They also to whom jurisdiction is given, are public 
ministers. For in their seats of justice they represent the 
person of the sovereign; and their sentence, is his sentence: 
for, as hath been before declared, all judicature is essen- 
tially annexed to the sovereignty ; and therefore all other 
judges are but ministers of him or them that have the 
sovereign power. And as controversies are of two sorts, 
namely of "fact," and of "law"; so are judgments, some 
of fact, some of law : and consequently in the same contro- 
versy, there may be two judges, one of fact, another of law. 



OF PUBLIC MINISTERS. 241 

And in both these controversies, there may arise a 
controversy between the party judged, and the judge ; 
which because they be both subjects to the sovereign, 
ought in equity to be judged by men agreed on by consent 
of both ; for no man can be judge in his own cause. But 
the sovereign is already agreed on for judge by them both, 
and is therefore either to hear the cause, and determine it 
himself, or appoint for judge such as they shall both agree 
on. And this agreement is then understood to be made 
between them divers ways ; as first, if the defendant be 
allowed to except against such of his judges, whose interest 
maketh him suspect them, (for as to the complainant, he 
hath already chosen his own judge), those which he 
excepteth not against, are judges he himself agrees on. 
Secondly, if he appeal to any other judge, he can appeal 
no further ; for his appeal is his choice. Thirdly, if he 
appeal to the sovereign himself, and he by himself, or by 
delegates which the parties shall agree on, give sentence, 
that sentence is final : for the defendant is judged by his 
own judges, that is to say, by himself. 

These properties of just and rational judicature con- 
sidered, I cannot forbear to observe the excellent constitu- 
tion of the courts of justice, established both for Common, 
and also for Public Pleas in England. By Common Pleas, 
I mean those, where both the complainant and defendant 
are subject : and by public, which are also called Pleas of 
the Crown, those where the complainant is the sovereign. 
For whereas there were two orders of men, whereof one 
was Lords, the other Commons ; the Lords had this privi- 
lege, to have for judges in all capital crimes, none but 
Lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which 
being ever acknowledged as a privilege of favour, their 
judges were none but such as they had themselves desired. 
And in all controversies, every subject, (as also in civil 
controversies the Lords) had for judges, men of the country 



242 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

where the matter in controversy lay ; against which he 
might make his exceptions, till at last twelve men without 
exception being agreed on, they were judged by those 
twelve. So that having his own judges, there could be 
nothing alleged by the party, why the sentence should not 
be final. These public persons, with authority from the 
sovereign power, either to instruct, or judge the people, 
are such members of the commonwealth, as may fitly be 
compared to the organs of voice in a body natural. 

Public ministers are also all those, that have authority 
from the sovereign, to procure the execution of judgments 
given ; to publish the sovereign's commands ; to suppress 
tumults ; to apprehend, and imprison malefactors ; and 
other acts tending to the conservation of the peace. For 
every act they do by such authority, is the act of the 
commonwealth ; and their service, answerable to that of 
the hands, in a body natural. 

Public ministers abroad, are those that represent the 
person of their own sovereign, to foreign states. Such are 
ambassadors, messengers, agents, and heralds, sent by 
public authority, and on public business. 

But such as are sent by authority only of some private 
party of a troubled state, though they be received, are 
neither public, nor private ministers of the commonwealth; 
because none of their actions have the commonwealth for 
author. Likewise, an ambassador sent from a prince, to 
congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity ; though 
the authority be public ; yet because the business is private, 
and belonging to him in his natural capacity ; is a private 
person. Also if a man be sent into another country, 
secretly to explore their counsels, and strength ; though 
both the authority, and the business be public ; yet because 
there is none to take notice of any person in him, but his 
own ; he is but a private minister ; but yet a minister of 
the commonwealth; and may be compared to an eye in the 



THE NUTRITION OF A COMMONWEALTH. 243 

body natural. And those that are appointed to receive 
the petitions or other informations of the people, and are 
as it were the public ear, are public ministers, and repre- ! 
sent their sovereign in that office. 

Neither a councillor, nor a council of state, if we con- 
sider it with no authority of judicature or command, but 
only of giving advice to the sovereign when it is required, 
or of offering it when it is not required, is a public person. 
For the advice is addressed to the sovereign only, whose 
person cannot in his own presence, be represented to him, 
by another. But a body of councillors, are never without 
some other authority, either of judicature, or of immediate 
administration : as in a monarchy, they represent the 
monarch, in delivering his commands to the public minis- 
ters : in a democracy, the council, or senate propounds the 
result of their deliberations to the people, as a council ; 
but when they appoint judges, or hear causes, or give 
audience to ambassadors, it is in the quality of a minister 
of the people: and in an aristocracy, the council of state 
is the sovereign assembly itself ; and gives council to none 
but themselves. 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

Of the Nutrition, and Procreation of a Commonwealth. 

The " nutrition " of a commonwealth consisteth, in the 
"plenty," and "distribution," of "materials" conducing 
to life: in "concoction," or "preparation"; and, when 
concocted, in the " conveyance " of it, by convenient 
conduits, to the public use. 

As for the plenty of matter, it is a thing limited by 
nature, to those commodities, which from the two breasts 
of our common mother, land and sea, God usually either 
freely giveth, or for labour selleth to mankind. 



244 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

For the matter of this nutriment, consisting in animals, 
vegetals, and minerals, God hath freely laid them before 
us, in or near to the face of the earth ; so as there needeth 
no more but the labour, and industry of receiving them. 
Insomuch as plenty dependeth, next to God's favour, merely 
on the labour and industry of men. 

This matter, commonly called commodities, is partly 
"native," and partly "foreign": "native," that which is 
to be had within the territory of the commonwealth : 
"foreign," that which is imported from without. And 
because there is no territory under the dominion of one 
commonwealth, except it be of very vast extent, that pro- 
duceth all things needful for the maintenance, and motion 
of the whole body ; and few that produce not something 
more than necessary ; the superfluous commodities to be 
had within, become no more superfluous, but supply these 
wants at home, by importation of that which may be had 
abroad, either by exchange, or by just war, or by labour. 
For a man's labour also, is a commodity exchangeable for 
benefit, as well as any other thing : and there have been 
commonwealths that having no more territory, than hath 
served them for habitation, have nevertheless, not only 
maintained, but also increased their power, partly by the 
labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by 
selling the manufactures whereof the materials were brought 
in from other places. 

The distribution of the materials of this nourishment, is 
the constitution of "mine," and "thine," and "his"; that 
is to say, in one word "propriety"; and belongeth in all 
kinds of commonwealth to the sovereign power. For 
where there is no commonwealth, there is, as hath been 
already shown, a perpetual war of every man against his 
neighbour ; and therefore everything is his that getteth it, 
and keepeth it by force; which is neither "propriety," nor 
"community"; but "uncertainty." Which is so evident, 



THE NUTRITION OF A COMMONWEALTH. 245 

that even Cicero, a passionate defender of liberty, in a 
public pleading, attributeth all propriety to the law civil. 
"Let the civil law," saith he, "be once abandoned, or but 
negligently guarded, not to say oppressed, and there is 
nothing, that any man can be sure to receive from his 
ancestor, or leave to his children." And again; "Take 
away the civil law, and no man knows what is his own, 
and what another man's." Seeing therefore the introduc- 
tion of "propriety" is an effect of commonwealth, which 
can do nothing but by the person that represents it, it is 
the act only of the sovereign ; and consisteth in the laws, 
which none can make that have not the sovereign power. 
And this they well knew of old, who called that Nd/xo?, 
that is to say, "distribution," which we call law; and 
defined justice, by "distributing" to every man "his 
own." 

In this distribution, the first law, is for division of the 
land itself : wherein the sovereign assigneth to every man 
a portion, according as he, and not according as any sub- 
ject, or any number of them, shall judge agreeable to 
equity, and the common good. The children of Israel, 
were a commonwealth in the wilderness ; but wanted the 
commodities of the earth, till they were masters of the 
Land of Promise ; which afterwards was divided amongst 
them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of 
Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their General, who, when 
there were twelve tribes, making them thirteen by sub- 
division of the tribe of Joseph, made nevertheless but 
twelve portions of the land ; and ordained for the tribe of 
Levi no land ; but assigned them the tenth part of the 
whole fruits ; which division was therefore arbitrary. And 
though" a people coming into possession of a land by war, 
do not always exterminate the ancient inhabitants, as did 
the Jews, but leave to many, or most, or all of them their 
estates ; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of 



246 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

the victors' distribution ; as the people of England held all 
theirs of William the Conqueror. 

From whence we may collect, that the propriety which 
a subject hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude 
all other subjects from the use of them ; and not to exclude 
their sovereign, be it an assembly, or a monarch. For 
seeing the sovereign, that is to say, the commonwealth, 
whose person he representeth, is understood to do nothing 
but in order to the common peace and security, this dis- 
tribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to 
the same : and consequently, whatsoever distribution he 
shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of 
every subject, that committed his peace, and safety to his 
discretion, and conscience ; and therefore by the will of 
every one of them, it is to be reputed void. It is true, 
that a sovereign monarch, or the greater part of a sovereign 
assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit 
of their passions, contrary to their own consciences, which 
is a breach of trust, and of the law of nature ; but this is 
not enough to authorize any subject, either to make war 
upon, or so much as to accuse of injustice, or any way to 
speak evil of their sovereign ; because they have authorized 
all his actions, and in bestowing the sovereign power, made 
them their own. But in what cases the commands of 
sovereigns are contrary to equity, and the law of nature, 
is to be considered hereafter in another place. 

In the distribution of land, the commonwealth itself, may 
be conceived to have a portion, and possess, and improve 
the same by their representative ; and that such portion 
may be made sufficient, to sustain the whole expense to the 
common peace, and defence necessarily required. Which 
were very true, if there could be any representative con- 
ceived free from human passions, and infirmities. But the 
nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of public 
land, or of any certain revenue for the commonwealth, is in 



THE NUTRITION OF A COMMONWEALTH. 247 

vain ; and tendeth to the dissolution of government, and to 
the condition of mere nature, and war, as soon as ever the 
sovereign power falleth into the hands of a monarch, or of 
an assembly, that are either too negligent of money, or too 
hazardous in engaging the public stock into a long or 
costly war. Commonwealths can endure no diet : for see- 
ing their expense is not limited by their own appetite, but 
by external accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, 
the public riches cannot be limited by other limits, than 
those which the emergent occasions shall require. And 
whereas in England, there were by the Conqueror, divers 
lands reserved to his own use, besides forests and chases, 
either for his recreation, or preservation of woods, and 
divers services reserved on the land he gave his subjects; 
yet it seems they were not reserved for his maintenance in 
his public, but in his natural capacity. For he, and his 
successors did for all that, lay arbitrary taxes on all subjects' 
land, when they judged it necessary. Or if those public 
lands, and services, were ordained as a sufficient mainte- 
nance of the commonwealth, it was contrary to the scope of 
the institution ; being, as it appeared by those ensuing 
taxes, insufficient, and, as it appears by the late small reve- 
nue of the crown, subject to alienation and diminution. It 
is therefore in vain, to assign a portion to the common- 
wealth ; which may sell, or give it away ; and does sell and 
give it away, when it is done by their representative. 

As the distribution of lands at home ; so also to assign 
in what places, and for what commodities, the subject shall 
traffic abroad, belongeth to the sovereign. For if it did 
belong to private persons to use their own discretion 
therein, some of them would be drawn for gain, both to 
furnish the enemy with means to hurt the commonwealth, 
and hurt it themselves, by importing such things, as pleas- 
ing men's appetites, be nevertheless noxious, or at least 
unprofitable to them. And therefore it belongeth to s the 



248 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign only, to approve, 
or disapprove both of the places, and matter of foreign 
traffic. 

Further, seeing it is not enough to the sustentation of a 
commonwealth, that every man have a propriety in a por- 
tion of land, or in some few commodities, or a natural prop- 
erty in some useful art, and there is no art in the world, 
but is necessary either for the being, or well-being almost 
of every particular man ; it is necessary, that men distribute 
that which they can spare, and transfer their propriety 
therein, mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutual 
contract. And therefore it belongeth to the common- 
wealth, that is to say, to the sovereign, to appoint in what 
manner all kinds of contract between subjects, as buying, 
selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking 
to hire, are to be made ; and by what words and signs 
they shall be understood for valid. And for the matter, 
and distribution of the nourishment, to the several members 
of the commonwealth, thus much, considering the model of 
the whole work, is sufficient. 

By concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodi- 
ties, which are not presently consumed, but reserved for 
nourishment in time to come, to something of equal value, 
and withal so portable, as not to hinder the motion of men 
from place to place ; to the end a man may have in what 
place soever, such nourishment as the place affordeth. 
And this is nothing else but gold, and silver, and money. 
For gold and silver, being, as it happens, almost in all 
countries of the world highly valued, is a commodious 
measure of the value of all things else between nations ; 
and money, of what matter soever coined by the sovereign 
of a commonwealth, is a sufficient measure of the value of 
all things else, between the subjects of that commonwealth. 
By the means of which measures, all commodities, movable 
and immovable, are made to accompany a man to all 



THE NUTRITION OF A COMMONWEALTH. 249 

places of his resort, within and without the place of his 
ordinary residence ; and the same passeth from man to 
man, within the commonwealth ; and goes round about, 
nourishing, as it passeth, every part thereof; insomuch as 
this concoction, is as it were the sanguification of the com- 
monwealth : for natural blood is in like manner made of the 
fruits of the earth ; and circulating, nourisheth by the way 
every member of the body of man. 

And because silver and gold have their value from the 
matter itself; they have first this privilege, that the value of 
them cannot be altered by the power of one, nor of a few 
commonwealths ; as being a common measure of the com- 
modities of all places. But base money may easily be 
enhanced or abased. Secondly, they have the privilege to 
make commonwealths move, and stretch out their arms, 
when need is, into foreign countries : and supply, not only 
private subjects that travel, but also whole armies with 
provision. • But that coin, which is not considerable for 
the matter, but for the stamp of the place, being unable to 
endure change of air, hath its effect at home only ; where 
also it is subject to the change of laws, and thereby to have 
the value diminished, to the prejudice many times of those 
that have it. 

The conduits, and ways by which it is conveyed to the 
public use, are of two sorts : one, that conveyeth it to the 
public coffers ; the other, that issueth the same out again 
for public payments. Of the first sort, are collectors, 
receivers, and treasurers ; of the second, are the treasurers 
again, and the officers appointed for payment of several 
public or private ministers. And in this also, the artificial 
man maintains his resemblance with the natural ; whose 
veins receiving the blood from the several parts of the 
body, carry it to the heart ; where being made vital, the 
heart by the arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and 
enable for motion all the members of the same. 



250 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

The procreation or children of a commonwealth, are 
those we call "plantations," or "colonies"; which are 
numbers of men sent out from the commonwealth, under a 
conductor, or governor, to inhabit a foreign country, either 
formerly void of inhabitants, or made void then by war. 
And when a colony is settled, they are either a common- 
wealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to 
their sovereign that sent them, as hath been done by many 
commonwealths, of ancient time, in which case the com- 
monwealth from which they went, was called their metrop- 
olis or mother, and requires no more of them, than fathers 
require of the children, whom they emancipate and make 
free from their domestic government, which is honour, and 
friendship ; or else they remain united to their metropolis, 
as were the colonies of the people of Rome ; and then they 
are no commonwealths themselves, but provinces, and parts 
of the commonwealth that sent them. So that the right of 
colonies, saving honour and league with their metropolis, 
dependeth wholly on their license or letters, by which their 
sovereign authorized them to plant. 

CHAPTER XXV. 

Of Counsel. 

How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things by 
the ordinary and inconstant use of words, appeareth in 
nothing more, than in the confusion of counsels, and com- 
mands, arising from the imperative manner of speaking in 
them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the 
words " do this*," are the words not only of him that com- 
mandeth ; but also of him that giveth counsel ; and of him 
that exhorteth ; and yet there are but few, that see not that 
these are very different things, or that cannot distinguish 
between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh. 



OF COUNSEL. 251 

and to whom the speech is directed, and upon what occasion. 
But rinding those phrases in men's writings, and being not 
able, or not willing to enter into a consideration of the 
circumstances, they mistake sometimes the precepts of 
counsellors, for the precepts of them that command; and 
sometimes the contrary ; according as it best agreeth with 
the conclusions they would infer, or the actions they 
approve. To avoid which mistakes, and render to those 
terms of commanding, counselling and exhorting, their 
proper and distinct significations, I define them thus. 

"Command" is, where a man saith, "do this," or "do 
not this," without expecting other reason than the will of 
him that says it. From this it followeth manifestly, that he 
that commandeth, pretendeth thereby his own benefit : for 
the reason of his command is his own will only, and the 
proper object of every man's will, is some good to him- 
self. 

" Counsel," is where a man saith, " do," or " do not this," 
and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by 
it to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident, 
that he that giveth counsel, pretendeth only, whatsoever he 
intendeth, the good of him, to whom he giveth it. 

Therefore between counsel and command, one great dif- 
ference is, that command is directed to a man's own bene- 
fit ; and counsel to the benefit of another man. And from 
this ariseth another difference, that a man may be obliged 
to do what he is commanded ; as when he hath covenanted 
to obey : but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counselled, 
because the hurt of not following it, is his own ; or if he 
should covenant to follow it, then is the counsel turned into 
the nature of a command. A third difference between them 
is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another man's 
counsel ; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to him- 
self : but to demand right to counsel another, argues a will 
to know his designs, or to gain some other good to him- 



252 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

self : which, as I said before, is of every man's will the 
proper object. 

This also is incident to the nature of counsel ; that what- 
soever it be, he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or 
punish it : for to ask counsel of another, is to permit him to 
give such counsel as he shall think best; and consequently, 
he that giveth counsel to his sovereign, whether a monarch, 
or an assembly, when he asketh it, cannot in equity be 
punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the 
opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the proposition in 
debate. For if the sense of the assembly can be taken 
notice of, before the debate be ended, they should neither 
ask, nor take any further counsel ; for the sense of the 
assembly, is the resolution of the debate, and end of all 
deliberation. And generally he that demandeth counsel, is 
author of it; and therefore cannot punish it ; and what the 
sovereign cannot, no man else can. But if one subject giv- 
eth counsel to another, to do anything contrary to the laws, 
whether that counsel proceed from evil intention, or from ig- 
norance only, it is punishable by the commonwealth; because 
ignorance of the law is no good excuse, where every man is 
bound to take notice of the laws to which he is subject. 

"Exhortation" and "dehortation," is counsel, accompa- 
nied with signs in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to 
have it followed : or to say it more briefly, " counsel vehe- 
mently pressed." For he that exhorteth, doth not deduce 
the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tie 
himself therein to the rigour of true reasoning ; but encour- 
ages him he counselleth to action : as he that dehorteth, 
deterreth him from it. And, therefore, they have in their 
speeches, a regard to the common passions and opinions of 
men, in deducing their reasons ; and make use of similitudes, 
metaphors, examples, and other tools of oratory, to persuade 
their hearers of the utility, honour, or justice of following 
their advice. 



OF COUNSEL. 253 

From whence may be inferred, first, that exhortation and 
dehortation is directed to the good of him that giveth the 
counsel, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the 
duty of a counsellor; who, by the definition of counsel, 
ought to regard not his own benefit, but his whom he advis- 
eth. And that he directeth his counsel to his own benefit, is 
manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by 
the artificial giving thereof ; which being not required of 
him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, 
is directed principally to his own benefit, and but accident- 
ally to the good of him that is counselled, or not at all. 

Secondly, that the use of exhortation and dehortation 
lieth only where a man is to speak to a multitude ; because 
when the speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, 
and. examine his reasons more rigorously than can be done 
in a multitude ; which are too many to enter into dispute, 
and dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them 
all at once. 

Thirdly, that they that exhort and dehort, where they are 
required to give counsel, are corrupt counsellors, and as it 
were bribed by their own interest. For though the counsel 
they give be never so good ; yet he that gives it, is no more 
a good counsellor, than he that giveth a just sentence for a 
reward, is a just judge. But where a man may lawfully 
command, as a father in his family, or a leader in an army, 
his exhortations and dehortations, are not only lawful, but 
also necessary, and laudable. But then they are no more 
counsels, but commands ; which when they are for execu- 
tion of sour labour, sometimes necessity, and always 
humanity requireth to be sweetened in the delivery, by 
encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of counsel, 
rather than in harsher language of command. 

Examples of the difference between command and coun- 
sel, we may take from the forms of speech that express them 
in Holy Scripture. " Have no other gods but me " ; " make 



254 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

to thyself no graven image " ; " take not God's name in 
vain " ; " sanctify the Sabbath " ; " honour thy parents " ; 
"kill not "; "steal not," &c. are commands; because the 
reason for which we are to obey them, is drawn from the 
will of God our king, whom we are obliged to obey. But 
these words, " Sell all thou hast ; give it to the poor ; and 
follow me," are counsel ; because the reason for which we 
are to do so, is drawn from our own benefit ; which is this, 
that we shall have "treasure in heaven." These words, 
" Go into the village over against you, and you shall find an 
ass tied, and her colt ; loose her, and bring her tome," are 
a command : for the reason of their fact is drawn from the 
will of their Master : but these words, " Repent and be bap- 
tized in the name of Jesus," are counsel ; because the rea- 
son why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit of God 
Almighty, who shall still be king in what manner soever we 
rebel ; but of ourselves, who have no other means of 
avoiding the punishment hanging over us for our sins. 

As the difference of counsel from command, hath been 
now deduced from the nature of counsel, consisting in a 
deducing of the benefit, or hurt that may arise to him that 
is to be counselled, by the necessary or probable conse- 
quences of the action he propoundeth ; so may also the 
differences between " apt " and " inept " counsellors be 
derived from the same. For experience, being but memory 
of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and 
counsel but the speech whereby that experience is made 
known to another ; the virtues, and defects of counsel, are 
the same with the virtues, and defects intellectual : and to 
the person of a commonwealth, his counsellors serve him in 
the place of memory, and mental discourse. But with this 
resemblance of the commonwealth, to a natural man, there 
is one dissimilitude joined, of great importance ; which 
is, that a natural man receiveth his experience, from the 
natural objects of sense, which work upon him without 



OF COUNSEL. 255 

passion, or interest of their own ; whereas they that give 
counsel to the representative person of a commonwealth, 
may have, and have often their particular ends and pas- 
sions, that render their counsels always suspected, and 
many times unfaithful. And therefore we may set down 
for tile first condition of a good counsellor, "that his ends, 
and interests, be not inconsistent with the ends and inter- 
ests of him he counselleth." 

Secondly, because the office of a counsellor, when an 
action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the 
consequences of it, in such manner, as he that is counselled 
may be truly and evidently informed; he ought to propound 
his advice, in such form of speech, as may make the truth 
most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firm ratioci- 
nation, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as 
the evidence will permit. And therefore "rash and unevi- 
dent inferences," such as are fetched only from examples, 
or authority of books, and are not arguments of what is 
good, or evil, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion; "obscure, 
confused, and ambiguous expressions, also all metaphorical 
speeches, tending to the stirring up of passions," (because 
such reasoning, and such expressions, are useful only to 
deceive, or to lead him we counsel towards other ends than 
his own) "are repugnant to the office of a counsellor." 

Thirdly, because the ability of counselling proceedeth 
from experience, and long study ; and no man is presumed 
to have experience in all those things that to the adminis- 
tration of a great commonwealth are necessary to be known, 
" no man is presumed to be a good counsellor, but in such 
business, as he hath not only been much versed in, but hath 
also much meditated on, and considered." For seeing the 
business of a commonwealth is this, to preserve the people 
in peace at home, and defend them against foreign invasion, 
we shall find, it requires great knowledge of the disposition 
of mankind, of the rights of government, and of the nature 



256 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

of equity, law, justice, and honour, not to be attained with- 
out study ; and of the strength, commodities, places, both 
of their own country, and their neighbours ; as also of the 
inclinations, and designs of all nations that may any way 
annoy them. And this is not attained to, without much 
experience. Of which things, not only the whole sum, but 
every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation 
of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The 
wit required for counsel, as I have said before (chap, viii.) is 
judgment. And the differences of men in that point come 
from different education, of some to one kind of study or 
business, and of others to another. When for the doing of 
anything, there be infallible rules, as in engines and edi- 
fices, the rules of geometry, all the experience of the world 
cannot equal his counsel, that has learnt or found out the 
rule. And when there is no such rule, he that hath most 
experience in that particular kind of business, has therein 
the best judgment, and is the best counsellor. 

Fourthly, to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth, 
in a business that hath reference to another commonwealth, 
" it is necessary to be acquainted with the intelligences, and 
letters " that come from thence, " and with all the records 
of treaties, and other transactions of state" between them; 
which none can do, but such as the representative shall 
think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not 
called to counsel, can have no good counsel in such cases 
to obtrude. 

Fifthly, supposing the number of counsellors equal, a 
man is better counselled by hearing them apart, than in an 
assembly; and that for many causes. First, in hearing them 
apart, you have the advice of every man ; but in an assembly 
many of them deliver their advice with "aye," or "no," or 
with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but 
by the eloquence of another, or for fear of displeasing some 
that have spoken, or the whole assembly, by contradiction; 



OF COUNSEL. 257 

or for fear of appearing duller in apprehension, than those 
that have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an 
assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose 
interests are contrary to that of the public; and these their 
interests make passionate, and passion eloquent, and elo- 
quence draws others into the same advice. For the pas- 
sions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of 
one brand ; in an assembly are like many brands, that 
inflame one another, especially when they blow one another 
with orations, to the setting of the commonwealth on fire, 
under pretence of counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every 
man apart, one may examine, when there is need, the truth, 
or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the 
advice he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections ; 
which cannot be done in an assembly, where, in every diffi- 
cult question, a man is rather astonied, and dazzled with 
the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course 
he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an assembly of 
many, called together for advice, wherein there be not some, 
that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also 
learned in the politics ; and give not their advice with care 
of the business propounded, but of the applause of their 
motley orations, made of the divers coloured threads, or 
shreds of authors ; which is an impertinence at least, that 
takes away the time of serious consultation, and in the secret 
way of counselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in 
deliberations that ought to be kept secret, whereof there be 
many occasions in public business, the counsels of many, 
and especially in assemblies, are dangerous ; and therefore 
great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affairs to 
lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and 
in whose fidelity they have most confidence. 

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking 
of counsel from a great assembly of counsellors, that wish- 
eth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a 



258 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

question of marrying his children, disposing of his lands, 
governing his household, or managing his private estate, 
especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his 
prosperity ? A man that doth his business by the help of 
many and prudent counsellors, with every one consulting 
apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth 
able seconds at tennis-play, placed in their proper stations. 
He does next best, that useth his own judgment only, as he 
that has no second at all. But he that is carried up and 
down to his business in a framed counsel, which cannot 
move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the exe- 
cution whereof is commonly, out of envy or interest, retarded 
by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like one that 
is carried to the ball, though by good players, yet in a 
wheelbarrow, or other frame, heavy of itself, and retarded 
also by the inconcurrent judgments, and endeavours of them 
that drive it ; and so much the more, as they be more that 
set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or 
more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And 
though it be true, that many eyes see more than one ; yet 
it is not to be understood of many counsellors ; but then 
only, when the final resolution is in one man. Otherwise, 
because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and 
are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit ; they 
that desire not to miss their mark, though they look about 
with two eyes, yet they never aim but with one ; and there- 
fore no great popular commonwealth was ever kept up, but 
either by a foreign enemy that united them ; or by the repu- 
tation of some eminent man amongst them ; or by the secret 
counsel of a few ; or by the mutual fear of equal factions ; 
and not by the open consultations of the assembly. And as 
for very little commonwealths, be they popular, or monar- 
chical, there is no human wisdom can uphold them, longer 
than the jealousy lasteth of their potent neighbours. 



OF CIVIL LAWS. 259 

CHAPTER XXVI. 
Of Civil Laws. 

By "civil laws," I understand the laws, that men are 
therefore bound to observe, because they are members, not 
of this, or that commonwealth in particular, but of a com- 
monwealth. For the knowledge of particular laws belong- 
eth to them, that profess the study of the laws of their 
several countries ; but the knowledge of civil law in general, 
to any man. The ancient law of Rome was called their 
" civil law," from the word civitas, which signifies a com- 
monwealth : and those countries, which having been under 
the Roman empire, and governed by that law, retain still 
such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the civil 
law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own civil laws. 
But that is not it I intend to speak of here ; my design 
being not to show what is law here, and there; but what is 
law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others have 
done, without taking upon them the profession of the study 
of the law. 

And first it is manifest, that the law in general, is not 
counsel, but command ; nor a command of any man to any 
man ; but only of him, whose command is addressed to one 
formerly obliged to obey him. And as for civil law, it 
addeth only the name of the person commanding, which is 
persona civitatis, the person of the commonwealth. 

Which considered, I define civil law in this manner. 
"'Civil law,' is to every subject, those rules, which the 
commonwealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or 
other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of, for the 
distinction of right, and wrong ; that is to say, of what is 
contrary, and what is not contrary to the rule." 

In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first 
sight evident. For every man seeth, that some laws are 



260 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

addressed to all the subjects in general ; some to particular 
provinces ; some to particular vocations ; and some to par- 
ticular men ; and are therefore laws, to every of those to 
whom the command is directed, and to none else. As also, 
that laws are the rules of just, and unjust ; nothing being 
reputed unjust, that is not contrary to some law. Likewise, 
that none can make laws but the commonwealth ; because 
our subjection is to the commonwealth only: and that com- 
mands, are to be signified by sufficient signs ; because a 
man knows not otherwise how to obey them. And there- 
fore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary con- 
sequence be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. 
Now I deduce from it this that followeth. 

i. The legislator in all commonwealths, is only the sov- 
ereign, be he one man, as in a monarchy, or one assembly of 
men, as in a democracy, or aristocracy. For the legislator 
is he that maketh the law. And the commonwealth only 
prescribes, and commandeth the observation of those rules, 
which we call law : therefore the commonwealth is the 
legislator. But the commonwealth is no person, nor has 
capacity to do anything, but by the representative, that is, 
the sovereign ; and therefore the sovereign is the sole legis- 
lator. For the same reason, none can abrogate a law 
made, but the sovereign ; because a law is not abrogated, 
but by another law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execu- 
tion. 

2. The sovereign of a commonwealth, be it one assembly, 
or one man, is not subject to the civil laws. For having 
power to make, and repeal laws, he may when he pleaseth, 
free himself from that subjection, by repealing those laws 
that trouble him, and making of new ; and consequently he 
was free before. For he is free, that can be free when he 
will : nor is it possible for any person to be bound to him- 
self ; because he that can bind, can release ; and therefore 
he that is bound to himself only, is not bound. 



OF CIVIL LAWS. 261 

3. When long use obtaineth the authority of a law, it is 
not the length of time that maketh the authority, but the 
will of the sovereign signified by his silence, for silence is 
sometimes an argument of consent; and it is no longer law, 
than the sovereign shall be silent therein. And therefore 
if the sovereign shall have a question of right grounded, not 
upon his present will, but upon the laws formerly made; the 
length of time shall bring no prejudice to his right; but the 
question shall be judged by equity. For many unjust 
actions, and unjust sentences, go uncontrolled a longer 
time than any man can remember. And our lawyers account 
no customs law, but such as are reasonable, and that evil 
customs are to be abolished. But the judgment of what is 
reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to 
him that maketh the law, which is the sovereign assembly, 
or monarch. 

4. The law of nature, and the civil law, contain each 
other, and are of equal extent. For the laws of nature, 
which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other moral 
virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature, 
as I have said before in the end of the fifteenth chapter, 
are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to 
peace and obedience. When a commonwealth is once 
settled, then are they actually laws, and not before ; as 
being then the commands of the commonwealth ; and there- 
fore also civil laws : for it is the sovereign power that 
obliges men to obey them. For in the differences of private 
men, to declare, what is equity, what is justice, and what is 
moral virtue, and to make them binding, there is need of 
the ordinances of sovereign power, and punishments to be 
ordained for such as shall break them ; which ordinances 
are therefore part of the civil law. The law of nature there- 
fore is a part of the civil law in all commonwealths of the 
world. Reciprocally also, the civil law is a part of the dic- 
tates of nature. For justice, that is to say, performance of 



262 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a dictate of 
the law of nature. But every subject in a commonwealth, 
hath covenanted to obey the civil law ; either one with 
another, as when they assemble to make a common repre- 
sentative, or with the representative itself one by one, when 
subdued by the sword they promise obedience, that they 
may receive life ; and therefore obedience to the civil law is 
part also of the law of nature. Civil, and natural law are 
not different kinds, but different parts of law ; whereof one 
part being written, is called civil, the other, unwritten, nat- 
ural. But the right of nature, that is, the natural liberty of 
man, may by the civil law be abridged and restrained: nay, 
the end of making laws, is no other, but such restraint ; 
without the which there cannot possibly be any peace. And 
law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit 
the natural liberty of particular men, in such manner as they 
might not hurt, but assist one another, and join together 
against a common enemy. 

5. If the sovereign of one commonwealth, subdue a peo- 
ple that have lived under other written laws, and afterwards 
govern them by the same laws, by which they were governed 
before ; yet those laws are the civil laws of the victor, and 
not of the vanquished commonwealth. For the legislator 
is he, not by whose authority the laws were first made, but 
by whose authority they now continue to be laws. And 
therefore where there be divers provinces, within the domin- 
ion of a commonwealth, and in those provinces diversity of 
laws, which commonly are called the customs of each sev- 
eral province, we are not to understand that such customs 
have their force, only from length of time ; but that they 
were anciently laws written, or otherwise made known, for 
the constitutions, and statutes of their sovereigns ; and are 
now laws, not by virtue of the prescription of time, but by 
the constitutions of their present sovereigns. But if an 
unwritten law, in all the provinces of a dominion, shall be 



OF CIVIL LAWS. 263 

generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use there- 
of; that law can be no other but a law of nature, equally 
obliging all mankind. 

6. Seeing then all laws, written and unwritten, have their 
authority and force, from the will of the commonwealth ; 
that is to say, from the will of the representative ; which in 
a monarchy is the monarch, and in other commonwealths 
the sovereign assembly ; a man may wonder from whence 
proceed such opinions, as are found in the books of lawyers 
of eminence in several commonwealths, directly, or by 
consequence making the legislative power depend on pri- 
vate men, or subordinate judges. As for example, "that 
the common law, hath no controller but the parliament " ; 
which is true only where a parliament has the sovereign 
power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by 
their own discretion. For if there be a right in any else to 
dissolve them, there is a right also to control them, and 
consequently to control their controllings. And if there 
be no such right, then the controller of laws is not parlia- 
mentiim, but rex in parliamento. And where a parliament 
is sovereign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise 
men, from the countries subject to them, for whatsoever 
cause ; yet there is no man will believe, that such an 
assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a legislative 
power. "Item," that the two arms of a commonwealth, 
are " force and justice ; the first whereof is in the king ; the 
other deposited in the hands of the parliament." As if a 
commonwealth could consist, where the force were in any 
hand, which justice had not the authority to command and 
govern. 

7. That law can never be against reason, our lawyers 
are agreed ; and that not the letter, that is every construc- 
tion of it, but that which is according to the intention of 
the legislator, is the law. And it is true : but the doubt is 
of whose reason it is, that shall be received for law. It is 



264 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

not meant of any private reason ; for then there would be as 
much contradiction in the laws, as there is in the schools ; 
nor yet, as Sir Edward Coke makes it, an " artificial per- 
fection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and 
experience," as his was. For it is possible long study may 
increase, and confirm erroneous sentences : and where men 
build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the 
ruin : and of those that study, and observe with equal time 
and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must 
remain discordant : and therefore it is not that juris pru- 
dentia, or wisdom of subordinate judges ; but the reason of 
this our artificial man the commonwealth, and his command, 
that maketh law : and the commonwealth being in their 
representative but one person, there cannot easily arise any 
contradiction in the laws ; and when there doth, the same 
reason is able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it 
away. In all courts of justice, the sovereign, which is the 
person of the commonwealth, is he that judgeth : the sub- 
ordinate judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which 
moved his sovereign to make such law, that his sentence 
may be according thereunto ; which then is his sovereign's 
sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one. 

8. From this, that the law is a command, and a com- 
mand consisteth in declaration, or manifestation of the will 
of him that commandeth, by voice, writing, or some other 
sufficient argument of the same, we may understand, that 
the command of the commonwealth is law only to those, 
that have means to take notice of it. Over natural fools, 
children, or madmen, there is no law, no more than over 
brute beasts ; nor are they capable of the title of just, or 
unjust ; because they had never power to make any cove- 
nant, or to understand the consequences thereof, and con- 
sequently never took upon them to authorize the actions of 
any sovereign, as they must do that make to themselves a 
commonwealth. And as those from whom nature or acci- 



OF CIVIL LAWS. 265 

dent hath taken away the notice of all laws in general ; so 
also every man, from whom any accident, not proceeding 
from his own default, hath taken away the means to take 
notice of any particular law, is excused, if he observe it not, 
and to speak properly, that law is no law to him. It is 
therefore necessary, to consider in this place, what argu- 
ments, and signs be sufficient for the knowledge of what is 
the law ; that is to say, what is the will of the sovereign, as 
well in monarchies, as in other forms of government. 

And first, if it be a law that obliges all the subjects with- 
out exception, and is not written, nor otherwise published 
in such places as they may take notice thereof, it is a law 
of nature. For whatsoever men are to take knowledge of 
for law, not upon other men's words, but every one from 
his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the rea- 
son of all men ; which no law can be, but the law of nature. 
The laws of nature therefore need not any publishing, or 
proclamation ; as being contained in this one sentence, 
approved by all the world, " Do not that to another, 
which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another 
to thyself." 

Secondly, if it be a law that obliges only some condition 
of men, or one particular man, and be not written, nor pub- 
lished by word, then also it is a law of nature ; and known 
by the same arguments, and signs, that distinguish those in 
such a condition, from other subjects. For whatsoever law 
is not written, or some way published by him that makes it 
law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him that 
is to obey it ; and is therefore also a law not only civil, but 
natural. For example, if the sovereign employ a public 
minister, without written instructions what to do ; he is 
obliged to take for instructions the dictates of reason ; as if 
he make a judge, the judge is to take notice, that his sen- 
tence ought to be according to the reason of his sovereign, 
which being always understood to be equity, he is bound to 



266 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

it by the law of nature : or if an ambassador, he is, in all 
things not contained in his written instructions, to take for 
instruction that which reason dictates to be most conduc- 
ing to his sovereign's interest ; and so of all other ministers 
of the sovereignty, public and private. All which instruc- 
tions of natural reason may be comprehended under one 
name of "fidelity"; which is a branch of natural jus- 
tice. 

The law of nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence 
of all other laws, to be made known, to every man that shall 
be obliged to obey them, either by word, or writing, or 
some other act, known to proceed from the sovereign 
authority. For the will of another cannot be understood, 
but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from 
his scope and purpose ; which in the person of the common- 
wealth, is to be supposed always consonant to equity and 
reason. And in ancient time, before letters were in common 
use, the laws were many times put into verse ; that the rude 
people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might 
the more easily retain them in memory. And for the same 
reason Solomon (Prov. vii. 3) adviseth a man, to bind the 
ten commandments upon his ten fingers. And for the law 
which Moses gave to the people of Israel at the renewing of 
the covenant (Deut. xi. 19), he biddeth them to teach it 
their children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon 
the way ; at going to bed, and at rising from bed ; and to 
write it upon the posts, and doors of their houses ; and 
(Deut. xxxi. 12) to assemble the people, man, woman, and 
child, to hear it read. 

Nor is it enough the law be written, and published ; 
but also that there be manifest signs that it proceedeth 
from the will of the sovereign. For private men, when 
they have, or think they have force enough to secure their 
unjust designs, and convoy them safely to their ambitious 
ends, may publish for laws what they please, without, or 



OF CIVIL LAWS. 267 

against the legislative authority. There is therefore requi- 
site, not only a declaration of the law, but also sufficient 
signs of the author and authority. The author, or legislator 
is supposed in every commonwealth to be evident, because 
he is the sovereign, who having been constituted by the 
consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be suffi- 
ciently known. And though the ignorance and security of 
men be such, for the most part, as that when the memory 
of the first constitution of their commonwealth is worn out, 
they do not consider, by whose power they used to be 
defended against their enemies, and to have their industry 
protected, and to be righted when injury is done them ; yet 
because no man that considers, can make question of it, no 
excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the 
sovereignty is placed. And it is a dictate of natural reason, 
and consequently an evident law of nature, that no man 
ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he 
hath himself demanded, or wittingly received against others. 
Therefore of who is sovereign, no man, but by his own 
fault, (whatsoever evil men suggest), can make any doubt. 
The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the authority 
derived from him; the removing whereof, dependeth on the 
knowledge of the public registers, public counsels, public 
ministers, and public seals ; by which all laws are suffi- 
ciently verified ; verified, I say, not authorized : for the 
verification, is but the testimony and record, not the 
authority of the law ; which consisteth in the command of 
the sovereign only. 

If therefore a man have a question of injury, depending 
on the law of nature ; that is to say, on common equity ; 
the sentence of the judge, that by commission hath author- 
ity to take cognizance of such causes, is a sufficient verifi- 
cation of the law of nature in that individual case. For 
though the advice of one that professeth the study of the 
law, be useful for the avoiding of contention ; yet it is but 



268 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

advice : it is the judge must tell men what is law, upon the 
hearing of the controversy. 

But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a 
written law ; every man by recourse to the registers, by 
himself or others, may, if he will, be sufficiently informed, 
before he do such injury, or commit the crime, whether it 
be an injury, or not : nay he ought to do so : for when a 
man doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just or 
unjust ; and may inform himself, if he will ; the doing is 
unlawful. In like manner, he that supposeth himself injured, 
in a case determined by the written law, which he may, by 
himself or others, see and consider ; if he complain before 
he consults with the law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth 
a disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his 
own right. 

If the question be of obedience to a public officer ; to 
have seen his commission, with the public seal, and heard 
it read ;' or to have had the means to be informed of it, if 
a man would, is a sufficient verification of his authority. 
For every man is obliged to do his best endeavour, to inform 
himself of all written laws, that may concern his own future 
actions. 

The legislator known ; and the laws, either by writing, or 
by the light of nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth 
yet another very material circumstance to make them obli- 
gatory. For it is not the letter, but the intendment, or mean- 
ing, that is to say, the authentic interpretation of the law 
(which is the sense of the legislator), in which the nature 
of the law consisteth ; and therefore the interpretation of 
all laws dependeth on the authority sovereign ; and the 
interpreters can be none but those, which the sovereign, 
to whom only the subject oweth obedience, shall appoint. 
For else, by the craft of an interpreter, the law may be made 
to bear a sense, contrary to that of the sovereign ; by which 
means the interpreter becomes the legislator. 



OF CIVIL LAWS. 269 

All laws, written, and unwritten, have need of interpre- 
tation. The unwritten law of nature, though it be easy to 
such, as without partiality and passion, make use of their 
natural reason, and therefore leaves the violators thereof 
without excuse ; yet considering there be very few, perhaps 
none, that in some cases are not blinded by self-love, or 
some other passion ; it is now become of all laws the most 
obscure, and has consequently the greatest need of able 
interpreters. The written laws, if they be short, are easily 
misinterpreted, from the divers significations of a word, or 
two : if long, they be more obscure by the divers sig- 
nifications of many words : insomuch as no written law, 
delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, 
without a perfect understanding of the final causes, for 
which the law was made ; the knowledge of which final 
causes is in the legislator. To him therefore there cannot 
be any knot in the law, insoluble ; either by finding out the 
ends, to undo it by ; or else by making what ends he will, 
as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot, by 
the legislative power ; which no other interpreter can 
do. 

The interpretation of the laws of nature, in a common- 
wealth, dependeth not on the books of moral philosophy. 
The authority of writers, without the authority of the com- 
monwealth, maketh not their opinions law, be they never 
so true. That which I have written in this treatise, con- 
cerning the moral virtues, and of their necessity for the 
procuring, and maintaining peace, though it be evident 
truth, is not therefore presently law ; but because in all 
commonwealths in the world, it is part of the civil law". 
For though it be naturally reasonable ; yet it is by the sov- 
ereign power that it is law : otherwise, it were a great error, 
to call the laws of nature unwritten law ; whereof we see so 
many volumes published, and in them so many contradic- 
tions of one another, and of themselves. 



270 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

The interpretation of the law of nature, is the sentence 
of the judge constituted by the sovereign authority, to hear 
and determine such controversies, as depend thereon ; and 
consisteth in the application of the law to the present case. 
For in the act of judicature, the judge doth no more but 
consider, whether the demand of the party, be consonant to 
natural reason, and equity ; and the sentence he giveth, is 
therefore the interpretation of the law of nature ; which 
interpretation is authentic ; not because it is his private 
sentence ; but because he giveth it by authority of the sov- 
ereign, whereby it becomes the sovereign's sentence ; which 
is law for that time, to the parties pleading. 

But because there is no judge subordinate, nor sovereign, 
but may err in a judgment of equity ; if afterward in another 
like case he find it more consonant to equity to give a 
contrary sentence, he is obliged to do it. No man's error 
becomes his own law ; nor obliges him to persist in it. 
Neither, for the same reason, becomes it a law to other 
judges, though sworn to follow it. For though a wrong 
sentence given by authority of the sovereign, if he know 
and allow it, in such laws as are mutable, be a constitution 
of a new law, in cases, in which every little circumstance is 
the same ; yet in laws immutable, such as are the laws of 
nature, they are no laws to the same or other judges, in the 
like cases for ever after. Princes succeed one another ; 
and one judge passeth, another cometh ; nay, heaven and 
earth shall pass ; but not one tittle of the law of nature shall 
pass; for it is the eternal law of God. Therefore all the 
sentences of precedent judges that have ever been, cannot 
altogether make a law contrary to natural equity : nor any 
examples of former judges, can warrant an unreasonable sen- 
tence, or discharge the present judge of the trouble of study- 
ing what is equity, in the case he is to judge, from the prin- 
ciples of his own natural reason. For example sake, it is 
against the law of nature, "to punish the innocent"; and 



OF CIVIL LAWS. 271 

innocent is he that acquitteth himself judicially, and is 
acknowledged for innocent by the judge. Put the case 
now, that a man is accused of a capital crime, and seeing 
the power and malice of some enemy, and the frequent cor- 
ruption and partiality of judges, runneth away for fear of 
the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought to a legal 
trial, and maketh it sufficiently appear, he was not guilty of 
the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is nevertheless con- 
demned to lose his goods ; this is a manifest condemnation 
of the innocent. I say therefore, that there is no place in 
the world, where this can be an interpretation of a law of 
nature, or be made a law by the sentences of precedent 
judges, that had done the same. For he that judged it first, 
judged unjustly ; and no injustice can be a pattern of judg- 
ment to succeeding judges. A written law may forbid inno- 
cent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying : but 
that flying for fear of injury, should be taken for presump- 
tion of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime 
judicially, is contrary to the nature of a presumption, which 
hath no place after judgment given. Yet this is set down 
by a great lawyer for the common law of England. " If a 
man," saith he, "that is innocent, be accused of felony, and 
for fear flyeth for the same ; albeit he judicially acquitteth 
himself of the felony ; yet if it be found that he fled for the 
felony, he shall notwithstanding his innocency, forfeit all 
his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. For as to the for- 
feiture of them, the law will admit no proof against the pre- 
sumption in law, grounded upon his flight." Here you see, 
" an innocent man judicially acquitted, notwithstanding his 
innocency," when no written law forbad him to fly, after 
his acquittal, "upon a presumption in law," condemned to 
lose all the goods he hath. If the law ground upon his 
flight a presumption of the fact, which was capital, the sen- 
tence ought to have been capital : if the presumption were 
not of the fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods ? 



272 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

This therefore is no law of England ; nor is the condemna- 
tion grounded upon a presumption of law, but upon the 
presumption of the judges. It is also against law, to say 
that no proof shall be admitted against a presumption of 
law. For all judges, sovereign and subordinate, if they 
refuse to hear proof, refuse to do justice : for though the 
sentence be just, yet the judges that condemn without hear- 
ing the proofs offered, are unjust judges ; and their pre- 
sumption is but prejudice ; which no man ought to bring 
with him to the seat of justice, whatsoever precedent judg- 
ments or examples he shall pretend to follow. There be 
other things of this nature, wherein men's judgments have 
been perverted, by trusting to precedents: but this is enough 
to show, that though the sentence of the judge, be a law to 
the party pleading, yet it is no law to any judge, that shall 
succeed him in that office. 

In like manner, when question is of the meaning of 
written laws, he is not the interpreter of them, that 
writeth a commentary upon them. For commentaries are 
commonly more subject to cavil than the text ; and there- 
fore need other commentaries ; and so there will be no end 
of such interpretation. And therefore unless there be an 
interpreter authorized by the sovereign, from which the 
subordinate judges are not to recede, the interpreter can 
be no other than the ordinary judges, in the same manner, 
as they are in cases of the unwritten law ; and their sen- 
tences are to be taken by them that plead, for laws in that 
particular case ; but not to bind other judges, in like cases 
to give like judgments. For a judge may err in the inter- 
pretation even of written laws ; but no error of a subordi- 
nate judge, can change the law, which is the general sen- 
tence of the sovereign. 

In written laws, men use to make a difference between 
the letter, and the sentence of the law : and when by the 
letter, is meant whatsoever can be gathered by the bare 






OF CIVIL LAWS. 273 

words, it is well distinguished. For the significations of 
almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the meta- 
phorical use of them, ambiguous ; and may be drawn in 
argument, to make many senses ; but there is only one 
sense of the law. But if by the letter, be meant the literal 
sense, then the letter, and the sentence or intention of the 
law, is all one. For the literal sense is that, which the 
legislator intended, should by the letter of the law be sig- 
nified. Now the intention of the legislator is always sup- 
posed to be equity : for it were a great contumely for a 
judge to think otherwise of the sovereign. He ought there- 
fore, if the word of the law do not fully authorize a reason- 
able sentence, to supply it with the law of nature ; or if the 
case be difficult, to respite judgment until he have received 
more ample authority. For example, a written law ordain- 
eth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall 
be restored by force : it happens that a man by negligence 
leaves his house empty, and returning is kept out by force, 
in which case there is no special law ordained. It is evi- 
dent that this case is contained in the same law : for else 
there is no remedy for him at all ; which is to be supposed 
against the intention of the legislator. Again, the word of 
the law commandeth to judge according to the evidence : 
a man is accused falsely of a fact, which the judge himself 
saw done by another, and not by him that is accused. In 
this case neither shall the letter of the law be followed to 
the condemnation of the innocent, nor shall the judge give 
sentence against the evidence of the witnesses ; because 
the letter of the law is to the contrary : but procure of the 
sovereign that another be made judge, and himself witness. 
So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a 
written law, may lead him to the intention of the law, 
whereby to interpret the same the better ; though no 
incommodity can warrant a sentence against the law. 
For every judge of right, and wrong, is not judge of 



274 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

what is commodious, or incommodious to the common- 
wealth. 

The abilities required in a good interpreter of the law, 
that is to say, in a good judge, are not the same with those 
of an advocate ; namely the study of the laws. For a 
judge, as he ought to take notice of the fact, from none 
but the witnesses ; so also he ought to take notice of the 
law from nothing but the statutes, and constitutions of the 
sovereign, alleged in the pleading, or declared to him by 
some that have authority from the sovereign power to 
declare them ; and need not take care beforehand what he 
shall judge ; for it shall be given him what he shall say 
concerning the fact, by witnesses ; and what he shall say 
in point of law, from those that shall in their pleadings 
show it, and by authority interpret it upon the place. The 
Lords of parliament in England were judges, and most 
difficult causes have been heard and determined by them ; 
yet few of them were much versed in the study of the laws, 
and fewer had made profession of them : and though they 
consulted with lawyers, that were appointed to be present 
there for that purpose yet they alone had the authority of 
giving sentence. In like manner, in the ordinary trials of 
right, twelve men of the common people, are the judges, 
and give sentence, not only of the fact, but of the right ; 
and pronounce simply for the complainant, or for the 
defendant ; that is to say, are judges, not only of the fact, 
but also of the right : and in a question of crime, not only 
determine whether done, or not done; but also whether it 
be "murder," "homicide," "felony," "assault," and the 
like, which are determinations of law : but because they 
are not supposed to know the law of themselves, there is 
one that hath authority to inform them of it, in the par- 
ticular case they are to judge of. But yet if they judge 
not according to that he tells them, they are not subject 
thereby to any penalty ; unless it be made appear, that 



OF CIVIL LAWS. 275 

they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted 
by reward. 

The things that make a good judge, or good interpreter 
of the laws, are, first, " a right understanding " of that 
principal law of nature called " equity " ; which depending 
not on the reading of other men's writings, but on the 
goodness of a man's own natural reason, and meditation, 
is presumed to be in those most, that have had most lei- 
sure, and had the most inclination to meditate thereon. 
Secondly, " contempt of unnecessary riches, and prefer- 
ments." Thirdly, "to be able in judgment to divest him- 
self of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion." 
Fourthly, and lastly, " patience to hear ; diligent attention 
in hearing ; and memory to retain, digest and apply what 
he hath heard." 

The difference and division of the laws, has been made 
in divers manners, according to the different methods, of 
those men that have written of them. For it is a thing 
that dependeth not on nature, but on the scope of the 
writer ; and is subservient to every man's proper method. 
In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of civil 
laws: 

1. The "edicts," "constitutions," and "epistles of the 
prince," that is, of the emperor; because the whole power 
of the people was in him. Like these, are the proclama- 
tions of the kings of England. 

2. "The decrees of the whole people of Rome," compre- 
hending the senate, when they were put to the question by 
the "senate." These were laws, at first, by the virtue of 
the sovereign power residing in the people ; and such of 
them as by the emperors were not abrogated, remained 
laws by the authority imperial. For all laws that bind, 
are understood to be laws by his authority that has power 
to repeal them. Somewhat like to these laws, are the acts 
of parliament in England. 



276 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

3. "The decrees of the common people," excluding the 
senate, when they were put to the question by the " trib- 
une " of the people. For such of them as were not abro- 
gated by the emperors, remained laws by the authority 
imperial. Like to these, were the orders of the House of 
Commons in England. 

4. Senatus consulta, the " orders of the senate " ; because 
when the people of Rome grew so numerous, as it was 
inconvenient to assemble them ; it was thought fit by the 
emperor, that men should consult the senate, instead of 
the people ; and these have some resemblance with the 
acts of council. 

5. "The edicts of prastors," and in some cases of 
" aediles " : such as are the chief justices in the courts of 
England. 

6. Resp07isa prudentui7i ; which were the sentences, and 
opinion of those lawyers, to whom the emperor gave 
authority to interpret the law, and to give answer to such 
as in matter of law demanded their advice ; which answers, 
the judges in giving judgment were obliged by the consti- 
tutions of the emperor to observe : and should be like the 
reports of cases judged, if other judges be by the law of 
England bound to observe them. For the judges of the 
common law of England, are not properly judges, but juris 
consulti ; of whom the judges, who are either the Lords, or 
twelve men of the country, are in point of law to ask 
advice. 

7. Also, "unwritten customs," which in their own nature 
are an imitation of law, by the tacit consent of the emperor, 
in case they be not contrary to the law of nature, are very 
laws. 

Another division of laws, is into "natural" and "posi- 
tive." "Natural" are those which have been laws from 
all eternity; and are called not only " natural," but also 
"moral" laws; consisting in the moral virtues, as justice, 



OF CIVIL LAWS. 277 

equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace, 
and charity ; of which I have already spoken in the four- 
teenth and fifteenth chapters. 

" Positive," are those which have not been from eternity; 
but have been made laws by the will of those that have 
had the sovereign power over others ; and are either writ- 
ten, or made known to men, by some other argument of the 
will of their legislator. 

Again, of positive laws some are "human," some 
"divine"; and of human positive laws, some are "dis- 
tributive," some "penal." " Distributive " are those that 
determine the rights of the subjects, declaring to every 
man what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a pro- 
priety in lands, or goods, and a right or liberty of action : 
and these speak to all the subjects. " Penal " are those, 
which declare, what penalty shall be inflicted on those that 
violate the law ; and speak to the ministers and officers 
ordained for execution. For though every one ought to be 
informed of the punishments ordained beforehand for their 
transgression ; nevertheless the command is not addressed 
to the delinquent, who cannot be supposed will faithfully 
punish himself, but to public ministers appointed to see 
the penalty executed. And these penal laws are for the 
most part written together with the laws distributive ; and 
are sometimes called judgments. For all laws are general 
judgments, or sentences of the legislator ; as also every par- 
ticular judgment, is a law to him whose case is judged. 

" Divine positive laws " (for natural laws being eternal, 
and universal, are all divine), are those, which being the 
commandments of God, not from all eternity, nor univer- 
sally addressed to all men, but only to a certain people, or 
to certain persons, are declared for such, by those whom 
God hath authorized to declare them. But this authority 
of man to declare what be these positive laws of God, how 
can it be known ? God may command a man by a super- 



278 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

natural way, to deliver laws to other men. But because it 
is of the essence of law, that he who is to be obliged, be 
assured of the authority of him that declareth it, which we 
cannot naturally take notice to be from God, " how can a 
man without supernatural revelation be assured of the 
revelation received by the declarer ? " and " how can he 
be bound to obey them ? " For the first question, how a 
man can be assured of the revelation of another, without 
a revelation particularly to himself, it is evidently impos- 
sible. For though a man may be induced to believe such 
revelation, from the miracles they see him do, or from 
seeing the extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing 
the extraordinary wisdom, or extraordinary felicity of his 
actions, all which are marks of God's extraordinary favour; 
yet they are not assured evidences of special revelation. 
Miracles are marvellous works : but that which is marvel- 
lous to one, may not be so to another. Sanctity may be 
feigned ; and the visible felicities of this world, are most 
often the work of God by natural, and ordinary causes. 
And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural rea- 
son, that another has had a supernatural revelation of 
God's will ; but only a belief ; every one, as the signs there- 
of shall appear greater or lesser, a firmer or a weaker 
belief. 

But for the second, how can he be bound to obey them ; 
it is not so hard. For if the law declared, be not against 
the law of nature, which is undoubtedly God's law, and he 
undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act ; bound 
I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it : for men's 
belief, and interior cogitations, are not subject to the com- 
mands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extra- 
ordinary. Faith of supernatural law, is not a fulfilling, 
but only an assenting to the same ; and not a duty that 
we exhibit to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to 
whom he pleaseth ; as also unbelief is not a breach of any 



OF CIVIL LAWS. 279 

of his laws ; but a rejection of them all, except the laws 
natural. But this that I say, will be made yet clearer, by 
the examples and testimonies concerning this point in holy 
Scripture. The covenant God made with Abraham, in a 
supernatural manner, was thus, (Gen. xvii. 10) "This is 
the covenant, which thou shalt observe between me and 
thee and thy seed after thee." Abraham's seed had not 
this revelation, nor were yet in being ; yet they are a party 
to the covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should 
declare to them for God's law ; which they could not be, 
but in virtue of the obedience they owed to their parents ; 
who, if they be subject to no other earthly power, as here 
in the case of Abraham, have sovereign power over their 
children and servants. Again, where God saith to Abra- 
ham, " In thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed ; 
for I know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house 
after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe 
righteousness and judgment," it is manifest, the obedience 
of his family, who had no revelation, depended on their 
former obligation to obey their sovereign. At Mount 
Sinai Moses only went up to God ; the people were for- 
bidden to approach on pain of death ; yet they were bound 
to obey all that Moses declared to them for God's law. 
Upon what ground, but on this submission of their own, 
" Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee ; but let not God 
speak to us, lest we die ? " By which two places it suffi- 
ciently appeareth, that in a commonwealth, a subject that 
has no certain and assured revelation particularly to him- 
self concerning the will of God, is to obey for such, the 
command of the commonwealth : for if men were at liberty, 
to take for God's commandments, their own dreams and 
fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men ; scarce 
two men would agree upon what is God's commandment ; 
and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the 
commandments of the commonwealth. I conclude there- 



280 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

fore, that in all things not contrary to the moral law, that 
is to say, to the law of nature, all subjects are bound to 
obey that for divine law, which is declared to be so, by the 
laws of the commonwealth. Which also is evident to any 
man's reason ; for whatsoever is not against the law of 
nature, may be made law in the name of them that have 
the sovereign power ; and there is no reason men should 
be the less obliged by it, when it is propounded in the 
name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world 
where men are permitted to pretend other commandments 
of God, than are declared for sucri by the commonwealth. 
Christian states punish those that revolt from the Chris- 
tian religion, and all other states, those that set up any 
religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not 
regulated by the commonwealth, it is equity, which is the 
law of nature, and therefore an eternal law of God, that 
every man equally enjoy his liberty. 

There is also another distinction of laws, into "funda- 
mental " and " not fundamental " ; but I could never see in 
any author, what a fundamental law signirieth. Neverthe- 
less one may very reasonably distinguish laws in that manner. 

For a fundamental law in every commonwealth is that, 
which being taken away, the commonwealth faileth, and is 
utterly dissolved ; as a building whose foundation is 
destroyed. And therefore a fundamental law is that, by 
which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is 
given to the sovereign, whether a monarch, or a sovereign 
assembly, without which the commonwealth cannot stand ; 
such as is the power of war and peace, of judicature, of 
election of officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think 
necessary for the public good. Not fundamental is that, 
the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the dissolution 
of the commonwealth ; such as are the laws concerning 
controversies between subject and subject. Thus much 
of the division of laws. 



OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, ETC 281 

I find the words lex civilis, and jus civile, that is to say 
"law" and "right civil," promiscuously used for the same 
thing, even in the most learned authors ; which neverthe- 
less ought not to be so. For " right " is "liberty," namely 
that liberty which the civil law leaves us : but " civil law " 
is an "obligation," and takes from us the liberty which 
the law of nature gave us. Nature gave a right to every 
man to secure himself by his own strength, and to invade 
a suspected neighbour, by way of prevention : but the civil 
law takes away that liberty, in all cases where the protec- 
tion of the law may be safely stayed for. Insomuch as lex 
and jus, are as different as "obligation " and "liberty." 

Likewise " laws " and " charters " are taken promiscu- 
ously for the same thing. Yet charters are donations of 
the sovereign ; and not laws, but exemptions from law. 
The phrase of a law is, jubeo, injungo, " I command " and 
"enjoin " : the phrase of a charter is, dedi, concessi, " I have 
given," "I have granted": but what is given or granted, 
to a man, is not forced upon him, by a law. A law may 
be made to bind all the subjects of a commonwealth : a 
liberty, or charter is only to one man, or some one part 
of the people. For to say all the people of a common- 
wealth, have liberty in any case whatsoever, is to say, that 
in such case, there hath been no law made ; or else having 
been made, is now abrogated. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

Of Crimes, Excuses, and Extenuations. 

A sin, is not only a transgression of a law, but also any 
contempt of the legislator. For such contempt, is a breach 
of all his laws at once. And therefore may consist, not 
only in the " commission " of a fact, or in speaking of 
words by the laws forbidden, or in the " omission " of 



282 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

what the law commandeth, but also in the "intention," or 
purpose to transgress. For the purpose to break the law, 
is some degree of contempt of him, to whom it belongeth 
to see it executed. To be delighted in the imagination 
only, of being possessed of another man's goods, servants, 
or wife, without any intention to take them from him by 
force or fraud, is no breach of the law, that saith, " Thou 
shalt not covet " : nor is the pleasure a man may have in 
imagining or dreaming of the death of him, from whose 
life he expecteth nothing but damage, and displeasure, a 
sin ; but the resolving to put some act in execution, that 
tendeth thereto. For to be pleased in the fiction of that, 
which would please a man if it were real, is a passion so 
adherent to the nature both of man, and every other living 
creature, as to make it a sin, were to make sin of being a 
man. The consideration of this, has made me think them 
too severe, both to themselves, and others, that maintain, 
that the first motions of the mind, though checked with 
the fear of God, be sins. But I confess it is safer to err 
on that hand, than on the other. 

A "crime," is a sin, consisting in the committing, by 
deed or word, of that which the law forbiddeth, or the 
omission of what it hath commanded. So that every 
crime is a sin ; but not every sin a crime. To intend to 
steal, or kill, is a sin, though it never appear in word, or 
fact : for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to 
his charge : but till it appear by something done, or said, 
by which the intention may be argued by a human judge, 
it hath not the name of crime : which distinction the 
Greeks observed in the word a/xapTrj/xa, and eynXrjfxa, or atria ; 
whereof the former, which is translated "sin," signifieth 
any swerving from the law whatsoever ; but the two latter, 
which are translated " crime," signify that sin only, whereof 
one man may accuse another. But of intentions, which 
never appear by any outward act, there is no place for 



OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, ETC 283 

human accusation. In like manner the Latins by peccatum, 
which is "sin," signify all manner of deviation from the 
law ; but by crimen^ which word they derive from cerno, 
which signifies "to perceive," they mean only such sins, 
as may be made appear before a judge ; and therefore are 
not mere intentions. 

From this relation of sin to the law, and of crime to the 
civil law, may be inferred, first, that where law ceaseth, 
sin ceaseth. But because the law of nature is eternal, 
violation of covenants, ingratitude, arrogance, and all facts 
contrary to any moral virtue, can never cease to be sin. 
Secondly, that the civil law ceasing, crimes cease : for 
there being no other law remaining, but that of nature, 
there is no place for accusation ; every man being his own 
judge, and accused only by his own conscience, and cleared 
by the uprightness of his own intention. When therefore 
his intention is right, his fact is no sin : if otherwise, his 
fact is sin ; but not crime. Thirdly, that when the sovereign 
power ceaseth, crime also ceaseth ; for where there is no 
such power, there is no protection to be had from the law ; 
and therefore every one may protect himself by his own 
power : for no man in the institution of sovereign power 
can be supposed to give away the right of preserving his 
own body ; for the safety whereof all sovereignty was 
ordained. But this is to be understood only of those, that 
have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the 
power that protected them ; for that was a crime from the 
beginning. 

The source of every crime, is some defect of the under- 
standing ; or some error in reasoning ; or some sudden force of 
the passions. Defect in the understanding, is "ignorance"; 
in reasoning, "erroneous opinion." Again, ignorance is 
of three sorts ; of the "law," and of the "sovereign," and 
of the "penalty." Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth 
no man ; because every man that hath attained to the use 



284 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

of reason, is supposed to know, he ought not to do to 
another, what he would not have done to himself. There- 
fore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do 
anything contrary to that law, it is a crime. If a man 
come from the Indies hither, and persuade men here to 
receive a new religion, or teach them anything that tendeth 
to disobedience of the laws of this country, though he be 
never so well persuaded of the truth of what he teacheth, 
he commits a crime, and may be justly punished for the 
same, not only because his doctrine is false, but also because 
he does that which he would not approve in another, 
namely, that coming from hence, he should endeavour to 
alter the religion there. But ignorance of the civil law, 
shall excuse a man in a strange country, till it be declared 
to him ; because, till then no civil law is binding. 

In the like manner, if the civil law of a man's own 
country, be not so sufficiently declared, as he may know it 
if he will; nor the action against the law of nature; the 
ignorance is a good excuse : in other cases ignorance of 
the civil law, excuseth not. 

Ignorance of the sovereign power, in the place of a 
man's ordinary residence, excuseth him not ; because he 
ought to take notice of the power, by which he hath been 
protected there. 

Ignorance of the penalty, where the law is declared, 
excuseth no man : for in breaking the law, which without a 
fear of penalty to follow, were not a law, but vain words, 
he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is ; 
because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth 
all the known consequences of it ; but punishment is a 
•known consequence of the violation of the laws, in every 
commonwealth ; which punishment, if it be determined 
already by the law, he is subject to that ; if not, then he is 
subject to arbitrary punishment. For it is reason, that he 
which does injury, without other limitation than that of 



OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, ETC. 285 

his own will, should suffer punishment without other limita- 
tion, than that of his will whose law is thereby violated. 

But when a penalty, is either annexed to the crime in 
the law itself, or hath been usually inflicted in the like 
cases ; there the delinquent is excused from a greater 
penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not great 
enough to deter men from the action, is an invitement to 
it : because when men compare the benefit of their injus- 
tice, with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of 
nature they choose that which appeareth best for them- 
selves : and therefore when they are punished more than 
the law had formerly determined, or more than others were 
punished for the same crime ; it is the law that tempted, 
and deceiveth them. 

No law, made after a fact done, can make it a crime : 
because if the fact be against the law of nature, the law 
was before the fact; and a positive law cannot be taken 
notice of, before it be made ; and therefore cannot be 
obligatory. But when the law that forbiddeth a fact, is 
made before the fact be done ; yet he that doth the fact, 
is liable to the penalty ordained after, in case no lesser 
penalty were made known before, neither by writing, nor 
by example, for the reason immediately before alleged. 

From defect in reasoning, that is to say, from error, men 
are prone to violate the laws, three ways. First, % by pre- 
sumption of false principles : as when men, from having 
observed how in all places, and in all ages, unjust actions 
have been authorized, by the force, and victories of those 
who have committed them ; and that potent men, breaking 
through the cobweb laws of their country, the weaker sort, 
and those that have failed in their enterprises, have been 
esteemed the only criminals ; have thereupon taken for 
principles, and grounds of their reasoning, " that justice 
is but a vain word : that whatsoever a man can get by his 
own industry, and hazard, is his own : that the practice of 



286 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

all nations cannot be unjust : that examples of former times 
are good arguments of doing the like again " ; and many- 
more of that kind : which being granted, no act in itself 
can be a crime, but must be made so, not by the law, but 
by the success of them that commit it ; and the same fact 
be virtuous, or vicious, as fortune pleaseth ; so that what 
Marius makes a crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and 
Caesar, the same laws standing, turn again into a crime, to 
the perpetual disturbance of the peace of the common- 
wealth. 

Secondly, by false teachers, that either misinterpret the 
law of nature, making it thereby repugnant to the law 
civil; or by teaching for laws, such doctrines of their own, 
or traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the 
duty of a subject. 

Thirdly, by erroneous inferences from true principles ; 
which happens commonly to men that are hasty, and pre- 
cipitate in concluding, and resolving what to do ; such as 
are they, that have both a great opinion of their own 
understanding, and believe that things of this nature require 
not time and study, but only common experience, and a 
good natural wit ; whereof no man thinks himself unpro- 
vided : whereas the knowledge, of right and wrong, which 
is no less difficult, there is no man will pretend to, without 
great and long study. And of those defects in reasoning, 
there is none that can excuse, though some of them may 
extenuate, a crime in any man, that pretendeth to the 
administration of his own private business ; much less in 
them that undertake a public charge ; because they pretend 
to the reason, upon the want whereof they would ground 
their excuse. 

Of the passions that most frequently are the causes of 
crime, one, is vain-glory, or a foolish over-rating of their 
own worth ; as if difference of worth, were an effect of 
their wit, or riches, or blood, or some other natural quality, 



OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, ETC. 287 

not depending on the will of those that have the sovereign 
authority. From whence proceedeth a presumption that the 
punishments ordained by the laws, and extended generally 
to all subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the 
same rigour they are inflicted on poor, obscure, and simple 
men, comprehended under the name of the "vulgar." 

Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value 
themselves by the greatness of their wealth, adventure on 
crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment, by corrupting 
public justice, or obtaining pardon by money, or other 
rewards. 

And that such as have multitude of potent kindred; and 
popular men, that have gained reputation amongst the mul- 
titude, take courage to violate the laws, from a hope of 
oppressing the power, to whom it belongeth to put them in 
execution. 

And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their 
own wisdom, take upon them to reprehend the actions, and 
call in question the authority of them that govern, and so 
to unsettle the laws with their public discourse, as that 
nothing shall be a crime, but what their own designs require 
should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be 
prone to all such crimes, as consist in craft, and in deceiv- 
ing of their neighbours ; because they think their designs 
are too subtle to be perceived. These I say are effects of a 
false presumption of their own wisdom. For of them that 
are the first movers in the disturbance of commonwealth, 
which can never happen without a civil war, very few are 
left alive long enough, to see their new designs established : 
so that the benefit of their crimes redoundeth to posterity, 
and such as would least have wished it: which argues they 
were not so wise, as they thought they were. And those 
that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do com- 
monly deceive themselves, the darkness in which they 
believe they lie hidden, being nothing else but their own 



288 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

blindness ; and are no wiser than children, that think all 
hid, by hiding their own eyes. 

And generally all vain-glorious men, unless they be withal 
timorous, are subject to anger ; as being more prone than 
others to interpret for contempt, the ordinary liberty of 
conversation : and there are few crimes that may not be 
produced by anger. 

As for the passions of hate, lust, ambition, and covetous- 
ness, what crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to 
every man's experience and understanding, as there needeth 
nothing to be said of them, saving that they are infirmities, 
so annexed to the nature, both of man, and all other living 
creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindered, but by 
extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity in pun- 
ishing them. For in those things men hate, they find a 
continual, and unavoidable molestation ; whereby either a 
man's patience must be everlasting, or he must be eased 
by removing the power of that which molesteth him. The 
former is difficult ; the latter is many times impossible, 
without some violation of the law. Ambition, and covet- 
ousness are passions also that are perpetually incumbent, 
and pressing ; whereas reason is not perpetually present, to 
resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity 
appears, their effects proceed. And for lust, what it wants 
in the lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth 
to weigh down the apprehension of all easy, or uncertain 
punishments. 

Of all passions, that which inclineth men least to break 
the laws, is fear. Nay, excepting some generous natures, 
it is the only thing, when there is appearance of profit or 
pleasure by breaking the laws, that makes men keep them. 
And yet in many cases a crime may be committed through 
fear. 

For not every fear justifies the action it produceth, but 
the fear only of corporeal hurt, which we call "bodily fear," 






OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, ETC. 289 

and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered, but 
by the action. A man is assaulted, fears present death, 
from which he sees not how to escape, but by wounding 
him that assaulteth him : if he wound him to death, this is 
no crime ; because no man is supposed at the making of a 
commonwealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life, 
or limbs, where the law cannot arrive time enough to his 
assistance. But to kill a man, because from his actions, or 
his threatenings, I may argue he will kill me when he can, 
seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from 
the sovereign power, is a crime. Again, a man receives 
words of disgrace or some little injuries, for which they that 
made the laws, had assigned no punishment, nor thought it 
worthy of a man that hath the use of reason, to take notice 
of, and is afraid, unless he revenge it, he shall fall into eon- 
tempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries 
from others ; and to avoid this, breaks the law, and pro- 
tects himself for the future, by the terror of his private 
revenge. This is a crime : for the hurt is not corporeal, 
but fantastical, and, though in this corner of the world, 
made sensible by a custom not many years since begun, 
amongst young and vain men, so light, as a gallant man, 
and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take 
notice of. Also a man may stand in fear of spirits, either 
through his own superstition, or through too much credit 
given to other men, that tell him of strange dreams and 
visions ; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, 
for doing, or omitting divers things, which nevertheless, to 
do, or omit, is contrary to the laws ; and that which is so 
done, or omitted, is not to be excused by this fear; but is a 
crime. For, as I have shown before in the second chapter, 
dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after 
the impressions our senses had formerly received waking ; 
and when men are by any accident unassured they have 
slept, seem to be real visions ; and therefore he that pre- 



290 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

sumes to break the law upon his own, or another's dream, 
or pretended vision, or upon other fancy of the power of 
invisible spirits, than is permitted by the commonwealth, 
leaveth the law of nature, which is a certain offence, and 
followeth the imagery of his own, or another private man's 
brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth any- 
thing or nothing, nor whether he that tells his dream, say 
true, or lie ; which if every private man should have leave 
to do, as they must by the law of nature, if any one have 
it, there could no law be made to hold, and so all common- 
wealth would be dissolved. 

From these different sources of crimes, it appears already, 
that all crimes are not, as the Stoics of old time maintained, 
of the same allay. There is place, not only for " excuse," 
by *vhich that which seemed a crime, is proved to be none 
at all; but also for "extenuation," by which the crime, that 
seemed great, is made less. For though all crimes do equally 
deserve the name of injustice, as all deviation from a straight 
line is equally crookedness, which the Stoics rightly observed: 
yet it does not follow that all crimes are equally unjust, no 
more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked; which 
the Stoics not observing, held it as great a crime, to kill a 
hen, against the law, as to kill one's father. 

That which totally excuseth a fact, and takes away from 
it the nature of a crime, can be none but that, which at the 
same time, taketh away the obligation of the law. For the 
fact committed once against the law, if he that committed 
it be obliged to the law, can be no other than a crime. 

The want of means to know the law, totally excuseth. 
For the law whereof a man has' no means to inform himself, 
is not obligatory. But the want of diligence to inquire, 
shall not be considered as a want of means ; nor shall any 
man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the government 
of his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the 
laws of nature ; because they are known by the reason he 



OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, ETC. 291 

pretends to ; only children, and madmen are excused from 
offences against the law natural. 

Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy 
(and he is then in the power of the enemy, when his person, 
or his means of living, is so), if it be without his own fault, 
the obligation of the law ceaseth ; because he must obey 
the enemy, or die ; and consequently such obedience is no 
crime: for no man is obliged, when the protection of the law 
faileth, not to protect himself, by the best means he can. 

If a man, by the terror of present death, be compelled to 
do a fact against the law, he is totally excused; because no 
law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. 
And supposing such a law was obligatory; yet a man would 
reason thus, " If I do it not, I die presently ; if I do it, I 
die afterwards ; therefore by doing it, there is time of -life 
gained " ; nature therefore compels him to the fact. 

When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary 
for his life, and cannot preserve himself any other way, but 
by some fact against the law ; as if in a great famine he take 
the food by force, or stealth, which he cannot obtain for 
money nor charity ; or in defence of his life, snatch away 
another man's sword ; he is totally excused, for the reason 
next before alleged. 

Again, facts done against the law by the authority of 
another, are by that authority excused against the author ; 
because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another, 
that is but his instrument : but it is not excused against a 
third person thereby injured; because in the violation of 
the law, both the author and actor are criminals. From 
hence it followeth that when that man, or assembly, that 
hath the sovereign power, commandeth a man to do that 
which is contrary to a former law, the doing of it is totally 
excused : for he ought not to condemn it himself, because 
he is the author ; and what cannot justly be condemned 
by the sovereign, cannot justly be punished by any other. 



292 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

Besides, when the sovereign commandeth anything to be 
done against his own former law, the command, as to that 
particular fact, is an abrogation of the law. 

If that man, or assembly, that hath the sovereign power, 
disclaim any right essential to the sovereignty, whereby 
there accrueth to the subject, any liberty inconsistent with 
the sovereign power, that is to say, with the very being of 
a commonwealth, if the subject shall refuse to obey the 
command in anything contrary to the liberty granted, this 
is nevertheless a sin, and contrary to the duty of the sub- 
ject : for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent 
with the sovereignty, because it was erected by his own 
consent and for his own defence ; and that such liberty as 
is inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of 
the evil consequence thereof. But if he not only disobey, 
but also resist a public minister in the execution of it, then 
it is a crime ; because he might have been righted, without 
any breach of the peace, upon complaint. 

The degrees of crime are taken on divers scales, and 
measured, first, by the malignity of the source, or cause ; 
secondly, by the contagion of the example ; thirdly, by the 
mischief of the effect ; and fourthly, by the concurrence of 
times, places, and persons. 

The same fact done against the law, if it proceed from 
presumption of strength, riches, or friends to resist those 
that are to execute the law, is a greater crime than if it pro- 
ceed from hope of not being discovered, or of escape by 
flight: for presumption of impunity by force, is a root, from 
whence springeth, at all times, and upon all temptations, a 
contempt of all laws ; whereas in the latter case, the appre- 
hension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more 
obedient for the future. A crime which we know to be so, 
is greater than the same crime proceeding from a false per- 
suasion that it is lawful ; for he that committeth it against 
his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or other power, 



OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, ETC. 293 

which encourages him to commit the same again : but he 
that doth it by error, after the error is shewn him, is con- 
formable to the law. 

He, whose error proceeds from the authority of a teacher, 
or an interpreter of the law publicly authorized, is not so 
faulty as he whose error proceedeth from a peremptory pur- 
suit of his own principles and reasoning: for what is taught 
by one that teacheth by public authority, the commonwealth 
teacheth, and hath a resemblance of law, till the same au- 
thority controlleth it ; and in all crimes that contain not 
in them a denial of the sovereign power, nor are against an 
evident law, excuseth totally: whereas he that groundeth 
his actions on his private judgment, ought, according to 
the rectitude, or error thereof, to stand or fall. 

The same fact, if it have been constantly punished in other 
men, is a greater crime, than if there have been many pre- 
cedent examples of impunity. For those examples are so 
many hopes of impunity, given by the sovereign himself : 
and because he which furnishes a man with such a hope 
and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, 
hath his part in the offence ; he cannot reasonably charge 
the offender with the whole. 

A crime arising from a sudden passion, is not so great, 
as when the same ariseth from long meditation : for in the 
former case there is a place for extenuation, in the common 
infirmity of human nature : but he that doth it with pre- 
meditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye on 
the law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof 
to human society ; all which, in committing the crime, he 
hath contemned and postposed to his own appetite. But 
there is no suddenness of passion sufficient for a total 
excuse: for all the time between the first knowing of the 
law, and the commission of the fact, shall be taken for a 
time of deliberation ; because he ought by meditation of 
the law, to rectify the irregularity of his passions. 



294 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

Where the law is publicly, and with assiduity, before all 
the people read and interpreted, a fact done against it, is a 
greater crime, than where men are left without such instruc- 
tion, to inquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty, and inter- 
ruption of their callings, and be informed by private men : 
for in this case, part of the fault is discharged upon common 
infirmity ; but, in the former, there is apparent negligence, 
which is not without some contempt of the sovereign power. 

Those facts which the law expressly condemneth, but 
the lawmaker by other manifest signs of his will tacitly 
approveth, are less crimes, than the same facts, condemned 
both by the law and lawmaker. For seeing the will of the 
lawmaker is a law, there appear in this case two contradic- 
tory laws ; which would totally excuse, if men were bound 
to take notice of the sovereign's approbation, by other argu- 
ments than are expressed by his command. But because 
there are punishments consequent, not only to the trans- 
gression of his law, but also to the observing of it, he is in 
part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot 
reasonably impute the whole crime to the delinquent. For 
example, the law condemneth duels ; the punishment is 
made capital : on the contrary part, he that refuseth duel, 
is subject to contempt and scorn, without remedy ; and 
sometimes by the sovereign himself thought unworthy to 
have any charge, or preferment in war. If thereupon he 
accept duel, considering all men lawfully endeavour to 
obtain the good opinion of them that have the sovereign 
power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished ; 
seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the punisher; 
which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or 
any other kind of disobedience ; but a care in governors, 
not to countenance anything obliquely, which directly they 
forbid. The examples of princes, to those that see them, 
are, and ever have been, more potent to govern their actions, 
than the laws themselves. And though it be our duty to 



OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, ETC. 295 

do, not what they do, but what they say ; yet will that duty 
never be performed, till it please God to give men an extraor- 
dinary, and supernatural grace to follow that precept. 

Again, if we compare crimes by the mischief of their 
effects ; first, the same fact, when it redounds to the damage 
of many, is greater, than when it redounds to the hurt of 
few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not only in the 
present, but also, by example, in the future, it is a greater 
crime, than if it hurt only in the present : for the former, 
is a fertile crime, and multiplies to the hurt of many ; the 
latter is barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the 
religion established in the commonwealth, is a greater 
fault, in an authorized preacher, than in a private person : 
so also is it, to live profanely, incontinently, or do any 
irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in a professor of the 
law, to maintain any point, or do any act, that tendeth to 
the weakening of the sovereign power, is a greater crime, 
than in another man : also in a man that hath such 
reputation for wisdom, as that his counsels are followed, 
or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the law, 
is a greater crime, than the same fact in another : for such 
men not only commit crime, but teach it for law to all 
other men. And generally all crimes are the greater, by 
the scandal they give ; that is to say, by becoming stum- 
bling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the 
way they go in, as upon the light that other men carry 
before them. 

Also facts of hostility against the present state of the 
commonwealth, are greater crimes, than the same acts done 
to private men : for the damage extends itself to all : such 
are the betraying of the strengths, or revealing of the secrets 
of the commonwealth to an enemy ; also all attempts upon 
the representative of the commonwealth, be it a monarch, 
or an assembly ; and all endeavours by word, or deed, to 
diminish the authority of the same, either in the present 



296 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

time, or in succession : which crimes the Latins understand 
by crimina laesae majestatis, and consist in design, or act, 
contrary to a fundamental law. 

Likewise those crimes, which render judgments of no 
effect, are greater crimes, than injuries done to one, or a 
few persons ; as to receive money to give false judgment, 
or testimony, is a greater crime, than otherwise to deceive 
a man of the like, or a greater sum ; because not only he 
has wrong, that falls by such judgments ; but all judgments 
are rendered useless, and occasion ministered to force, and 
private revenges. 

Also robbery, and depeculation of the public treasure, 
or revenues, is a greater crime, than the robbing, or 
defrauding of a private man ; because to rob the public, is 
to rob many at once. 

Also the counterfeit usurpation of public ministry, the 
counterfeiting of public seals or public coin, than counter- 
feiting of a private man's person, or his seal ; because the 
fraud thereof, extendeth to the damage of many. 

Of facts against the law, done to private men, the greater 
crime, is that, where the damage in the common opinion 
of men, is most sensible. And therefore 

To kill against the law, is a greater crime, than any 
other injury, life preserved. 

And to kill with torment, greater, than simply to kill. 

And mutilation of a limb, greater, than the spoiling a 
man of his goods. 

And the spoiling a man of his goods, by terror of death, 
or wounds, than by clandestine surreption. 

And by clandestine surreption, than by consent fraudu- 
lently obtained. 

And the violation of chastity by force, greater, than by 
flattery. 

And of a woman married, than of a woman not married. 

For all these things are commonly so valued: though 



OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, ETC. 297 

some men are more, and some less sensible of the same 
offence. But the law regardeth not the particular, but the 
general inclination of mankind. 

And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in 
words, or gesture, when they produce no other harm, than 
the present grief of him that is reproached, hath been 
neglected in the laws of the Greeks, Romans, and other 
both ancient and modern commonwealths; supposing the 
true cause of such grief to consist, not in the contumely, 
which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own 
virtue, but in the pusillanimity of him that is offended by it. 

Also a crime against a private man, is much aggravated 
by the person, time, and place. For to kill one's parent, 
is a greater crime, than to kill another : for the parent 
ought to have the honour of a sovereign, though he sur- 
rendered his power to the civil law ; because he had it 
originally by nature. And to rob a poor man, is a greater 
crime, than to rob a rich man ; because it is to the poor 
a more sensible damage. 

And a crime committed in the time or place appointed 
for devotion, is greater, than if committed at another time 
or place : for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the law. 

Many other cases of aggravation, and extenuation might 
be added : but by these I have set down, it is obvious to 
every man, to take the altitude of any other crime proposed. 

Lastly, because in almost all crimes there is an injury 
done, not only to some private men, but also to the common- 
wealth ; the same crime, when the accusation is in the 
name of the commonwealth, is called public crime : and 
when in the name of a private man, a private crime ; and 
the pleas according thereunto called public, judicia publico, 
Pleas of the Crown ; or Private Pleas. As in an accusation 
of murder, if the accuser be a private man, the plea is a 
Private Plea ; if the accuser be the sovereign, the plea is a 
Public Plea. 



298 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 
Of Punishments and Rewards. 

A punishment, " is an evil inflicted by public authority, 
on him that hath done, or omitted that which is judged by 
the same authority to be a transgression of the law ; to the 
end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed 
to obedience." 

Before I infer anything from this definition, there is a 
question to be answered, of much importance ; which is, by 
what door the right or authority of punishing in any case, 
came in. For by that which has been said before, no man 
is supposed bound by covenant, not to resist violence ; and 
consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any 
right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In 
the making of a commonwealth, every man giveth away 
the right of defending another ; but not of defending him- 
self. Also he obligeth himself, to assist him that hath the 
sovereignty, in the punishing of another ; but of himself 
not. But to covenant to assist the sovereign, in doing 
hurt to another, unless he that so covenanteth have a 
right to do it himself, is not to give him a right to punish. 
It is manifest therefore that the right which the common- 
wealth, that is, he, or they that represent it, hath to 
punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the 
subjects. But I have also showed formerly, that before 
the institution of commonwealth, every man had a right to 
everything, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to 
his own preservation ; subduing, hurting, or killing any 
man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of 
that right of punishing, which is exercised in every com- 
monwealth. For the subjects did not give the sovereign 
that right ; but only in laying down theirs, strengthened 
him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preserva- 



PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS. 299 

tion of them all : so that it was not given, but left to him, 
and to him only ; and (excepting the limits set him by- 
natural law) as entire, as in the condition of mere nature, 
and of war of every one against his neighbour. 

From the definition of punishment, I infer, first, that 
neither private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can 
properly be styled punishment ; because they proceed not 
from public authority. 

Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the 
public favour, is not a punishment ; because no new evil is 
thereby on any man inflicted; he is only left in the estate 
he was in before. 

Thirdly, that the evil inflicted by public authority, 
without precedent public condemnation, is not to be styled 
by the name of punishment ; but of an hostile act; because 
the fact for which a man is punished, ought first to be 
judged by public authority, to be a transgression of the 
law. 

Fourthly, that the evil inflicted by usurped power, and 
judges without authority from the sovereign, is not punish- 
ment ; but an act of hostility ; because the acts of power 
usurped, have not for author, the person condemned ; and 
therefore are not acts of public authority. 

Fifthly, that all evil which is inflicted without intention, 
or possibility of disposing the delinquent, or, by his 
example, other men, to obey the laws, is not punishment ; 
but an act of hostility : because without such an end, no 
hurt done is contained under that name. 

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by 
nature, divers hurtful consequences ; as when a man in 
assaulting another, is himself slain, or wounded ; or when 
he falleth into sickness by the doing of some unlawful act ; 
such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of 
nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a 
punishment divine ; yet it is not contained in the name of 



300 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

punishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted 
by the authority of man. 

Seventhly, if the harm inflicted be less than the benefit, 
or contentment that naturally followeth the crime com- 
mitted, that harm is not within the definition ; and is 
rather the price, or redemption, than the punishment of a 
crime : because it is of the nature of punishment, to have 
for end, the disposing of men to obey the law ; which end, 
if it be less than the benefit of the transgression, it attaineth 
not, but worketh a contrary effect. 

Eighthly, if a punishment be determined and prescribed 
in the law itself, and after the crime committed, there be a 
greater punishment inflicted, the excess is not punishment, 
but an act of hostility. For seeing the aim of punishment 
is not a revenge, but terror; and the terror of a great 
punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration of 
a less, the unexpected addition is no part of the punish- 
ment. But where there is no punishment at all determined 
by the law, there whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature 
of punishment. For he that goes about the violation of a 
law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an inde- 
terminate, that is to say, an arbitrary punishment. 

Ninthly, harm inflicted for a fact done before there was 
a law that forbade it, is not punishment, but an act of 
hostility : for before the law, there is no transgression of 
the law: but punishment supposeth a fact judged, to have 
been a transgression of the law ; therefore harm inflicted 
before the law made, is not punishment, but an act of 
hostility. 

Tenthly, hurt inflicted on the representative of the 
commonwealth, is not punishment, but an act of hostility : 
because it is of the nature of punishment, to be inflicted 
by public authority, which is the authority only of the 
representative itself. 

Lastly, harm inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, 



PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS. 301 

falls not under the name of punishment: because seeing 
they were either never subject to the law, and therefore 
cannot transgress it; or having been subject to it, and 
professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they 
can transgress it, all the harms that can be done them, 
must be taken as acts of hostility. But in declared 
hostility, all infliction of evil is lawful. From whence it 
followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, 
and deliberately deny the authority of the representative 
of the commonwealth (whatsoever penalty hath been 
formerly ordained for treason) he may lawfully be made 
to suffer whatsoever the representative will. For in 
denying subjection, he denies such punishment as by 
the law hath been ordained ; and therefore suffers as an 
enemy of the commonwealth ; that is, according to the 
will of the. representative. For the punishments set down 
in the law, are to subjects, not to enemies ; such as are 
they, that having been by their own acts subjects, deliber- 
ately revolting, deny the sovereign power. 

The first, and most general distribution of punishments, 
is into "divine," and "human." Of the former I shall 
have occasion to speak, in a more convenient place 
hereafter. 

" Human," are those punishments that be inflicted by 
the commandment of man; and are either "corporal," or 
"pecuniary," or "ignominy," or "imprisonment," or 
" exile," or mixed of these. 

" Corporal punishment " is that, which is inflicted on 
the body directly, and according to the intention of him 
that inflicteth it : such as are stripes, or wounds, or depriva- 
tion of such pleasures of the body, as were before lawfully 
enjoyed. 

And of these, some be "capital," some "less" than 
"capital." Capital, is the infliction of death; and that 
either simply, or with torment. Less than q--\\^\ rr* 



302 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

stripes, wounds, chains, and any other corporal pain, not 
in its own nature mortal. For if upon the infliction of a 
punishment death follow not in the intention of the inflictor, 
the punishment is not to be esteemed capital, though the 
harm prove mortal by an accident not to be foreseen ; in 
which case death is not inflicted, but hastened. 

"Pecuniary punishment," is that which consisteth not 
only in the deprivation of a sum of money, but also of 
lands, or any other goods which are usually bought and 
sold for money. And in case the law, that ordaineth such 
a punishment, be made with design to gather money, from 
such as shall transgress the same, it is not properly a 
punishment, but the price of privilege and exemption from 
the law, which doth not absolutely forbid the fact, but 
only to those that are not able to pay the money : except 
where the law is natural, or part of religion ; for in that 
case it is not an exemption from the law, but a transgres- 
sion of it. As where a law exacteth a pecuniary mulct, of 
them that take the name of God in vain, the payment of 
the mulct, is not the price of a dispensation to swear, but 
the punishment of the transgression of a law indispensable. 
In like manner if the law impose a sum of money to be 
paid, to him that has been injured ; this is but a satisfac- 
tion for the hurt done him ; and extinguisheth the accusation 
of the party injured, not the crime of the offender. 

" Ignominy," is the infliction of such evil, as is made 
dishonourable; or the deprivation of such good, as is made 
honourable by the commonwealth. For there be some 
things honourable by nature ; as the effects of courage, 
magnanimity, strength, wisdom, and other abilities of body 
and mind : others made honourable by the commonwealth; 
as badges, titles, offices, or any other singular mark of the 
sovereign's favour. The former, though they may fail by 
nature, or accident, cannot be taken away by a law ; and 
therefore the loss of them is not punishment. But the 



PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS. 303 

latter, may be taken away by the public authority that 
made them honourable, and are properly punishments : 
such are degrading men condemned, of their badges, titles, 
and offices ; or declaring them incapable of the like in time 
to come. 

" Imprisonment," is when a man is by public authority 
deprived of liberty ; and may happen from two divers ends ; 
whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused ; the other 
is the inflicting of pain on a man condemned. The former 
is not punishment ; because no man is supposed to be pun- 
ished, before he be judicially heard, and declared guilty. 
And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by 
bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard, over and 
above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is 
against the law of nature. But the latter is punishment, 
because evil, and inflicted by public authority, for some- 
what that has by the same authority been judged a trans- 
gression of the law. Under this word imprisonment, I com- 
prehend all restraint of motion, caused by an external 
obstacle, be it a house, which is called by the general name 
of a prison ; or an island, as when men are said to be con- 
fined to it ; or a place where men are set to work, as in old 
time men have been condemned to quarries, and in these 
times to galleys ; or be it a chain, or any other such impedi- 
ment. 

" Exile " (banishment) is when a man is for a crime, con- 
demned to depart out of the dominion of the commonwealth, 
or out of a certain part thereof : and during a prefixed time, 
or for ever, not to return into it : and seemeth not in its 
own nature, without other circumstances, to be a punish- 
ment ; but rather an escape, or a public commandment to 
avoid punishment by flight. And Cicero says, there was 
never any such punishment ordained in the city of Rome ; 
but calls it a refuge of men in danger. For if a man ban- 
ished, be nevertheless permitted to enjoy his goods, and the 



304 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

revenue of his lands, the mere change of air is no punish- 
ment, nor does it tend to that benefit of the commonwealth, 
for which all punishments are ordained, that is to say, to 
the forming of men's wills to the observation of the law ; 
but many times to the damage of the commonwealth. For 
a banished man, is a lawful enemy of the commonwealth 
that banished him ; as being no more a member of the same. 
But if he be withal deprived of his lands, or goods, then the 
punishment lieth not in the exile, but is to be reckoned 
amongst punishments pecuniary. 

All punishments of innocent subjects, be they great or 
little, are against the law of nature ; for punishment is only 
for transgression of the law, and therefore there can be no 
punishment of the innocent. It is therefore a violation, 
first, of that law of nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their 
revenges, to look at anything but some future good : for 
there can arrive no good to the commonwealth, by punish- 
ing the innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth 
ingratitude : for seeing all sovereign power, is originally 
given by the consent of every one of the subjects, to the 
end they should as long as they are obedient, be protected 
thereby ; the punishment of the innocent, is a rendering of 
evil for good. And thirdly, of the law that commandeth 
equity ; that is to say, an equal distribution of justice ; 
which in punishing the innocent is not observed. 

But the infliction of what evil soever, on an innocent 
man, that is not a subject, if it be for the benefit of the 
commonwealth, and without violation of any former cove- 
nant, is no breach of the law of nature. For all men that 
are not subjects, are either enemies, or else they have ceased 
from being so by some precedent covenants. But against 
enemies, whom the commonwealth judgeth capable to do 
them hurt, it is lawful by the original right of nature to 
make war ; wherein the sword judgeth not, nor doth the 
victor make distinction of nocent, and innocent, as to the 



PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS. 305 

time past nor has other respect of mercy, than as it con- 
duceth to the good of his own people. And upon this 
ground it is, that also in subjects, who deliberately deny 
the authority of the commonwealth established, the ven- 
geance is lawfully extended, not only to the fathers, but 
also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, 
and consequently innocent of the fact, for which they are 
afflicted : because the nature of this offence, consisteth in 
the renouncing of subjection ; which is a relapse into the 
condition of war, commonly called rebellion ; and they that 
so offend, suffer not as subjects, but as enemies. For 
"rebellion," is but war renewed. 

"Reward," is either of "gift," or by "contract." When 
by contract, it is called "salary," and "wages"; which is 
benefit due for service performed, or promised. When of 
gift, it is benefit proceeding from the " grace " of them that 
bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them service. 
And therefore when the sovereign of a commonwealth 
appointeth a salary to any public office, he that receiveth 
it, is bound in justice to perform his office ; otherwise, he 
is bound only in honour, to acknowledgment, and an 
endeavour of requital. For though men have no lawful 
remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private 
business, to serve the public, without reward or salary ; yet 
they are not bound thereto, by the law of nature, nor by the 
institution of the commonwealth, unless the service cannot 
otherwise be done ; because it is supposed the sovereign 
may make use of all their means, insomuch as the most 
common soldier, may demand the wages of his warfare as a 
debt. 

The benefit which a sovereign bestoweth on a subject, 
for fear of some power and ability he hath to do hurt to the 
commonwealth, are not properly rewards ; for they are not 
salaries ; because there is in this case no contract supposed, 
every man being obliged already not to do the common- 



306 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

wealth disservice : nor are they graces ; because they be 
extorted by fear, which ought not to be incident to the sov- 
ereign power : but are rather sacrifices, which the sovereign, 
considered in his natural person, and not in the person of 
the commonwealth, makes, for the appeasing the discontent 
of him he thinks more potent than himself ; and encourage 
not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, 
and increasing of further extortion. 

And whereas some salaries are certain, and proceed from 
the public treasury ; and others uncertain, and casual, pro- 
ceeding from the execution of the office for which the sal- 
ary is ordained ; the latter is in some cases hurtful to the 
commonwealth ; as in the case of judicature. For where 
the benefit of the judges, and ministers of a court of justice 
ariseth from the multitude of causes that are brought to 
their cognizance, there must needs follow two inconven- 
iences : one, is the nourishing of suits ; for the more suits, 
the greater benefit : and another that depends on that, 
which is contention about jurisdiction ; each court drawing 
to itself as many causes as it can. But in offices of execu- 
tion there are not those inconveniences ; because their 
employment cannot be increased by any endeavour of their 
own. And thus much shall suffice for the nature of punish- 
ment and reward ; which are, as it were, the nerves and 
tendons, that move the limbs and joints of a commonwealth. 

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride 
and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to 
government : together with the great power of his governor, 
whom I compared to "Leviathan," taking that comparison 
out of the two last verses of the one-and-fortieth of " Job "; 
where God having set forth the great power of "Levia- 
than," calleth him king of the proud. " There is nothing," 
saith he, " on earth, to be compared with him. He is made 
so as not to be afraid. He seeth every high thing below 
him ; and is king of all the children of pride." But because 



DISSOLUTION OF COMMONWEALTHS. 307 

he is mortal, and subject to decay, as all other earthly crea- 
tures are ; and because there is that in heaven, though not 
on earth, that he should stand in fear of, and whose laws 
he ought to obey ; I shall in the next following chapter 
speak of his diseases, and the causes of his mortality ; and 
of what laws of nature he is bound to obey. 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

Of those Things that Weaken, or tend to the Dissolution of a 
Com?nonwealth. 

Though nothing can be immortal, which mortals make; 
yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their 
commonwealths might be secured, at least from perishing by 
internal diseases. For by the nature of their institution, they 
are designed to live, as long as mankind, or as the laws of 
nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life. Therefore 
when they come to be dissolved, not by external violence, 
but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are 
the "matter "; but as they are the "makers," and orderers 
of them. For men, as they become at last weary of irregu- 
lar jostling, and hewing one another, and desire with all their 
hearts, to conform themselves into one firm and lasting edi- 
fice : so for want, both of the art of making fit laws, to 
square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, 
to suffer the rude and cumbersome points of their present 
greatness to be taken off, they cannot without the help of 
a very able architect, be compiled into any other than a 
crazy building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, 
must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity. 

Amongst the " infirmities " therefore of a commonwealth, 
I will reckon in the first place, those that arise from an 
imperfect institution, and resemble the diseases of a natural 
body, which proceed from a defectuous procreation. 



308 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

Of which, this is one, " that a man to obtain a kingdom, 
is sometimes content with less power, than to the peace, 
and defence of the commonwealth is necessarily required." 
From whence it cometh to pass, that when the exercise of 
the power laid by, is for the public safety to be resumed, it 
hath the resemblance of an unjust act ; which disposeth 
great numbers of men, when occasion is presented, to rebel ; 
in the same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by 
diseased parents, are subject either to untimely death, or 
to purge the ill quality, derived from their vicious concep- 
tion, by breaking out into biles and scabs. And when 
kings deny themselves some such necessary power, it is not 
always, though sometimes, out of ignorance of what is 
necessary to the office they undertake ; but many times out 
of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure. 
Wherein they reason not well ; because such as will hold 
them to their promises, shall be maintained against them 
by foreign commonwealths; who in order to the good of 
their own subjects let slip few occasions to " weaken " the 
estate of their neighbours. So was Thomas Becket, Arch- 
bishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Second, 
by the Pope ; the subjection of ecclesiastics to the common- 
wealth, having been dispensed with by William the Con- 
queror at his reception, when he took an oath, not to 
infringe the liberty of the church. And so were the barons, 
whose power was by William Rufus, to have their help in 
transferring the succession from his elder brother to him- 
self, increased to a degree inconsistent with the sovereign 
power, maintained in their rebellion against king John, by 
the French. 

Nor does this happen in monarchy only. For whereas 
the style of the ancient Roman commonwealth, was, "the 
senate and people of Rome " ; neither senate, nor people 
pretended to the whole power ; which first caused the sedi- 
tions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Satur- 



DISSOLUTION OF COMMONWEALTHS. 309 

ninus, and others ; and afterwards the wars between the 
senate and the people, under Marius and Sylla ; and again 
under Pompey and Caesar, to the extinction of their democ- 
racy, and the setting up of monarchy. 

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one 
only action ; which was, that no man on pain of death 
should propound the renewing of the war for the island of 
Salamis ; and yet thereby, if Solon had not caused to be 
given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit 
of a madman, and in verse, propounded it to the people 
that flocked about him, they had had an enemy perpetually 
in readiness, even at the gates of their city ; such damage, 
or shifts, are all commonwealths forced to, that have their 
power never so little limited. 

In the second place, I observe the " diseases " of a com- 
monwealth, that proceed from the poison of seditious doc- 
trines, whereof one is, " That every private man is judge of 
good and evil actions." This is true in the condition of 
mere nature, where there are no civil laws ; and also under 
civil government, in such cases as are not determined by 
the law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of 
good and evil actions, is the civil law ; and the judge the 
legislator, who is always representative of the common- 
wealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to 
debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the 
commonwealth ; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, 
as in their private judgments they shall think fit ; whereby 
the commonwealth is distracted and "weakened." 

Another doctrine repugnant to civil society, is, that 
" whatsoever a man does against his conscience, is sin " ; 
and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself 
judge of good and evil. For a man's conscience, and his 
judgment is the same thing, and as the judgment, so also 
the conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he 
that is subject to no civil law, sinneth in all he does against 



3io OF COMMONWEALTH. 

his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but 
his own reason ; yet it is not so with him that lives in a 
commonwealth ; because the law is the public conscience, 
by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Other- 
wise in such diversity, as there is of private consciences, 
which are but private opinions, the commonwealth must 
needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sov- 
ereign power, further than it shall seem good in his own 
eyes. 

It hath been also commonly taught, " that faith and sanc- 
tity, are not to be attained by study and reason, but by 
supernatural inspiration, or infusion." Which granted, I 
see not why any man should render a reason of his faith ; 
or why every Christian should not be also a prophet ; or 
why any man should take the law of his country, rather 
than his own inspiration, for the rule of his action. And 
thus we fall again in the fault of taking upon us to judge of 
good and evil ; or to make judges of it, such private men 
as pretend to be supernaturally inspired, to the dissolution 
of all civil government. Faith comes by hearing, and hear- 
ing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of 
them that speak to us ; which accidents are all contrived 
by God Almighty ; and yet are not supernatural, but only, 
for the great number of them that concur to every effect, 
unobservable. Faith and sanctity, are indeed not very fre- 
quent ; but yet they are not miracles, but brought to pass 
by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways, 
by which God worketh them in his elect, at such times as 
he thinketh fit. And these three opinions, pernicious to 
peace and government, have in this part of the world, pro- 
ceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned 
divines, who joining the words of Holy Scripture together, 
otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to 
make men think that sanctity and natural reason, cannot 
stand together. 



DISSOLUTION OF COMMONWEALTHS 311 

A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a common- 
wealth, is this, " that he that hath the sovereign power is 
subject to the civil laws." It is true, that sovereigns are 
all subject to the laws of nature ; because such laws be 
divine, and cannot by any man, or commonwealth be abro- 
gated. But to those laws which the sovereign himself, 
that is, which the commonwealth maketh, he is not sub- 
ject. For to be subject to laws, is to be subject to the 
commonwealth, that is to the sovereign representative, 
that is to himself; which is not subjection, but freedom 
from the laws. Which error, because it setteth the laws 
above the sovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a 
power to punish him ; which is to make a new sovereign ; 
and again for the same reason a third, to punish the sec- 
ond ; and so continually without end, to the confusion, 
and dissolution of the commonwealth. 

A fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the dissolution of a com- 
monwealth, is, "that every private man has an absolute 
propriety in his goods ; such, as excludeth the right of 
the sovereign." Every man has indeed a propriety that 
excludes the right of every other subject : and he has it 
only from the sovereign power ; without the protection 
whereof, every other man should have equal right to the 
same. But if the right of the sovereign also be excluded, 
he cannot perform the office they have put him into; which 
is, to defend them both from foreign enemies, and from the 
injuries of one another ; and consequently there is no 
longer a commonwealth. 

And if the propriety of subjects, exclude not the right of 
the sovereign representative to their goods ; much less to 
their offices of judicature, or execution, in which they rep- 
resent the sovereign himself. 

There is a sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against 
the essence of a commonwealth ; and it is this, " that the 
sovereign power may be divided." For what is it to 



312 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

divide the power of a commonwealth, but to dissolve it ; 
for powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for 
these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, 
that making profession of the laws, endeavour to make 
them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the 
legislative power. 

And as false doctrine, so also oftentimes the example of 
different government in a neighbouring nation, disposeth 
men to alteration of the form already settled. So the 
people of the Jews were stirred up to reject God, and to 
call upon the prophet Samuel, for a king after the manner 
of the nations : so also the lesser cities of Greece, w.ere 
continually disturbed, with seditions of the aristocratical, 
and democratical factions ; one part of almost every com- 
monwealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedemonians ; the 
other, the Athenians. And I doubt not, but many men 
have been contented to see the late troubles in England, 
out of an imitation of the Low Countries ; supposing there 
needed no more to grow rich, than to change, as they had 
done, the form of their government. For the constitution 
of man's nature, is of itself subject to desire novelty. When 
therefore they are provoked to the same, by the neighbour- 
hood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is 
almost impossible for them, not to be content with those 
that solicit them to change ; and love the first beginnings, 
though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder ; 
like hot bloods, that having gotten the itch, tear them- 
selves with their own nails, till they can endure the smart 
no longer. 

And as to rebellion in particular against monarchy ; one 
of the most frequent causes of it, is the reading of the 
books of policy, and histories of the ancient Greeks, and 
Romans ; from which, young men, and all others that are 
unprovided of the antidote of solid reason, receiving a 
strong, and delightful impression, of the great exploits of 



DISSOLUTION OF COMMONWEALTHS. 3T3 

war, achieved by the conductors of their armies, receive 
withal a pleasing idea, of all they have done besides ; and 
imagine their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from 
the emulation of particular men, but from the virtue of 
their popular form of government : not considering the 
frequent seditions, and civil wars, produced by the imper- 
fection of their policy. From the reading, I say, of such 
books, men have undertaken to kill their kings, because 
the Greek and Latin writers, in their books, and discourses 
of policy, make it lawful, and laudable, for any man so to 
do ; provided, before he do it, he call him tyrant. For 
they say not "regicide," that is, killing a king, but "tyran- 
nicide," that is, killing of a tyrant is lawful. From the 
same books, they that live under a monarch conceive an 
opinion, that the subjects in a popular commonwealth 
enjoy liberty; but that in a monarchy they are all slaves. 
I say, they that live under a monarchy conceive such an 
opinion ; not they that live under a popular government : 
for they find no such matter. In sum, I cannot imagine, 
how anything can be more prejudicial to a monarchy, than 
the allowing of such books to be publicly read, without 
present applying such correctives of discreet masters, as 
are fit to take away their venom : which venom I will not 
doubt to compare to the biting of a mad dog, which is a 
disease the physicians call "hydrophobia," or "fear of 
water." For as he that is so bitten, has a continual tor- 
ment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water ; and is in such an 
estate, as if the poison endeavoured to convert him into a 
dog: so when a monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by 
those democratical writers, that continually snarl at that 
estate ; it wanteth nothing more than a strong monarch, 
which nevertheless out of a certain " tyrannophobia," or 
fear of being strongly governed, when they have him, they 
abhor. 

As there have been doctors, that hold there be three 



314 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

souls in a man ; so there be also that think there may be 
more souls, that is, more sovereigns, than one, in a com- 
monwealth ; and set up a "supremacy" against the "sov- 
ereignty"; "canons" against "laws"; and a "ghostly 
authority " against the " civil " ; working on men's minds, 
with words and distinctions, that of themselves signify 
nothing, but bewray by their obscurity ; that there walk- 
eth, as some think, invisibly another kingdom, as it were a 
kingdom of fairies, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest, 
that the civil power, and the power of the commonwealth 
is the same thing ; and that supremacy, and the power of 
making canons, and granting faculties, implieth a common- 
wealth ; it followeth, that where one is sovereign, another 
supreme ; where one can make laws, and another make 
canons ; there must needs be two commonwealths, of one 
and the same subjects ; which is a kingdom divided in 
itself, and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the insig- 
nificant distinction of "temporal," and "ghostly," they are 
still two kingdoms, and every subject is subject to two 
masters. For seeing the " ghostly " power challengeth the 
right to declare what is sin, it challengeth by consequence 
to declare what is law, sin being nothing but the transgres- 
sion of the law ; and again, the civil power challenging to 
declare what is law, every subject must obey two masters, 
who both will have their commands be observed as law ; 
which is impossible. Or, if it be but one kingdom, either 
the " civil," which is the power of the commonwealth, must 
be subordinate to the "ghostly," and then there is no sov- 
ereignty but the " ghostly " ; or the " ghostly " must be 
subordinate to the "temporal," and then there is no 
"supremacy" but the "temporal." When therefore these 
two powers oppose one another, the commonwealth cannot 
but be in great danger of civil war and dissolution. For 
the " civil " authority being more visible, and standing in 
the clearer light of natural reason, cannot choose but draw 



DISSOLUTION OF COMMONWEALTHS. 315 

to it in all times a very considerable part of the people : 
and the "spiritual," though it stand in the darkness of 
School distinctions, and hard words, yet because the fear 
of darkness and ghosts, is greater than other fears, cannot 
want a party sufficient to trouble, and sometimes to destroy 
a commonwealth. And this is a disease which not unfitly 
may be compared to the epilepsy, or falling sickness, 
which the Jews took to be one kind of possession by 
spirits, in the body natural. For as in this disease, there 
is an unnatural spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth 
the roots of the nerves, and moving them violently, taketh 
away the motion which naturally they should have from 
the power of the soul in the brain, and thereby causeth 
violent, and irregular motions, which men call convulsions, 
in the parts ; insomuch that he that is seized therewith, 
falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into 
the fire, as a man deprived of his senses ; so also in the 
body politic, when the spiritual power, moveth the mem- 
bers of a commonwealth, by the terror of punishments, and 
hope of rewards, which are the nerves of it, otherwise than 
by the civil power, which is the soul of the commonwealth, 
they ought to be moved ; and by strange, and hard words 
suffocate their understanding, it must needs thereby dis- 
tract the people, and either overwhelm the commonwealth 
with oppression, or cast it into the fire of a civil war. 

Sometimes also in the merely civil government, there be 
more than one soul ; as when the power of levying money, 
which is the nutritive faculty, has depended on a general 
assembly ; the power of conduct and command, which is 
the motive faculty, on one man ; and the power of making 
laws, which is the rational faculty, on the accidental con- 
sent, not only of those two, but also of a third ; this endan- 
gereth the commonwealth, sometimes for want of consent 
to good laws ; but most often for want of such nourish- 
ment, as is necessary to life, and motion. For although 



316 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

few perceive, that such government, is not government, 
but division of the commonwealth into three factions, and 
call it mixed monarchy ; yet the truth is, that it is not one 
independent commonwealth, but three independent fac- 
tions ; nor one representative person, but three. In the 
kingdom of God, there may be three persons independent, 
without breach of unity in God that reigneth ; but where 
men reign, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it can- 
not be so. And therefore if the king bear the person of 
the people, and the general assembly bear also the person 
of the people, and another assembly bear the person of a 
part of the people, they are not one person, nor one sover- 
eign, but three persons, and three sovereigns. 

To what disease in the natural body of man, I may 
exactly compare this irregularity of a commonwealth, I 
know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man 
growing out of his side, with a head, arms, breast, and 
stomach of his own : if he had had another man growing 
out of his other side, the comparison might then have been 
exact. 

Hitherto I have named such diseases of a commonwealth, 
as are of the greatest, and most present danger. There be 
other not so great, which nevertheless are not unfit to be 
observed. As first, the difficulty of raising money, for the 
necessary uses of the commonwealth ; especially in the 
approach of war. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, 
that every subject hath a propriety in his lands and goods, 
exclusive of the sovereign's right to the use of the same. 
From whence it cometh to pass, that the sovereign power, 
which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the com- 
monwealth, finding the passage of money to the public 
treasury obstructed, by the tenacity of the people, whereas 
it ought to extend itself, to encounter, and prevent such 
dangers in their beginnings, contracteth itself as long as it 
can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people 



DISSOLUTION OF COMMONWEALTHS. 317 

by stratagems of law, to obtain little sums, which not suf- 
ficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for pres- 
ent supply, or perish ; and being put often to these extrem- 
ities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or 
else the commonwealth must perish. Insomuch as we may 
compare this distemper very aptly to an ague ; wherein, 
the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter 
obstructed, the veins which by their natural course empty 
themselves into the heart, are not, as they ought to be, 
supplied from the arteries, whereby there succeedeth at 
first a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbs ; and 
afterward a hot, and strong endeavour of the heart, to 
force a passage for the blood ; and before it can do that, 
contenteth itself with the small refreshments of such things 
as cool for a time, till, if nature be strong enough, it break 
at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissi- 
pateth the venom into sweat ; or, if nature be too weak, 
the patient dieth. 

Again, there is sometimes in a commonwealth, a disease, 
which resembleth the pleurisy ; and that is, when the treas- 
ure of the commonwealth, flowing out of its due course, is 
gathered together in too much abundance, in one, or a few 
private men, by monopolies, or by farms of the public reve- 
nues ; in the same manner as the blood in a pleurisy, get- 
ting into the membrane of the breast, breedeth the^e 
inflammation, accompanied with a fever, and painful 
stitches. 

Also the popularity of a potent subject, unless the 
commonwealth have very good caution of his fidelity, 
is a dangerous disease ; because the people, which should 
receive their motion from the authority of the sovereign, 
by the flattery and by the reputation of an ambitious man 
are drawn away from their obedience to the laws, to follow 
a man, of whose virtues, and designs they have no knowl- 
edge. And this is commonly of more danger in a popular 



3i8 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

government, than in a monarchy ; because an army is of 
so great force, and multitude, as it may easily be made 
believe, they are the people. By this means it was, that 
Julius Caesar, who was set up by the people against the 
senate, having won to himself the affections of his army, 
made himself master both of senate and people. And this 
proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is plain rebel- 
lion ; and may be resembled to the effects of witchcraft. 

Another infirmity of a commonwealth, is the immoderate 
greatness of a town, when it is able to furnish out of its 
own circuit, the number, and expense of a great army : as 
also the great number of corporations ; which are as it were 
many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, 
like worms in the entrails of a natural man. To which 
may be added, the liberty of disputing against absolute 
power, by pretenders to political prudence ; which though 
bred for the most part in the lees of the people, yet ani- 
mated by false doctrines, are perpetually meddling with 
the fundamental laws, to the molestation of the com- 
monwealth ; like the little worms, which physicians call 
ascarides. 

We may further add, the insatiable appetite, or (3ov\i/jua, 
of enlarging dominion ; with the incurable " wounds " 
thereby many times received from the enemy ; and the 
'Swens," of ununited conquests, which are many times a 
burthen, and with less danger lost, than kept ; as also the 
" lethargy " of ease, and " consumption " of riot and vain 
expense. 

Lastly, when in a war, foreign or intestine, the enemies 
get a final victory ; so as, the forces of the commonwealth 
keeping the field no longer, there is no further protection 
of subjects in their loyalty ; then is the commonwealth 
"dissolved," and every man at liberty to protect himself 
by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto 
him. For the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and 



THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN. 319 

motion to the commonwealth ; which expiring, the mem- 
bers are governed by it no more, than the carcase of a 
man, by his departed, though immortal soul. For though 
the right of a sovereign monarch cannot be extinguished 
by the act of another ; yet the obligation of the members 
may. For he that wants protection, may seek it anywhere ; 
and when he hath it, is obliged, without fraudulent pre- 
tence of having submitted himself out of fear, to protect 
his protection as long as he is able. But when the power 
of an assembly is once suppressed, the right of the same 
perisheth utterly ; because the assembly itself is extinct ; 
and consequently, there is no possibility for the sovereignty 
to re-enter. 

CHAPTER XXX. 

Of the Office of the Sovereign Representative. 

The office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an assem- 
bly, consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the 
sovereign power, namely the procuration of " the safety of 
the people " ; to which he is obliged by the law of nature, 
and to render an account thereof to God, the author of that 
law, and to none but him. But by safety here, is not meant 
a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, 
which every man by lawful industry, without danger, or 
hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself. 

And this is intended should be done, not by care applied 
to individuals, further than their protection from injuries, 
when they shall complain ; but by a general providence, con- 
tained in public instruction, both of doctrine, and example; 
and in the making and executing of good laws, to which 
individual persons may apply their own cases. 

And because, if the essential rights of sovereignty, speci- 
fied before in the eighteenth chapter, be taken away, the 
commonwealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth 



32 o OF COMMONWEALTH. 

into the condition, and calamity of a war with every other 
man, which is the greatest evil that can happen in this life ; 
it is the office of the sovereign, to maintain those rights 
entire; and consequently against his duty, first, to transfer 
to another, or to lay from himself any of them. For he that 
deserteth the means, deserteth the ends ; and he deserteth 
the means, that being the sovereign, acknowledgeth him- 
self subject to the civil laws ; and renounceth the power of 
supreme judicature; or of making war, or peace by his own 
authority ; or of judging of the necessities of the common- 
wealth ; or of levying money and soldiers, when, and as 
much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or 
of making officers, and ministers both of war and peace ; 
or of appointing teachers, and examining what doctrines 
are conformable, or contrary to the defence, peace, and good 
of the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the 
people be ignorant, or misinformed of the grounds, and 
reasons of those his essential rights ; because thereby men 
are easy to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the 
commonwealth shall require their use and exercise. 

And the grounds of these rights, have the rather need 
to be diligently, and truly taught ; because they cannot be 
maintained by any civil law, or terror of legal punishment. 
For a civil law, that shall forbid rebellion, (and such is all 
resistance to the essential rights of the sovereignty), is not, 
as a civil law, any obligation, but by virtue only of the law 
of nature, that forbiddeth the violation of faith ; which 
natural obligation, if men know not, they cannot know the 
right of any law the sovereign maketh. And for the pun- 
ishment, they take it but for an act of hostility ; which 
when they think they have strength enough, they will en- 
deavour by acts of hostility, to avoid. 

As I have heard some say, that justice is but a word, 
without substance; and that whatsoever a man can by force, 
or art, acquire to himself, not only in the condition of war, 






THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN. 321 

but also in a commonwealth, is his own, which I have already 
showed to be false: so there be also that maintain, that there 
are no grounds, nor principles of reason, to sustain those 
essential rights, which make sovereignty absolute. For if 
there were, they would have been found out in some place, 
or other ; whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any 
commonwealth, where those rights have been acknowledged, 
or challenged. Wherein they argue as ill, as if the savage 
people of America, should deny there were any grounds, or 
principles of reason, so to build a house, as to last as long 
as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well 
built. Time, and industry, produce every day new knowl- 
edge. And as the art of well building is derived from prin- 
ciples of reason, observed by industrious men, that had long 
studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of 
figure, and proportion, long after mankind began, though 
poorly, to build: so, long time after men have begun to con- 
stitute commonwealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into 
disorder, there may principles of reason be found out, by 
industrious meditation, to make their constitution, except- 
ing by external violence, everlasting. And such are those 
which I have in this discourse set forth: which whether they 
come not into the sight of those that have power to make 
use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth 
my particular interests, at this day, very little. But suppos- 
ing that these of mine are not such principles of reason ; yet 
I am sure they are principles from authority of Scripture; 
as I shall make it appear, when I shall come to speak of the 
kingdom of God, administered by Moses, over the Jews, his 
peculiar people by covenant. 

But they say again, that though the principles be right, 
yet common people are not of capacity enough to be made 
to understand them. I should be glad, that the rich and 
potent subjects of a kingdom, or those that are accounted 
the most learned, were no less incapable than they. But 



322 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine, 
proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as 
from the interest of them that are to learn. Potent men, 
digest hardly anything that setteth up a power to bridle 
their affections ; and learned men, anything that discov- 
ereth their errors, and thereby lesseneth their authority : 
whereas the common people's minds, unless they be tainted 
with dependence on the potent, or scribbled over with the 
opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive 
whatsoever by public authority shall be imprinted in them. 
Shall whole nations be brought to "acquiesce" in the great 
mysteries of the Christian religion, which are above reason, 
and millions of men be made believe, that the same body 
may be in innumerable places at one and the same time, 
which is against reason ; and shall not men be able, by their 
teaching, and preaching, protected by the law, to make that 
received, which is so consonant to reason, that any unpre- 
judicated man needs no more to learn it than to hear it ? 
I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people 
in the essential rights which are the natural and funda- 
mental laws of sovereignty, there is no difficulty, whilst a 
sovereign has his power entire, but what proceeds from his 
own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the 
administration of the commonwealth ; and consequently, 
it is his duty, to cause them so to be instructed ; and not 
only his duty, but his benefit also, and security against the 
danger that may arrive to himself in his natural person from 
rebellion. 

And, to descend to particulars, the people are to be taught, 
first, that they ought not to be in love with any form of gov- 
ernment they see in their neighbour nations, more than with 
their own, nor, whatsoever present prosperity they behold 
in nations that are otherwise governed than they, to desire 
change. For the prosperity of a people ruled by an aris- 
tocratical, or democratical assembly, cometh not from aris- 



THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN. 323 

tocracy, nor from democracy, but from the obedience, and 
concord of the subjects : nor do the people flourish in a 
monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but 
because they obey him. Take away in any kind of state, 
the obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, 
and they shall not only not nourish, but in short time be 
dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to do 
no more than reform the commonwealth, shall find they do 
thereby destroy it ; like the foolish daughters of Peleus, in 
the fable ; which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepid 
father, did by the counsel of Medea, cut him in pieces, and 
boil him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him 
a new man. This desire of change, is like the breach of 
the first of God's commandments: for there God says, Non 
habebis Deos alie7ios ; Thou shalt not have the gods of other 
nations; and in another place concerning "kings," that they 
are "gods." 

Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to 
be led with admiration of the virtue of any of their fellow- 
subjects, how high soever he stand, or how conspicuously 
soever he shine in the commonwealth ; nor of any assembly, 
except the sovereign assembly, so as to defer to them any 
obedience, or honour, appropriate to the sovereign only, 
whom, in their particular stations, they represent ; nor to 
receive any influence from them, but such as is conveyed 
by them from the sovereign authority. For that sovereign 
cannot be imagined to love his people as he ought, that is 
not jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of popu- 
lar men, to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have often 
been, not only secretly, but openly, so as to proclaim mar- 
riage with them in facie ecclesiae by preachers, and by pub- 
lishing the same in the open streets, which may fitly be 
compared to the violation of the second of the ten com- 
mandments. 

Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, 



324 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

how great a fault it is, to speak evil of the sovereign repre- 
sentative, whether one man, or an assembly of men ; or to 
argue and dispute his power-; or any way to use his name 
irreverently, whereby he may be brought into contempt with 
his people, and their obedience, in which the safety of the 
commonwealth consisteth, slackened. Which doctrine the 
third commandment by resemblance pointeth to. 

Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when 
it is taught, remember it, nor after one generation past, so 
much as know in whom the sovereign power is placed, with- 
out setting apart from their ordinary labour, some certain 
times, in which they may attend those that are appointed 
to instruct them ; it is necessary that some such times be 
determined, wherein they may assemble together, and, after 
prayers and praises given to God, the Sovereign of sover- 
eigns, hear those their duties told them, and the positive laws, 
such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and 
be put in mind of the authority that maketh them laws. To 
this end had the Jews every seventh day, a sabbath, in which 
the law was read and expounded ; and in the solemnity 
whereof they were put in mind, that their king was God ; 
that having created the world in six days, he rested the 
seventh day ; and by their resting on it from their labour, 
that that God was their king, which redeemed them from 
their servile, and painful labour in Egypt, and gave them a 
time, after they had rejoiced in God, to take joy also in 
themselves, by lawful recreation. So that the first table of 
the commandments, is spent all in setting down the sum of 
God's absolute power; not only as God, but as king by pact, 
in peculiar, of the Jews ; and may therefore give light, to 
those that have sovereign power conferred on them by the 
consent of men, to see what doctrine they ought to teach 
their subjects. 

And because the first instruction of children, dependeth 
on the care of their parents, it is necessary that they should 



THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN. 325 

be obedient to them, whilst they are under their tuition ; 
and not only so, but that also afterwards, as gratitude 
requireth, they acknowledge the benefit of their education, 
by external signs of honour. To which end they are to be 
taught, that originally the father of every man was also his 
sovereign lord, with power over him of life and death ; and 
that the fathers of families, when by instituting a common- 
wealth, they resigned that absolute power, yet it was never 
intended, they should lose the honour due unto them for 
their education. For to relinquish such right, was not 
necessary to the institution of sovereign power ; nor would 
there be any reason, why any man should desire to have 
children, or take the care to nourish and instruct them, if 
they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them, 
than from other men. And this accordeth with the fifth 
commandment. 

Again, every sovereign ought to cause justice to be taught, 
which, consisting in taking from no man what is his, is as 
much as to say, to cause men to be taught not to deprive 
their neighbours, by violence or fraud, of anything which 
by the sovereign authority is theirs. Of things held in 
propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life, 
and limbs ; and in the next degree, in most men, those that 
concern conjugal affection ; and after them, riches and 
means of living. Therefore the people are to be taught, to 
abstain from violence to one another's person, by private 
revenges ; from violation of conjugal honour ; and from 
forcible rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one another's 
goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be 
showed the evil consequences of false judgment, by cor- 
ruption either of judges or witnesses, whereby the distinc- 
tion of propriety is taken away, and justice becomes of no 
effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth, seventh, 
eighth, and ninth commandments. 

Lastly, they are to be taught, that not only the unjust 



326 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

facts, but the designs and intentions to do them, though by 
accident hindered, are injustice ; which consisteth in the 
pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of the act. 
And this is the intention of the tenth commandment, and 
the sum of the second table ; which is reduced all to this 
one commandment of mutual charity, " thou shalt love thy 
neighbour as thyself " : as the sum of the first table is 
reduced to "the love of God"; whom they had then newly 
received as their king. 

As for the means, and conduits, by which the people may 
receive this instruction, we are to search, by what means 
so many opinions, contrary to the peace of mankind, upon 
weak and false principles, have nevertheless been so deeply 
rooted in them. I mean those, which I have in the pre- 
cedent chapter specified : as that men shall judge of what 
is lawful and unlawful, not by the law itself, but by their 
own consciences ; that is to say, by their own private judg- 
ments : that subjects sin in obeying the commands of the 
commonwealth, unless they themselves have first judged 
them to be lawful : that their propriety in their riches is 
such, as to exclude the dominion, which the commonwealth 
hath over the same : that it is lawful for subjects to kill 
such, as they call tyrants : that the sovereign power may be 
divided, and the like ; which come to be instilled into the 
people by this means. They whom necessity, or covetous- 
ness keepeth attent on their trades, and labour ; and they, 
on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth carrieth after 
their sensual pleasures ; which two sorts of men take up the 
greatest part of mankind ; being diverted from the deep 
meditation, which the learning of truth, not only in the 
matter of natural justice, but also of all other sciences 
necessarily requireth, receive the notions of their duty, 
chiefly from divines in the pulpit, and partly from such of 
their neighbours or familiar acquaintance, as having the 
faculty of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser 



THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN. Z 2 1 

and better learned in cases of law and conscience, than 
themselves. And the divines, and such others as make 
show of learning, derive their knowledge from the univer- 
sities, and from the schools of law, or from the books, which 
by men, eminent in those schools and universities, have 
been published. It is therefore manifest, that the instruc- 
tion of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching 
of youth in the universities. But are not, may some man 
say, the universities of England learned enough already to 
do that ? or is it you will undertake to teach the univer- 
sities ? Hard questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to 
answer ; that till towards the latter end of Henry the 
Eighth, the power of the Pope, was always upheld against 
the power of the commonwealth, principally by the uni- 
versities ; and that the doctrines maintained by so many 
preachers, against the sovereign power of the king, and by 
so many lawyers, and others, that had their education there, 
is a sufficient argument, that though the universities were 
not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how 
to plant the true. For in such a contradiction of opin- 
ions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently 
instructed ; and it is no wonder, if they yet retain a relish 
of that subtle liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, 
against the civil authority. But to the latter question, it is 
not fit, nor needful for me to say either aye, or no : for any 
man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what 
I think. 

The safety of the people, requireth further, from him, or 
them that have the sovereign power, that justice be equally 
administered to all degrees of people ; that is, that as well 
the rich and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be 
righted of the injuries done them ; so as the great, may have 
no greater hope of impunity, when they do violence, dis- 
honour, or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of 
these, does the like to one of them : for in this consisteth 



328 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

equity ; to which, as being a precept of the law of nature, a 
sovereign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of his 
people. All breaches of the law, are offences against the 
commonwealth: but there be some, that are also against 
private persons. Those that concern the commonwealth 
only, may without breach of equity be pardoned ; for every 
man may pardon what is done against himself, according 
to his own discretion. But an offence against a private 
man, cannot in equity be pardoned, without the consent of 
him that is injured ; or reasonable satisfaction. 

The inequality of subjects, proceedeth from the acts of 
sovereign power ; and therefore has no more place in the 
presence of the sovereign, that is to say, in a court of justice, 
than the inequality between kings and their subjects, in the 
presence of the King of kings. The honour of great persons, 
is to be valued for their beneficence and the aids they give 
to men of inferior rank, or not at all. And the violences, 
oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but 
aggravated by the greatness of their persons ; because they 
have least need to commit them. The consequences of this 
partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner. Im- 
punity maketh insolence ; insolence, hatred ; and hatred, an 
endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious 
greatness, though with the ruin of the commonwealth. 

To equal justice, appertaineth also the equal imposition 
of taxes ; the equality whereof dependeth not on the equality 
of riches, but on the equality of the debt that every man 
oweth to the commonwealth for his defence. It is not 
enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life ; 
but also to fight, if need be, for the securing of his labour. 
They must either do as the Jews did after their return from 
captivity, in re-edifying the temple, build with one hand, 
and hold the sword in the other ; or else they must hire 
others to fight for them. For the impositions, that are laid 
on the people by the sovereign power, are nothing else but 



THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN. 329 

the wages, due to them that hold the public sword, to defend 
private men in the exercise of their several trades, and 
callings. Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth 
thereby, is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to 
poor and rich ; the debt which a poor man oweth them that 
defend his life, is the same which a rich man oweth for the 
defence of his ; saving that the rich, who have the service 
of the poor, may be debtors not only for their own persons 
but for many more. Which considered, the equality of 
imposition, consisteth rather in the equality of that which 
is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume 
the same. For what reason is there, that he which labour- 
eth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth 
little, should be more charged, than he that living idly, 
getteth little, and spendeth all he gets ; seeing the one hath 
no more protection from the commonwealth, than the other ? 
But when the impositions, are laid upon those things which 
men consume, every man payeth equally for what he useth : 
nor is the commonwealth defrauded by the luxurious waste 
of private men. 

And whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become 
unable to maintain themselves by their labour ; they ought 
not to be left to the charity of private persons ; but to be 
provided for, as far forth as the necessities of nature require, 
by the laws of the commonwealth. For as it is uncharita- 
bleness in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the 
sovereign of a commonwealth, to expose them to the hazard 
of such uncertain charity. 

But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: 
they are to be forced to work; and to avoid the excuse of 
not finding employment, there ought to be such laws, as may 
encourage all manner of arts ; as navigation, agriculture, 
fishing, and all manner of manufacture that requires labour. 
The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still increas- 
ing, they are to be transplanted into countries not sufficiently 



33° OF COMMONWEALTH. 

inhabited : where nevertheless, they are not to exterminate 
those they find there ; but constrain them to inhabit closer 
together, and not to range a great deal of ground, to snatch 
what they find ; but to court each little plot with art and 
labour, to give them their sustenance in due season. And 
when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants, then 
the last remedy of all is war ; which provideth for every 
man, by victory, or death. 

To the care of the sovereign, belongeth the making of 
good laws. But what is a good law ? By a good law, I 
mean not a just law : for no law can be unjust. The law is 
made by the sovereign power, and all that is done by such 
power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people ; 
and that which every man will have so, no man can say is 
unjust. It is in the laws of a commonwealth, as in the laws 
of gaming : whatsoever the gamesters all agree on, is injus- 
tice to none of them. A good law is that, which is 
"needful," for the "good of the people," and withal 
"perspicuous." 

For the use of laws, which are but rules authorized, is not 
to bind the people from all voluntary actions ; but to direct 
and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves 
by their own impetuous desires, rashness or indiscretion; as 
hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in 
their way. And therefore a law that is not needful, having 
not the true end of a law, is not good. A law may be con- 
ceived to be good, when it is for the benefit of the sovereign ; 
though it be not necessary for the people ; but it is not so. 
For the good of the sovereign and people, cannot be sepa- 
rated. It is a weak sovereign, that has weak subjects; and 
a weak people, whose sovereign wanteth power to rule them 
at his will. Unnecessary laws are not good laws ; but traps 
for money : which where the right of sovereign power is 
acknowledged, are superfluous ; and where it is not acknowl- 
edged, insufficient to defend the people. 



THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN. 331 

The perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of 
the law itself, as in a declaration of the causes, and motives 
for which it was made. That is it, that shows us the mean- 
ing of the legislator ; and the meaning of the legislator 
known, the law is more easily understood by few, than many 
words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity ; and there- 
fore multiplication of words in the body of the law, is 
multiplication of ambiguity : besides it seems to imply, by 
too much diligence, that whosoever can evade the words, 
is without the compass of the law. And this is a cause of 
many unnecessary processes. For when I consider how 
short were the laws of ancient times ; and how they grew by 
degrees still longer ; methinks I see a contention between 
the penners, and pleaders of the law ; the former seeking to 
circumscribe the latter ; and the latter to evade their cir- 
cumscriptions ; and that the pleaders have got the victory. 
It belongeth therefore to the office of a legislator, (such as 
is in all commonwealths the supreme representative, be it 
one man, or an assembly), to make the reason perspicuous, 
why the law was made ; and the body of the law itself, as 
short, but in as proper, and significant terms, as may be. 

It belongeth also to the office of the sovereign, to make 
% right application of punishments, and rewards. And see- 
ing the end of punishing is not revenge, and discharge of 
choler ; but correction, either of the offender, or of others 
by his example ; the severest punishments are to be inflicted 
for those crimes, that are of most danger to the public ; 
such as are those which proceed from malice to the govern- 
ment established ; those that spring from contempt of 
justice ; those that provoke indignation in the multitude ; 
and those, which unpunished, seem authorized, as when 
they are committed by sons, servants, or favourites of men 
in authority. For indignation carrieth men, not only against 
the actors, and authors of injustice ; but against all power 
that is likely to protect them ; as in the case of Tarquin ; 



33 2 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

when for the insolent act of one of his sons, he was driven 
out of Rome, and the monarchy itself dissolved. But crimes 
of infirmity ; such as are those which proceed from great 
provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance 
whether the fact be a great crime, or not, there is place 
many times for lenity, without prejudice to the common- 
wealth ; and lenity, when there is such place for it, is 
required by the law of nature. The punishment of the 
leaders and teachers in a commotion, not the poor seduced 
people, when they are punished, can profit the common- 
wealth by their example. To be severe to the people, is to 
punish that ignorance, which may in great part be imputed 
to the sovereign, whose fault it was, that they were no 
better instructed. 

In like manner it belongeth to the office, and duty of the 
sovereign, to apply his rewards always so, as there may 
arise from them benefit to the commonwealth ; wherein con- 
sisteth their use, and end; and is then done, when they that 
have well served the commonwealth, are with as little 
expense of the common treasure, as is possible, so well 
recompensed, as others thereby may be encouraged, both 
to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study 
the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better. To 
buy with money, or preferment, from a popular ambitious 
subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions 
in the minds of the people, has nothing of the nature of 
reward ; (which is ordained not for disservice, but for 
service past ;) nor a sign of gratitude, but of fear ; nor does 
it tend to the benefit, but to the damage of the public. It 
is a contention with ambition, like that of Hercules with 
the monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every 
one that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like 
manner, when the stubbornness of one popular man, is 
overcome with reward, there arise many more, by the 
example, that do the same mischief, in hope of like benefit ; 



THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN. 333 

and as all sorts of manufacture, so also malice encreaseth 
by being vendible. And though sometimes a civil war, may 
be deferred by such ways as that, yet the danger grows still 
the greater, and the public ruin more assured. It is there- 
fore against the duty of the sovereign, to whom the public 
safety is committed, to reward those that aspire to greatness 
by disturbing the peace of their country, and not rather to 
oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, 
than after a longer time with greater. 

Another business of the sovereign, is to choose good 
counsellors ; I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the 
government of the commonwealth. For this word counsel, 
consilium, corrupted from considium, is of a large significa- 
tion, and comprehendeth all assemblies of men that sit 
together, not only to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, 
but also to judge of facts past, and of law for the present. 
I take it here in the first sense only : and in this sense, 
there is no choice of counsel, neither in a democracy, nor 
aristocracy ; because the persons counselling are members 
of the person counselled. The choice of counsellors there- 
fore is proper to monarchy ; in which, the sovereign that 
endeavoureth not to make choice of those, that in every 
kind are the most able, dischargeth not his office as he 
ought to do. The most able counsellors, are they that have 
least hope of benefit by giving evil counsel, and most knowl- 
edge of those things that conduce to the peace, and defence 
of the commonwealth. It is a hard matter to know who 
expecteth benefit from public troubles ; but the signs that 
guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in 
their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men 
whose estates are no"t sufficient to discharge their accustomed 
expenses, and may easily be observed by any one whom it 
concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge 
of the public affairs, is yet harder; and they that know 
them, need them a great deal the less. For to know, who 



334 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

knows the rules almost of any art, is a great degree of the 
knowledge of the same art ; because no man can be assured 
of the truth of another's rules, but he that is first taught to 
understand them. But the best signs of knowledge of any- 
art, are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects 
of it. Good counsel comes not by lot, nor by inheritance ; 
and therefore there is no more reason to expect good advice 
from the rich or noble, in matter of state, than in delineating 
the dimensions of a fortress ; unless we shall think there 
needs no method in the study of the politics, as there does 
in the study of geometry, but only to be lookers-on ; which 
is not so. For the politics is the harder study of the two. 
Whereas in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a 
right of certain persons, to have place in the highest council 
of state by inheritance ; it is derived from the conquests of 
the ancient Germans; wherein many absolute lords joining 
together to conquer other nations, would not enter into the 
confederacy, without such privileges, as might be marks of 
difference in time following, between their posterity, and 
the posterity of their subjects ; which privileges being 
inconsistent with the sovereign power, by the favour of the 
sovereign, they may seem to keep ; but contending for them 
as their right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and 
have at last no further honour, than adhereth naturally to 
their abilities. 

And how able soever be the counsellors in any affair, the 
benefit of their counsel is greater, when they give every one 
his advice, and the reasons of it apart, than when they do 
it in an assembly, by way of orations ; and when they have 
premeditated, than when they speak on the sudden ; both 
because they have more time, to survey the consequences 
of action; and are less subject to be carried away to contra- 
diction, through envy, emulation, or other passions arising 
from the difference of opinion. 

The best counsel, in those things that concern not other 



THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN. 335 

nations, but only the ease and benefit the subjects may 
enjoy, by laws that look only inward, is to be taken from 
the general informations, and complaints of the people of 
each province, who are best acquainted with their own 
wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in 
derogation of the essential rights of sovereignty, to be dili- 
gently taken notice of. For without those essential rights, 
as I have often before said, the commonwealth cannot at 
all subsist. 

A commander of an army in chief, if he be not popular, 
shall not be beloved nor feared as he ought to be by his 
army, and consequently, cannot perform that office with 
good success. He must therefore be industrious, valiant, 
affable, liberal and fortunate, that he may gain an opinion 
both of sufficiency, and of loving his soldiers. This is 
popularity, and breeds in the soldiers both desire, and 
courage, to recommend themselves to his favour ; and 
protects the severity of the general in punishing, when 
need is, the mutinous, or negligent soldiers. But this love 
of soldiers, if caution be not given of the commander's 
fidelity, is a dangerous thing to sovereign power ; especially 
when it is in the hands of an assembly not popular. It 
belongeth therefore to the safety of the people, both that 
they be good conductors, and faithful subjects, to whom 
the sovereign commits his armies. 

But when the sovereign himself is popular ; that is, 
reverenced and beloved of his people, there is no danger 
at all from the popularity of a subject. For soldiers are 
never so generally unjust, as to side with their captain 
though they love him, against their sovereign, when they 
love not only his person, but also his cause. And there- 
fore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed 
the power of their lawful sovereign, before they could settle 
themselves in his place, have been always put to the 
trouble of contriving their titles, to save the people from 



33 6 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

the shame of receiving them. To have a known right to 
sovereign power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it 
needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his 
subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to 
govern his own family : nor, on the part of his enemies, 
but a disbanding of their armies. For the greatest and 
most active part of mankind, has never hitherto been well 
contented with the present. 

Concerning the offices of one sovereign to another, which 
are comprehended in that law, which is commonly called 
the "law of nations," I need not say anything in this 
place ; because the law of nations, and the law of nature, 
is the same thing. And every sovereign hath the same 
right, in procuring the safety of his people, that any 
particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his 
own body. And the same law, that dictateth to men that 
have no civil government, what they ought to do, and what 
to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the same to 
commonwealths, that is, to the consciences of sovereign 
princes and sovereign assemblies ; there being no court of 
natural justice, but in the conscience only; where not man, 
but God reigneth ; whose laws, such of them as oblige all 
mankind, in respect of God, as he is the author of nature, 
are "natural"; and in respect of the same God, as he is 
King of kings, are "laws." But of the kingdom of God, 
as King of kings, and as King also of a peculiar people, I 
shall speak in the rest of this discourse. 



CHAPTER XXXI. 

Of the Kingdom of God by Nature. 

That the condition of mere nature, that is to say, 
of absolute liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are 
sovereigns, nor subjects, is anarchy, and the condition of 






THE KINGDOM OF GOD. 337 

war : that the precepts, by which men are guided to avoid 
that condition, are the laws of nature : that a common- 
wealth, without sovereign power, is but a word without 
substance, and cannot stand : that subjects owe to sover- 
eigns, simple obedience, in all things wherein their obedi- 
ence is not repugnant to the laws of God, I have sufficiently 
proved, in that which I have already written. There wants 
only, for the entire knowledge of civil duty, to know what 
are those laws of God. For without that, a man knows 
not, when he is commanded anything by the civil power, 
whether it be contrary to the law of God, or not : and so, 
either by too much civil obedience, offends the Divine 
Majesty ; or through fear of offending God, transgresses the 
commandments of the commonwealth. To avoid both 
these rocks, it is necessary to know what are the laws 
divine. And seeing the knowledge of all law, dependeth 
on the knowledge of the sovereign power, I shall say 
something in that which followeth, of the " Kingdom of 
God." 

"God is king, let the earth rejoice," saith the Psalmist 
(xcvii. i). And again, (Psalm xcix. i) "God is king, 
though the nations be angry ; and he that sitteth on the 
cherubims, though the earth be moved." Whether men 
will or not, they must be subject always to the divine 
power. By denying the existence, or providence of God, 
men may shake off their ease, but not their yoke. But to 
call this power of God, which extendeth itself not only to 
man, but also to beasts, and plants, and bodies inanimate, 
by the name of kingdom, is but a metaphorical use of the 
word. For he only is properly said to reign, that governs 
his subjects by his word, and by promise of rewards to 
those that obey it, and by threatening them with punish- 
ment that obey it not. Subjects therefore in the kingdom 
of God, are not bodies inanimate, nor creatures irrational ; 
because they understand no precepts as his : nor atheists, 



3 $8 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

nor they that believe not that God has any care of the 
actions of mankind; because they acknowledge no word for 
his, nor have hope of his rewards or fear of his threaten- 
ings. They therefore that believe there is a God that 
governeth the world, and hath given precepts, and pro- 
pounded rewards, and punishments to mankind, are God's 
subjects ; all the rest, are to be understood as enemies. 

To rule by words, requires that such words be manifestly 
made known ; for else they are no laws : for to the nature 
of laws belongeth a sufficient, and clear promulgation, such 
as may take away the excuse of ignorance ; which in the 
laws of men is but of one only kind, and that is, proclama- 
tion, or promulgation by the voice of man. But God 
declareth his laws three ways ; by the dictates of " natural 
reason," by "revelation," and by the "voice" of some 
"man," to whom by the operation of miracles, he pro- 
cureth credit with the rest. From hence there ariseth a 
triple word of God, "rational," "sensible," and "pro- 
phetic": to which correspondeth a triple hearing ; "right 
reason," "sense supernatural," and "faith." As for sense 
supernatural, which consisteth in revelation or inspiration, 
there have not been any universal laws so given, because 
God speaketh not in that manner but to particular persons, 
and to divers men divers things. 

From the difference between the other two kinds of 
God's word, "rational," and "prophetic," there may be 
attributed to God, a twofold kingdom, " natural," and 
"prophetic": natural, wherein he governeth as many of 
mankind as acknowledge his providence, by the natural 
dictates of right reason ; and prophetic, wherein having 
chosen out one peculiar nation, the Jews, for his subjects, 
he governed them, and none but them, not only by natural 
reason, but by positive laws, which he gave them by the 
mouths of his holy prophets. Of the natural kingdom of 
God I intend to speak in this chapter. 



THE KINGDOM OF GOD. 339 

The right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, 
and punisheth those that break his laws, is to be derived, 
not from his creating them, as if he required obedience as 
of gratitude for his benefits ; but from his " irresistible 
power." I have formerly shown, how the sovereign right 
ariseth from pact : to show how the same right may arise 
from nature, requires no more, but to show in what case it 
is. never taken away. Seeing all men by nature had right 
to all things, they had right every one to reign over all the 
rest. But because this right could not be obtained by 
force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that 
right, to set up men, with sovereign authority, by common 
consent, to rule and defend them : whereas if there had 
been any man of power irresistible, there had been no rea- 
son, why he should not by that power have ruled and 
defended both himself, and them, according to his own 
discretion. To those therefore whose power is irresistible, 
the dominion of all men adhereth naturally by their excel- 
lence of power ; and consequently it is from that power, 
that the kingdom over men, and the right of afflicting men 
at his pleasure, belongeth naturally to God Almighty ; not 
as Creator, and gracious ; but as omnipotent. And though 
punishment be due for sin only, because by that word is 
understood affliction for sin ; yet the right of afflicting, is 
not always derived from men's sin, but from God's 
power. 

This question, " why evil men often prosper, and good 
men suffer adversity," has been much disputed by the 
ancient, and is the same with this of ours, "by what right 
God dispenseth the prosperities and adversities of this 
life" ; and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, 
not only of the vulgar, but of philosophers, and which is 
more, of the Saints, concerning the Divine Providence. 
"How good," saith David, (Psalm lxxiii. i, 2, 3) "is the 
God of Israel to those that are upright in heart ; and yet 



34° OF COMMONWEALTH. 

my feet were almost gone, my treadings had well-nigh slipt; 
for I was grieved at the wicked, when I saw the ungodly in 
such prosperity." And Job, how earnestly does he expos- 
tulate with God, for the many afflictions he suffered, not- 
withstanding his righteousness ? This question in the case 
of Job, is decided by God himself, not by arguments derived 
from Job's sin, but his own power. For whereas the friends 
of Job drew their arguments from his affliction to his sin, 
and he defended himself by the conscience of his innocence, 
God himself taketh up the matter, and having justified the 
affliction by arguments drawn from his power, such as this, 
(Job xxxviii. 4) "Where wast thou, when I laid the founda- 
tions of the earth ? " and the like, both approved Job's 
innocence, and reproved the erroneous doctrine of his 
friends. Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of 
our Saviour, concerning the man that was born blind, in 
these words, " Neither hath this man sinned, nor his 
fathers ; but that the works of God might be made mani- 
fest in him." And though it be said, "that death entered 
into the world by sin," (by which is meant, that if Adam 
had never sinned, he had never died, that is, never suffered 
any separation of his soul from his body,) it follows not 
thence, that God could not justly have afflicted him, though 
he had not sinned, as well as he afflicteth other living crea- 
tures, that cannot sin. 

Having spoken of the right of God's sovereignty, as 
grounded only on nature ; we are to consider next, what 
are the Divine laws, or dictates of natural reason ; which 
laws concern either the natural duties of one man to 
another, or the honour naturally due to our Divine Sov- 
ereign. The first are the same laws of nature, of which I 
have spoken already in the fourteenth and fifteenth chap- 
ters of this treatise ; namely, equity, justice, mercy, humil- 
ity, and the rest of the moral virtues. It remaineth there- 
fore that we consider, what precepts are dictated to men, 



THE KINGDOM OF GOD. 341 

by their natural reason only, without other word of God, 
touching the honour and worship of the Divine Majesty. 

Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of 
the power, and goodness of another ; and therefore to hon- 
our God, is to think as highly of his power and goodness, 
as is possible. And of that opinion, the external signs 
appearing in the words and actions of men, are called 
" worship " ; which is one part of that which the Latins 
understand by the word cultus. For cultus signifieth prop- 
erly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestows on 
anything, with a purpose to make benefit by it. Now those 
things whereof we make benefit, are either subject to us, 
and the profit they yield, followeth the labour we bestow 
upon them, as a natural effect ; or they are not subject to 
us, but answer our labour, according to their own wills. In 
the first sense the labour bestowed on the earth, is called 
" culture " ; and the education of children, a " culture " of 
their minds. In the second sense, where men's wills are to 
be wrought to our purpose, not by force, but by complais- 
ance, it signifieth as much as courting, that rs, a winning 
of favour by good offices ; as by praises, by acknowledging 
their power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from 
whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly "wor- 
ship " : in which sense Publicola, is understood for a wor- 
shipper of the people ; and cultus Dei, for the worship of 
God. 

From internal honour, consisting in the opinion of power 
and goodness, arise three passions; "love," which hath 
reference to goodness ; and " hope," and " fear," that relate 
to power : and three parts of external worship ; "praise," 
" magnifying," and " blessing " : the subject of praise, being 
goodness ; the subject of magnifying and blessing, being 
power, and the effect thereof felicity. Praise, and magni- 
fying are signified both by words, and actions : by words, 
when we say a man is good, or great : by actions, when we 



34 2 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

thank him for his bounty, and obey his power. The opinion 
of the happiness of another, can only be expressed by words. 

There be some signs of honour, both in attributes and 
actions, that be naturally so ; as amongst attributes, 
"good," "just," "liberal," and the like; and amongst 
actions, "prayers," "thanks," and "obedience." Others 
are so by institution, or custom of men ; and in some times 
and places are honourable ; in others, dishonourable ; in 
others, indifferent : such as are the gestures in salutation, 
prayer, and thanksgiving, in different times and places, 
differently used. The former is "natural"; the latter 
" arbitrary " worship. 

And of arbitrary worship, there be two differences : for 
sometimes it is a "commanded, " sometimes "voluntary" 
worship : commanded, when it is such as he requireth who 
is worshipped ; free, when it is such as the worshipper 
thinks fit. When it is commanded, not the words, or ges- 
ture, but the obedience is the worship. But when free, the 
worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to 
them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, 
seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely, they are no 
worship, because no signs of honour ; and no signs of hon- 
our, because a sign is not a sign to him that giveth it, but 
to him to whom it is made, that is, to the spectator. 

Again, there is a "public," and a "private" worship. 
Public, is the worship that a commonwealth performeth, as 
one person. Private, is that which a private person ex- 
hibiteth. Public, in respect of the whole commonwealth, 
is free ; but in respect of particular men, it is not so. Pri- 
vate, is in secret free ; but in the sight of the multitude, it 
is never without some restraint, either from the laws, or 
from the opinion of men ; which is contrary to the nature 
of liberty. 

The end of worship amongst men, is power. For where 
a man seeth another worshipped, he supposeth him power 



THE KINGDOM OF GOD. 343 

ful, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his power 
greater. But God has no ends : the worship we do him, 
proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to our 
capacity, by those rules of honour, that reason dictateth to 
be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of 
benefit, for fear of damage, or in thankfulness for good 
already received from them. 

That we may know what worship of God is taught us by 
the light of nature, I will begin with his attributes. Where, 
first, it is manifest, we ought to attribute to him "existence." 
For no man can have the will to honour that, which he 
thinks not to have any being. 

Secondly, that those philosophers, who said the world, or 
the soul of the world was God, spake unworthily of him ; 
and denied his existence. For by God, is understood the 
cause of the world ; and to say the world is God, is to say 
there is no cause of it, that is, no God. 

Thirdly, to say the world was not created, but eternal, 
seeing that which is eternal has no cause, is to deny there 
is a God. 

Fourthly, that they who attributing, as they think, ease 
to God, take from him the care of mankind; take from him 
his honour : for it takes away men's love, and fear of him ; 
which is the root of honour. 

Fifthly, in those things that signify greatness, and power; 
to say he is "finite," is not to honour him; for it is not a 
sign of the will to honour God, to attribute to him less than 
we can; and finite, is less than we can; because to finite, it 
is easy to add more. 

Therefore to attribute "figure" to him is not honour; for 
all figure is finite : 

Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an "idea " 
of him, in our mind : for whatsoever we conceive is finite : 

Nor to attribute to him "parts," or "totality"; which 
are the attributes only of things finite : 



344 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

Nor to say he is in this, or that "place" ; for whatsoever 
is in place, is bounded, and finite : 

Nor that he is "moved," or " resteth " : for both these 
attributes ascribe to him place : 

Nor that there be more gods than one; because it implies 
them all finite: for there cannot be more than one infinite: 

Nor to ascribe to him, (unless metaphorically, meaning 
not the passion but the effect,) passions that partake of 
grief; as "repentance," "anger," " mercy ": or of want; as 
"appetite," "hope," "desire"; or of any passive faculty: 
for passion, is power limited by somewhat else. 

And therefore when we ascribe to God a "will," it is not 
to be understood, as that of man, for a "rational appetite"; 
but as the power, by which he effecteth everything. 

Likewise when we attribute to him "sight," and other 
acts of sense; as also "knowledge," and "understanding"; 
which in us is nothing else, but a tumult of the mind, raised 
by external things that press the organical parts of man's 
body; for there is no such thing in God; and being things 
that depend on natural causes, cannot be attributed to 
him. 

He that will attribute to God, nothing but what is war- 
ranted by natural reason, must either use such negative 
attributes, as "infinite," "eternal," "incomprehensible"; 
or superlatives, as "most high," "most great," and the like; 
or indefinite, as "good," "just," "holy," "creator"; and in 
such sense, as if he meant not to declare what he is, (for 
that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our 
fancy,) but how much we admire him, and how ready we 
would be to obey him ; which is a sign of humility, and of 
a will to honour him as much as we can. For there is but 
one name to signify our conception of his nature, and that 
is, " I am " : and but one name of his relation to us, and 
that is, " God " ; in which is contained Father, King, and 
Lord. 



THE KINGDOM OF GOD. 345 

Concerning the actions of divine worship, it is a most 
general precept of reason, that they be signs of the intention 
to honour God; such as are, first, "prayers." For not the 
carvers, when they made images, were thought to make 
them gods ; but the people that " prayed " to them. 

Secondly, "thanksgiving"; which differeth from prayer 
in divine worship, no otherwise, than that prayers precede, 
and thanks succeed the benefit ; the end, both of the one 
and the other, being to acknowledge God, for author of all 
benefits, as well past as future. 

Thirdly, "gifts," that is to say, "sacrifices" and "obla- 
tions," if they be of the best, are signs of honour: for they 
are thanksgivings. 

Fourthly, "not to swear by any but God," is naturally a 
sign of honour: for it is a confession that God only knoweth 
the heart; and that no man's wit or strength can protect a 
man against God's vengeance on the perjured. 

Fifthly, it is a part of rational worship, to speak consid- 
erately of God ; for it argues a fear of him, and fear is a 
confession of his power. Hence followeth, that the name 
of God is not to be used rashly, and to no purpose ; for that 
is as much as in vain : and it is to no purpose, unless it be 
by way of oath, and by order of the commonwealth, to make 
judgments certain ; or between commonwealths, to avoid 
war. And that disputing of God's nature is contrary to his 
honour: for it is supposed, that in this natural kingdom of 
God, there is no other way to know anything, but by natural 
reason, that is, from the principles of natural science ; which 
are so far from teaching us anything of God's nature, as 
they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the 
smallest creature living. And therefore, when men out of 
the principles of natural reason, dispute of the attributes of 
God, they but dishonour him : for in the attributes which 
we give to God, we are not to consider the signification of 
philosophical truth; but the signification of pious intention, 



346 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

to do him the greatest honour we are able. From the want 
of which consideration, have proceeded the volumes of 
disputation about the nature of God, that tend not to his 
honour, but to the honour of our own wits and learning; 
and are nothing else but inconsiderate and vain abuses of 
his sacred name. 

Sixthly, in "prayers," "thanksgivings," "offerings," and 
"sacrifices," it is a dictate of natural reason, that they be 
every one in his kind the best, and most significant of 
honour. As for example, that prayers and thanksgiving, 
be made in words and phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor 
plebeian ; but beautiful, and well composed. For else we do 
not God as much honour as we can. And therefore the 
heathens did absurdly, to worship images for gods : but 
their doing it in verse, and with music, both of voice and 
instruments, was reasonable. Also that the beasts they 
offered in sacrifice, and the gifts they offered, and their 
actions in worshipping, were full of submission, and com- 
memorative of benefits received, was according to reason, 
as proceeding from an intention to honour him. 

Seventhly, reason directeth not only to worship God in 
secret; but also, and especially, in public, and in the sight 
of men. For without that, that which in honour is most 
acceptable, the procuring others to honour him, is lost. 

Lastly, obedience to his laws, that is, in this case to the 
laws of nature, is the greatest worship of all. For as 
obedience is more acceptable to God than sacrifice; so also 
to set light by his commandments, is the greatest of all 
contumelies. And these are the laws of that divine worship, 
which natural reason dictateth to private men. 

But seeing a commonwealth is but one person, it ought 
also to exhibit to God but one worship; which then it doth, 
when it commandeth it to be exhibited by private men, 
publicly. And this is public worship ; the property whereof, 
is to be " uniform " : for those actions that are done differ- 



THE KINGDOM OF GOD. 347 

ently, by different men, cannot be said to be a public 
worship. And therefore, where many sorts of worship be 
allowed, proceeding from the different religions of private 
men, it cannot be said there is any public worship, nor that 
the commonwealth is of any religion at all. 

And because words, and consequently the attributes of 
God, have their signification by agreement and constitution 
of men, those attributes are to be held significative of 
honour, that men intend shall so be ; and whatsoever may 
be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no 
law but reason, may be done by the will of the common- 
wealth, by laws civil. And because a commonwealth hath 
no will, nor makes no laws, but those that are made by the 
will of him, or them that have the sovereign power ; it 
followeth that those attributes which the sovereign ordain- 
eth, in the worship of God, for signs of honour, ought to be 
taken and used for such, by private men in their public 
worship. 

But because not all actions are signs by constitution, but 
some are naturally signs of honour, others of contumely ; 
these latter, which are those that men are ashamed to do in 
the sight of them they reverence, cannot be made by human 
power a part of divine worship ; nor the former, such as are 
decent, modest, humble behaviour, ever be separated from 
it. But whereas there be an infinite number of actions and 
gestures of an indifferent nature ; such of them as the com- 
monwealth shall ordain to be publicly and universally in 
use, as signs of honour, and part of God's worship, are to 
be taken and used for such by the subjects. And that which 
is said in the Scripture, " It is better to obey God than 
man," hath place in the kingdom of God by pact, and not 
by nature. 

Having thus briefly spoken of the natural kingdom of 
God, and his natural laws, I will add only to this chapter 
a short declaration of his natural punishments. There is 



34 8 OF COMMONWEALTH. 

no action of man in this life, that is not the beginning of 
so long a chain of consequences, as no human providence 
is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And 
in this chain, there are linked together both pleasing and 
unpleasing events ; in such manner, as he that will do any- 
thing for his pleasure, must engage himself to suffer all the 
pains annexed to it; and these pains, are the natural punish- 
ments of those actions, which are the beginning of more 
harm than good. And hereby it comes to pass, that intem- 
perance is naturally punished with diseases ; rashness, with 
mischances; injustice, with the violence of enemies; pride, 
with ruin; cowardice, with oppression: negligent govern- 
ment of princes, with rebellion ; and rebellion, with slaughter. 
For seeing punishments are consequent to the breach of 
laws ; natural punishments must be naturally consequent to 
the breach of the laws of nature ; and therefore follow them 
as their natural, not arbitrary effects. 

And thus far concerning the constitution, nature, and 
right of sovereigns, and concerning the duty of subjects, 
derived from the principles of natural reason. And now, 
considering how different this doctrine is, from the practice 
of the greatest part of the world, especially of these western 
parts, that have received their moral learning from Rome 
and Athens ; and how much depth of moral philosophy is 
required, in them that have the administration of the 
sovereign power; I am at the point of believing this my 
labour, as useless as the commonwealth of Plato. For he 
also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of 
state, and change of governments by civil war, ever to be 
taken away, till sovereigns be philosophers. But when I 
consider again, that the science of natural justice, is the 
only science necessary for sovereigns and their principal 
ministers ; and that they need not be charged with the 
sciences mathematical, as by Plato they are, farther than 
by good laws to encourage men to the study of them ; and 



THE KINGDOM OF GOD. 349 

that neither Plato, nor any other philosopher hitherto, hath 
put into order, and sufficiently or probably proved all the 
theorems of moral doctrine, that men may learn thereby, 
both how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hope, 
that one time or other, this writing of mine may fall into 
the hands of a sovereign, who will consider it himself (for 
it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any 
interested, or envious interpreter ; and by the exercise of 
entire sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, 
convert this truth of speculation, into the utility of 
practice. 



35 1 



DE CORPORE POLITICO 
SELECTIONS. 



PART II. 



CHAPTER VI. 

A Difficulty concerning Absolute Subjection to Man, arising from 
our Absolute Subjectio?i to God Almighty, Propounded ; etc. 

i. Having showed, that in all commonwealths whatso- 
ever, the necessity of peace and government requireth, that 
there be existent some power, either in one man, or in 
one assembly of men, by the name of the power sovereign, 
which it is not lawful for any member of the same common- 
wealth to disobey; there occurreth now a difficulty, which, 
if it be not removed, maketh it unlawful for a man to put 
himself under the command of such absolute sovereignty as 
is required thereto. And the difficulty is this ; we have 
amongst us the Word of God for. the rule of our actions : 
now if we shall subject ourselves to men also, obliging our- 
selves to do' such actions as shall be by them commanded, 
when the commands of God and man shall differ, we are to 
obey God, rather than man ; and consequently, the cove- 
nant of general obedience to man is unlawful. 

2. This difficulty hath not been of very great antiquity 
in the world. There was no such "dilemma " amongst the 
Jews ; for their civil law, and divine law, was one and 
the same law of Moses ; the interpreters whereof were the 
priests, whose power was subordinate to the power of the 
king ; as was the power of Aaron, to the power of Moses. 
Nor is it a controversy that was ever taken notice of 



354 DE COR PORE POLITICO. 

amongst the Grecians, Romans, or other Gentiles : for 
amongst these their several civil laws were the rules whereby 
not only righteousness and virtue, but also religion, and 
the external worship of God, was ordered and approved ; 
that being esteemed the true worship of God, which was 
Kara ra vd/xi/xa, according to the laws civil. Also those 
Christians that dwell under the temporal dominion of the 
bishop of Rome, are free from this question ; for that they 
allow unto him, their sovereign, to interpret the Scriptures, 
which are the law of God, as he in his own judgment shall 
think right. This difficulty therefore remaineth amongst, 
and troubleth those Christians only, to whom it is allowed, 
to take for the sense of the Scripture, that which they 
make thereof, either by their own private interpretation, or 
by the interpretation of such as are not called thereunto by 
public authority ; they that follow their own interpretation 
continually, demanding liberty of conscience ; and those 
that follow the interpretation of others not ordained there- 
unto by the sovereign of the commonwealth, requiring a 
power in matters of religion either above the power civil, 
or at least not depending on it. 

3. To take away this scruple of conscience, concerning 
obedience to human laws, amongst those that interpret to 
themselves the word of God in the Holy Scriptures, I pro- 
pound to their consideration, first, that no human law is 
intended to oblige the conscience of a man, unless it break 
out into action, either of the tongue, or other part of the 
body. The law made thereupon would be of none effect, 
because no man is able to discern, but by word or other 
action whether such law be kept or broken. Nor did the 
apostles themselves pretend dominion over men's con- 
sciences, concerning the faith they preached, but only per- 
suasion and instruction. And therefore St. Paul saith (2 
Cor. i. 24), writing to the Corinthians, concerning their 
controversies, that he and the rest of the apostles had 



CONCERNING SUBJECTION TO MAN AND GOD. 355 
no dominion over their faith, but were helpers of their 

j°y- 

4. And for the actions of men which proceed from their 
consciences, the regulating of which actions is the only 
means of peace, if they might not stand with justice, it 
were impossible that justice towards God, and peace 
amongst men, should stand together in that religion that 
teacheth us, that "justice and peace shall kiss each other," 
and in which we have so many precepts of absolute obe- 
dience to human authority ; as Matth. xxiii. 2, 3, we have 
this precept : " The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' 
seat ; all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that 
observe and do." And yet were the Scribes and Pharisees 
not priests, but men of temporal authority. Again Luke 
xi. 17: " Every kingdom divided against itself shall be 
desolate " ; and is not that kingdom divided against itself, 
where the actions of every one shall be ruled by his private 
opinion, or conscience, and yet those actions such as give 
occasion of offence and breach of peace ? Again Rom. 
xiii. 5 : " Wherefore you must be subject, not because of 
wrath only, but also for conscience sake." Titus iii. 1 : 
" Put them in remembrance, that they may be subject to 
principalities and powers." 1 Peter ii. 13, 14: "Submit 
yourselves unto all manner of ordinance of man, for the 
Lord's sake, whether it be unto the king, as unto the 
superior, or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by 
him for the punishment of evil doers." Jude, verse 8 : 
" These dreamers also that defile the flesh, and despise 
government, and speak evil of them that are in authority." 
And forasmuch as all subjects in commonwealths are in 
the nature of children and servants, that which is a com- 
mand to them, is a command to all subjects. But to these 
St. Paul saith (Colos. iii. 20, 22): "Children, obey your 
parents in all things ; servants, be obedient to your masters 
according to the flesh in all things." And verse 23 : "Do 



35 6 DE COR PORE POLITICO. 

it heartily as to the Lord." These places considered, it 
seemeth strange to me, that any man in a Christian com- 
monwealth, should have any occasion to deny his obedience 
to public authority, upon this ground, that " it is better to 
obey God than man." For though St. Peter and the apos- 
tles did so answer the council of the Jews, that forbad them 
to preach Christ, there appeareth no reason that Christians 
should allege the same against their Christian governors, 
that command them to preach Christ. To reconcile this 
seeming contradiction of simple obedience to God, and 
simple obedience to man, we are to consider a Christian 
subject, as under a Christian sovereign, or under an infidel. 

5. And under a Christian sovereign we are to consider, 
what actions we are forbidden by God Almighty to obey 
them in, and what not. The actions we are forbidden to 
obey them in, are such only, as imply a denial of that faith 
which is necessary to our salvation : for otherwise there 
can be no pretence of disobedience ; for why should a man 
incur the danger of a temporal death, by displeasing of 
his superior, if it were not fear of eternal death hereafter ? 
It must therefore be enquired, what those propositions and 
articles be, the belief whereof our Saviour or his apostles 
have declared to be such, as without believing them, a man 
cannot be saved ; and then all other points, that are 
now controverted, and made distinction of sects, Papists, 
Lutherans, Calvinists, Arminians, &c. (as in old time, the 
like made Paulists, Apollonians, and Cephasians), must 
needs be such, as a man needeth not for the holding 
thereof, deny obedience to his superiors. And for the 
points of faith necessary to salvation, I shall call them 
"fundamental," and every other point a "superstruction." 

6. And without all controversy, there is not any more 
necessary point to be believed for man's salvation than 
this, that "Jesus is the Messiah," that is, "the Christ"; 
which proposition is explicated in sundry sorts, but still 



CONCERNING SUBJECTION TO MAN AND GOD. 357 

the same in effect ; as, that " he is God's anointed " ; for 
that is signified by the word Christ : that " he was the true 
and lawful king of Israel, the Son of David, the Saviour of 
the world, the redeemer of Israel, the salvation of God, he 
that should come into the world, the son of God," and, 
which I .desire by the way to have noted, against the now 
sect of Arians, "the begotten Son of God," Acts iii. 13; 
Heb. v. 5: "The only begotten Son of God," John i. 14, 
18; John iii. 16, 18; 1 John, iv. 9: "That he was God," 
John i. 1 ; John xx. 28 : " That the fulness of the Godhead 
dwelt in him bodily," Coloss. ii. 9: Moreover, "the Holy 
One, the Holy One of God, the forgiver of sins, that he is 
risen from the dead." These are explications, and parts of 
that general article, that "Jesus is the Christ." This 
point therefore, and all the explications thereof are funda- 
mental : as also all such as be evidently inferred from 
thence; as, BELIEF IN GOD THE FATHER: John 
xii. 44 : " He that believeth in me, believeth not in me, but 
in him that sent me"; 1 John ii. 23: "He that denieth 
the Son, hath not the Father": BELIEF IN GOD THE 
HOLY GHOST, of whom Christ saith, John xiv. 26 : 
" But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the 
Father will send in my name": and John xv. 26: "But 
when the Comforter shall come, whom I will send unto 
you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth " : BELIEF 
OF THE SCRIPTURES, by which we believe those 
points and of the immortality of the soul, without which 
we cannot believe he is a Saviour. 

7. And as these are the fundamental points of faith 
necessary to salvation; so also are they only necessary as 
matter of faith, and only essential to the calling of a 
Christian; as may appear by many evident places of Holy 
Scripture : John v. 39 : " Search the Scriptures, for in them 
ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which 
testify of me." Now, forasmuch as by the "Scripture," is 



35 8 DE COR PORE POLITICO. 

meant there the Old Testament (the New being then not 
written), the belief of that which was written concerning 
our Saviour in the Old Testament, was sufficient belief for 
the obtaining of eternal life : but in the Old Testament, 
there is nothing revealed concerning Christ, but that he is 
the Messiah, and such things as belong to the fundamental 
points thereupon depending. And therefore those "funda- 
mental" points are sufficient to salvation as of faith. And 
John vi. 28, 29 : "Then said they unto him, What shall we 
do, that we might work the works of God ? Jesus answered 
and said unto them, This is the work of God, that ye 
believe in him, whom he hath sent." So that the point to 
be believed is, " That Jesus Christ came forth from God, 
and he which believeth it, worketh the works of God." 
John xi. 26, 27: "Whosoever liveth and believeth in me, 
shall never die. Believest thou this ? She said unto him, 
Yea, Lord, I believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of 
God, which should come into the world." Hence followeth, 
"He that believeth this, shall never die." John xx. 31: 
" But these things are written, that ye might believe, that 
Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God ; and that believing, 
ye might have life through his name." By which appeareth, 
that this " fundamental " point is all that is required, as 
of faith to our salvation. 1 John iv. 2 : " Every spirit 
that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is 
of God : 1 John v. 1 : " Whosoever believeth that Jesus 
is the Christ, is born of God"; and (verse 5) "Who is 
he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth, that 
Jesus is the Son of God": and verse 13: "These things 
have I written unto you that believe in the name of the 
Son of God, that ye may know that ye have eternal life." 
Acts, viii. 36, 37 : "The eunuch said, Here is water, what 
doth hinder me to be baptized ? And Philip said unto 
him, If thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest. 
He answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son 



CONCERNING SUBJECTION TO MAN AND GOD. 359 

of God." This point therefore was sufficient for the recep- 
tion of man into baptism, that is to say, to Christianity. 
And Acts, xvi. 29-31 : " The keeper of the prison fell down 
before Paul and Silas, and said, Sirs, what shall I do to be 
saved? And they said, Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ." 
And the sermon of St. Peter, upon the day of Pentecost, 
was nothing else but an explication, that "Jesus was the 
Christ." And when they had heard him, they asked him, 
What shall we do? He said unto them, (Acts, ii. 38): 
" Amend your lives, and be baptized every one of you in the 
name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins." Rom. x. 9 : 
" If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and 
shalt believe in thy heart, that God raised him up from the 
dead, thou shalt be saved." To these places may be added, 
that wheresoever our Saviour Christ doth approve the faith 
of any man, the proposition believed, if the same be to be 
collected out of the text, is always some of these funda- 
mental points before mentioned, or something equivalent : 
as the faith of the centurion (Matth. viii. 8): "Speak the 
word only, and my servant shall be healed " ; believing he 
was omnipotent : the faith of the woman, which had an 
issue of blood (Matth. ix. 2 1 ): " If I may but touch the hem 
of his garment " ; implying, he was the Messiah : the faith 
required of the blind men, (Matth. ix. 28): "Believe you 
that I am able to do this ?" The faith of the Canaanitish 
woman, (Matth. xv. 22), that he was the "Son of David," 
implying the same. And so it is in every one of those 
places, none excepted, where our Saviour commendeth any 
man's faith, which because they are too many to insert 
here, I omit, and refer them to his inquisition that is not 
otherwise satisfied. And as there is no other faith required, 
so there was no other preaching : for the prophets of the 
Old Testament preached no other ; and John the Baptist 
preached only the approach of the kingdom of heaven, that 
is to say, of the kingdom of Christ. The same was the 



360 DE CORPORE POLITICO. 

commission of the apostles (Matth. x-7): "Go preach, 
saying, The kingdom of heaven is at hand." And Paul 
preaching amongst the Jews, (Acts, xviii. 5), did but testify 
unto the Jews, that "Jesus was the Christ." And the 
heathens took notice of Christians no otherwise, but by 
this name, that they believed "Jesus to be a king," crying 
out, (Acts, xvii. 6, 7) : " These are they that have subverted 
the state of the world, and here they are, whom Jason hath 
received. And these all do against the decrees of Caesar, 
saying, that there is another king, one Jesus." And this 
was the sum of their predictions, the sum of the confessions 
of them that believed, as well men as devils. This was the 
title of his cross, "Jesus of Nazareth, king of the Jews"; 
this the occasion of the crown of thorns, sceptre of reed, 
and a man to carry his cross ; this was the subject of the 
" Hosannas" ; and this was the title, by which our Saviour, 
commanding to take another man's goods, bade them say, 
" The Lord hath need " ; and by this title he purged the 
temple of the profane market kept there. Nor did the 
apostles themselves believe any more than that " Jesus was 
the Messiah," nor understand so much ; for they under- 
stood the Messiah to be no more than a temporal king, till 
after our Saviour's resurrection. Furthermore, this point, 
that "Christ is the Messiah," is particularly set forth for 
"fundamental" by that word, or some other equivalent 
thereunto in divers places. Upon the confession of Peter 
(Matth. xvi. 16): "Thou art the Christ, the son of the 
living God," our Saviour (verse 18) saith, "Upon this 
rock will I build my church." This point therefore is the 
whole foundation of Christ's church. St. Paul saith, (Rom. 
xv. 20): "I so enforced myself to preach the Gospel, not 
where Christ was named, lest I should have built upon 
another man's foundation." St. Paul, (1 Cor. iii. 10) when 
he had reprehended the Corinthians for their sects, and 
curious doctrines and questions, he distinguisheth between 



CONCERNING SUBJECTION TO MAN AND GOD. 361 

"fundamental" points, and " superstruction " ; and saith : 
" I have laid the foundation, and another buildeth there- 
upon ; but let every man take heed how he buildeth upon it. 
For other foundation can no man lay than that which is 
laid, which is Jesus Christ." Coloss. ii. 6, 7: "As you 
have received Christ Jesus the Lord, so walk in him, rooted 
and builded in him, and stablished in the faith." 

8. Having showed this proposition, " Jesus is the Christ," 
to be the only fundamental and necessary point of faith, 
I shall set down a few places more, to show, that other 
points, though they may be true, are not so necessary to be 
believed, as that a man may not be saved, though he 
believe them not. And first, if a man could not be saved 
without assent of the heart to the truth of all controversies, 
which are now in agitation concerning religion, I cannot 
see, how any man living can be saved ; so full of subtilty, 
and curious knowledge it is to be so great a divine. Why 
therefore should a man think that our Saviour, who (Matth. 
xi. 30), saith, that his "yoke is easy," should require a 
matter of that difficulty ? Or how are little children said 
to believe, (Matth. xviii. 6); or how could the good thief 
be thought sufficiently catechised upon the cross ? or St. 
Paul so perfect a Christian presently upon his conversion ? 
And though there may be more obedience required in him 
that hath the fundamental points explicated unto him, than 
in him that hath received the same but implicitly ; yet there 
is no more faith required for salvation in one man, than 
another. For if it be true, that " Whosoever shall confess 
with his mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in his heart, 
that God raised him from the dead, shall be saved " ; as 
it is, Rom. x. 9, and that " Whosoever believeth that Jesus 
is the Christ, is born of God"; the belief of that point 
is sufficient for the salvation of any man whosoever he 
be, forasmuch as concerneth faith. And seeing he that 
believeth not that "Jesus is the Christ," whatsoever he 



362 DE CORPORE POLITICO. 

believe else, cannot be saved ; it followeth, that there is no 
more required of the salvation of one man, than another, 
in matter of faith. 

9. About these points fundamental, there is little contro- 
versy amongst Christians, though otherwise of different 
sects among themselves. And therefore the controversies 
of religion, are altogether about points unnecessary to salva- 
tion ; whereof some are doctrines raised by human ratio- 
cination, from the points "fundamental." As for example ; 
such doctrines as concern the manner of the real presence, 
wherein are mingled tenets of faith concerning the omnipo- 
tency and divinity of Christ, with the tenets of Aristotle 
and the Peripatetics concerning substance and accidents, 
species, hypostasis, and the subsistence and migration of 
accidents from place to place ; words some of them without 
meaning, and nothing but the canting of Grecian sophisters. 
And these doctrines are condemned expressly, Col. ii. 8, 
where after St. Paul had exhorted them to " be rooted and 
builded in Christ," he giveth them this further caveat : 
" Beware lest there be any man that spoil you through 
philosophy and vain deceits, through the traditions of men, 
according to the rudiments of the world." And such are 
such doctrines, as are raised out of such places of the 
Scriptures, as concern not the foundation, by men's natural 
reason ; as about the concatenation of causes, and the 
manner of God's predestination ; which are also mingled 
with philosophy : as if it were possible for men that know 
not in what manner God seeth, heareth, or speaketh, to 
know nevertheless the manner how he intendeth, and 
predestinateth. A man therefore ought not to examine by 
reason any point, or draw any consequence out of Scripture 
by reason, concerning the nature of God Almighty, of 
which reason is not capable. And therefore St. Paul, (Rom. 
xii. 3) giveth a good rule, "That no man presume to under- 
stand above that which is meet to understand, but that he 



CONCERNING SUBJECTION TO MAN AND GOD. 363 

understand according to sobriety"; which they do not, 
who presume out of Scripture, by their own interpretation, 
to raise any doctrine to the understanding, concerning 
those things which are incomprehensible. And this whole 
controversy concerning the predestination of God, and the 
free-will of man, is not peculiar to Christian men. For we 
have huge volumes of this subject, under the name of " fate " 
and "contingency,' 7 disputed between the Epicureans and 
the Stoics, and consequently it is not matter of faith, but 
of philosophy : and so are also all the questions concerning 
any other point, but the foundation before named ; and 
God receiveth a man, which part of the question soever he 
holdeth. It was a controversy in St. Paul's time, whether a 
Christian Gentile might eat freely of any thing which the 
Christian Jews did not ; and the Jew condemned the 
Gentile that he did eat, to whom St. Paul saith, (Rom. 
xiv. 3): "Let not him that eateth not, judge him that 
eateth ; for God hath received him." And verse 6, in the 
question concerning the observing of holy days, wherein the 
Gentiles and Jews differed, he saith unto them, " He that 
observeth the day, observeth it to the Lord ; and he that 
observeth not the day, observeth it not to the Lord." And 
they who strive concerning such questions, and divide them- 
selves into sects, are not therefore to be accounted zealous 
of the faith, their strife being but carnal, which is confirmed 
by St. Paul (1 Cor. iii. 4) : " When one saith, I am of Paul, 
and another, I am of Appollos, are ye not carnal ? " For 
they are not questions of faith, but of wit, wherein, carnally, 
men are inclined to seek the mastery one of another. For 
nothing is truly a point of faith, but that "Jesus is the 
Christ"; as St. Paul testifieth, (1 Cor. ii. 2): "For I 
esteemed not the knowledge of anything amongst you, save 
Jesus Christ, and him crucified." And 1 Tim. vi. 20, 21 : 
"O Timotheus, keep that which is committed unto thee, 
and avoid profane and vain babblings, and opposition of 



364 DE COR PORE POLITICO. 

science falsely so called, which while some profess,- they 
have erred concerning the faith." 2 Tim. ii. 16: "Shun 
profane and vain babblings," etc. Verse 17, 18: "Of 
which sort is Hymenaeus and Philetus, which as concerning 
the truth, have erred, saying, that the resurrection is past 
already." Whereby St. Paul showed, that the raising of 
questions by human ratiocination, though it be from the 
fundamental points themselves, is not only not necessary, 
but most dangerous to the faith of a Christian. Out of all 
these places, I draw only this conclusion in general, that 
neither the points now in controversy amongst Christians 
of different sects, or in any point that ever shall be in 
controversy, excepting only those that are contained in this 
article, " Jesus is the Christ," are necessary to salvation, 
as of faith ; though in matter of obedience, a man may be 
bound not to oppose the same. 

10. Although to the obtaining of salvation, there be 
required no more, as hath been already declared, out of the 
Holy Scriptures, as matter of faith, but the belief of those 
fundamental articles before set forth ; nevertheless, there 
are required other things, as matter of obedience. For, 
as it is not enough in temporal kingdoms, to avoid the 
punishment which kings may inflict, to acknowledge the 
right and title of the king, without obedience also to his 
laws : so also it is not enough, to acknowledge our Saviour 
Christ to be the king of heaven, in which consisteth 
Christian faith, unless also we endeavour to obey his laws, 
which are the laws of the kingdom of heaven, in which con- 
sisteth Christian obedience. And forasmuch as the laws 
of the kingdom of heaven, are the laws of nature, as hath 
been showed, Part I. chapter v., not only faith, but also 
the observation of the law of nature, (which is that for 
which a man is called just or righteous, in that sense, in 
which justice is taken not for the absence of guilt, but for 
the endeavour and constant will to do that which is just) 



CONCERNING SUBJECTION TO MAN AND GOD. 365 

not only faith, but this justice, which also from the effect 
thereof, is called repentance, and sometimes works, is 
necessary to salvation. So that faith and justice do both 
concur thereto ; and in the several acceptation of this word 
(justification) are properly said both of them to justify ; 
and the want of either of them is properly said to condemn. 
For not only he that resisteth a king upon doubt of his 
title, but also he that doth it upon the inordinateness of 
his passions, deserveth punishment. And when faith and 
works are separated, not only the faith is called dead with- 
out works, but also works are called dead works without 
faith. And therefore St. James, (chapter ii. 17), saith, 
" Even so the faith, if it have no works, is dead in itself "; 
and verse 26 : " For as the body without the spirit is dead, 
even so faith without works is dead." And St. Paul, (Heb. 
vi. 1), calleth works without faith, "dead works," where he 
saith, " Not laying again the foundation of repentance from 
dead works." And by these dead works, is understood not 
the obedience and justice of the inward man, but the 
"opus operatum," or external action, proceeding from fear 
of punishment, or from vain-glory, and desire to be honoured 
of men : and these may be separated from faith, and con- 
duce no way to a man's justification. And for that cause, 
St. Paul, (Rom. iv.) excludeth the righteousness of the 
law, from having part in the justification of a sinner. For 
by the law of Moses, which is applied to men's actions, 
and requireth the absence of guilt, all men living are liable 
to damnation ; and therefore no man is justified by works, 
but by faith only. But if works be taken for the endeavour 
to do them, that is, if the will be taken for the deed, or internal 
for external righteousness, then do works contribute to 
salvation. And then taketh place that of St. James, (chap, 
ii. 24) : "Ye see then, how that of works a man is justified, 
and not of faith only." And both of these are joined to 
salvation, as in St. Mark i. 15 : "Repent and believe the 



366 DE COR PORE POLITICO. 

gospel." And Luke xviii. 18-22, when a certain ruler 
asked our Saviour, what he ought to do to inherit eternal 
life, he propounded to him the keeping of the command- 
ments ; which when the ruler said he had kept, he pro- 
pounded to him the faith, "Sell all that thou hast, and 
follow me." And John iii. 36: "He that believeth in the 
Son, hath everlasting life." And "He that obeyeth not 
the Son, shall not see life." Where he manifestly joineth 
obedience and faith together. And Rom. i. 17 : "The just 
shall live by faith"; not every one, but the "just." For 
also "the devils believe and tremble." But though both 
faith and justice (meaning still by justice, not absence of 
guilt, but the good intentions of the mind, which is called, 
righteousness by God, that taketh the will for the deed) be 
both of them said to justify, yet are their parts in the act 
of justification to be distinguished. For justice is said to 
justify, not because it absolveth, but because it denominates 
him just, and setteth him in an estate, or capacity of 
salvation, whensoever he shall have faith. But faith is 
said to justify, that is, to absolve, -because by it a just man 
is absolved of, and forgiven his unjust actions. And thus 
are reconciled the places of St. Paul and St. James, that 
" Faith only justifieth," and " a man is not justified by faith 
only " ; and showed how faith and repentance must concur 
to salvation. 

11. These things considered, it will easily appear, that 
under the sovereign power of a Christian commonwealth, 
there is no danger of damnation from simple obedience to 
human laws ; for in that the sovereign alloweth Christianity, 
no man is compelled to renounce that faith, which is enough 
for his salvation, that is to say, the fundamental points. 
And for other points, seeing they are not necessary to 
salvation, if we conform our actions to the laws, we do not 
only what we are allowed, but also what we are commanded 
by the law of nature, which is the moral law taught by our 



CONCERNING SUBJECTION TO MAN AND GOD. 367 

Saviour himself. And it is part of that obedience which 
must concur to our salvation. 

12. And though it be true, whatsoever a man doth 
against his conscience, is sin ; yet the obedience in these 
cases, is neither sin, nor against the conscience. For the 
conscience being nothing else but a man's settled judgment 
and opinion, when he hath once transferred his right of 
judging to another, that which shall be commanded, is no 
less his judgment, than the judgment of that other. So 
that in obedience to laws, a man doth still according to 
his own conscience, but not his private conscience. And 
whatsoever is done contrary to private conscience, is then 
a sin, when the laws have left him to his own liberty, and 
never else. And then whatsoever a man doth, not only 
believing it is ill done, but doubting whether it be ill or 
not, is done ill, in case he may lawfully omit the doing. 

13. And as it hath been proved, that a man must submit 
his opinions in matter of controversy to the authority of 
the commonwealth ; so also is the same confessed by the 
practice of every one of them that otherwise deny it. For 
who is there differing in opinion from another, and thinking 
himself to be in the right, and the other in the wrong, that 
would not think it reasonable, if he be of the same opinion 
that the whole state alloweth, that the other should submit 
his opinion also thereunto ; or that would not be content, if 
not that one or a few men, yet all the divines of a whole 
nation, or at least an assembly of all those he liketh, should 
have the power to determine all the controversies of 
religion ? or, who is there that would not be content, to 
submit his opinions, either to the pope, or to a general 
council, or to a provincial council, or to a presbytery of 
his own nation ? And yet in all these cases he submitteth 
himself to no greater than human authority. Nor can a 
man be said to submit himself to Holy Scripture, that doth 
not submit himself to some or other for the interpretation 



3^8 BE COR PORE POLITICO. 

thereof. Or, why should there be any church government 
at all instituted, if the Scripture itself could do the office 
of a judge in controversies of faith ? But the truth is 
apparent, by continual experience, that men seek not only 
liberty of conscience, but of their actions ; nor that only, 
but a further liberty of persuading others to their opinions ; 
nor that only, for every man desireth, that the sovereign 
authority should admit no other opinions to be maintained, 
but such as he himself holdeth. 

14. The difficulty therefore of obeying both God and 
man in a Christian commonwealth is none : all the difficulty 
resteth in this point, whether he that hath received the 
faith of Christ, having before subjected himself to the 
authority of an infidel, be discharged of his obedience 
thereby, or not, in matters of religion. In which case it 
seemeth reasonable to think, that since all covenants of 
obedience are entered into for the preservation of a man's 
life, if a man be content without resistance to lay down his 
life, rather than obey the commands of an infidel, in so 
hard a case he hath sufficiently discharged himself thereof. 
For no covenant bindeth further than to endeavour ; and if 
a man cannot assure himself to perform a just duty, when 
thereby he is assured of present death, much less can it be 
expected that a man should perform that, for which he 
believeth in his heart he shall be damned eternally. And 
thus much concerning the scruple of conscience, that may 
arise concerning obedience to human laws, in them that 
interpret the law of God to themselves. It remaineth, to 
remove the same scruple from them, that submit their con- 
troversies to others not ordained thereunto by the sovereign 
authority. And this I refer to the chapter following. 



MAGISTRATES IN THE KINGDOM OF CHRIST. 369 



CHAPTER VII. 

lhe Question Propounded, Who are the Magistrates in the 
Kingdom of Christ; etc. 

1. In the former chapter have been removed those diffi- 
culties opposing our obedience to human authority, which 
arise from misunderstanding of our Saviour's title and 
laws : in the former whereof, namely, his title, consisteth 
our faith ; and in the latter, our justice. Now they who 
differ not amongst themselves concerning his title and 
laws, may nevertheless have different opinions concerning 
his magistrates, and the authority he hath given them. 
And this is the cause, why many Christians have denied 
obedience to their princes, pretending that our Saviour 
Christ hath not given this magistracy to them, but to 
others. As for example : some say, to the pope universally ; 
some, to a synod aristocratical ; some, to a synod democrat- 
ical in every several commonwealth ; and the magistrates 
of Christ being they by whom he speaketh, the question is, 
whether he speak unto us by the pope, or by convocations 
of bishops and ministers, or by them that have the sovereign 
power in every commonwealth. 

2. This controversy was the cause of those two mutinies, 
that happened against Moses in the wilderness. The first 
by Aaron and his sister Miriam, who took upon them to 
censure Moses, for marrying an Ethiopian woman. And 
the state of the question between them and Moses, they set 
forth (Numb. xii. 2) in these words: "What hath the Lord 
spoken but only by Moses ? hath he not spoken also by 
us ? And the Lord heard this," etc., and punished the same 
in Miriam, forgiving Aaron upon his repentance. And this 
is the case of all them that set up the priesthood against 



37° DE COR PORE POLITICO. 

the sovereignty. The other was of Corah, Dathan, and 
Abiram, who with two hundred and fifty captains gathered 
themselves together against Moses, and against Aaron. 
The state of their controversy was this, whether God were 
not with the multitude, as well as with Moses, and every 
man as holy as he. For (Numb. xvi. 3) thus they say, 
" You take too much upon you, seeing all the congregation 
is holy ; every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them : 
wherefore then lift ye yourselves above the congregation of 
the Lord ? " And this is the case of them that set up their 
private consciences, and unite themselves to take the gov- 
ernment of religion out of the hands of him or them, that 
have the sovereign power of the commonwealth : which how 
well it pleaseth God, may appear by the hideous punishment 
of Corah and his accomplices. 

3. In the government therefore of Moses there was no 
power, neither civil, nor spiritual, that was not derived from 
him. Nor in the state of Israel under kings, was there any 
earthly power, by which those kings were compellable to 
anything, or any subject allowed to resist them in any case 
whatsoever. For though the prophets by extraordinary 
calling, did often admonish and threaten them, yet they 
had no authority over them. And therefore amongst the 
Jews, the power spiritual and temporal, was always in the 
same hand. 

4. Our Saviour Christ, as he was the rightful king of 
the Jews in particular, as well as king of the kingdom of 
Heaven, in the ordaining of magistrates, received that form 
of policy which was used by Moses. According to the 
number of the children of Jacob, Moses took unto him by 
the appointment of God (Numb. i. 4) twelve men, every 
one of the chief of their tribe, which were to assist him in 
the muster of Israel. And these twelve, verse 44, are called 
the " princes of Israel, twelve men, every one for the house 
of their fathers"; which are said also (Numb. vii. 2), "to 



MAGISTRATES IN THE KINGDOM OE CHRIST 371 

be heads over the houses of their fathers, and princes of the 
tribes, and over them that were numbered." And these 
were every one equal amongst themselves. In like manner 
our Saviour took unto him twelve apostles, to be next unto 
him in authority, of whom he saith (Matth. xix. 28), "When 
the Son of Man shall sit in the throne of his majesty, ye 
which follow me in the regeneration, shall sit also upon 
twelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel." 
And concerning the equality of the twelve apostles amongst 
themselves, our Saviour saith (Matth. xx. 25), "Ye know 
that the Lords of the Gentiles have domination over them," 
&c. Verse 26: "But it shall not be so amongst you; but 
whosoever will be^ greatest among you, let him be your 
servant." And Matth. xxiii. 11: "He that is greatest 
among you, let him be your servant." And a little before, 
verse 8, " Be not called Rabbi ; for one is your doctor, 
Christ, and all ye are brethren." And Acts i. in choosing 
of Matthias to be an apostle, though St. Peter used the 
part of a "prolocutor," yet did no man take upon him the 
authority of election, but referred the same to lot. 

5. Again, Moses had the command of God, Numb. xi. 
16: "Gather to me seventy men of the elders of Israel, 
whom thou knowest that they are the elders of the people, 
and governors over them, and bring them unto the taber- 
nacle," &c. And Moses, verse 24, did accordingly. And 
these were chosen to help Moses in bearing the burthen of 
the government, as appeareth, verse 17 of the same chap- 
ter. And as the twelve princes of the tribes were accord- 
ing to the number of Jacob's children ; so were the seventy 
elders according to the number of the persons that went 
down with Jacob into Egypt. In like manner our Saviour 
in his kingdom of Heaven, the church, out of the whole 
number of those that believed in him, ordained seventy 
persons, which peculiarly were called the seventy disciples, 
to whom he gave power to preach the Gospel and baptize. 



37 2 DE CORPORE POLITICO. 

6. In our Saviour's time therefore, the hierarchy of the 
church consisted, besides himself that was the head, of 
twelve apostles, who were equal amongst themselves, but 
ordained over others, as were the twelve heads of the 
tribes, and seventy disciples, who had every one of them 
power to baptize and teach, and help to govern the whole 
flock. 

7. And whereas in the commonwealth instituted by 
Moses, there was not only a high-priest for the present, 
but also a succession and order of priests ; it may be 
demanded, why our Saviour Christ did not ordain the like ? 
To which may be answered, that the high-priesthood, for- 
asmuch as concerneth the authority thereof, was in the 
person of Christ, as he was Christ, that is king. So also 
was it in Moses, Aaron having the ministerial part only. 
For notwithstanding that Aaron was the high-priest, yet 
the consecration of him belonged (Exod. xxix. 1) to Moses. 
All the utensils of sacrifice, and other holy things, were 
ordered by Moses ; and in sum, the whole Levitical law 
was delivered by God by the hand of Moses, who was to 
Aaron a God, and Aaron to him a mouth. And for the 
ministerial part, there could no high-priest be ordained but 
himself ; for seeing our Saviour was himself the sacrifice, 
who but himself could offer him up ? And for the celebra- 
tion of that sacrifice for ever after, our Saviour annexed 
the priesthood to those whom he had appointed to govern 
the church. 

8. After the ascension of our Saviour, the apostles dis- 
persed themselves for the spreading of the Gospel, and 
continually as they converted any number of men, in any 
city or region, to the faith, they chose out such as they 
thought fittest, to direct them in matter of conversation 
and life, according to Christ's law, and to explicate unto 
them, that mystery of Christ come in the flesh, that is to 
say, to unfold unto them at large the office of the Messiah. 



MAGISTRATES IN THE KINGDOM OF CHRIST. 373 

And of those elders, some were subordinate to others, 
according as the apostles, who ordained them, thought 
meet. So St. Paul gave power unto Titus, to ordain elders 
in Crete, and to redress things that were amiss. So that 
Titus was both an elder, and ordained elders (Tit. i. 5) : 
" For this cause I left thee in Crete, that thou shouldest 
continue to redress the things that remain, and ordain 
elders in every city " ; where the word is Ka/rao-T^o-?;?, that 
is constitute ; whereby it appeareth, that in the apostles' 
times, one elder had authority over another, to ordain and 
rule them. For 1 Tim. v. 19, Timothy an elder, is made 
judge of accusations against other elders. And Acts xiv. 
23, the disciples are said to ordain elders, for all the con- 
gregations of the cities they had preached in. And though 
the word there be x €i P orov W avTfi s, yet it signifieth not elec- 
tion by holding up of hands, but simple and absolutely 
ordination. For the ordinary choosing of magistrates 
amongst the Grecians, which were all either popularly 
governed, or else by "oligarchy," being performed by 
holding up of hands, made that word be taken simply, for 
an election or ordination, howsoever made. And thus in 
the primitive church, the hierarchy of the church, was 
apostles, elders that governed other elders, and elders that 
ruled not,, but their office was to preach, to administer the 
sacraments, to offer up prayers and thanksgiving in the 
name of the people. But at that time there appeared no 
distinction between the names of bishop and elder. But 
immediately after the apostles' time, the word bishop was 
taken to signify such an elder as had the government of 
elders, and other elders were called by the name of priests, 
which signifieth the same that elder doth. And thus the 
government of bishops hath a divine pattern in the twelve 
rulers, and seventy elders of Israel, in the twelve apostles 
and seventy disciples of our Saviour, in the ruling elders, 
and not ruling elders, in the time of the apostles. 



374 DE COR PORE POLITICO. 

9. And thus much of the magistrates over Christ's flock 
in the primitive church. For the office of a minister, or 
ministress, was to be subject to the flock, and to serve them 
in those things which appertain to their temporal business. 
The next thing to be considered is the authority which our 
Saviour gave them, either over those whom they had con- 
verted, or those whom they were about to convert. And 
for these latter, which as yet, were without the church, the 
authority which our Saviour gave to his apostles was no 
more but this, to preach unto them that Jesus was the 
Christ, and to explicate the same in all points, that concern 
the kingdom of heaven, and to persuade men to embrace 
our Saviour's doctrine, but by no means to compel any man 
to be subject to them : for seeing the laws of the kingdom 
of heaven, as hath been showed, Part I, ch. v., sect. 10, are 
dictated to the conscience only, which is not subject to 
compulsion and constraint, it was not congruent to the 
style of the King of Heaven to constrain men to submit 
their actions to him, but to advise them only ; nor for him 
that professeth the sum of his law to be love, to extort any 
duty from us with fear of temporal punishment. And 
therefore as the mighty men in the world, that hold others 
in subjection by force, are called in Scripture by the name 
of hunters ; so our Saviour calleth those whom he appointed 
to draw the world unto him, by subduing their affections, 
"fishers." And therefore he saith to Peter and Andrew, 
(Matt. iv. 19) : "Follow me, and I will make ye fishers of 
men." And Luke x. 3: "Behold," saith Christ, "I send 
ye forth as lambs amongst wolves." And it were to no 
end to give them the right of compelling, without strength- 
ening the same with greater power than of "lambs" 
amongst "wolves." Moreover, Matth. x., where our Saviour 
giveth a commission to his apostles, to go forth and con- 
vert the nations to the faith, he giveth them no authority 
of "coercion" and punishment, but only saith, (verse 14, 



MAGISTRATES IN THE KINGDOM OF CHRIST 375 

15) "Whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your 
words, when ye depart out of that house, or that city, 
shake off the dust of your feet. It shall be easier for the 
land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment, than 
for that city." Whereby it is manifest, that all that the 
apostles could do by their authority, was no more than to 
renounce communion with them, and leave their punish- 
ment to God Almighty, in the day of judgment. Likewise 
the comparisons of the kingdom of heaven to the seed, 
Matth. xiii. 3, and to the leaven, Matth. xiii. t>Z-> doth inti- 
mate unto us that the increase thereof ought to proceed 
from internal operation of God's word preached, and not 
from any law or compulsion of them that preach it. More- 
over our Saviour himself saith (John xviii. 36), "That" 
his "kingdom is not of this world " ; and consequently his 
magistrates derive not from him any authority of punishing 
men in this world. And therefore also, Matth. xxvi. 52, 
after St. Peter had drawn his sword in his defence, our 
Saviour saith " Put up thy sword into his place. For all 
that take the sword, shall perish by the sword." And, 
verse 54, " How then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, which 
say, that it must be so ? " showing out of the Scriptures, 
that the kingdom of Christ was not to be defended by the 
sword. 

10. But concerning the authority of the apostles or 
bishops over those who were already converted and within 
the church, there be that think it greater than over them 
without. For some have said, (Bellarmin. " Lib. de Rom. 
Pont. cap. 29,") "Though the law of Christ deprive no 
prince of his dominion, and Paul did rightly appeal unto 
Caesar, whilst kings were infidels and out of the church ; 
yet when they became Christians, and of their own accord 
underwent the laws of the gospel, presently as sheep to a 
shepherd, and as members to the head, they became subject 
to the prelate of the ecclesiastical hierarchy." Which, 



37 6 DE CORP ORE POLITICO. 

whether it be true or not, is to be considered by that light 
which we have from the Holy Scripture, concerning the 
power of our Saviour and his apostles, over such as they 
had converted. But our Saviour, as he imitated the com- 
monwealth of the Jews in his magistrates, the twelve and 
the seventy ; so did he also in the censure of the church, 
which was " excommunication "; but amongst the Jews, the 
church did put the excommunicated persons from the con- 
gregation, which they might do by their power temporal ; 
but our Saviour and his apostles, who took upon them no 
such power, could not forbid the excommunicated person to 
enter into any place and congregation, into which he was 
permitted to enter, by the prince, or sovereign of the place. 
For that had been to deprive the sovereign of his authority. 
And therefore the excommunication of a person subject to 
an earthly power, was but a declaration of the church, 
which did excommunicate, that the person so excommuni- 
cated was to be reputed still as an infidel, but not to be 
driven by their authority, out of any company, he might 
otherwise lawfully come into. And this is it our Saviour 
saith (Matth. xviii. 17): "If he refuse to hear the church, 
let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican." 
So that the whole effect of excommunicating a Christian 
prince, is no more than he or they that so excommunicate 
him depart and banish themselves out of his dominion. 
Nor can they thereupon discharge any of his subjects of 
their obedience to him ; for that were to deprive him of his 
dominion ; which they may not do, for being out of the 
church. It is confessed by them that make this objection, 
and proved in the former section, that our Saviour gave no 
authority to his apostles to be judges over them. And 
therefore in no case can the sovereign power of a common- 
wealth be subject to any authority ecclesiastical, besides 
that of Christ himself. And though he be informed con- 
cerning the kingdom of heaven, and subject himself thereto 



MAGISTRATES IN THE KINGDOM OE CHRIST. $11 

at the persuasions of persons ecclesiastical, yet is he not 
thereby subject to their government and rule. For if it 
were by their authority he took that yoke upon him, and 
not by their persuasion, then by the same authority he 
might cast it off. But this is unlawful. For if all the 
churches in the world should renounce the Christian faith, 
yet is not this sufficient authority for any of the members 
to do the same. It is manifest therefore, that they who 
have the sovereign power, are immediate rulers of the 
church under Christ, and all other but subordinate to them. 
If that were not, but kings should command one thing upon 
pain of death, and priests another, upon pain of damnation, 
it would be impossible that peace and religion should stand 
together. 

ii. And therefore there is no just cause for any man to 
withdraw his obedience from the sovereign state, upon 
pretence that Christ hath ordained any state ecclesiastical 
above it. And though kings take not upon them the 
ministerial priesthood, yet are they not so merely laic, as 
not to have sacerdotal jurisdiction. To conclude this 
chapter, since God speaketh not in these days to any man 
by his private interpretation of the Scriptures, nor by the 
interpretation of any power above, or not depending on 
the sovereign power of every commonwealth, it remaineth, 
that he speaketh by his vice-gods, or lieutenants here on 
earth, that is to say, by sovereign kings, or such as have 
sovereign authority as well as they. 



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